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Summary
In the introduction, the importance of the subject and 
the reasons for investigating it further are given. I have 
also mentioned the various Greek sources which have been 
used. The first chapter contains evidence from Homer and 
Hesiod which indicates that will-making in a very- 
rudimentary oral form was not unknown in seventh-century 
Greece. In the second chapter, I have looked at Solon7 s 
law of testament, introduced in 594/3, which permitted a 
man to adopt someone by will. The third chapter consists 
of a discussion of the evidence from Sophocles, Euripides 
and Aristophanes concerning testaments, which suggests 
that in the fifth century, Athenians were often writing 
their wills as opposed to just making oral dispositions of 
property, and that these documents had various functions. 
Chapter 4 looks at the changes made to Solon7 s law by the 
Thirty Tyrants in 404/3. In Chapter 5, the legal 
competence to make a will is considered, particularly with 
reference to the clauses of exception in Solon7 s law, 
although this question is also examined with reference to 
a person7 s citizenship status. The longest chapter is the
sixth one, which treatis of the purpose of the testament. 
The evidence discussed here indicates that the Athenian 
will had a much wider scope than has often been thought. 
Chapter 7 concerns the formalities involved in witnessing 
a will, the means of ensuring that a testament was kept 
safe and vitiating the document. I have also discussed 
whether or not a will had to be written.
It seems as if there were no strict legal rules about 
these things, but that they were left to the testator7 s 
discretion. The final chapter concerns the arguments of 
the Attic orators when questioning a will7 s authenticity, 
and concludes that in the fourth century, arguments on 
grounds of forgery were probably used more widely in the 
courts than those based on capacity. In the conclusion, I 
have looked at the question of the chronology of the 
Athenian will, and have defended my results, which suggest
that during the period under consideration, even though
certain functions of the will were probably more prevalent 
in some centuries than in others, its fundamental purpose 
was the care of the ookcs . Appendix 1 sets out the
evidence concerning the relative positions of Nicanor and
Nicomachus in the household of Aristotle, and Appendix 2 
discusses the dating of the two fourth-century wills.
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Introduction.
In the society of ancient Athens, the care of
*7*
one7 s 01 and immediate family was of paramount 
importance. By means of his last will and testament, a 
man could assure himself that his last wishes in this 
respect would be carried out, unless, of course, the 
document was questioned or fell into dishonest hands. In 
ancient Athens, the will was still very much in its 
infancy, and there were no restrictions concerning 
details such as the manner in which the document was 
worded and so on; something which became more prevalent 
in Roman times. It is because Roman concepts of law were 
more closely defined that I have deliberately not applied 
them to Greek law, a thing which has been done often in 
the past, most notably by German scholars. In addition, 
the study of the testament sometimes provides an insight 
into the private and personal life of the testator, 
because in a man7 s will, one can see where his priorities 
lie, and thus catch a glimpse of the side of a man7 s 
character which might not have been displayed to his male 
contemporaries.
Despite the importance of the subject, there has been
no full-length study of it in English, and the most 
recent study of the Greek will in general was written in 
German in 1909 (1). However, there are various articles 
concerning certain aspects of individual wills, in 
addition to the relevant chapters in text books of Greek 
law, and these have been of great value, even though I do 
not necessarily agree with all of the opinions expressed 
( 2 ) .
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The ancient sources for the study of the Athenian 
will are fairly plentiful, and it is fortunate that part 
of the text of Solon's testamentary law is extant.
For the most part, I have relied upon the speeches of 
the Greek orators, particularly Isaeus and Demosthenes; 
there is also some information in Lysias, Hyperides, 
Aeschines and Andocides. Admittedly, no law-court speech 
is above suspicion, and Isaeus, my major source, has been 
particularly accused of dishonesty and much maligned, 
most notably by Sir William Wyse. However, I think that 
it must be borne in mind that any law-court speech will 
have a bias in favour of the person for whom it was 
written, and there will be an attempt to distort facts in 
order to strengthen one's client's case. That Isaeus was 
particularly skilled at this (3) does not make him an 
unreliable source, but merely indicates that he was a 
good lawyer. However, despite this natural bias, Isaeus 
may have been able to distort the facts of a case, but it 
is very improbable that he could distort a law or custom 
with which the jury was familiar (4).
I have supplemented this evidence with information 
from Diogenes Laertius concerning the wills of certain
philosophers. Most of this information, with the 
exception of the will of Plato, concerns the 
post-classical period. For the most part, ' I have relied 
heavily on his verbatim quotations of the wills. This is 
because, in the one case where his text differs greatly 
from the Arabic translation, it seems very likely that 
the Greek version is correct, because in some points, the 
other is wrong in law (5). Therefore, even though
-5-
Diogenes Laertius is only as reliable as the source he is 
using, as far as the testaments of the philosophers are
concerned, it seems as if his source transmitted the 
texts accurately.
I have also referred to the dramatists. Tragic drama 
has its problems as a potential source, the main one 
being that of anachronism . However, I do not think that 
this is a good enough reason for completely disregarding 
this evidence (6). Comedy poses different problems, such 
as the fact that one has to try and distinguish what 
might be regarded as literally true and what is a joke.
The opening chapter is a discussion from Homer and 
Hesiod. This is not of any direct bearing on Athenian 
law, but, in the absence of any evidence from Athens at
this early stage, it is of some use in attempting to
ascertain what might have been the case before Solon's
law of testament.
In addition, I have also made use of Plutarch, Lives, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Critical Essays,
Ps. -Aristotle, Athenaion Politeia and Xenophon, Hellenica.
As far as legal boundaries are concerned, I have 
limit^ed my discussion to cases which fell within the
jurisdiction of Athenian law, and have not taken into 
account any information which can be found in various 
inscriptions and papyri concerning wills outwith Attica. 
There are two exceptions to this, namely the testaments 
of Conon and Aristotle, and I have given my reasons for 
including these in my discussion of them.
Unless otherwise stated, all three-figure dates are
B. C.
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Notes
1. Bruck, Schenkuncr.
2. These shall be referred to and discussed in the 
sections of my thesis to which they are relevant.
3. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Isaeo. 4, 14.
4. It could be objected that there is an example of a 
possible distortion of the law in Is. vi, 28. 
However, this is a reference to the Solonian law of 
testament which specifically forbids a man with 
legitimate sons to make a will ([Dem. ] xlvi, 14), and 
this clause was probably only taken to refer to 
testamentary adoption. Therefore, even though this is 
not true in fact , since men with children did make 
wills , it is in accordance with the text of Solon7 s 
testamentary law.
5. This is the will of Aristotle, and the differences 
between the Arabic and Greek versions of the document 
are discussed in Chapter 6, Function.
6. cf. Lacey, Family, p. 10.
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Chanter 1 
Wills in Homer and Hesiod
The word and its verb S a c r • do not occur
in either Homer or Hesiod. The verb StSwj-w- is found, but 
it generally refers to gifts as opposed to bequests. Any 
aspects of inheritance which might have some bearing on 
the subject of wills shall also be discussed. Since 
Homer is regarded as being the earlier poet of the two, I 
shall begin with Homer (1).
The authorship of the Iliad and the Odvssev is
disputed. The two great epics are attributed to Homer,
but it is not known whether they were composed by one
inspired genius or in parts by several bards. Their date
and place of composition is uncertain, although it is
generally believed that they were composed about 700BC
somewhere off the Greek mainland (2). It is probable
that the poems were at first composed by an illiterate
bard or bards and written down later. This matter is
also open to conjecture (3). Therefore, the customs
Wose ok
mentioned in the works are probably not only^ the period
in which they are set, but also those of the period in 
which they were written. Furthermore, since the place of 
composition is uncertain, it is very likely that these 
customs were not indicative of the practices of just one 
location but several.
The first reference to inheritance is in the second 
book of the Iliad. when the previous owners of 
Agamemnon's staff are mentioned:
Z.(iV$ StoilCi, $!¥.)<> T OjO 
E p ^ e l oi.s Si &**.€/ ITetJbv t n ' K y r r  ri 10 j
«tvr£,^ > 0 etvrtt W & t>f 8 u )d  *A rpe TToofcet/c 7LOCVV
A rp& VS Se 6vg$K.(JV iK lT T iv  TToX>V4.f> V l &V€6T*J y
oLVT^p o otvrc Q vZ e T * Ay*.jJLefJ.^ov l Xtcrr& $op>vj\r«.LJ
iroh7Lfl€ iv y y io c e t, t c * i  ^ A p ) ^  r r o ts r i
(Horn. 1J.. ii, 102-108)
Here, two different verbs are used to describe the giving
of property, namely SiSufn, and m Ciu j . The former is used 
with reference to the giving of the staff by gods and a 
demi god, and because these givers were immortals and
could not leave legacies as such, btSutpu refers to a gift
as opposed to a bequest. On the other hand, ?j:C(T(J is
first used in conjunction with 9vrjttc *v and refers to the 
giving of the staff by mortals, which suggests that it
indicates a bequest as opposed to a gift "inter
vivos" (4). The text does not make it clear whether an oral 
or a written bequest is referred to here. There are only 
two references to writing in the Homeric epics.
-9-
In the first, the Achaean warriors "make their mark" on 
lot tokens to decide who is to fight Hector (5). This 
suggests that they are illiterate. The second occurs in 
the tale of Bellerophon which relies on the transmission 
of a message written on "folded tablets":
.... 77o/oev bJ o ye
y p l L l f d S  T fC t f 'k K . l*  T T T V IC 7 M  9 v p . $ 9 o f > &  lT O 'K 'h *L J
(Horn. 11. vi, 168-169)
This passage has been quoted to support the hypothesis 
that Homeric society was not completely illiterate. 
However, Jeffery suggests that the Bellerophon story's 
origin is not Greek but Lycian, and, since the message is 
"an integral part of the story any later teller would 
continue to repeat the traditional detail of the baneful 
signs without having any first hand knowledge of the 
thing itself" (7). This suggestion is compatible with 
the other evidence from Homer concerning writing, since 
this is limited to the mention of an illiterate' s mark. 
Therefore, since Homeric society very probably was
illiterate, r e f e r s  to an oral as opposed to a
written bequest. The verb <£/<£ 66e^ -/ indicates the 
significance of the bequest; the staff was a symbol of 
regal authority, and the giving of it denoted the handing 
over of the kingdom to another.
-10-
It would have been necessary for the giver to specify 
whom he wished to receive the sceptre, since if this was 
not done, the succession probably would have been settled 
by force. In this case, 9s£uttco is best interpreted as a 
bequest to take place after the death of the giver, since 
if a king were to leave a man with authority over his 
kingdom before leaving on a long journey, he might return 
to find a usurper on the throne, and would have to use 
force to regain it (8). Norton says of this series of 
bequests:
"That this is not simple hereditary succession would seem 
to be evident from the fact that Atreus who had sons, 
left it to his brother, Thyestes, and Thyestes who also 
had sons, left it to his nephew, Agamemnon. The simple 
narrative reads as if the men in question had a right to 
dispose of it as they wished and did so" (9).
However, Norton fails to recognize the fact that these 
bequests refer to the transferral of power as opposed to 
just property. The staff of regal authority could have 
been passed from Atreus to Thyestes because Agamemnon had 
not yet reached the age when he would be strong enough to 
rule, and this could be why Thyestes left the staff to
Agamemnon rather than to his sons. In addition, he may 
have thought that Agamemnon, because of his military 
ability, would have been more able to maintain his 
ascendancy through might, since in Homeric society, the 
strength of a ruler or his sons was of paramount 
importance (10).
-11-
Therefore, the fact that the staff was passed from one 
person to another despite the fact that the givers had 
sons does not indicate that a man had the right to
dispose of his property as he wished.
This separation between the Homeric king7 s authority
and his private possessions is indicated in the 
conference at the beginning of the Odvssev. Here, in 
reply to Antinous7 wish that Telemachus will not become 
king of Ithaca, Telemachus asks if it is possible for him 
to keep Odysseus7 private property, and this request is 
acceded to by Eurymachus, another of Penelope^ suitors 
(U):
TyX£jU.oC^  ’ y TOl 7*oCV7Vc kv yo‘U * * 6 1' tC.4uT*.t,
06 T/S £.jUioc?-uJ X€ vs € <.
k,TTJfieLTt^  e/AtTos /Cot‘' 60Z6I *  a v 'ti.ceo is ."
(Horn. Od. i, 400-402)
This passage indicates that a prince could expect to 
inherit his father7 s private property which would not be 
acquired by the next king if the prince himself did not 
ascend to the throne. On the other hand, if there were
persons who were strong enough to overthrow his kingly 
authority, he might not necessarily inherit his kingdom. 
Therefore, it was to the advantage of a young prince if 
the throne was given to a trustworthy person, since this 
would lessen the likelihood of assassination and civil 
s tri f e.
-12-
There is further evidence in the Iliad and the 
Odvssev that the son of a king did not necessarily
succeed to his father7 s position as ruler.
When Aeneas challenges Achilles, Achilles taunts him 
with trying to curry favour with Priam in the hope that 
Priam will abdicate in his favour:
-  -  .  y  y e  & V f t O &  6 /A .o l  6  6  ot 6  & + . <* o i \ / 0 J y 6 L
i'frTTopif.vov Tp£666LV  V  te r C T O $ * H O i , 6  l ,
T  r y  § J tf ii& p .o v , <x.T*.p e *  x £ v  e / *  ’
c>\> Tt> *- rovveitu. y€ IffoCoLylOS, ye/0*.$ iv
e i 6 c v  yikp oi frcLT&es, o SJ ejurreSo* o\>$* * e  ciff>u>\/-
(Horn. 11. xx, 179-183)
This quotation suggests that it was possible for a king 
to abdicate in favour of someone else even if, like 
Priam, he had adult sons. It is not made clear how this 
could be done, whether by solemn public declaration or in 
private. The word tfLrrtSo s implies that Priam would only 
abdicate if he were to become physically unfit, 
and cLkkC<fj>uv indicates that it is Achilles7 opinion that
Priam would only abdicate in favour of Aeneas if he were
out of his senses. The latter is also apparent in 
Achilles7 sarcastic tone.
-13-
That such a happening would not have been considered by 
Priam's sons is indicated by the fact that Hector assumes 
that kingly power will be passed through him to his sons 
(12). Furthermore, since Priam's sons have come of age 
and there are a great number of them, it is probable that 
even if Priam were to abdicate in favour of Aeneas, they 
would prevent him from coming to the throne by means of 
force.
Owing to the fact that legal concepts in the Homeric 
period were less developed than those in Athens at the 
time of the orators, the question of validity with 
reference to the bequest of a kingdom does not apply, 
since legal power rested with the king, not with a court 
of law, and the only manner in which the bequest would be 
upheld or invalidated would be by use of force, not 
equity.
Odysseus' conversation in the underworld with his 
mother, Anticleia, suggests what might have happened when 
a ruler was absent from his kingdom for a long time:
" fcutTfe £e 1*01* TToLTfOi /tocl. v t4 as  t #  ^Ct<-rro\/1
7j 7T*p 1/ yl p * s  , y ji TlS 1J Sy
k Y $ p * v  olK \ os S'ovtceru .
fit.Vfi M-0L  fJL'/ T j6 T ’f j £  p o v ^ V  fife / T 6 y
ye rroufr * *1  tt&vtol <fv\*66z>-
rj jUt,V G ytjuetf OS T7S 0I f l b T O i
-14-
Q .6 i f i f i j v  t j  p a v r i * *  r/crv/oc ft 'fr ijp
jftaX f a j v  K tC s y  re T ^ 'J O T t, & v p . £
e o l s L v  I v t  p .6 y * .p o i6 i  v  • o C $ v p * C  $ *  o b  a . t e ' t
f d ^ r o v e L *  w t t T t s  t &  KotZ j 'f to L r * .  S<*.x-pu j ( e o ”  *
6 0 *  P  ov TTcS T"fS & X eL  y 6 /0 ^ S t € /‘c .^ X v s
7 j7 \e p n * ^ 0 * >  repcexsee*. v ip e ro n .**  tax.u S <*.? r*.s tf^ots ,
SvxbivvT^u J o<.£ € / T6 0 c i & e  P  >«■<*. 6 rroAo ✓  u r & p  3 c i J l6y Vise uv ■
17cC\rr(s& y * -P  fce<^-&oxj 6 1 - irtx.Ti^p & £  gos o t w T o ^ t  p t 'tp . 's *^
3 ; f' / (■ . I'
a p y q  j o vd (z  rroXt-voG to < r^ p ^ &  r a t i .  *
(Horn. Od. xi, 174-187)
Here, the words y*.. • suggest that the onus of
keeping Odysseus' estate intact rests upon Penelope, 
which implies also that her future husband would also 
rule Ithaca. Finley states that the situation had arisen 
because the nobles of Ithaca "were agreed that the house 
of Odysseus was to be dethroned. Along with the rule,
his successor was also to take his wife, his widow as
many thought.
-15-
On this point, they were terribly insistent and it may be 
suggested that their reasoning was this^ that by 
Penelope7 s receiving the suitor of her choice into the 
bed of Odysseus, some shadow of legitimacy, however dim 
and fictitious, would be thrown over the new king" (13). 
Finley does not make it clear whether he thinks that 
Penelope7 s new husband would also be the heir to 
Odysseus7 private property in addition to ruling his 
kingdom. However, one of the suitors conceded that 
Telemachus could keep his father7 s private property in 
the event of his mother marrying again (14). The fact 
that Telemachus had to ask if he could retain his 
position as head of the ottos seems to suggest that this 
was not guaranteed to him, and implies that if the 
successful suitor were to employ enough force, Telemachus 
could also be ousted from this position. On the other 
hand, it is also possible that Telemachus7 request is an 
example of him employing some of his father7 s guile to 
gain sympathy from the onlookers in the assembly. In 
addition, the words go\/ S’ o v . . . indicate that
despite the competition from the suitors, Telemachus is
regarded as the heir to the throne and is treated 
accordingly.
Another matter arising from Odysseus7 conversation 
with Anticleia is the position of Laertes, Odysseus7 
father. Finley assumes that Laertes retired because he 
was no longer strong enough to rule his kingdom (15).
-16-
If this was so, it is not clear in the poems whether he 
formally bequeathed his kingdom to Odysseus or whether 
the situation had evolved gradually in that Odysseus had 
slowly taken over the responsibility of ruling Ithaca. 
Another possiblility is that Laertes' absence from the 
running of the kingdom is because his presence "would not 
suit the plot of the Odvssev amd his withdrawal is at 
least likely to be a matter of artistic convenience as 
well as a reflection of actual usage." Calhoun then adds 
that there are examples of aged kings, such as Peleus,
Idomeneus, Priam and Nestor (16). In addition, even
though he is old and weak, Peleus is still king (17). 
However, when he is in the underworld, Achilles asks
whether his father is still in a position of power, since 
he no longer has a son to protect him (18). Priam,
although old, is still the Trojan king, and Nestor, 
despite his age, sailed to Troy, where he was of moral 
support to the Achaean army, and returned to rule his
kingdom when the war was over. Laertes is the only king 
who is depicted in Homer' s epics as having retired from 
public life. Therefore, it seems very probable that his 
retirement is for dramatic reasons, since if he were in
power, the tale of Odysseus' homecoming and the sub-plot 
of the suitors would not be effective.
-17-
Therefore, as far as a kingdom was concerned, there 
was a distinct separation between a man' s right to 
inherit his father' s regal authority and his private 
property. It seems as if he was formally entitled to 
inherit the latter, but his right to the kingdom was not 
unassailable, and could be given to someone else by means 
of an oral disposition.
That it was possible for a man to give his son part 
of his property before death is indicated by the 
reference to the fact that Peleus had given Achilles, his 
own armour to take with him to Troy:
e> S } & tTollSu
yijp**s. • ' o v y  vco i  %v evre6<~  rr<*.rpo s e y j p * . .
(Horn. II. xvii, 196-197) (o refers to Peleus).
Norton states that this passage "might be regarded as a 
' donatio mortis causa' , " but the fact that such a
committal is mentioned seems to be an indication that the
son was not necessarily a universal heir to his father's
property (19). The view that the gifts were a "donatio 
mortis causa" could arise from the interpretation
of as meaning "because he was going to die soon",
which would be equivalent to in Iliad, ii,
106. However, Peleus' wife, Thetis, refers to him as
being weighed down with years.
• • • o iues Stj yjp<x.L \yypu>
Too- fj.ey£.po 11 &.p y so & j o i\Am. Se p-ot vd'S-
(Horn. 11. xviii, 434-435)
-18-
Since she makes this statement shortly after the death of 
Patroclus, and Peleus had given Achilles his armour ten 
years previously, it seems very unlikely that this was a 
"donatio mortis causa". It is also possible that Peleus' 
gifts to Achilles are mentioned because they were gifts 
to Peleus from the gods.
There is also some evidence which is contrary to 
Norton's suggestion that the bequest of armour to 
Achilles indicates that a son was not necessarily his 
father's universal heir.
Achilles implies that if he had not chosen to come 
to Troy and die an early death, he would have inherited 
his father's property:
S i pot* i r o ^ o ^  i jreccvTo 9vp.o$
yjpcksr*. p v i j € r j y  &k <>xovj e ’uicvZ^v
K T y p o L B l .  fT e .p  ( f  € 6  rot. y  % -pcO v 6 K . r j 6 < * . T O
(Horn. II. ix, 398-400)
/
Here, the word seems to refer to Peleus' private
property as opposed to his kingdom. However, the fact
that he also would have married, ( y j ^ r^ • • • * ),
suggests that he would probably succeed to the throne as 
well, since if he had a family, the line to the throne 
would be secure.
The importance of producing a son to succeed one in 
kingship is also indicated when Hector expresses the wish 
that his son rule the Trojans "with might" (20). Finley 
rightly states that the Homeric kings "were personally 
interested in pushing their family parallel to a point 
at which their sons could automatically follow them on 
the throne as they succeeded them in the oikos" (21). 
Therefore, if Achilles failed to marry, he would not be 
ensuring the future rule of the kingdom by his immediate 
family. Furthermore, Achilles himself regrets the fact 
that he is doomed to an early death, since Peleus will 
not have anyone from his family to succeed to the throne:
T«CJ QlJlCt: 9GOS 'oTTL  qt?  t u
^ C  ^ / \ /  /fTc/it.doiy p i6yu.fO0c£L y o y j ro tc/9£LO k r &  v',
cL W 1 £  i/wt. TTxt- 1. X0C. ~T&hce. 1/  rTtAv'e^ '
(Horn. II. xxiv, 538-540)
Here Achilles seems to take it for granted that if he had 
stayed at home and chosen a long uneventful life as 
opposed to a short heroic one, he would have inherited 
his father's kingdom. However, this would have depended
on whether Achilles would have been able to establish and 
maintain his ascendancy by might. Therefore, it seems as 
if Achilles assumed that if he had not gone to Troy, he 
would have inherited both his father' s kingdom and his 
personal property.
-20-
There is also a passage in the Odyssey in which one
of Penelope's suitors states that Telemachus' property
will be divided if he dies when sailing to seek news of
his father:
Ti3 V  dlS* et, ,ce ic+u v r t 5 t u v  ico'cA.ys e xrl v j o S
T r j? &  c /s  r r e p  ’O S 'v e z e v s j
t/1 s  ^
O V T O i  fC € .V  tcoCfc IJ U C ^ K K d V  S f i f t A e C & V  T T O V O V  ’
yjqp Ktv TTu*-r*. * 9 *  y 0ctc cot £> * .Z t6
ro v ro v  ^ujrepu iofyUe/ jfe 7 7 4 o t t v c o l  .
(Horn. Od- ii/ 332-336)
Here, the house, ocjci*. , of Telemachus is to be treated 
differently from his other property, *.ry/4.*.r«c . The latter 
is to be divided amongst all the suitors (£*.$«*. ),
whereas his oitci*. is to be given to the one who marries 
his mother (<?uieX«c.. .. orr vc oc ), and will presumably be the 
marital home. This suggests that if Telemachus lives, 
the successful suitor will not receive this property (22).
In addition, when Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, 
is telling a sorry tale to Eumaeus, he states that he is
the son of a Cretan and his concubine, and that when his 
father died, his legitimate sons only gave him a dwelling 
place and a few gifts:
-21-
. . . TOO ^ tO-y ✓  £ .S o C 6 o L V T O
r r o u S t s  v T r i p d v j A . o L '  e t r l  K . x ^ p o v s  i f i u K o v r o ,
c C l/T o C ^  iyLU JC  ^ t .o c X « . 7T x < V f> f<  S o g u . *  K JttL*- o t  itH  '  ^ y ^ c ^ l - U V .
(Horn. Od. xiv, 208-210)
This quotation indicates that the legitimate sons of a 
man had the right to become universal heirs of his 
property which they divided amongst themselves, and that
they were also free to give some of it to their father's 
illegitimate offspring if they so wished. This suggests 
that a bastard son probably did not have the right to 
inherit his father' s property if there were legitimate 
male offspring.
There is an indication concerning what might have
happened if a man only had legitimate female children and 
a bastard son. Menelaus had a daughter, Hermione, by his 
wife, Helen, and, when it became evident that she was 
unable to bear him more children, he had a son by a slave 
girl (23). The son's name, Megapenthes, indicates that
the situation caused Menelaus great sorrow. Hermione was 
sent away in marriage to Achilles' son who was king of 
the Myrmidons, so it seems as if Megapenthes was to be 
the heir to both his father's o ix - o s  and kingdom.
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Therefore, since it seems as if Achilles, Telemachus 
and Megapenthes were to become heirs to their respective 
father7 s property, and it is not mentioned that anyone
except the Cretan7 s legitimate sons inherited his 
property, Norton7s view that a son "was not necessarily 
the universal heir to his father7 s property" is not 
correct.
In addition to the giving of property "inter vivos", 
there is also an example of a bequest being made in event 
of death. This occurs when Telemachus is referring to 
the gifts which were given to him by Menelaus:
TTaC^ ec ov y«.p YSfxev otcjs 6 6r<*t -rjLSe t y y x . .
elf K-ev €fce pvycrrjpes «.yfvopGs t v
(Horn. Od. xvii, 78-83)
At this point in the poem, Peiraeus has just offered to
take the gifts which Menelaus and Helen have given 
Telemachus. These gifts consist of a silver mixing bowl, 
a two handled cup and a richly embroidered robe (24).
icT'&Cv'ctifTtS TT**Tpu 'Cocrr*£ rr<
hS*tov €%pvrei ee fiov^u>p./> ttrtLvpep&r y  -tuvk t L 
6l $e ic. >eyo> toCtolbl tcyp*-
§yj T o r e  pLOt- yoe.ZpoYTt- ^ e p t c v  rrpos ^ a c C p tjy
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Telemachus' reply is to state who they are to belong to
if he dies while fighting the suitors. His statement 
concerning this property begins with a conditional
clause, u , which indicates that this is
not a gift "inter vivos", since it is only to take place 
in event of death. The recipient of the bequest is to be 
either ^ireaus («cx>ro^... ««) or one of the bystanders 
(ft-v-ot i-H'sSer namely Mentor, Antiphus and Halisthernes
in addition to Telemachus' guest, Theoclymenus (25).
Bruck cites this bequest as a typical example of the
Roman form of bequest, "mortis causa donatio imminente 
periculo" (26). However, it is mistaken to apply Roman 
legal concepts to Greek examples, since Greek law, 
particularly at this very early period, was not as 
regulated as Roman law. Bruck also states that these 
gifts acted as a sort of deposit, which, if Telemachus 
were to die, Peiraeus could keep (27). This is not so, 
because the words r i indicate that it was not
necessarily Peiraeus who was to receive the goods in the
event of Telemachus' death, but it could be one of the 
other men who were with Telemachus at the time the 
bequest was made.
De Ste Croix states that this bequest is an example
of a man having a free right to dispose of
than irr.it r-^ r«c (28).
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However, the words r r ^ t r r r < * r « .  g j.evv ’r * i S U g g e s t  that 
the reason why Telemachus does not dispose of his nat-TpA/* 
is not necessarily because he does not have the right to 
do so, but because his mother's suitors will divide it 
amongst themselves if he is killed (29). Therefore, even 
if he did bequeath it, the bequest could not be carried 
out.
Therefore, Odyssey, xvii, 78-83 is an example of an 
oral will, in which property is disposed of in the event 
of death. Since his father's kingdom will be given to 
his mother's successful suitor, and his will be
divided amongst all of them, Telemachus is in effect 
disposing of all the property which he is able to give 
away. This passage indicates that such a bequest was 
permissible in Homeric times.
Further evidence concerning wills in Homeric times 
can be found when Penelbpe recounts to her suitors the 
parting words of her husband:
" - * 7 o  " ; i > / zl f 7 , /.. . 7w ovic otd ij k. £ v jx. tfcos j -y U
a v t o v 7 * fj.e*>'c>'SToay.
HbCTpoS K#Z e r  y.6y*.p9 L.6
C /» J/ j ~ _ S . j s
r o v t  tj  Z f u  p v L 'K K O '/  t jU L tV  * 1 T  t>* O t i j h  ✓  <£O VT61»
y6 y & *■ 6 X, S r<*.
"!* / v. 1
I  'Cj^ rt fa d *  /C J 6  & £ 71, | £  & *  ,  T (s  O 7 Kja.T ’ix* d u i jA  at. A-t /TOv £  »<, .
(Horn. Od. xvii, 265-270)
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Here, Odysseus is not certain whether he will return from 
Troy or not. He arranges for the care of his parents in 
his absence, which has been and is to continue to be the 
responsibility of Penelope. Odysseus grants Penelope 
permission to re-marry, and this is presumably to be done 
only in the event of his death. He does not specify a
future husband for her, and the words 4»
indicate that she is to choose the man she would like to
marry (30). The fact that she is to leave the house
after re-marrying (ioctoL ) indicates that
Odysseus wishes his son to inherit his property. Since 
some of the arrangements made by Odysseus when leaving 
for Troy are in the event of death, these words to 
Penelope are in effect an oral will.
A matter which is closely connected with the
discussion of the will is adoption, and Bruck cites the 
following passage as evidence that adoption took place in 
Homeric times (31):
*>s efl^  Sou t )£«.t jtona' €juOjy6°^,
Tel O fJUbt OV Tt BtOc y £ jj & T t uoV
&/J.6V ' t @6 0 t S 6 / T I 6- «• / 4 ^ / A . A 6 v ,
TToC€Uf*-T]v > <-/«*. X^Oi 7TOT * ^ L y o *  X^A-Vi/WS.
(Horn. 11. ix, 491-495)
At this point in his speech, Phoenix, the man to whom 
Peleus entrusted Achilles when Achilles left to fight in 
the Trojan war (32)., is using examples of his closeness 
to the warrior from his boyhood in which he treated him 
as a father.
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In citing this passage, Bruck seems to
\ — t ftake fe. non.**.—  iroi.6vpy}/ as a statement that Phoenix adopted 
him. However, this is contrary to other evidence in the 
Iliad in which Achilles regards himself as Peleus' son
and heir (33). Therefore, the words 66 rru*S*... TToiev^yt/
probably do not refer to an adoption "inter vivos", but 
to the fact that Phoenix treated Achilles in the manner 
in which he would have treated a son of his own. Since 
there is no other reference which could be regarded as 
evidence concerning adoption in Homeric times, it seems 
as if such a concept did not exist.
Hesiod's Works and Davs is addressed to a certain
Perses, who was the poet's brother. There are two 
references to inheritance in the work.
Towards the beginning of the Works and Davs. Hesiod 
mentions a quarrel between himself and his brother 
concerning their father' s property:
J/e \ \ - j c „ /  a > V / *
rjOTf j ju t *  y * p  K\ y j t >ovr e o c t r e  r r o A x «*.
, yiiyot. jSxx.6/
Su)po j f& y o v s  J ol T y y & e  £ 0 €.a.o v 6 l . . . .
(Hes. W. D. 3 7-3 9)
This quotation indicates that in Hesiod' s time, lawsuits 
concerning inheritance were common. The
words yS+f--- indicate that Hesiod and Perses
had agreed upon a division of their father's property.
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However, there was an attempt by Perses to acquire more
suggests that it could either refer to extra bits of land 
or moveable chattels (34). If e f o f e *$ is to be taken 
literally/ it seems as if it might have been the latter. 
Hesiod suggests that his brother bribed the kings (35), 
but it is not stated specifically whether this bribery 
was successful and he won the case.
The importance of a son to inherit his father's 
property is mentioned later in the poem:
(Hes. W. D. 376-380)
This quotation shows that Hesiod regards a son as useful 
because of the increase in wealth which he will bring to
the household and because he will look after his father 
in old age (<&* . . . 4y»cocr*. . Neither here nor in any
other part of the Works and Davs does the poet mention 
the religious observances due to one' s ancestors/ and 
this implies that the continuation of these was probably 
not regarded as important.
than he was entitled to ( ^ is not
stated exactly what property the quarrel concerned. West
^ L O V V O je ^ J i b t 77c*/5 7T tX p iO ib V  OfcitOV'
y & p p i / u - e v ’ u > s  y i i p o l c l v  *
yjyjoccoS $£ eT tp o y ir*£&* 6yic*.T*. \&£rre^Y
Lp e  tT \e6*e66L rnpoL Z e v s  I t *  it 6 t o *  ot^po
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It is possible that Hesiod states that it is advisable 
for a man to have only one son because the estate would
not have to be divided on the father's death.
Therefore, the only references in Hesiod to
inheritance concern succession by descendants. There are 
no references to adoption, oral bequest or written will.
In conclusion, the written will did not exist in
either Homer's or Hesiod's time. In the Homeric epics, 
there is evidence that one could dispose of property by 
means of an oral bequest, as Telemachus did. There is no 
example of a man with sons disposing of his private
property in this way, and succession was usually by his
male offspring. The rules of succession to the kingship, 
however, were less rigid, since the ability to establish 
and maintain oneself in a position of power depended on 
one's strength and guile. Hesiod recognises the need for 
a man to have a son to inherit his property and care for
him in old age, and this recognition was to lead
eventually to the development of adoption. In neither 
poet is there evidence that adoption was in existence at 
this early stage.
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Chapter 2
Solon's Law of Testament
There is no precise evidence concerning the laws of 
succession in pre-Solonian times. Plutarch only states 
that if a man died without sons, the property remained in
concerning the inheritance of property ceased when Solon 
introduced his law of testament in 594/593 (2). •
Quotations of and references to this law are found 
in the writings of the Attic orators in addition to Plato 
and Plutarch. Since all this evidence is from a later 
date than the writing of the law, it is firstly necessary 
to discern which parts of these references, if any, are 
later additions to the original Solonian law, or later 
interpretations of it.
the ytvofc , but does not explain how that was arranged 
(1). However, the exclusive right of they^^*
1 .
re  k ffenet-* '€ {TtrTTOUIl u TO
OAtJV
vtto r o v n J ' '  t o v  n t t / 9**yoU H.L
A
7
([Dem.] xlvi, 14)
virt
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This is the most detailed extant quotation of the law, 
and since it was read out as a law by the clerk of court,
it is reliable as a verbatim account of the law of
testament as it stood in the fourth century. The 
words ore £©a.c«>v would not have been
necessary about two hundred years after the law had been 
made, so it is likely that this law was not altered, with 
the exception of the deletion of some of the clauses by 
the Thirty (3). However, the fact that these clauses are 
quoted here in full and in part in other references 
indicates that they were probably restored by the 
democracy in 403/402 or shortly afterwards. There is no 
indication that this was the complete text of the law.
2 .
h o /a o£ ,
t l otv y v y t i  u)v oy tm v  'vck. e*>v o r r  •^T'vjp
$ i tc 0 Tot •* ol iro 0 * / /  oc v e c $  npcv  sire SVeres
rov  tr^Tpo s ic v p i* -*
( [ Dem. ] xlvi, 24 )
This passage is also a direct quotation from the fourth 
century Athenian testamentary law. There is no evidence
that this law was part of Solon's code.
There are also various interpretations of the law 
dating from the fourth century.
Isaeus
3.
y.0c Tov \/6ia*v ivxyvejQc, fc’s tc&XtCti. lie 
&d«c ojri/iS &.V j TTociSzs
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^  f  C. "N A , ^
£Oq l  yv-ygiot. o y i p  v o p ^ v e r j $ J u) £ . v f p e $ y S i *  t o -v t o
rov VOfJLOV O V T V S j  O p U Y  pMYTjV T4.VTJV
It*.T+ .fvyyv o d e  ^ ^ys ^yoyjpL^^i kxl' -rr*p * <p vy  y  v tov
j&tOV TOLS &.TftU6C TtJv OiV&/0U)Jrt*>Yj TO fc^gcVoC u 
TTdtygoC^^PCC OVTiY ** frty' floTJhoOYToCL .
(Is. ii, 13)
This passage is part of an argument in defence of the
validity of an adoption "inter vivos" which took place
about twenty years before the death of the adoptive 
father. Since the testamentary law of Solon is referred
to in defence of such an adoption, the argument suggests
that Solon may have only legalized adoption "inter vivos".
4. Ol»rt y*"P St *.4 6 6 (. 0Vl~€r So’O You. o v S t v Z  ov f * Y
T&V e,0>VTod itv«v TlAV $-VJtLTe{Ui\/} € *  Y 7V S
tcocT*’~>'1 ir&v r^A6 i/r<2 ,
(Is. iii, 42)
5 0 yip YojuLOS Sl ippy Svj v K&ye*' Si otruis
vv T ‘f> 7V. *.v t o x // 6pci/ pcy rrv.cS*i y Y j s i b v s
tcxur+lCcTTy ,i p p € v * S '  GocV & 6  d y A e i o - i  fc t^CTtu Kcn-y j ) 67)v
ToUL>T-gui>. o v w t ) /  jx eru yutv Qvy*rtpuiV eerc $ ovveci Ktx. i
Sl^deidtCL 7V. XUToi ' &CY€V Se TUV yvy^LutV Qvyt/LTe p  uiV ai)( OL^V
TG ovffe notyttt.t6*+L ovT6 So^Ybn. ovSeiu ovS'ev Tea r &ocvtoxj .
(Is. iii, 68)
6.
k*Lc r £  iu*Y xr^rpl vJj-ry', / e i  tthZSgs Z p p s 
iyeYOYro, ov*. ic* T * C r y s  £t#.&£ 6 0-«.L-
/ v c /  \
tt-ex&v&t. y tcp 0 vop-os 6z>* ivu 7~u.)$ ic-Cpiov e i*** .
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e*Cv/ T i g  T tX  k * - Z > T o V  '
(Is. x, 13)
Here it is alleged that a man could only make a will if 
he had legitimate daughters on the condition that he left 
the property "with them". However, there is no indication 
in the remaining text of the law that this provision was 
part of the law of testament, and since a girl without 
brothers would be styled an i i r i x .*ypo$, it is more likely 
that if this rule was Solonian in origin, it would have 
been included in his law concerning int*~>-ypou (4).
^ VojjjDSj t*> *Sp&b j o v  k. gotv 
T<$ SmQ-yTon, gLOifov, x-V pi ^  s eirvLX. KL&TJb-vGu t*L$
* AAoL (-x/
(Is. iv, 14)
y *p o vofto± o^S&vZ *»£ r *  6*tv r o y >
l \ ^ jv L \ /  _ ?\ t \ - A  S
VtTO yypUiS TJ VTTo *06e>V yj VTTo T'lO V 0cA7\uJv K  tcui
t - /
UuetS L&T& rfot/Otx. very 6 ^
(Is. iv, 16)
9* Oiiro6c 6 YOfjLOS , <*> Uv$pe-$f KjOlvo S cx.rr*-£ l £ f T u. w
6j>£tyoct. rac acvrflD S / * . & e 6 0 x . p . y  tt**Sc>Gs $ cJe (-
yy^6 iflc aLppev6s>, e p.y <x.p*. ptKre<-S y v n o  yjfx^s
y 5*-* oi/ixo Tc tJ*v iv  no voyu^j rr <*-/OxraSov r *~L.
(Is. vi, 9)
These quotations mention some of the clauses concerning 
the capacity of the testator to make a will, but in none 
of these passages are all these clauses mentioned.
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Wyse states that in vi, 9 Isaeus omits the 
clause yu^oCLfot. rrcd6fxezos because he "did not wish to 
attract attention to the influence which may have been 
exerted by Philoctemon1s sister" (5). However, since 
most references to the law are incomplete, it seems as if 
this omission is of no particular significance.
10.
otA-Xet y .y j v O ijS  J o L ^ 6 )^ V y S y  z * .  l o v S e z Z r r p 0 6  y
%rrt- t o i* . \ J T c h s
t
cJS TTterl-6 TO  V S / 4 . « . p T v p K *
IToLpi 6 r  tL6 S"tLLj z& }4.ov y & o z ro < , O T U ?
/Jouxo^ro S o v T *  (r*. V  T 0~V .
(Is. ix, 13)
Here, the matter of having one's will witnessed is 
mentioned, but there is no indication whether this was a 
matter which was regulated by statute (6). The verb used 
with reference to the making of a will is Sot/vui.
Demosthenic sources
11.
°  f4.€ Z t .& y k .e '*  V0f4-0Z tVot. i S o v ^ i .
T* locvirov £  reCL, JT^Zdes * <-
yyy€to<* , o v y  octree r & p y f > (y  t o v  s t y y v T - u . r c o
t j s  &yxf6r&L«i* , .** ec$ t o  p e s o *
5 T y v  cO f) 6 K€r*-aCZ 6 t</U / K/ -^O V TTGLj6y To
TTO(.£r?v U.K\y KoV S 6 tf, ....
( Dem. x x , 1 o "i )
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Here, Solon's reasoning behind his drafting of the law is
given a different interpretation from that of quotation
3
V  in that it is alleged that he wished to promote good
will and a vying for generosity between the citizens.
12.
1 o $ o u  f jL y  i r r r a t r  o i y v r o  > f y s i z  c o r e  Z o n t o v
4 r y z  ocv T o T S
OtTiJS OCV £JS T o Z  $ y £  T r O i.y S t l& tV  0 \ ) tc
i f e o v  S < *.B € 6  8 c t i- ; J<^ 3 v r<x-5 6y>c^r^A.i. 77ovr>*.S
' v i o v  y v y e t  ov t i r n ^ y  t k z « L  ,  y  r e x e - o r y  6 * z t *l *, icxro S% S o
v /* > L j  n j  s  s
T y z  tc^eyp &Z0p. I  d<V ro Z S  tk p jt y  S 0<-*C6riOlS 7=0  V  lt&±+J4+* pLGrt>‘&'b \
T . /01>6O 7 & V  1fOt,y6U.^L6,Zt>V .
([Dem.] xliv, 68)
The beginning of this passage is a partial quotation from 
the law as found in quotation 1. However, there is no 
reference to the custom described in the 
words u is  . . . rro L y  6 < p .e z o v  in any other passage concerning 
the law of Solon, so it seems probable that this was not 
part of the original law, even though it was acceptable 
in fourth-century Athens. (7).
13.
tc x Z  a L \c v p # , y e  T cL vrt*. T To L zr*. e 'S o p , o £ 4 T‘ y  e  & c zd L .
0  o T u  a iz  Tt i t  yV Z o C u iC i TTGs l B o f jL t  ZO s
i  j /  \  z
C r p ^ r -  r^y  ^ AA~OS T 6  x^ x-o. T O ^ o L V T y  .
([Dem.] xlviii, 56)
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This quotation is a deliberate misinterpretation of one 
of the clauses in Solon's law, since in the text the 
term is not applied to everything a man
might do, but only to the making of a will.
Hvoerides
14.
fcn St fc-ou o r r e p c j tw/ S /  yjy/4.oJ$
TT(*p*.Tr?\y6io t o v t o i s  y  i^eZvjoct t*,
fsCWTo-u ol[l tfrreos oi\,J -rt$ f io v ^ ro c t .  irXyjv [ y
y tjjp0*5 i/J rj votov y / jjulvlu} v y  yuj^ext-^cj
7 7 y  [vtroj SeGyco-v ■yj ^[jro J  y*'7} ^
(Hyp. iii, 17, col. 8)
Here, there is no mention of the clause concerning 
legitimate sons. Norton attaches significance to this, 
stating that its insertion would not be detrimental to 
the orator's argument (8). However, many of the clauses 
are omitted in other speeches with no particular reason. 
In addition, Hyperides is not discussing wills in this
speech, but the validity or otherwise of agreements, and 
uses the law of testament as a comparison. Therefore, he 
might not have regarded the phrase concerning legitimate 
sons as necessary for the argument.
Plato
15.
7 £ v  7/ o y o v  r o v T © / ,  o j y o c $ e  x n f i o - C f u e  / o t , t o  ^
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t\TuBh6oLv Tb* t^&Zvct.u & otvrov <Tto(. t £ 0 6 6 l
k irA^5 t f t r u s  *✓ r is  d9e>-pj To i . . . .
C k r iB e C ^  refers t o  o t T7&x<*.c vofjuoderov v r e s )
(Plato, Laws, 922E)
This reference to the law of testament suggests that it
permitted complete freedom of testament. However, the
other quotations of and references to this law which
contains the clauses concerning madness and so on
indicate that this was probably not the case.
Plutarch
16.
Ev SokX^.*! 6 6 So hCeU. ToS V'Op C StOLGyiCcJ ✓ vSfJUj^  .
i rp ire p o \s  y«.p o v *  I *  y e v t t .  r o v
ro Q  *■ 0 T os 6&61. r *  )(PJpLX-Tu. !Cx<X TO ^  C>iK.Oi/
l V ' oc $ '  cj /3 o v f le r * t Z  n s  eirLTf? S yj <x $ y e-i
pyj noLiSe* oc^ r-y , Sb-vt**-l Toi o. ' J t o v ^
T e s -v y y  e f i . f L ^ 6 c  pSLxTuor
) M  rw- y / » y p * r « L  t c r - jp o u r * .  rJ> v 
0 YTblV ^IT o t y  66 V  o-V /-L^V o< t/6 S y  V y£ 7T<jcAi/
0-O f * <£jtx<3s ris S'oeeiS e jy tc .e f ,  e t  y c y
i \ r v jl * /  JK r  ~& 4rn- fty h  V06U2f o w e tc e  r  y  pV>fpL ac y  dfroyu*]/
*yj ic a i.T ^ ^ y e & e 'l s } j  y v v tc tx . 'l  n e ^^o yu ^o  ^  ... .
(Plut. Sol. 21, 3-4)
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Asheri states that this reference to the law is 
inaccurate, since Plutarch refers to the law as allowing 
complete freedom of testament (9). However, the 
words ov .. . it&.&(>jj.e'sos indicate that Asheri is not quite 
correct here. Gernet also finds this quotation 
inaccurate, and states that Plutarch refers to Solon7 s 
testamentary law as if he legalized the type of will 
which was more common in Plutarch7 s own time. In 
addition, Gernet states that Plutarch has overlooked the 
fact that the existence of male children only precluded a 
man from making a will (10). This is correct, since the 
words psj iTd.'tfes erJ<-*v suggest that a man with
LeglTim&te children of either sex could not make a will. 
Glotz states that in Plutarch, the law is accorded the 
importance it deserves (11). This is probably a 
reference to the fact that the law freed the individual 
from family control. Since the effect of the law was to 
allow the transferral of property to one outside the y'kvas 
, I agree with Glotz.
There are various omissions of various clauses in 
some of these quotations. The clause stating that 
Solon7 s law allowed a man to bequeath his property to
whomsoever he wished is found in ten of these references 
(1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16); the reference to
legitimate children in eight, (1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 11,
3§£); the persuasion of a woman in four, (1, 13, 14, 15);
madness in four, (1,16, 8, 14); being locked up in three,
(1, 14, 16); old age in four, (1, 7, 8, 14); force in
three (1, 14, 16); bei.ng--lockod up ~rrr t-hrec,— Hr— ---3r-64;
drugs in two, (1, 16); illness in two, (1, 14) and the
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provision that an adopted son could not make a will is 
found in two (1, This information indicates that
quotation 1 is the most extensive in detail concerning 
the law. Since it is probably also a genuine quotation 
of Solon's law, I shall mainly refer to this text in my 
discussion.
There are various opinions concerning what form 
of k.'*’) Solon allowed. Some scholars take the view
that he allowed adoption "inter vivos", others, 
testamentary adoption, and yet others that he permitted 
posthumous adoption.
Bruck holds the view that Solon's law permitted one 
to adopt "inter vivos", and that what was later regarded 
as a law of testament was but a later development (12). As 
his evidence he takes some references from fourth century 
Athens concerning adoption "inter vivos" and the 
importance of the continuation of the , particularly
Isaeus ii and vii. However, these references only show 
that adoption "inter vivos" was recognised in the fourth 
century as being a way by means of which a man could 
ensure the continuation of his after his death, and
is not convincing proof of the law of 594/593. Bruck
also states that Plutarch, when stating that the law rrefo  
cCov' was introduced by Solon, misinterprets the
law and understands it according to the practice of his 
own age. However, this does not take into account the 
other evidence concerning wills in fourth-century Athens
(13), since he states that the wording of this evidence 
is not authentic, but refers to a later modification of
the law. Bruck is of the opinion that this change came 
about when the law was altered by the Thirty. However, 
this is not so, because the only alteration made at this 
time was the deletion of the clauses concerning capacity
(14). Therefore, Bruck's arguments are not convincing.
Ehrenberg also holds the opinion that the law only 
permitted adoption "inter vivos", and that it was only 
later that testamentary adoption came about. As evidence 
f o r  the later alteration of the law, he refers to [Dem. ] 
xliii, 51 (15). However, even though the reference in
this passage to the archonship of Eucleides suggests that
the law regarding intestate succession may have been
altered (16), it cannot be taken as evidence for the
alteration of testamentary law. On the other hand, the 
quotation of the law of testament in [Dem] xlvi, 14
specifically refers to Solon, and this suggests that, 
with the exception of the temporary change made by the 
Thirty, the text of the law remained unaltered.
Harrison is also of the opinion that Solon only
legalized adoption "inter vivos", and that the will 
originated in a contract between two parties: the
adopter and adoptee or his representative (17). In
addition, Harrison states that even though the
words t£ $i*.9&6dt<L emys <*/ y go back to
Solon, it is "unsafe to build too much on the meaning of 
this word in constructing a view of the original or 
eventual nature of the Athenian will. All we can say is 
that the use of the word in this law is perfectly 
compatible with the theory that originally
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Solon did nothing more than allow a man without sons to 
adopt whom he pleased "inter vivos"; but it is equally 
compatible with the view that he allowed such a man 
complete testamentary freedom" (18). However, the words 
"but ... freedom" considerably weaken Harrison's 
argument, since they indicate that it is based on 
probability only, and is not supported by any direct 
evidence.
There is also evidence that, contrary to these 
opinions, adoption "inter vivos" existed before Solon's 
archonship:
fv*i eir6wc/L-yvTo . . . o r e  £ ot a^ __
( [ Dem. ] xlvi, 14 )
Here, those who were adopted when Solon became archon are 
excluded from the right of making a will, thus indicating 
the Solon did not introduce adoption "inter vivos", but 
that it was, as Ruschenbusch states, already recognised 
as a device to ensure that a family would have 
descendants (19).
Gernet has various suggestions to make concerning 
the function of Solon's law. He states that the law 
concerned adoption "inter vivos" even though it already
existed before Solon's archonsip. It is his opinion 
that the words Uv indicate that Solon
allowed a childless man to adopt someone who was outwith 
the circle of the yt/os (20). Gernet also suggests that 
before Solon, one was only allowed to adopt agnate 
relatives. This view is based on evidence concerning 
adoption in fourth-century Athens in which the majority
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of adoptions, either testamentary or "inter vivos", were 
of relatives on the female side (21). However, this 
cannot be taken as decisive evidence concerning the law 
in the sixth century. In order to support his opinion of 
the function of Solon,s law, Gernet suggests that the 
reference to the law in Isaeus ii, (
irr ird L . t v - u (Is. ii, 13)) implies
that the original law concerned adoption and that later
the wording was modified (22). Although I agree with 
Gernet in that texts attributed to Solon by 
fourth-century writers were sometimes not quite faithful 
reproductions of the original (23), I do not believe that
Isaeus ii is more in accordance with the original law.
This is because Gernet does not give a good reason for 
doubting the authenticity of the law as quoted in [Dem. ] 
xlvi, 14. Since this would have been read out by the 
clerk of court it would have been the text of the law as 
it stood in the fourth century, and was also probably the 
text of the original sixth century law (24). Therefore, 
the evidence which Gernet cites is very inadequate.
Thalheim holds the view that the law of testament 
concerned testamentary adoption, and takes as his
evidence Plutarch's reference to the law (25). However, 
Plutarch does not state that Solon allowed adoption by 
will, but that this law permitted a man to give his 
property (Sov^eo. r*. ocuToi) / (Sol. , 21, 3)) to whomsoever he
wished. Therefore, this cannot be taken as evidence that 
Solon introduced testamentary adoption.
Asheri also holds this opinion, but does not cite
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the evidence for his view.
MacDowell states as follows:
"Solon, in the first half of the sixth century was
responsible for the next stage of development. He
introduced a law permitting a man without sons to adopt a 
son by will so that the adoption took effect only after 
his death " (26).
This indicates that MacDowell thinks that Solon 
introduced adoption by testament. However, he does not
cite any evidence in support of his opinion.
On the other hand, Lipsius interprets the law as
quoted by Plutarch (Sol.. 21,3-5) and Demosthenes (xx,
20) as allowing testamentary adoption of someone who was
outside the y&vob (27). Hammond follows Lipsius7 opinion 
(28). However, the texts which Lipsius quotes as evidence 
do not contain specific details concerning the nature of 
the Solonian will.
Beauchet states that Solon introduced the liberty of 
choice of the heir whom a childless man could adopt by
testament, and that adoption by will of someone within 
the yl/os was already known. Therefore, Solon only
codified existing practices and introduced liberty of
choice (29). Glotz holds Beauchet7s opinion, and states 
that the first will was made by a dying man who requested 
that his only daughter be married to his brother7 s son 
(30). However, he does not state his evidence for this, 
so his hypothesis is of no value. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence that testamentary adoption existed before 
Solon.
-46-
Freeman also thinks that Solon7 s law allowed 
adoption by testament, so that the chosen heir would only 
receive the property as a member of the family (31). In 
addition, she also mentions the view that the law also 
could have allowed posthumous adoption, but she does not 
express a definite opinion concerning this.
On the other hand, Wyse is of the opinion that the 
phrase diere . _ & in  Sue. &<*■'- suggests that Solon
legalised posthumous adoption, the method by which a 
person who was next of kin to the deceased could have 
himself adopted into the deceased7s family (32). 
However, it is more probable that the
words t d e r i  d ir iS (*.<*,6 <*£&<«. expresses a direct result
of an adoption, namely that a man once adopted could not 
claim an inheritance from his former family (33). 
Furthermore, if someone became the posthumously adopted 
son of a man, it was not by virtue of a will made by the 
deceased, but on either his own initiative or that of his 
representative (34). However, the wording of Solon7s law 
suggests that the heir presumptive is not to take the 
initiative but the original owner is to do this. 
Therefore, Wyse is not quite correct in his opinion
concerning the function of Solon7 s law.
Jones states that before Solon made his law, "the 
purposes of a will were effected by adoption, and after 
wills appeared adoptions, posthumous or "inter vivos/ 
continued to be common" (35). This statement is not 
quite clear, since the words "the. - . adoption" imply that 
Solon legalized testamentary adoption, whereas "and.-.
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common" suggest that the will introduced by Solon may 
have had functions other than adoption, and that 
posthumous adoptions were known before Solon, whereas 
there is no evidence concerning when the latter came into 
existence.
Adcock speaks of Solon's testamentary law as follows: 
"If there were no legitimate sons, a man had the right to 
bequeath his property to whomsoever he would. Very 
often, this took the form of adoption by testament, and, 
where property was left undivided, a will may be regarded 
as a form of posthumous adoption" (36).
Adcock does not define the term "posthumous adoption", 
although in the context in which it is used here, it 
seems to be synonymous with testamentary adoption. 
However, these two forms of adoption were very different 
from each other, since even though both took place after 
the death of the adoptive father, the latter was 
authorised by will, and the former was not. Therefore, 
Adcock is mistaken in his use of the term. Although it is 
implied in the words "very often" that other wills were 
legalized by Solon, he does not state what these were.
Andrewes states that by virtue of Solon' s law a
testator "regularly" adopted someone as his son and 
heir. He then adds that "Solon in his law used what 
became the standard terminology for testamentary 
disposition, SucT-t 9-ol i and : the provision might
cover more than simple adoption "(37). However, Andrewes 
fails to state specifically what the other functions of 
the Solonian will could have been.
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Therefore, in view of the fact that previous 
discussion of the function of Solon's law are inadequate, 
it is necessary to re-examine the evidence concerning the 
type of will which Solon legalized.
The clause on which the majority of previous 
discussions have been based is:
T<i. koiuraij 6 »- €t/oci o trtos iLv t ....
( [ Dem. ] xlvi, 14 )
Since the word 6 oul has many different
interpretations (38), it is unwise to base one's argument 
solely on this word. As can be seen from my analysis in 
Chapter 6, the function of the Athenian will as 
understood from the evidence from the fourth and third 
centuries was concerned with other matters in addition to 
adoption (39). However, this cannot be regarded as 
reliable evidence concerning the nature of the Solonian 
will, since it dates from over two hundred years after 
the law was made.
There is, unfortunately, no evidence from
sixth-century Athens concerning the exact function of the 
Solonian will, so it seems as if the best method of
examining this law is to consider evidence from the times 
nearest to the sixth century, namely, the seventh and 
fifth centuries.
Even though the word S\aJ9'y*.ij does not occur in 
Homer, there is evidence that two forms of rudimentary 
oral will were in existence. One was the bequest of
property in event of death, which suggests that in the
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Homeric age, a man without sons may have been able to 
bequeath all his property to one nominated as his heir 
(40). The other was the will of Odysseus which was made 
before he left for Troy and in which he regulated family 
matters (41). There is no evidence that adoption was 
customary in the times of either Homer or Hesiod.
In the evidence from the fifth century, there are 
also several different types of will. In the works of 
the dramatists, there is evidence concerning three 
functions of the will: the arrangement of family matters
(c. 440, c. 430) an inventory of property (c. 416) and
the adoption of an heir who would marry one's daughter 
(c. 420) (42). In the writings of the Attic orators,
there are also some wills dating from the fifth century; 
there are two wills concerning adoption (412, c. 406),
two regulating family matters (410/409, 404) and one in
which a complete bequest of property is made without 
adoption, (c. 415-413) (43). Therefore, extant evidence
shows that in the fifth century, wills concerning 
adoption seem to be a little less common than wills 
regulating the care of family, and that other forms of
will, namely the complete bequest and the inventory
existed but were not quite so common.
It can be seen from this evidence that the major 
difference between the wills of the seventh century and 
those of the fifth is that in the latter adoption by 
testament was regarded as a legal form of will, whereas 
in the former it did not exist. Therefore, in view of 
this, it is probable that the major innovation of Solon's
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testamentary law was that he legalized adoption by will, 
whereas previously the only legal form of adoption had 
been "inter vivos". However, there is no specific 
indication in the wording of the law that the only legal 
form of will was testamentary adoption, since 
is not synonymous with r o < .y 6 * 6 c In addition, the 
words owt4$ do not mean "whomsoever eae one may
wish", which is how they are interpreted by those who are 
of the opinion that Solon only legalized adoption, 
testamentary or otherwise, of one outside the yZvo*» . if 
this were meant, the wording of the law would probably 
have been wbi-jccce fa i oimrt*. , which it is not.
However, the words oV^s "however he may wish",
imply that Solon allowed a man without legitimate sons 
complete freedom of testament, and that he was not 
debarred from making a will with a function other than 
testamentary adoption, such as a complete bequest of 
property or just an inventory of the contents of his 
estate. Since later evidence indicates that in the late 
fifth century and early fourth century, adoption by will 
was more common than at the end of the fourth century and 
the beginning of the third, it is likely that when the
testament was legalized a childless man may have been 
more inclined to adopt someone as his heir and leave him 
his property, but he was also free to do otherwise.
In addition, seventh- and fifth-century evidence 
also points to another form of which was made by
a man with children and in which the care of the 
testator's dependants was regulated. However, the words
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in Solon's law, puy yv“je t c > L . forbid
anyone with legitimate sons from making a will, and would 
seem to render such a document illegal. It is possible 
that the reason this clause was included in the law was 
to prevent legitimate offspring from being deprived of 
all or part of their inheritance, and so being left in 
reduced circumstances by the death of their father. It 
is, therefore, necessary to examine the question whether 
a will which did not deprive the children of their
inheritance would be contrary to the law of Solon. By
the time of the fourth century, when a man with children 
wrote a will, he would often leave a dowry for his wife 
and sometimes bequests for his children's guardians 
(44). Since such a will would detract from the value of 
the total estate, it is possible that a document
containing these clauses would not have been legally 
admissible in the sixth century. However, there is
evidence that Solon also wrote laws concerning dowries 
and guardianship. Plutarch states that Solon limited the 
dowry to be given to a woman on her marriage to three 
changes of clothing and a few pieces of furniture:
TU* S'&KKi*** yKfcCJv £/4«cTioC Tpi*. 6K&Vy pciKifOOTj
S, €  T&f* o v* Si Tys
(Plut. Sol. 20, 6) pi £ vy /
Here, rCa* are a reference to the fact
that this rule affected all women who were not
since before this passage, Plutarch speaks of the
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position of the 4TTLK.7\.'>jpc$ ' ip^ Q words eX*kf>ov j^ y ^ & v  
indicate that a woman's dowry was limited by law to the 
few objects mentioned and that the giving of money or 
land as a dowry was against the law, and because of this, 
the dowry laid down by law would not detract from the 
value of the estate. There is also evidence that Solon 
regulated matters of guardianship:
t i& * S K i4 T o v  Se pca.tc.eZvo * e r f t r p o r r o v  T ? j o p f o i v & Z y
p y r p l  j juy  e w e w c e L V j  p t - y i *  e r r  t r p  o treTjer<~ <£V y  o i /e lo c .
epX&T*.*- 7-do v itp^n. ri3 v T&\.e \t r y  6 *tiSTu}iv.
(D. L. i, 5 6) (45)
Even though Diogenes Laertius approves of this law, he 
gives no indication as to how a guardian would be 
nominated if he was not the children's next of kin. It 
is a possibility that a man could appoint such a person 
by will. Therefore, it seems as if a will made by a man 
with legitimate sons may have been permissible if its 
terms were within the boundaries of the law; that is if 
the dowry of the female dependants was limited to three 
changes of clothing and some furniture, and if the 
guardian appointed was neither to marry the mother nor
was the next of kin to the children. This possibility is 
strengthened by the fact that there is evidence in favour 
of this form of will from Homeric times onwards.
The provisions in the law with reference to the 
capacity of the testator now need to be discussed. The 
words ‘ Ogou p~y i .zeiroZysro .. . are £.ot^s v  6-l Tys
seem to suggest that this exception was limited only to
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those who had been adopted when Solon became archon.
However, it is evident from literature dating from the
later period that this exception also applied to all
those who were to be adopted in the future (46). Such a
provision was quite sensible, since an adoption took
place with the intention of providing a line of
successors to the and caring for its religious
cults, and if the adopted son did not produce a son of
his own, but disposed of the property by will, there
would be no guarantee that these rites would continue to
be observed. There is no evidence concerning what was
bk)
regarded as constituting madness, persuasion &€ a woman 
and so on, and this might well have been the reason why 
the law was regarded as obscure (47).
There is no indication in the extant text of the law 
concerning the form which the Solonian will was to have 
taken. MacDowell seems to assume that a testament should 
be written (48). However, there is no specific evidence 
that this was so, and since oral wills were permissible 
at a later date (49), it seems likely that when the 
testament was first introduced, it did not have to be 
written but could also be oral. There is also no
evidence concerning whether matters such as witnessing, 
codicils and revocation were regulated by law, or just 
left to the discretion of the testator.
Ehrenberg has suggested that Solon's testamentary law 
"chiefly concerned the upper class" (50). However, 
Solon in his poems states that his laws were for everyone:
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BzGfjLOV S 0' OjbUf'cJS t £> X-o<.<•$ T6 x.oe.y^Q-iZ j
•^u S^Tolv &t& fe*c<*.6 ro / Jkpju06K$ S'Ck.y
?/
CJptkJ)* .
([Aristotle] Ath. Pol.. xii, 4)
Here the words tc^tcuj re « * y p c # d o  not have a moral
significance but a social one (51), namely that Solon's 
laws were for poor men in addition to the rich.
Therefore, a man from a poor background would have had as
much right to dispose of his property by testament as a
rich man.
There is no evidence in Solon's poems concerning the 
motivation behind the making of this law. However, there 
are some suggestions concerning this in later literature.
Isaeus suggests that the law of Solon (which he 
confuses with adoption "inter vivos") was made for the 
benefit of the adoptive father (no 3). Demosthenes 
states that Solon introduced his law of testament not to 
deprive the next of kin but to enable persons to vie in
generosity with each other. However, since the making of 
a testament would have had the effect of depriving the
next of kin of a man' s property, Demosthenes' logic is 
not quite sound here. Plutarch puts forward a moral and 
philosophical interpretation, namely that Solon placed 
friendship above kinship, favour above necessity, and 
made a man' s property his own. However, this seems to be 
more a result of the law as opposed to Solon's motivation 
in making it. Therefore, since there is inadequate
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evidence, Solon7 s motivation in writing his law of 
testament is open to conjecture.
In conclusion, Solon7 s law of of testament was not 
an example of his taking the middle path. This is 
because by means of this law he gave the individual the 
right to alienate his property from the ye^os completely, 
and whether he did this by means of adopting a son or by 
bequest was left to his own discretion. It is also 
probable that he allowed a man with legitimate sons to 
make a will regulating their care, so long as they were 
not deprived of their estate. There is, however, a note 
of caution in the law, in that not everyone was given the 
capacity to dispose of property by testament.
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Chapter 3
Inheritance and Testamentary Law in the Fifth-Centurv
Athenian Dramatists
The noun and its verb £iccTl c do not occur
in the works of the Greek tragedians, but are first used 
by the comic poet Aristophanes. However, information 
concerning both inheritance and wills are mentioned in 
the works of the tragedians Euripides and Sophocles 
(1). Since tragedy and comedy are very different from 
each other, I shall discuss them separately, although I 
shall not separate instances of inheritance in Euripides 
and Sophocles, since the two dramatists were roughly 
contemporary.
Inheritance in Sophocles and Euripides
Any evidence which can be obtained from tragedy 
should be treated with caution, since these plays were 
based on Greek myths and the tales which were written
around Homer's Iliad and Odvssev and other epics. 
Therefore, as is the case with inheritance in Homer, the 
customs mentioned in these works are probably not only 
those of the time in which they were set but also those 
in which they were written (2), so I shall attempt to 
indicate any examples of anachronism where it may occur 
in the passages concerning inheritance.
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It is firstly necessary to discuss any other aspects 
of inheritance in tragedy apart from inheritance by 
legitimate sons, in addition to writing about 
testaments. This is because if a man made a will, he
more often than not wished to avoid the rules of
intestate succession. Therefore, it is necessary to 
discover what these rules were in order to discuss the 
will in its correct perspective.
In both Hesiod and Homer, childlessness is regarded 
as a source of grief (3). This was especially so in the
case of a king, since his family would no longer rule his
kingdom after his death. There is no indication in 
tragedy that the situation could be remedied by means of 
adoption. However, there are several examples of 
bastards inheriting, and these are found in Euripides' 
Ion and Andromache and in Sophocles' Electra.
In Ion, Xuthus, and Creusa his wife, are childless, 
and so Xuthus seeks advice at the oracle of Delphi, where 
he is led to believe that Ion, the illegitimate offspring 
of Creusa and Apollo; is his own bastard son, fathered 
during a Bacchanalian orgy (4). It is because of this 
that Xuthus regards him as his heir:
k x t J  d e o v  SiijtLeS} i iK y r t 'x v  r e  6 y v
€€ r&s tcocvo rr<crf>*
ov 6; 6K $io^  fju tv  6 icy irp w  o lv+(*■ & *'-  rr*cT{M<>;
noKv &  TTnovres'
(Eur. Ion, 576-579)
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Here, the importance which Xuthus places on his 
fatherhood is indicated by the fact that he repeats the 
word and seems to assume that Ion will identify
with him as such. Even though Ion is not legitimate, he is 
regarded by Xuthus as the heir to his kingship
c*(ov. . . r r^ rp oS ). in addition, since Xuthus has already 
referred to his kingdom, the words Se ttA o-vto s are
probably a reference to the personal wealth of his oxjcos 
, which Ion is to inherit as well. However, although 
Xuthus claims that Ion is the son of a freeborn woman, 
when a servant informs Creusa of what has happened, he 
makes a different statement concerning Ion's maternity:
Kgit tmvS* K .t r ^ v r ^  e ^ x ^ ^  w eigy kj*-*.6 v '
kfcy r o p ) } ro\/j el*. SovKys nvos
yvveLicos 6 S gov buifA.cn oetnoTyv ocy6 t .
vC.iTAQ'Gv ot/ yj / y *p  To tco-H-OV/ ^  TtV'p' t v y e v o v s
TTL0O0V ge , 6*)v T&fCJV olTTcllSCbcV,
ig&yut* ouiccm* €.1 Se roS/ yr TTttcpS vy
rfiv Aiot&v vi v XP'j * 6 p tfiQy v yenptJi/
(Eur. Ion. 836-842)
Here, the servant attempts to prejudice the mind of
Creusa against Ion by stating that he is the illegitimate
son of a slave girl. He does not state that such a man
would be unable to inherit the kingdom, but the
words tkiiyrop'.. .’onyeL suggest that he holds Ion in scorn
because of his parentage.
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The servant suggests that Xuthus could have taken 
different steps to ensure that the kingdom had an heir, 
such as fathering a son from a freeborn woman ( ei '
evyavov* ) or marrying again if Creusa disapproved of
an illicit union (ec ... y*.p.tov ). There is no indication 
concerning what Creusa7 s position would have been if a 
second marriage had taken place. The first of these two 
alternatives suggests that a bastard son of a free woman 
probably had a higher standing with regard to inheritance 
than the illegitimate offspring of a slave girl. The 
words olicovs indicate that the servant regards the
begetting of a son as important for the continuation of 
the o i t - o s
There is also a reference in the Andromache of 
Euripides to a bastard being able to inherit a kingdom:
yvvdZw.* SJ o i iy p L K ju * )  T O V , A v S p O p ^
70) y y y  y p y  *C y e p 0 ?,
' 'E .K k V iJ  6 V / +  e ^ v e j C o t S  y £ f L O l i y
Toy S t j  tSj * x. P" * IM k h . o'V jjuoyoy 
S j .  /gou ' t J e x  $ ' e *- r v v U  y^py
£/U.®/ Si* OiKKotf b i t i r e f * *  /*4oA066 0*.S
e v S *.i- fJL O to vv tv.5 '
(Eur. And. 1243-1249)
Here it is implied by the fact that he will be the
ancestor of a long line of kings (4*- to^Ss ) that
Molossus will inherit Helenus' kingdom. There is no 
indication that his illegitimacy (he is the son of 
Andromache and Neoptolemus) will prevent him from
inheriting, but since Helenus had no sons of his own,
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maybe this was regarded as a good enough reason for
having Molossus on the throne.
It is notable that in these two cases of bastards 
inheriting, it is specifically stated that it is because 
there are no legitimate sons. However, in Sophocles7 
Electra. the children of Clytaemnestra7 s union with
Aegisthus are regarded as the legitimate heirs, and
Aegisthus is in a position of power. This is in spite of 
the fact that Orestes, the legitimate son of Agamemnon 
and Clytaemnestra is still alive. Segal attempts to
assess the effect which Aegisthus7 adulterous union and 
usurpation of authority will have on the minds of the
Athenian audience:
"Usurping the masculine authority of the house, 
Clytaemnestra transmits that authority not to the son of 
her womb but to her lover, an older male who prevents the 
legitimate heir from acceding to his father7 s property. 
This usurper, at the masculine interior of the house,
also stands in an anomalous, indeed outrageous position: 
instead of taking a wife to his own hearth, the usual 
practice in the patriarchal society of the fifth century,
he has moved to her s, and borrowed her authority along
with her oikos" (5).
However, even though the practice described here would 
have appeared most improper to a fifth-century Athenian 
audience, it was possible for such a thing to happen in 
Homeric times, where a similar situation occurs in Ithaca 
when Penelope7s suitors are agreed that the successful 
one shall be ruler of the kingdom. The major difference
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between the two situations is that whereas Orestes is not 
recognised as the heir to his father's ©£*•©$ , Telemachus 
is to be permitted to retain this position (6 ). In
Euripides' version of the play, Electra asks her mother 
why the kingdom was not given to her children by 
Agamemnon (7), but this was probably because at the time 
of Agamemnon's death, Orestes was but a child (8 ), and 
would not have been able to rule a kingdom by force or 
any other means. However, Electra bitterly points out 
that Clytaemnestra's children by Aegisthus will have 
prior right of succession over Orestes and herself, 
despite the fact that they are younger (9), and the union 
is unlawful (10). This is probably because Aegisthus'
supremacy has not yet been questioned, and the right of 
his children by Clytaemnestra to inherit rests upon his 
ability to hold power by force. Once this position of 
power is successfully challenged, their right to inherit 
will cease, unless they prove to be stronger than the 
challenger, since in the heroic age, possession of a 
kingdom was decided by might, not equity (11). Therefore, 
the example in the Electra of bastards inheriting despite 
the existence of a legitimate son, rests on the ability
of their father to rule the kingdom by might (1 2 ), and 
cannot be taken as indicative of fifth-century practices.
In order to prevent a usurper coming to the throne, 
there arose a custom whereby an older king who was no 
longer able to maintain his ascendancy by might, would 
allow his son to rule instead (13).
Cadmus handed the crown to his grandson Pentheus
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while he himself was still alive:
K .*.$ fjuo S jJL<rv ©2/ yep<KS t g  m -l  T v p p a v iS ^ .
flevfiei Qroyvrf0 s 6 >c >re<y veoarL.
(Eur. Bacchae. 42-43)
The reason given here for Cadmus' abdication in favour of 
Pentheus is that he was getting old {yep^s ), and it is 
probable that his age rendered him unable to rule 
effectively. This is further indicated at the the end of 
the play when Cadmus implies that Pentheus protected him 
from injury and insult (14).
At the time the Alcestis of Euripides takes place, 
Admetus is king even though his father, Pheres, is still 
alive. However, Pheres is still in possession of his 
private property:
jroKa.u3v p i *  tto xvim e&povs $e qc*- yv
AeCy• rrc*.rpo* y*-p Tbcvr' £bcpy v .
(Eur. Ale. 687-688)
The future tense of the verb A^it^ indicates that Pheres 
probably intended to continue as owner of his private 
property, and so as head of the ootos , until his death.
The fact that this property, which was in the form of
land, was inherited from his own father is indicated
by rtv.Tf>b$> ... r r ^ p c ^ . . Thus, when a king became too old to
y
rule, he did not necessarily cease being head of the o^cos .
A further example of a kingdom passing to a stronger 
and younger person is to be found in the Hippplvtus, 
where Theseus reigns in both Troezen and Athens, even
though Pittheus, the past king of Troezen and Theseus' 
maternal grandfather is still alive (15).
On the other hand, it was not necessarily always the 
case that an older king would abdicate in favour of a 
younger man. This is indicated by the fact that in 
Euripides' Andromache. Peleus is still king, despite the 
fact that his grandson, Neoptolemus, is probably stronger 
than he is:
atk.ov' T o rS e  iTcaZS  f l y
Fyke*, S ' i s yf$
•y&pO'STOSf GtcyiTTpOV OV .
(Eur. And. 21-23)
Stevens suggests that av implies that Neoptolemus
might have urged or forced the aged Peleus to step down 
from his throne, but in fact he allowed him to reign in 
Pharsalus while he himself withdrew to Phthia (16). 
However, the fact that Peleus is strong enough to prevail 
over Menelaus when he comes to kill Andromache (17) 
indicates that he is still strong enough to rule, 
although, despite Peleus' boasts (18), he would probably 
not be able to prevail in a case of hand-to-hand combat,
since he was not strong enough to fight at Troy (19).
There are also some instances of will making and 
bequest in Greek tragedy.
In the Alcestis. before leaving for Thrace, Heracles 
gives a woman to Admetus to look after in his absence:
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- . • ywotXio*, T y v f c r  ( * 0 L 6 ^ 6 0 V
£<*)$ &.V XtrTTOV^ S e v f o  & )f> y  K.u»* ± *.yu3V
feA-5 T V  P 0C.VVOV B iC rO Y O V tA V  K+Lr*LK.*>/6* V ‘.
-np**jgoL<* S ’ o /A,y TV^OLfJ-f- L r o e r y t c L i . ^  ypcp )
S'ScVfJLL T" y y f&  C7>c£l. [rp Q61T6 X & T v  So/>col&.
(Eur. Al. 1020-1024)
Here, Heracles does not specifically define the status of 
this woman, but since he later states that she was won by 
him as a prize in a sporting contest (2 0 ), it is very 
likely that her position is one of a slave, and as such 
she is regarded as his property. While he is giving this 
woman to Admetus to care for, Heracles also states that 
Admetus can keep her if he does not return 
(rrpv-Jf*-'* Stip-ct.z ). Bruck classes these words of 
Heracles as a "mortis causa donatio imminente periculo" 
and states that this is an instance of anachronism, a 
custom of Euripides' time being transferred to legend
(21). However, it is mistaken to apply Roman legal terms 
to Greek law, because the latter was not as regulated as 
Roman law. In addition, in the Homeric era, there is an
example of a bequest of property in the event of death
(2 2 ) so this incident is not necessarily anachronistic. 
Therefore, Bruck is not quite correct in his analysis of 
the situation. Thus, it is more probable that these 
words of Heracles are an example of a bequest of property 
to someone outwith his family, in event of death, and so 
they constitute an oral will; although, of course, the
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audience realise that he is in reality giving Alcestis 
back to her husband.
Ajax's speech to his illegitimate son, Eurysaces, 
could be interpreted as a type of oral will, since in it 
he states his last wishes before committing suicide:
l i  VolZ j y e tro to  r r w p o s  e v r v y  i t r t p  o
T &  S '  bfxotob' K&-Z y 6VOC & V  O’i  S  •
ic n -C ro i,  6 6  h# . ' v'vv r o v r a  y  6- ^ y X o v v
SSo
oi Q o v r e i t '  O ’i S & V  TU >\rS  J € f r * . l 6 & t i . v f j /C*.4c.<sJ ✓
55S
n j )  fp o v ttv  yvs fo  p y S e v  ySt6r6  5 
[ r o  p . y  f p o v e i V  y f y  k L P t } & V f £ 3 T i * 0 Y  f C e c i c O / j J  
ecjs ypctpeov tuxc r& ?yu treZ6&*-L pi*&yy 6.
or*/ S J TTpos T o v r o ,  8 & Z  C *  o r r m s  m * -T p o $
S e t fc t *  o l o s  e j  o o a v  >rp£<pyi.
Teuf s S& CDvtfotS, TTYerTJfJLV-61* flX * tc O ^ ^  Y£ OLV
Tf vyyY >0L r« , p y Tf i l  X
oliTOu 6 J y^^KLOJV', olSv*) p.y rts
6 r~uy v*-~ 6 L 7uo oLt * j  o u  St. x ^3^ ' 9 o y t* _
T o Z o V  J T v X u t p O  f  (f)vX$Uc.<S. t e i j x . p 0 t  & p (Q  L SOL
1 & t y o )  T p o f y b  tH o K + O Y  ZfJL-JTct. * * * ■  T c c s v /
f y K ^ H o i  o i y Y t Z j  S'vep’t v * *  fyjf3*"* ^X**3*'
J & 8pe$ <ke r 16 ry  pe-$ , &y*.ajos $<»S
vfjLi.v f *  k&lyvJ'S TyvS * i n i 6 *-ytr rc*3
/ ) \ ■> 7 j  ^  ^ (Y
i r  > ep^Y e v t o x y v , orr.^^
56 0
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r®/ tQ vSfc rrp o s  S ^^uo-v* i/u a -v  s JLytJy'
T o + .fA .v v L ' SeCJ^fcu j j . y j r p 'C  T * t 'E p u j lo ' i '^  7 & y < j}
i/ / >. s ,
cjs e f t *  yeyyToct yypofiot>ic.o £ 5*7.0
6 6  T *  * V  jJ L V ^  0 t> $  I t J ly t O f m L  T O V  lc .o t .T i* i & & O V  J
)u*.L 1*. pt*. T& -6yy  fJL'*fT> < k \{M V & p y *-' r«'£s
& ^ 6 0 V 6 ' OlS pyT€r X'VfJL&’ CJV kfXS*» .
0 i / ^ \ > tn jv ro  jJLOL 6 V  f  rr<X.Lj 7 ^ g J j  y € lt(O V V p .O V j
E v p v 6 ,  ^SX & Stoi t r o A .v p p x .fo v  6 r p e < f < » v  f t S
rTop fTa t^CO5 £ V  1~i. f io  to  /  d.ppyicrO 'S 6& iC o$ ’
7^ £'«Caa* re v y y  kjoIv* 6 fio l re d iy /e r *  l .
(Soph. Aiax. 550-577)
This address to Eurysaces takes place amongst the carnage 
of the slaughtered cattle. The tone of the speech 
alternates between toughness and tenderness (23).
The first wish which he expresses to his son is that 
he be like him in all else but his bad luck (Z  cr+7- *-*<cos
). This indicates that he sees his son essentially as an 
"heir to his heroism" and thus as a reflection of 
himself. After a few lines in a gentler, more
philosophical tone (*.k Ztou . ■. * ) this sentiment is
repeated (or«u/... ). These lines ( 556-5 57) seem to
suggest a request for vengeance. However, since Ajax 
plans to commit suicide, vengeance cannot be exacted 
against his enemies because they murdered him, since they 
did not. On the other hand, it is possible that Ajax 
regarded Agamemnon, Menelaus and Odysseus as responsible
for his plight, because the armour of Achilles was not 
granted to him, but to Odysseus, and it is this action 
which has brought about his decision to kill himself. 
However, the fact remains that Ajax's death is not caused 
by murder but by his own action.
Ajax also makes provision for the future care of 
Eurysaces. He tells the boy that Teucer, Ajax's 
half-brother^ will be his guardian, and because of this, 
he need not fear insults (e-ure*-.-. ). The word used
to describe the function which Teucer will be fulfilling 
is r p o f d s  as opposed to the term i w t T p o n o  s . Bond states 
that "this is a word of contempt applied to a man" (25). 
However, in this particular example, Teucer is also 
referred to as a , and it is specifically stated
that he is at present fighting the Trojans, ( Svgpce *
¥jp** ex*** anc^  these references detract from the more 
feminine implications of TpoQos . Since there is no
reference in Homeric times to a man providing a guardian 
for his young son in event of death, it is probable that 
this clause in the will is anachronistic. Ajax also asks 
his comrades-in-arms to assist Teucer in his task
(4xX'... )(+f>i-/ ), since y ^ p ^  seems to refer to the task of
caring for Eurysaces. The word ' t m s «rru> indicates that 
solemnity of this request, and also governs the message 
which Ajax asks these men to give to Teucer. This is 
that he is to take Eurysaces to his home and show him to 
Telamon and Euryboia, Ajax's parents. The
words «s... indicate that the hero wishes his son to
care for his parents in their old age.
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Ajax7 s final provisions concern his armour. The
* *■ T cse$.......X'Vy.eoov
are still part of the message which his seamen 
are to bear to Teucer, and contain the request that his 
arms are not to be made a prize to be contested for by 
his fellow Greeks. He then bequeaths his shield to 
Eurysaces (i^Ai . . G ^tcos ). This bequest recalls Aj ax7 s 
earlier wish that his son emulate him; just as the shield 
was Ajax7s outstanding characteristic, so does he wish it 
to be his son7 s. Concerning the remainder of his armour, 
he expresses the wish for it to be buried with him 
(n£ ... r e y  6 rocu ).
There are two omissions in the provisions of this 
will. Firstly, Ajax makes no arrangements for the future 
care of his concubine, Tecmessa, although it is possible 
that he may have wished Teucer to care for her as well, 
but there is no specific evidence concerning this, so the 
matter is open to conjecture. Secondly, he does not make 
provisions for the remainder of his possessions. Since 
his father Telamon is still alive (26), he is not head of 
his , so he would not be able to dispose of this,
but any other acquired possessions are not dealt with.
This suggests that even though his son Eurysaces is 
illegitimate, these may have been intended to be 
inherited by him, since Ajax recognizes him as his son.
Therefore, the speech of Ajax to his son can be
regarded as an oral will, since it involves the
disposition of property and the care of his son in event
of death. By means of it, he provides a guardian for his
words ttaLL rXpoL /u.ifT J
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illegitimate son Eurysaces, and states that the boy is to
look after Telemon and Euryboia, he accepts his son as
his heir and bequeaths him his shield, and states that 
the rest of his armour is to be buried with him.
Another instance of an oral will in Greek tragedy 
can be found in Sophocles' Trachiniae. This occurs
towards the end of the play when Heracles extracts a
promise from his son Hyllus to do whatever he asks (27), 
and proceeds to make two requests. The first of these, 
in which he asks Hyllus to carry him to the summit of 
Oeta and burn him there (28), cannot be taken as a will 
because there is no mention of what is to happen after
his death. However, it can be regarded as a
the sense of contract, since Hyllus has promised to
accede to his father's request. The second request is
that Hyllus marry Heracles' concubine, Iole: 
tyV oJS . T06OTJT0V S y  6 , i t r i6 K '- j i r 'r (J ,  TGK.'fOy/ •
TvLVTy^j 6f*-0 \7
J n&rf>i£uiv Of>tuu>v vyfiLesO * J
nposQov fjLyS1 * i r i 6 r ^6y<, ir*.rp l'
O tA \o i>  ( f iv S  p u t  y TOX% $ (T  b-CT^pOc $ kfJLOV
l)e t &OL V7 o L V T ^ J  o L V rt 6 0 V  t t o t g }
k b * -1 r o v r t  / . y S e v t o v  .
(Soph. Trach. 1221-1227)
Here, the verb t i n d i c a t e s  the request, by means
of which he formally disposes of Iole in the event of his
death (c/ijv ). The reasoning behind Heracles'
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request is not so much to provide care for Iole but to 
prevent any one else but his son from sleeping with her 
). Winnington-Ingram rightly states that 
Heracles asks this of Hyllus because he "can regard 
Hyllus in no other light than his own individuality, his 
own ' phusis' which explains, among other things, his 
insistence that he and no other should go to bed with 
Iole" (29). Thus, Heracles' motivation is pride as 
opposed to affection for either his concubine or his 
son. It is probable that Sophocles included this request 
in the play in order to avoid contradicting the legend 
which held that Hyllus was the husband of Iole (30), and 
cannot be taken as indicative of fifth-century 
practices. In view of the fact that Hyllus has already 
made a solemn promise to do what his father asks, this 
request can be regarded as a <*i in the sense of a
solemn compact or covenant (31) in addition to 
meaning will.
There are also two references in Greek tragedy in 
which writing is connected with will making.
One of these occurs in a fragment from Euripides' 
play, Palamedes:
6 *S> fA&'/O
1/ '(f-jvytsr*.
f e j i j V p O Y  <&✓ f r p -S t tO iS L  y p *  jU fitO LT J & t o t
£)€r } o 1> ?roc~pbv’T'o. iravT-?»*s jrte
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T&lOer? K&.T* 0LtcoVS lT & \ /7 J £ ITl *  ^  6 6 *  <-
/7WTet^  7*> <kjro$vyz ica* r-tx fifypv.'rcjv  fxerpov
jpkycLrrti ei-tr&Tv; ro v SJ e l e v e n .
« 6' (/ Tt'Tr t 0TJ6 LV ir&L$ tctlkol
$ 6 \r o s  j  jtoTJK y e v S *^  X& y&(-v >
(Eur. Pal. 578, Nauck)
In this quotation, the speaker lists the benefits which 
the invention of writing has given to mankind. This is 
an example of anachronism, since Homeric society, in 
which the play is set, was probably illiterate (32), so 
this passage is best taken as evidence concerning 
fifth-century Athenian practices as opposed to earlier 
ones. It seems as if an oral will is regarded by the 
speaker as inadequate, since its contents will not be 
remembered. On the other hand, if the extent of his 
property is recorded in a will, his children will know
what is theirs ( rr<*.t6 iv' ...
frcTr&r/ )/ and the heir will know it (rS*'.-- e t$ £ ).
The function of the type of will which the speaker is 
talking about is that of an inventory of property, which
indicates this was one of the functions of a will by the 
time of the fifth-century (33). Since the speaker refers 
to children, this indicates that in fifth-century Athens, 
a man with children was entitled to make a will which was 
in effect an inventory of his property. There is no
reference to a will of this type in Homer, so it is
probable that the function of the will referred to is
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also an example of anachronism. A will having this 
function can also be used as evidence of the truth in 
event of a quarrel («,'••• ^ ytiv/). Here the word used to 
refer to the document is iex-ros , and since Homer does 
refer to baneful signs being written on folded tablets 
(34), this is not an example of anachronism and cannot be 
taken as evidence concerning the materials on which wills 
were written in the fifth century. Therefore, this 
quotation indicates that in the fifth century, it was 
considered acceptable for a man, even if he had 
legitimate children, to write a will which was just an 
inventory of property.
The second reference in tragedy to a written will 
can be found in Sophocles' Trachiniae, where it is stated 
that Heracles left behind a tablet with writing on it. 
There are conflicting ideas concerning the contents of 
this tablet, so it seems best to quote the passages which 
refer to this tablet. The first reference to the tablet 
is ominous:
. . . TOtoC.T^TTyv kfAOO
A-niiJV Us r-y ✓
be
(Soph. Trach. 46-48)
In a later reference, Deianira expands upon its contents:
b>fO/Utk.TJ k w *  01, 1CU>V ^  Tt> T  7 ✓ S'S/uOlS
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\i£iTT€t $£a.toy &yy€ypu^Api€vyv
{§ T j v Q < j j 4 « . & f }  o iyL O C  T T p O G d & V  O V K  € T K y  T 7 Q T € f
r rO T ^ -X o v S  k y i o  ^ 5  e ^ L u i v  } Q V T tO  ( fp o C G U L ,
w S  rt & p * -€ 0 » V "  G L p f T G  K O Zt B tC V & V fX ^V O S.
Vt/V O* COS € T *  o "& K  O S * 6CTT6 p e  V '* & ^ Q 'U S  o ' T(. 
^ c /
X p e Z y  p u e t e e A u  i c r y s c v , e in e  S' y V  r e t c v o t s
p L o lp + V  T ftC T p tp * . s y"y^ S u > c^p €  T o v  V & p C & L ,
y p O Y O V  t r p o T o L ^ n L i  60S T p L p L y v O S  y i r & c t x
^ to p o L S  i c T le iy  i c k v  l u v t i o s  /3 € p t^ s >
T0T J y  S oC vktv  y p * ' y  6<f&  tV &  r V  ) { P 0 ' ' e£ >
y  r o v Q *  v n t  K.%pOLpLOVTt*. TOV f tp O V O V  T&7uOS
to  7 io t n o v '  i y *  r r y  Tcp p t u .
T O LoLvri  £ < fp ° <-$€ r r p o s  9 $ tS v  e ipaLppL£v*>
TLJV H p tK ic X & itV V  6 >C rt A j£ r v r £  TTO ^cJVj
V is  T y V  T7UX^C UxV ( ^ y y O Y  o t v S  y to L L  TToTe
A cJ $ c3 yc & 1 6 6 0 J V  £ k  i r ^ T ^ ^ u S e ^ Y  -
(Soph. Trach. 155-172)
Jebb states that the tablet which Deianira refers to in 
this quotation was inscribed with the oracular message 
which was given to Heracles at Dodona, and seems to
assume that the will mentioned is an oral one (35).
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Kamerbeek also holds that the S ^ T05> contains a 
memorandum of the oracle which Heracles received at 
Dodona, as opposed to his will, stating that ty y  9yn«. does
not mean 1 agreement" or "covenant", but "letter", or 
"symbol" (36). Easterling is also of this opinion and 
states that "Heracles first revealed the prophecy to
Deianira, then gave her his testamentary instructions, 
but Sophocles tells the story in the reverse order, so as 
to lay the strongest stress on the idea of the critical 
moment which is dramatically more important. The verbal 
repetition of yj>£vov , , ^ povov reinforces this
emphasis" (37).
On the other hand, Norton states that the tablet
contained Heracles' will, and that denotes
"the contents of this testamentary document" (38). 
However, I agree with Kamerbeek and Jebb in interpreting
the word as "letter" or "signs" as opposed to "covenant",
which seems to be Norton's interpretation.
Since the majority view holds that the tablet 
contained an oracle, it is best to begin my discussion of 
it by citing the evidence which seems to support this 
view.
There are other references to the oracle in the 
play. One of these occurs when Deianira is trying to 
persuade her son, Hyllus to find out what has happened to 
Heracles:
Ay. Up* o U &oc S y r 1, A r (rtcvov , As R e t i r e  }ujl
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.^ot/re7ot jT ie r* ^ ^ p u)
Y'A . T*. TroTeiw , fx< jr^ p } rfc/ * 6 yov y *  1°  kyra£>.
/i'y. ws -y Tfe^vr'yV -n>£ f!> '*v  fjusjva^4* tsk<CrT^
^  TOV TtY U p *-* % &*•*'' ks TO y*V 6Tepo \/
“r b v  - \ f i i n o v  *j £«j  p i o r o ' f  •
(Soph. Trach. 76-81)
In this quotation, no reference is made to the oracle 
being written on a tablet, but the verb a.-kiaui is used as 
opposed to , which suggests that Heracles did not
just tell her the oracle, but left something on which its 
terms were written. The words i j s . . . k^e i v indicate that 
Deianira knows the terms of the oracle. When the chorus 
refers to the prophecy (39) it does not state whether it 
was written down or not. However, in a moment of 
revelation when Heracles realises the real meaning of the 
oracle, he states that he did write it down.
pC T& V  o p & t'U v >C<xc ^  x.pLotc icocTo^yf 6
A-\UV 66fcA, 6 u V  o < \£ o S  6 ^ pet
/r/ris ry<, TTcCTptJUS K.*2  TTo*.~vy A&06OX)
(Soph. Trach. 1166-1168)
The reference to writing here suggests that the tablet 
probably contained the terms of the oracle.
However, lines 155-172 which narrate the relating of 
the oracle also include an account of Heracles' will. 
Even though Easterling states that the terms of each are
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juxtaposed for dramatic effect, this could lead to 
confusion in the minds of the audience, since one would
expect Deianira to say that Heracles told her what was to
happen to his property and then related the oracle which 
was written on the tablet. The sequence of events as 
supposed by Easterling, namely Deianira mentions the 
tablet, then states that Heracles made an oral will, and 
following this relates what Heracles told her was written 
on the tablet seems illogical, since a completely 
irrelevant subject is interposed between tablet and 
oracle. So this passage is more easily interpreted as 
meaning that the tablet contained a disposition of 
property as well as a record of the oracle. The reason 
why the will is not mentioned elsewhere in the play in 
connexion with the oracle is that it is irrelevant to the 
plot, whereas the plot revolves around the interpretation 
of the oracle. It is probable that the will is mentioned 
in lines 155-163 for a dramatic purpose. Earlier on in 
the play, the subject of the tablet was introduced with 
ominous words (40). When its contents are revealed to be 
both a will and an oracle, the audience is further 
prepared for Heracles' death, since wills are
inextricably linked with dying.
The terms of the will concern the testator' s
family. Firstly Heracles made provision for his wife:
... nxe/ a re  J  f * '  x . r y t i ' /  . • •
(Soph. Trach. 161-162)
am
Concerning this, the first scholi/f on these lines reads:
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TTpO 6 ljiC6 LV /XcLfie'Cv 1~*jv TTpoZiCfi. KoCL
T*  $'£>pOL * fit* 6 ? to 'v  pJe^ovs it^ ry & U  fuyv.
(Schol. Trach. 162A)
This suggests that the words 7\£pv$ icr^en/ refer to
Deianira's dowry which she had brought with her together
with any gifts which Heracles may have made to her (41). 
However, it was possible for a husband to increase his 
wife's dowry on arranging this matter in event of death
(42), so the words K^crvs icrijec/ might not necessarily 
indicate that Heracles intended Deianira to take with her 
a dowry of exactly the same amount as she had brought 
with her. There is no indication of the precise value of 
Deianira's dowry, so it is open to conjecture whether 
Heracles increased the amount or not. Since there is 
evidence from fifth-century Athens that a man could give 
a woman gifts in addition to her dowry (43), it is 
possible that K.T'Cjtti* could also include these.
The provision of a dowry for Deianira is an example of 
anachronism, since it seems as if dowries were not 
customary in the heroic age of Greece (44). Secondly, 
Heracles divides his property amongst his sons:
... get.fc S ' y *  retcvoi*
- S -  r  \ yy'ys diKLp&To/ . . . .
(Soph. Trach. 162-163)
It is not specifically stated here how much property each 
of the sons should receive. Kamerbeek seems to assume 
that each son will receive an equal share of patrimony
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(45), but since there is no precise evidence concerning 
this, the matter is purely conjectural. Segal states
that the will characterizes Heracles as a father-figure
(46), which indeed it does.
The reference to the will being written is an
example of anachronism, since writing was not known in
the heroic age (47). Indeed, Deianira herself is depicted 
as not understanding the contents of the tablet (48), 
which suggests that she is illiterate. However, the 
material on which the will is inscribed, namely a tablet, 
is in accordance with early Greek customs, since such a 
practice is referred to in Homer (49).
Therefore, the tablet on which the oracle was 
written very probably did contain Heracles' will. The 
terms of this will are anachronistic and indicate that it 
was probably customary for a family man to make such 
terms in ^ his will in fifth-century Athens.
There are thus various instances of anachronism in 
the evidence concerning wills and inheritance in Greek 
tragedy. These are references to wills being written 
down, the provision of a dowry for the testator's wife, 
the appointment of a guardian for his son, and the
function of a will as an inventory. It is these 
instances of anachronism which can be taken as indicative 
of fifth-century practices.
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Inheritance in Aristophanes
There is no need to attempt to discern anachronism 
when discussing inheritance in Aristophanes, since in his 
form of comedy, real-life situations and political events 
are taken and satirized. However, a different kind of 
caution needs to be employed when examining evidence from 
this source, since Aristophanes may distort or exaggerate 
for comic effect, and so it is necessary to deduce 
whether what is said is literally true or a joke. It is 
in the works of Aristophanes that the word 
occurs for the first time in extant Greek literature.
There is also some information concerning the right of a 
bastard to inherit his father's property.
In Aristophanes' Birds. Heracles, Poseidon and a
Triballian god enter Cloudcuckooland trying to arrange a 
settlement whereby the gods can be permitted passage
through the new kingdom so that they will be able to 
receive men's sacrifices. While this is happening, 
Peisthetaerus states that Heracles is a bastard and so is 
unable to inherit any of his father's property:
7To. T< S ' o l c * J rr^A-dct;
rot. i-u £ ol-u t 6 \ / .  y * p  K iro Q o c ry
j r o c r o - v r o t a .  r j  /  f * . ,
7T£v"p cv. 6 o d  yoLp {&tr<x.'/TK. ‘
T* Wypt-Q' > 06' £ Z i . i r o
-n  ^ i
7T *. oo oy ee vep 6 * u,
SeOp'  cos eju' v-tray Z p y * 6 *, tV<* ^
-84-
&J 6 } o Q«rZos & vBv^jyt a v .
T & Y  y i . p  TTc<Tpc jc j \  u .v .o i.p 'ij y L t r & O T L  S o l
(otLT"*. 7C>i)S rtf/LLOVS' yS B oS , yo(.p & i H.OTJ yv“y * t O S .  
H p . l y t i  r 6 # o s j  t C  T ^ y e i s )
77"/. 6V pLOYTOL y^
y& yV'/aU.kCC S> • J  jrc o s  <*V rro rs
f e n i i c X - y p o  y e i v v - L  r y Y  JA £ y Y u , i * » *  S ojc6-?  s y
o Z & o c v  Q v y v L T & p 'j  o v t o o v  y v y s t o J v ;
H p • T C  S' S T n * - T n } p  4 U OO  T < x  x P ' f y p L H . T * .
Y o & e t  a t  t r  0 6  Y J
TTt  . o  Yoyuos <x.Hrk r  d * £ .
o^to s  <5 T7o6&uS(2y 7Tpt*>To$  ^ o's CTra/cpA o vis
c * . v & & 6 o x i  T c o v  s r # . r p Z o j * y p - y / 4 . * - r u j Y
Q 4.6K -coy b tS s X .^ 0 ^  S iv r k s  et^oc l  y v y s t o s .  
k p io  Se Yjoll Td *  ^ S X M i V O i ,  600 YOjjLoV
‘ vo&oo $ e  M y  ZcYta h y y ib r s f a L V  W o d S r i*  S ytu sy
y vy 6 L.vv. s<Z.r £Z TTv-iSeS ju.y oJ6 l  y^y6 i Ot / ro t s
i y y v r * . r t *  y e ^o o /%  jL s e re Z s # .L . tu>*. y f y y L 9 . r o > * .
Hp. iyco l S' * f> ' o v S I y r £ *  rrocrfZ^v y p yp L ^ r^ j*
p j t r e t T u v - j
I f , .  o i  p u c /T o o  ysw. A > o c .  S e
ydy b' b TToc-ryf eUyyKy' 'e$ rout, pp*(rep^ s ;
Pip. ov Si}T * 6p.£ y&• &K.Z S ijT ' &SolC/UOL ]^ 6 * 77’<xAoc‘.
(Aristoph. Birds. 1641-1670)
Much of the humour in this quotation lies in the fact 
that Heracles is treated as an ordinary Athenian resident 
as opposed to a demi-god (50). Lines 1644-1645 refer to 
the Athenian system of succession whereby a legitimate
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son was entitled to receive all of his father's property,
and the compfedy here lies in the reference to Zeus dying,
since he is an immortal and will not die. Peisthetaerus
states that Poseidon is mistaken, and Heracles is not
entitled to any of Zeus' property because he is a
bastard. The reason he is regarded as such is because
his mother is a , since she is a mortal and Zeus is
rv\<w>e
a god. Patterson states that this statement is cwid in 
relation to no particular law at all (51). However, she 
later says that this passage indicates that "the child of 
a Xene was in the popular mind a nothos". and that this 
is Pericles' citizenship law (52), since Pericles' law of 
451-450 decreed that to be an Athenian citizen, one had
to be born of citizen parents to possess civic rights and 
to be considered legitimate (53). Therefore, it is
probable that the words voQos y * f • • • are a
reference to Pericles’ citizenship law. Athene is
referred to as being Zeus' £rrt-x.*>ypos
(y  . y Yy e'C co/ ) t and here the amusement lies partly in
the statement' s inaccuracy, since Zeus had legitimate 
sons, such as Ares and Hephaestus. Harrison indirectly 
indicates another humorous implication when he states
that if one takes Peisthetaerus seriously, "he argues 
that Athene was Zeus' eirCccXajpos and that Poseidon would 
get the property - by marrying Athene presumably, though 
Peisthetaerus does not say this" (54). This implication 
is amusing since Athene was a virgin goddess, and 
marriage would be unthinkable to her, although an 
Athenian had no choice in whom she married (55).
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Peisthetaerus then quotes a law concerning the
inheritance of bastards, which he ascribes to Solon
(kpto . - - ypy pi oL.r oJ \S ) (56). The genitive
absolute, jroCtSuv y v p e i^ v  ± s probably conditional,
and thus suggests that a bastard may have counted as a 
relative if there were no legitimate children. The next 
clause of the law which is quoted concerns what would 
happen if there were no legitimate sons, namely that
those nearest in would then share (pL&r&Ts<*-1 ) the
property, and this suggests that a bastard might well 
have been able to inherit some property in default of 
legitimate sons (57). This indicates that the only reason 
why Heracles is to have no share of Zeus' property is 
because there is a legitimate daughter, Athene. The
reference to Heracles not having been introduced into a
phratry is an indication that the rule that only 
legitimate sons could be admitted into the phratry 
existed in Aristophanes' time as well as in the time of
Isaeus (58).
Therefore, since the Athenian audience would have 
only found the situation amusing if a law prohibiting 
bastards to inherit if there were legitimate sons, or be
enrolled in a phratry, had been current at the time, it
is very probable that such a law existed. The passage
also suggests that the references in tragedy to bastards 
inheriting all of their father's property (59) are 
probably not indicative of fifth-century practices.
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It is also in Aristophanes7 Birds that the 
word SiK&jtoJ is found meaning "covenant" for the first 
time in extant Greek literature:
7  3  v  p P i  Pi .ca)>X < 0  fJ i£ r\S  o  i? j
7  ^ $ t£  Q t^Ovr y *  OcS’^ r & tC-y y &pLOo
^  *  t r & p  o  t t C t c o s  ~r <+/ y v v e t jL j*  t  & &  t  o  ^
0 f*OTTO fj.-yt~Gs £  \fot\S TOUT^^ 6p<-6
o p h i t e  6r&* € s<h *.lv S p v r r e t f  —
Xo. ovr i -nan
t (>v  j  o v S o L p rto s .
7Tl . ovtCj TuxfOtfXtcu Xeyoo-
X o -  8t*.Tt 9 irp A .L  y»£.
T f t -  rtfp,p5 p y yvy Txvrn'’ pco<~ •
v y s ■> \ s — — ^
AO- 6 /u .w p  e r ^  -ro-TJ-TOis f p-<*6t. yiK .*.y  ro ^ s  ncp<-f~<Ki. ^
ICokC ro ts  0 erO^Tai.i,i -jTot. 6 <-<s .
(Aristoph. Birds. 438-446)
The verb $m.rC and its noun ShlQ^k.'ij are used
constantly in this quotation to mean a pledge between two
fcWl <9 <• /
parties, and ^ is another sense of the preposition
which means "between" here. Norton states that he does
not think that "it would be possible to find a more 
definite and explicit meaning of a word than that
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of in this passage. If there were no other
occurrence of it in the language, this would be 
sufficient to establish the signification of solemn 
compact or covenant11 (60). This definition of the word
will have to be borne in mind when considering the 
word S n.& 'v jitsy as referring to "will" or "testament",
where SiL takes the meaning "in different directions".
The first time Six&yicy is mentioned meaning "will" 
is actually in an earlier play by Aristophanes, namely 
Wasps which was performed in 422. This play is an
amusing attack on the jury system of Athens and on Cleon 
(61). The major comic character, Philocleon, is an old 
man who is obsessesed with being on a jury, and one of 
the major reasons for this is the pleasure and power 
which he obtains from it (62). One of the instances of
him showing his power is the adjudication of an estate 
and its & trC pos:
k & v  & tt oQ'Y'Vj&tc.u}!/ & TcJ $ u£ ffw/
TTolS* £irC*c x-y p o 
icAoS-e*.* yp.e?± r-yfV A y * e itro ^re^  r f j
} yc.oy^ j^ ~ryj tt* m  66rjj.^^S to?> h y p L t c o c e r r 6 i>6 y j- 
USopLfsv TocOt-yv f ar i S ocv yp.oi% Lvt ifion-ye <*-i <4. ^  rrei-*?) .
K ^ u  Tici?r J k\S VTT&V 0  V \sO L. ■ T 5 " OV<$epU.J
« ? K 1 -
VOlfT £ y£/° VOc f’O U T" uJ */ L>-> * &^p y >C6k» fie ^  .
r y  5 S J i  w t. c x y p o v  T y s  xc^.x^kZ<> r v/u.xJ^ .jv'.
(Aristoph. Wasps, 583-589)
-89-
This quotation contains the earliest reference in Athens 
to the position of an heiress. One of the clauses in 
Solon's law concerning eTTLXAypOt- was that a man with a 
legitimate daughter could make a will adopting a son so 
long as the adopted son married the girl (63), and it 
seems as if the will in this passage has this function.
This quotation also indicates the ordinary man's 
attitude to a will, since although Philocleon can hardly 
be called a typical Athenian, he is such a clown and a 
rascal, wills were often regarded with suspicion, either 
because their validity was questionable or because they 
were thought to be forgeries (64). This attit£ude is, as 
Dover rightly states, exaggerated into one which is "not 
only fundamentally contemptuous of law, but has some 
affinity with a cowardly delinquency which earned very 
strong disapproval, injury to widows, orphans and 
heiresses" (65). The implication that injury is being 
done to the girl lies in the fact that she is legally 
obliged to marry, and so have sexual intercourse with the 
man to whom the court gives her, and Philocleon states 
that he will give her to the most persuasive speaker 
(line 586), which indicates a disregard for her father's
wishes. This idea that the girl will be sexually abused 
is more fully expressed in line 589, where the 
words ✓ ---
have a double meaning and can either refer to the will or 
to the heiress' physical condition (6 6 ). Philocleon's 
attitude towards the document is also indicated in the 
words puLx*?* 7 ^/ **6 fk a.-vj
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, and in the adverb 6&/JLv<Zs which almost 
personifies the seals. MacDowell rightly states that 
these words are "a variation of the type of joke in which 
an important man is treated rudely; many people sometimes 
wish they would ignore or tear up an important document" 
(67).
This passage also provides some information 
concerning the sealing of a will. The seal or seals were 
generally made by a piece of molten wax being stamped by 
a special device which was normally engraved on a piece 
of metal (6 8 ). Here the plural eytte io i-G t ✓
is used/ which suggests that on the will which 
Philocleon is envisaging, there is more than one seal. 
The seals referred to here are not the original ones, 
because these would have been broken for the contents of 
the will to be perused. Therefore, it is more probable 
that these seals are those placed on the document by the 
persons who read it after the testator' s death, and maybe 
by others who witnessed this reading (69). The 
word Krofyy means the case in which the seal was enclosed, 
and this is the only example of this meaning of the word 
occurring in extant classical Greek literature. The
scholia on Aristophanes' Wasps attempt to explain the 
word as follows:
Co i S ■ V T  A I d
ToitS 6<f/o*cyL(><- Cv)
£/£•<.€/. R A-6-^acs V f f i iJ J .
S l no i c c y ^ v A - iu J  r y  6TT i
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t o  u  ( f t t s v l ^ B u s ' -  t o O<, r ' i j t r o V t> oc^r^s^ V f/Q id L .
5 B 5 b  o ^ i .  g v  t < *S  s  & < p /0 < *y  Z 6<. ' rxTs ^  t o Z*> y p x . y . f X K T e ^ S
'c6n v v 'Vjroc ux>yy\) $1T‘-ri&6’ix(,LVJ o rro> s /u.y
ot T'VlfDi. CKVTiZov ' d f U x  c &  T i. £f0tOV
( I ;rfrr't&ov'S i ) c  ic & y 'y  v 7 \ . t j  <) H./jLfx&i/O'/
(Schol. 585a, 585b, KostlC )
Here, the reason given for the use of a **7 X 1 is to
protect the seals, on a document, so that the impressions 
on the seal will not vanish, (presumably by being rubbed 
or otherwise tampered with). The material vti-feh which
a was made from is assumed to have been shell
( ). This assumption is also made by MacDowell,
who states that a K-tyxy was "either made from a
sea-shell or else shaped like one" (70). However, since 
the purpose of such an object was to protect something, 
it seems unlikely that a brittle substance such as shell 
would be of much practical value, since it could break
very easily. Therefore it is necessary to look at
MacDowell's second alternative, in which he suggests that 
a could be shell-shaped. However, he is not quite
exact here, because shell-shaped can imply various
different forms. The definition of the word given by 
Liddell and Scott states that in addition to meaning
"shell", yj can also mean anything shaped like a
mussel shell, such as the boss of a shield, a small iron 
crucible or even an eye-socket (71). Therefore the shape 
would be roughly hemispherical. Since it would have not
been practical to make the seal cap from shell, the other
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meanings of i suggest that other materials could be 
used for this purpose such as metal or even carved bone.
Therefore, this passage indicates that in 
fifth-century Athens, a man could make a will in which he 
married his daughter to another and adopted him as his 
son. It can also be taken as evidence concerning the 
sealing of a will.
Thus, the evidence in Aristophanes concerning wills 
and the inheritance of bastards indicates that it was 
contrary to law for a bastard to inherit all of his 
father's property in Athens, that the word could
also mean a solemn compact, and that wills in the 
fifth-century had adoption as one of their functions.
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this 
chapter shows that the will in fifth-century Athens had 
various functions. It could be made by a man with 
legitimate sons and either act as an inventory or contain 
provisions for the testator's wife and children, and a 
man with no legitimate sons was able to adopt by means of 
a testament. It could also function as a bequest. In 
addition, the passage from Aristophanes' Wasps indicates 
that by 422 a man was taking the precaution of having his
will sealed, presumably so that it would not be tampered 
with.
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Chapter 4
The Alteration of Solon's law of testament 
by the Thirty Tyrants (404/403)
The period between the years 411 and 402 was a time
of constitutional upheaval in Athens. It was also
accompanied by a revision of the ancestral laws, which
took place in three separate stages: 411-404, 404/3 and
403/2. The stage which is relevant to my discussion in 
the second, since there is evidence that the wording of 
the law of testament was changed in 404/3 when the Thirty 
Tyrants were in power in Athens.
The account of the alteration of this law is given 
by Aristotle:
K.d£ TCJV %60C d i*p .< ft6/& r j r y66i$ 6^ ° ^  T&
K V pO i yV T fiis  ttsTs ictt. r£  w  a j o> ^ *£rr*> *0(0 & ou
TTOi.ovvr«fj> d L ** iu < {i6 f i-y  T 'y re *  r y *  w o u rk - C ^ j ■ c lo *  ~ r£ /? l ro'D
£ov tv. %<Kvrov co oiv ncvpiOr trocj4ci<*T£-i cat 8 xrrvx.Jf,
S e  r f p O A l v 6 o c $  S v Q t C O ^ L a u i  p . ' y  f A t L S i . Z * ' /  y  y  T j j p u / V  y
L/
yv/«4,ici ITu96 jjk.6: SC if "* oL * tlTLOS }J.y y  rOc £ G'li-COiftX.STv-tj
}£^0 i ’
([Aristotle], Ath. Pol, xxxv, 2)
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With reference to this quotation, it is firstly necessary 
to discuss the extent to which the Thirty altered Solon's 
law of testament. Sandys wonders whether the Thirty 
permitted men with legitimate sons complete freedom of 
testament, which would allow the bequest of an estate 
away from a legitimate son (1). In addition, 
Ruschenbusch states that the clauses governing the making 
of a will were removed by the Thirty (2), which also
suggests that absolute freedom of testation was allowed.
On the other hand, Rhodes thinks that refers
only to the words which follow it,
namely feTx©*' (3), and this suggests that
men with legitimate children were not given complete
freedom of testament. In addition, the author of the 
Ath. Pol, is referring to the removal of the ambiguities 
in Solon's law, and two of the clauses concerning the
capacity to make a will, namely the existence of a
legitimate son or the fact that the testator had been 
adopted, are matters which in most cases it would have 
been difficult to dispute (4). In addition these
exceptions are not open to misinterpretation.
The clauses which are quoted as having been deleted 
bu the Thirty are those concerning madness, old age and
persuasion by a woman. These are not, however, a 
complete list of the exceptions in Solon's law which were 
probably open to misinterpretation, since the list reads 
as follows:
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0iv  }jJ*J ju.<KVLi2>v yypcJs y  (jfifftktLolx/ y" \/660V
$j ywcxi-yCu m>L0^ ir^ o $  > ^ ^  tv  v t ^ v  rov tra^pa. Y o[ov^
$ j  -v i r *  J L s tL y u ,y $  y  v t r o  S eb fjuzv  K & T *  < f9 e is .
( [Dem. ] xlvi, 14)
All of these clauses are open to dispute because it is 
not specifically stated what constituted persuasion by a 
woman, influence of drugs, sickness and so on. This 
would be left to the discretion of the courts. In 
addition, the law was often paraphrased by those who 
referred to it (5), and this is what the author of the 
Ath. Pol, may have done. Therefore, it is very likely 
that the Thirty deleted all of the exceptions which could 
have been regarded as ambiguous.
It is now necessary to discuss the motivation of the 
Thirty in deleting these clauses from the law.
Aristotle states that the motivation behind the 
alteration of the law was to prevent sycophancy 
(orrtjs... ). Asheri agrees with Aristotle's statement,
and says that "the reform was directed against sycophants
which had flourished in the radical democracy" (6 ). 
Bonner and Smith state that the alteration of Solon's 
testamentary law is cited by Aristotle as an example of 
the Thirty changing laws in order to prevent sycophancy 
(7).
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The word & vfco favrys was a term of abuse as opposed 
to a term of law, so a testamentary heir who was accused 
of relying on an invalid will might well call the one 
claiming to be the heir "ab intestato" a sycophant. In
addition, it was often used with reference to a man who 
"made a practice of prosecuting without justification, 
whether because he hoped to get an innocent defendant 
convicted and so obtain a payment due to a successful 
prosecutor, or because he hoped to blackmail the
defendant into bribing him to drop the case" (8 ).
In the procedure for claiming an estate under a will (9), 
there are three possible openings for sycophants. 
Firstly, a man could come forward claiming an estate for 
himself, alleging that he was a relative of the deceased, 
and that the will was invalid, in the hope that the 
testamentary claimant would bribe him to drop the case. 
Even though the term was often used with
reference to prosecutors, it is possible that such a man
would be called a by the other claimant.
Secondly, a sycophant could act as a prosecutor for false 
witness against one who had solemnly declared that the 
testator had legitimate sons, so the will was not valid. 
This is improbable, since Aristotle uses the word
sycophant to imply that such a man would contest the 
validity of a will, not defend it. Thirdly, the 
sycophant may have been the one who had sworn the solemn 
statement that there were legitimate children fathered by 
the testator, but this is unlikely, since the word 
sycophant was often used to refer to a prosecutor rather 
than defendant.
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In addition, the second and third possibilities would not 
have been prevented by the alteration of the law, since 
the clause concerning legitimate sons was probably not 
deleted by the Thirty. Therefore, it seems as if the 
first possibility was the most likely. However, one
would not expect many sycophants in inheritance cases, 
since generally only relatives of the deceased or
testamentary heirs had any standing in these. The major 
exception to this would be if a man had died abroad after
a long absence from Athens, as Nicostratus did, and in
this case there were allegedly many false claimants 
(1 0).
In view of the lack of possible openings for sycophants 
in inheritance cases, it seems very improbable that the 
major reason for the alteration of this law was to 
prevent sycophancy. Therefore, the assumption of Asheri 
and Bonner and Smith is not correct.
There is another possibility concerning the 
motivation of the Thirty. The rhetra of Epitadeus, which 
permitted complete freedom of testament in Sparta, was 
probably introduced in the late fifth century (11). It 
is possible that the Thirty may have been influenced by
this law since they were supporters of Sparta. The law 
is mentioned by Plutarch and Aristotle:
St Tt* k v y p  Se icocc ^flCXerroS1
rdv' r p o r r o £ jT irkS tv s  o/oft*., upbs vcS / o*.VTtg
$ld.QopV$j CfOyTp*./ 6 \f € ^ €rc.y<fJ- TOT o^>co/ ec >Cocl,
T O /  ICoCl. K-CC^
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_ TTbi,V B’GjJs&V0 V
(Plut. Aais. 5, 3 )
& .V & 6 &*. L fjLev y&'f9 J T y s  vrTA/9jf0v6<*.lfj £ lT o {y .6 6 V
O-li MNOVj Sp$U)S ffb<s>j6ex$ } ScSf/oLc $& Kxxt A.6-t/Tftt.y
ijfOVBcetV 6 &cd<er T^XS /QoV^ O^ JLQ WOtS'
(Aristotle, Pol. 1270a)
In the first of these quotations, the
words f/jPos - £<*.^ qpoc*5 imply that Epitadeus introduced 
his law as a result of an argument with his son. This 
indicates that Spartan law granted freedom of testation 
to a man with legitimate male offspring. Both quotations 
suggest that the freedom to make a will was absolute, and 
that there were no clauses in the law which regulated a 
man7 s capacity to do this. Asheri states that the 
testamentary law of Sparta was not connected with 
adoption, since both Plutarch and Aristotle "use the
terms $ i S£v+.l and which in Attic sources
design free forms of will, while the institution of an 
adopted heir is called or e^ecro tec s <- <>
(12). However, this argument is not convincing, because 
Plutarch uses the word SWri.p e /o v  in conjunction
with *cocTv.7urr&x s . Since there is no indication in 
either Plutarch or Aristotle that the Spartan law of 
testament concerned adoption, it is more likely that it
legalized absolute freedom of bequest. Even though the 
Thirty deleted some of clauses concerning a man7 s 
capacity to make a will, it was only those which were
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open to misinterpretation, so they probably did not 
delete the clauses excepting men with legitimate sons or 
those who had been adopted. This indicates that their 
reform of the law was not as far-reaching as the 
innovation of Epitadeus. In view of this, it seems as if 
the Thirty were not influenced by the Spartan law of 
testament to any great extent.
There is another possible cause for the alteration 
of this law. Pseudo-Aristotle states that the Thirty 
diminished the power of the jurY courts
(kolZ rb  ic-vfios . - - TroKire/io^.^ ), and gives the deletion of
the various clauses in the law of testament as an example 
of this. This suggests that the clauses in Solon' s law 
which were deleted were often the cause of much 
litigation, and this would not be favoured by the Thirty, 
since there is also evidence that the Thirty took other 
steps to curtail the power of the courts (13). This 
indicates that the primary motivation of the Thirty in 
ammending this law was probably the reduction of the
power of the juries, which would in turn strengthen their 
own position.
The fact that certain clauses in the law were
removed does not necessarily indicate that the Thirty
tampered with the (14), since the *
probably survived until about 130 or later (15). In
addition, in [Dem. ] xlvi, 14, the Solonian law of
testament is quoted in what seems to be its original form 
(16). Therefore, it is more likely that the Thirty
rendered the Solonian law of testament invalid by
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inscribing a new, shortened version of the law.
In conclusion, the Thirty did not legalize complete 
freedom of testament to every male member of the Athenian 
population in line with the Spartan law, but this was 
probably limited to those who were neither adopted nor 
had legitimate sons. It is very likely that the major 
reason behind this ammendment was the reduction of the 
power of the courts. The fact that this alteration was 
removed after the democracy was restored is indicated by 
the evidence from fourth-century Athens in which the 
clauses concerning old age, madness and so on were used 
as evidence against the validity of a will in a court of 
law (17).
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Historia
Chapter 5
The Capacity to Dispose of Property bv Testament
'it
The law of Solon, as ^  is quoted in part in the
speeches by the Attic orators (1) does not specifically
state what status one had to have with reference to
citizenship in order to dispose of one's property by
testament. However, the Attic orators would have only
bo
quoted those passages which were relevant -©t their 
respective cases, so this does not necessarily mean that 
such a clause was not included in the law. On the other 
hand, there is evidence that Solon included in his law 
certain clauses concerning insanity, the influence of a 
woman and so on (2). Therefore, I shall firstly discuss 
whether non-citizens were able to make wills in Athens, 
and then I shall attempt to define what limitations were 
imposed on these and Athenian citizens in terms of the 
capacity to make a will.
A slave was himself the property of his master (3), 
and any small amount of property which he could have 
acquired during his lifetime, such as necessary clothing,
was automatically returned to his owner after his death. 
Therefore a slave had no testamentary rights.
There is relatively little information concerning 
the position of non-citizen freedmen with reference to 
their capacity to make a will. This might well be 
because freedmen probably did not own a substantial 
amount of property, since slaves were often manumitted
-109-
on or after the death of their master (4), and so would 
probably be fairly old on becoming free, and as a result, 
might not have the time to make much money. Therefore, 
such cases would not have been worth contesting. On 
being granted his freedom, an ex-slave had to be 
registered as a metic or a resident alien by his former 
master who became his patron (trpo* 5 ) (5 ). if he
died having produced legitimate children after his 
emancipation, they would become his heirs. It is,
however, uncertain whether children born before he was 
freed would qualify to inherit from him. They probably 
did not, since slaves were not permitted to marry, 
although they could cohabit, and the children of such a 
union would have been regarded as bastards, and were 
therefore outside the (6 ). In addition, such
children would have been regarded as slaves themselves, 
in which case any property which they might have been
able to own would have been regarded as the property of 
their master. Was a freedman without legitimate children 
permitted to dispose of his property by means of a will?
There is some evidence concerning this question.
In Isaeus iv, two of the claimants of Nicostratus' 
estate, which was allegedly disposed of by means of a
will, came forward stating that he was their freedman:
S ’ 0 JtflU K p o L **b &  TO pL6V 5 ^ / /
t(fvL6e^ -T0V A/iC0ff Tpi-T O V  TcL7<£.*TOV £-6 , kt7£l§y
S'dVfc e l x ° y t o v t o Sfirtjr*!; 4 i r e x e v & e . p o v  o c v ro * ' e*ti t o j *
/■ v ? tfTf>0$& (70  L >j 6 OLjTO 6 6/oCl
(Is. iv, 9)
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However, the major argument in Isaeus iv is that the will 
of Nicostratus is a forgery (7), so it is more likely 
that Ctesias and Cranaus did not claim that the 
master-freedman relationship overrode a will, but that 
the will was a forgery.
In the Rhetoric to Alexander, there is an example of 
an argument to be presented in a law court:
'n r & p  o s i t - x y p o * &p *ou c  i r e  r ro ty  tovs
y O'/Tots T o t l  otTToUdv falTO fcovet- </ f rw ^
T o v  i L T t e ^ v B e p o v  -p p y y c ^ r  u»v l p £  w /  p p o e  n c v p io v
' t £j v  y # ,p  € o c . \ / r ^ v  clt/ t o s
T e r& n e v T y  tc o ru ^  e y y v ro L r * )  y & v o v $  pct/ tvs <vV icot-Z toj ✓
krrtfi-ev&zpo*'/ $Ck. * lo% &V c-ty i/
([Aristotle], Rhetoric to Alexander. 1422b)
No will is mentioned in this passage, so it refers to a 
freedman who died intestate. The words Kvp<ov and *PX(r'"'/  
suggest that even though the freedman's original sponsor, 
(TTpcertLTys ) had died, he was still technically a member 
of the household from which he was freed, so the heirs of 
his former master had the right to inherit his estate if 
he died childless. The word ${ io llOs implies that it
was both according to law and social custom that this
should happen.
Therefore, neither of these passages provides
conclusive evidence as to whether a freedman could
dispose of his property by testament.
There is a clause in the will of Theophrastus, as 
quoted by Diogenes Laertius, which is relevant to the
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question of whether freedmen had testamentary rights:
TfopTTV itccc Qp€TTTy $7<.tzU QefOi 0V 6 c Ko<c
yJpTv rro x x ^ v  yp 6 ct*.v  rro<p66]( y p e  \Sot<>; t d  tl TrytoTfpov ejyovbt
I7 *p j y p iJv  i c e e ?  n  ocl/ tc I  e tc ry e o ti /ro  ict*o oc v V /  TT<^ pJ
Ir r r r d p y o u  0 i6 r o t s  S/0<Xy(/4ois J
<&6 <f CL\£) s oipV> i ^ 6 T /  fkVTdTS V(TV*pyei.V T0CV7o^/  tc TT6 p
tCLL o i i j r o b  ^ L e - x i ^ ^ y v  t f e \ a i v T J  K *lZ  7Z<.y X .p e O i/T L  IT  hCrO\A!<iCIS
ItcLC fToL/TtL fA.0L Bvy!CCCff:Tt9e^TO •
(D. L. v, 54)
The interpretation of this passage is disputed. Wyse
states that this clause " has been interpreted as a
renunciation of the right of succession possessed by -the
heirs of the patron" (8 ). It is not stated who has
interpreted the passage in this manner, but this is what
the words i<*.Q&.wep ■.. 6vyic^ T eT i9e '/ro imply. Wyse himself
suggests that Theophrastus' intention may have been " to
prevent disputes about the conditions of the term of
service {rr^ptKpLOY-^ ), during which the so-called freedman
was sometimes in a position hardly distinguishable from
slavery, and to ensure that the heirs did not send
p
Ponj^ ylus and Threpta out into the world stripped of all 
they possessed" (9). Wyse's argument here is
inconsistent, because if Theophrastus' intention was to 
regulate his ex-slaves' terms of service for his heirs, 
then they would not be going "out into the world" with or 
without possessions, but would be remaining in the house 
serving Melantes and Pancreon. It is very dubious
whether Melantes and Pancreon could avail themselves of
Pompylus' and Threpta's property whilst the ex-slaves
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were still living. This is because a freedman had only 
three disabilities with regard to property: he could not 
own land in Attica, anything which he had earned as a 
slave was regarded as being the property of his master, 
and if he was required to pay a particular sum to his 
manumittor as a condition of his emancipation, this also 
was not his (10). These conditions excepted, all 
property owned by a freedman was his and could not be 
taken from him in the manner which Wyse suggests, as this 
would constitute theft. In addition, Pompylus and 
Threpta are not said to have been affected by any of the 
property disabilities outlined above, since no land is 
mentioned, also they have long been
free, tt6c AoCa. exevQ-epoi^ 0 ^6 ^ / therefore the money
which they have earned was presumably gained after their 
manumission, and Theophrastus does not mention any debt 
due to him from them as a condition of their
manumission. The fact that their property does belong to 
them so that they can dispose of it by will if they so
wish, is further indicated by the word ot£(^e(7v£5 which in
the legal sense is interpreted as "securely" (1 1 ), which 
here would indicate freedom of disposition, since
Pompylus' and Threpta's property was not alienable from
them other than after death.
Therefore, this passage from Diogenes Laertuis 
indicates that, in 280 when Theophrastus made his will, a 
freedman could not dispose of his property by testament 
unless he was permitted to do so by his former owner 
(12). It is probable that the position of a freedman in 
this respect was the same as it had been in the fourth
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century, since it is very unlikely that a freedman's 
rights were less restricted in the fourth century than 
they were in the third.
It was possible for the state to liberate a slave if 
he gave true information that his owner had committed 
sacrilege (13). There is no evidence which indicates 
what happened to the property of a man who had been 
liberated in this way. If he died childless, his former 
master would probably not have inherited it because he 
had not given his slave his freedom. Therefore, it could 
have been either inherited by the state or, because he 
had been of service to the state, he might have been 
permitted to dispose of it by testament.
Aliens who were not normally resident in Attica 
would not be bound by Attic law, and their capacity to 
dispose of property by testament would be determined by 
the law of their native state. However, any property 
which a non-resident alien left behind him in Athens when 
he died was adjudicable under Athenian law (14).
The testamentary rights of a non-freedman metic are 
not documented in any extant evidence (15). However, if 
freedmen could make wills if permitted to do so by their 
owners, it is possible that metics could also do this.
The fact that metics had testamentary rights by the third 
century is indicated by the wills of Aristotle, 
Theophrastus, Strato and Lyco (16), all of whom were 
metics, and Diogenes Laertius does not state that these 
documents were invalidated by an Athenian court of law. 
However, there is some evidence that metic status may 
have gradually disappeared by this time (17) so the fact
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that the peripatetic philosophers made wills cannot be 
regarded as evidence concerning the testamentary rights 
of metics in fourth-century Athens. It is, however,
probable that no metic who was granted the right to 
possess land in Attica could dispose of it by will unless 
he was specifically permitted to do so (18). If a metic 
was given the right of testation, and if the validity of
his will was questioned, the case would come before the
Polemarch's court (19).
Male Athenian citizens (20) could make a will, but 
as a general rule, they could not do so if they had
legitimate sons, and if they had female children, their
property had to be disposed of "with them" (21). There
were, however, some exceptions to this rule.
A man with illegitimate children was permitted to 
make a will since bastards had very limited inheritance 
rights under Athenian law (22). This is indicated by the 
fact that the speaker in Isaeus iii attempts to uphold 
his mother's claim to Pyrrhus' estate on grounds of 
kinship by asserting that Phile, the counter-claimant, is 
Pyrrhus' illegitimate daughter, and that this is why 
Pyrrhus adopted Endius by testament (23).
There is also a law which decreed that a father
could make a will if his sons were minors:
A/0M01
^ 0  t l  o t v  v ' i t u v  fr r T ^ y p
ib^v c£tto#o4Vc06i/ q I vieCi iT p t' &\tl T0^
lt9.rpoi> S i d £.vp(w fet/olu .
( [ Dem. ] xlvi, 24 )
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Lane-Fox suggests that this law is a lie by Apollodorus, 
(24) which implies that it is not genuine. However, the 
text suggests that it is a quotation from law which was 
read out not by Apollodorus but by the clerk of court, 
which indicates that it is genuine. The type of will 
allowed by this law is not specified. However, it 
probably would provide for the adoption of a son, because 
the reason why a man with children would wish to dispose 
of his property by testament to take effect only <fcf they 
died before or just after reaching adulthood was so that 
he could adopt another son by testament in view of this. 
This adopted son would then carry out the religious rites 
of the . The two-year limit was placed on the
time for allowing the validity of such a will because by 
the age of about twenty, the testator7 s son could either 
have been able to make a will himself { i f ,  for example, 
he was departing on military service); or, even though as 
a general custom, Athenian males married rather later in 
life (25), he could have married and produced sons of his 
own.
This law is quoted by Apollodorus who argues that 
since both himself and Pasicles are alive, the will 
written by his father Pasio is not valid (26). However,
this is not consistent with the fact that Pasio provided 
guardians for Pasicles (27), which would not have been 
done if he had intended the will to come into effect only 
if Pasicles died before he reached his majority or two 
years afterwards.
In addition, Karnezis questions the validity of the 
will made by Demosthenes (I). He states that the will
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was only to come into effect if the orator were to die 
during his minority or within two years of coming of age, 
and that the will was deliberately written in accordance 
with this law (28). Karnezis supports his hypothesis as 
follows:
"If his (ie. the elder Demosthenes' ) son died while still 
a minor and there was no will, then the two women (ie. 
Cleoboule and Demosthenes' sister) would be J rrt n-n-'+tpoo . 
Upon the decision of the court through a lawsuit 
) the next of kin who would claim Kleoboule 
(with her paternal property) (29) would be someone onn
her father's side, not a relative of Demosthenes'
household; his daughter would be claimed by his brother
Demon. To avoid this situation, the will was written to 
take effect only if his son died, in which case the women 
would marry only the men stated therein, ie, Aphobos and 
Demophon. As it happened, the marriages never took 
effect" (30).
However, Karnezis neglects to take account of the fact 
that Demophon was to receive the dowry of Demosthenes' 
sister immediately (et>9vi ), that Aphobus was to live in 
the family home until the younger Demosthenes came of age 
in addition to receiving a dowry with Cleoboule, and that
Therippides was to receive the interest on seventy minae 
until Demosthenes (II) came of age (31).
These bequests were taken by the beneficiaries soon after 
the death of Demosthenes (I), a fact which was admitted 
by the men themselves when each one is said to have 
stated that the others took the bequests given to them 
(32). Furthermore, if, as Demosthenes alleges, the will
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contained instructions about the leasing of the property, 
the testator would have intended these to be carried out 
immediately. In addition, Karnezis ignores the fact that 
the will nominated Aphobus, Therippides and Demophon as 
guardians of the children. The fact that they took up 
their position as guardians as instructed is indicated by 
the fact that Demosthenes (II) later prosecuted them for 
embezzling his property.
Therefore, since Karnezis does not take into account
the other functions of the will (33) which indicate that
it was to be acted upon immediately after the death of
the testator, his view that the document was invalid 
because it was only to take effect if Demosthenes (II)
were to die within two years of coming of age is not 
correct.
In addition to the type of will which was valid if a
kis
man's son died during the-ir minority or two years
afterwards, other forms of testament made by men with
legitimate children were legal.
In Lysias xiii, Dionysodorus, who was allegedly
betrayed by Agoratus, sends for his wife, the speaker's
sister, from his prison cell, and makes his will in the 
presence of her and his friends:
\ t V u v r Z b v  S& t Tyi A  ' o v v b o S o p o s  t<£
T€ o i i c e Z d .  r k  #.v t o v  S i i Q e r o  o n u s  oc v t Zj  i S t i c e i ,
TT£p' Wyopotrou rouroufc J6 Aeygi/ oTi * tri0S
t o u , Kcu. ’z t t L g  t c y m h v  k f o i  ico n -
rOUT(J T c J T-^ i f iX /T O V , £<*2 TOCS
T i j A . t f p l ' i V  V i r e p  ol.V  TO V  % y {p o < .T O V ' Kou T r j
N C /s ) / S J  ^ —y-ovcu-icc 'rjj <xvrov e(re6*y/r7~6 j v o p . a u r y v  icne*./
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' £  J* O L V T O V  j  y & v + j T o t - L  o C X t'H j TTq c l S 'L o v  j (p p lJ ^ G L V  f t p
■ y£i r o j A ^ v c p  o r e .  T o m ’ rr* L T e p p i o c & t o x ,  % y o p o c r c S  U r r e i c .  r e t v e ^
r nuO. u.e>*&v£<-\/ r i p c c j p Q T v  t j7 rsp  o ^ f o G  ejs <pov&< 
y
- OV'-r-V .
(Lysias, xiii, 41-42)
In this passage, the testator has not yet got a
legitimate child, but believes his wife to be pregnant by 
him (v'o^i.c.Jot'.. . octjtoG y  It is not stated whether the
will was written or oral, or what its provisions were. 
It is possible that the will was made to appoint 
guardians for the child and to set other matters of 
property in order (34). However, the purpose of this 
scene is not to digress upon Dionysodorus7 testament, but 
to arouse the pity of the jury by exploiting the pathos 
of the position of his wife and unborn child. This is 
indicated further by the request of vengeance upon 
Agoratus (35). On the other hand, this passage does make
clear the fact that one could make a will before the
birth of one7 s child, since it would have been necessary 
to regulate property matters just in case it did not 
survive. This is also indicated by the fact that the 
testator in Hyperides ii, col. 4 made a will, even though
his wife was pregnant at the time of his death.
In Lysias, xxxii, Diodotus makes a will and leaves 
two copies of it in the house. His capacity to do this 
is unquestioned by the speaker (36). The father of the 
orator Demosthenes also made a will (37), and when 
Demosthenes brought a lawsuit against his guardian, 
Aphobus, he did not question his rights to do so.
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The reason why the capacity of either of these two men to 
make a will is unquestioned seems to be that the children 
in both instances were under age, and it was therefore 
necessary for both the elder Demosthenes and Diodotus to 
regulate property matters with reference to their 
respective wives and children (38).
The question of the capacity of the banker Pasio to 
make a will is a little more complicated, since when he
died he had two sons, and one had come of age and the
other was still a minor. Pasio's will provided guardians 
for his younger son, Pasicles, bequeathed some goods and 
money to his wife, Archippe, and gave her as wife to 
Phormio, bequeathed a lodging house to his eldest son, 
Apollodorus, and provided for the management of the 
estate until Pasicles should come of age (39). Lacey
states that one of the factors which validated the will 
was the fact that Apollodorus was away from Athens at the 
time of Pasio's death (40). However, although 
Apollodorus himself states that Phormio married his
mother in his absence he does not say that he was not in
Athens when his father died:
’Ey i3 y&Pj ' $  Shc*.gtol C^  t t o k x o j v  ^pyjua.rto*' i) ro€
tnnj-po 5 -tocra. Sevres *.<*.£ nx vn * §of»/uu.u)v'o^  t-^ovros,
ere irpo* Ty* pyrepv. y y M ^ s r o s .  r y /
<k.Trd$7)mo3''r£>$ ipLoO Sypi0e'c<< Tpijp* v ro$ v p r y ---
( [ Dem. ], xlv, 3 )
Since Apollodorus' trierarchy took place in 369/8, and it 
was during this time that Phormio allegedly married 
Archippe , Lacey's suggestion that this coincided with
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Pasio7 s death in 371/0 is not correct. It may have been 
that Apollodorus was absent for other reasons when his 
father died, but in the absence of any evidence, this is 
purely conjectural. Therefore, it seems as if the 
allegation that the marriage of Archippe took place 
before Phormio took over the guardianship of Pasicles 
(41) is probably a misrepresentation of the facts. An 
important factor was that Pasicles was a minor and 
therefore Pasio had to make arrangements for his future 
well-being by providing guardians who would care for him 
and oversee the estate until he should come of age. If, 
as is alleged, Apollodorus was extravagant (42), this was 
an extremely wise move on the part of Pasio. Lacey 
states that Pasio7 s will "did not breach Solon7 s law, 
though it showed a fundamental weakness in it, since one 
son was adult (and thus prevented his father from making 
a will), one was a minor (and thus enabled him to do 
so);" (43). Lacey is not quite accurate here, since the
law of testament which dates from Solon7s time (44), does 
not specifically state what age the sons of a man had to
be for his will to be regarded as valid, but specifically
forbids him to make a will if he had sons at all 
( oC'/ jU.'1/ ZTouJVs Jj& o i O „ ).
Therefore, Lacey is probably referring to the law quoted 
in [Dem. ], xlvi, 14, which probably permitted a type of 
will with a different function from that of Pasio7 s 
(45). In addition, it is probable that even in Solon's 
time, a man might have been able to make a will if he had
legitimate sons who were minors, as long as he did not
deprive them of their estate and its terms were within
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the boundaries of the law (46). The fact that the 
validity of the will of the elder Demosthenes was not 
questioned by his son with respect to the legacies which 
were given from the estate, indicates that the custom, if 
not the law concerning this had probably changed since 
Solon's time. Therefore, it seems as if Pasio did have 
the right to make a will, because even though he had an 
adult legitimate son, his younger child Pasicles was 
still a minor and it was necessary to make arrangements 
for his care.
Conon, the Athenian general, left a will bequeathing 
over half of his estate away from his son by his second 
marriage (47). Part of his estate was in Athens, and it 
is probable that he gave this to Timotheus before his 
death:
Se fcL.tv'O'S'roo, o-b&e *  n<^>roT(tr S i6 * '& y d 6 s r(r<t  ^ c J t r e
lc*Z  rrepc TU> ✓  / / £  /
'die T p  v e t  ic ^ r c m  rr Se 7TacpJ
f r b T O t b  %/tfe.LV' J s  y * p  KjivL3^i- / J i t *  b h s  K v W P ’^ o Keci
Nx^ocfy/Aitf §e y v v ^ j toocc , y y o v ' 7'0
itp+'i 6 <pl6 ^V /«-<- Q J^tf7T£r/9 ten.*.
f*. £v$cL$e,
(Lysias, xix, 36)
The fact that the word is used indicates that the
speaker is not thoroughly conversant with Conon's
financial concerns. However t *•<*./<* .. . implies that
Conon's Athenian property was given to Timotheus before
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his death, whilst he kept his belongings in Cyprus for 
his own use; presumably to support his wife and child 
there. Because of Conon7 s absence from Athens, and the
confiscations which took place during the rule of the 
Thirty Tyrants, the value of this property^ may have 
decreased, and although the speaker7 s estimation of four
talents may not be quite correct, since this is part of a 
hypothetical argument (48), the implication is that
Timotheus7 Athenian property was not worth a very large
proportion of his father7s estate (49). The will itself 
concerns the money in Cyprus which Conon kept for himself 
(50). Therefore the seventeen talents which he left to 
his other son was from the wealth which he had kept in 
Cyprus, and was not his Athenian property, as Lacey 
states (51). Conon7s capacity to make a will bequeathing 
a great amount of his property away from his son was not 
affected by Athenian legislation since it was made in 
Cyprus. Furthermore, the fact that the speaker does not
criticize this implies that although it may not have been 
common to do so, such a disposition of foreign property 
was not unheard of at the time this speech was made (388 
or 387).
By means of firstly an oral agreement then a
testament, Euctemon curtailed the inheritance rights of 
one of his sons by his second marriage to just one farm
(52). The value of this property is not stated, but it
of
probably would have represented less them the boy7 s share 
of his father7 s estate than the property he would have 
been entitled to if Euctemon had not made the agreement
(53). Wyse states that this arrangement was " a secret
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compact between father and son, contrary to law and 
morality" (54). However, Wyse does not give his reasons 
for stating this.
Isaeus' narrative of how the agreement came about is 
as follows:
Oi I'oty I^ oLlOC QVt* <S OV u. oCV GTL
I&vo<-vto nyfiSes T e f t o v T o s ,  favy aois-no S*
(Is. vi, 23)
The fact that relatives ( ot *. vo^ icol~ o .^ ) were involved in 
the dispute and persuaded Philoctemon to agree to the 
compact indicates that, contrary to Wyse, the compact was
allegation that Euctemon had threatened to re-marry and 
produce more children, and they imply that any children 
born from this union would not be Euctemon's offspring
but others (55). It is possible that Wyse thought the
inheritance of a legitimate son or because it was illegal 
to give a smaller share of property to one legitimate son 
than to another. However, in Demosthenes' speech against 
Aphobus, the orator does not argue that it was illegal 
for his father to make large bequests from a small
not a secret one. The words o n , . - -  2t*.<fopaj ' refer to the
agreement illegal either because it limited the
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estate, but uses eiicos arguments: it is unlikely that his
father would have wished him to be deprived of the
majority of his estate (56). This suggests that it was
probably not illegal for a man to alienate some of his 
estate from his son. In addition, the speaker of Isaeus
vi states that this agreement proves that the boy is 
illegitimate:
TOcS o(\fro"0 Q’dS&vZ &\/
y P & fe c ’ 5o« i/ criSefut-u.}/ j  b stfyuLOS m -u t d $ oLrroS?£
7V T&V m x rp o s  O r ^
&  d>6<~ ir& $c)es y v y e cot.
(Is. vi, 28)
However, the clause in the will of Pasio in which 
Apollodorus receives the bequest of a tenement house in 
addition to his half share of Pasio's property (57) 
indicates that it was possible to bequeath property by 
will to one's legitimate son. The law specified equal
shares of their father's estate for legitimate sons (58) 
but Pasio's will indicates that this law could be 
overcome if a man decided otherwise in his will.
Therefore the speaker' s argument is not effective.
Thus, contrary to Wyse's opinion, it seems as if the
testament of Euctemon was not contrary to law, even if it 
was contrary to Athenian "mores" in that it severely
limited the inheritance of a legitimate son.
There is another passage in Isaeus which refers to 
the capacity of a man with legitimate sons to make a will:
q<£>✓ / f y tKvro/ &
4a y Q j  AtHpfcw- os-rcs Z) o ^  4/? o v $
v OVTS
(IS.# X, 9)
Here, the words o%rJ. . . it />*§<*.<. imply that although
Aristarchus (I) may not have wished to make a will, he 
could have done so. In addition, the wills of Pasio and 
Demosthenes (I) indicate that it was possible for a man 
with legitimate sons to make a will to take effect as 
soon as the testator died, and this could include various 
bequests. Furthermore, it was also legal for a man to 
make a will in the event of his legitimate sons dying 
during their minority or within two years of coming of 
age, and this could function as the giving of his 
property to another (59). Therefore, the
words o v t £ ■ • • er&pu} are in accordance with neither law 
nor custom.
According to Isaeus iii, 6 8 and x, 13 it was illegal 
for a man to dispose of his property by will if he had a 
legitimate daughter, unless it was "with her". However, 
since it was possible for a man to dispose of some of his 
property by testament to others even if he had a 
legitimate son, it is even more probable that a man with 
a legitimate daughter could do this also, as long as he
made ample provision for her.
In Menander's play, Dvskolos, the father of a girl 
of marriageable age disposes of his property when he is 
speaking to Gorgias, the son of his estranged wife and 
her first husband:
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r e  t r o t - o O p * - ' g-* z i ^ V ,  X  r '  r v y ^ v e J
f l& t /T & s  ^C C v T 'q O  i/& /U £ 6 & V  G tS p L .L , "P^j v' S g  £ 0  £> T h t f O & y y  V  u ) *
c t y $ p * .  $ 'c ^ i /T ip  f f f ‘T T 0 p lG O '/ • e i  y o L p  u c k c  G ^ o S ' 1 v  y t o ^ f  v o i p c *
J> s 
e y u j j
c i v r - d b  o v  $ v ' / y 6 o j u . J e v p e C / '  o v  y< £{*  j j - 6 l
o£S& els. <&aa' e /*e  juL& /*/ «:V d o l ^ ’ t^s  j& ov \opd j'
T$. A * * ,  irpiiL T T J 0Cvr£s TTa^f*. KckfiZoV' / < ) « /  * X &(* & v v  ttu$
Q -tO i. s  ’
l& l& G fj.u J ✓  6 ^  S £<>i c o t m s . t o v  H - T y  p t t+ r o  S
e r r iS S S o u  f v  r r f o T  ic e * . t o u /u o v  S i t k j j i  e ? T p y j  f i v j p u e v  ,
1 ^ 7 Sl €^ep0 v XetyScZv' Sto'itcei fcaL1u&  *.<*.£ 7"^ V juyTz-pot..
(Men. Dvsk. 729-739)
Lane - Fox (60) states that as Cnemon "is still alive, 
this arrangement is more fcha** a gift than a will".
However, the words "as he is still alive" are open to
misinterpretation: one is not able to make a will if one
is dead. Probably, Lane - Fox is of the opinion that the 
words re  7rep<6 <J&^ J indicate that this is not a
testament. However, the fact that these words are
preceded by JkrroQtC\/u) vds suggests that the
possibility of him surviving is an afterthought, and that
these instructions were firstly intended to be carried 
out in the event of death. Therefore, this can be
regarded as a will.
In this passage, Cnemon adopts Gorgias, but he
cannot betroth him to his daughter because homometric 
brothers and sisters were not allowed to marry although
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homopatric ones probably were (61). He does not give his 
daughter all of his estate, so she is not an po<b ,
but places her into the care of
Gorgias Bo u r T r f e y y v iZ ,  ic y  - - • e* r  & )
Cnemon does, however, specify her dowry; she is to have 
half of his property (raO  c~rjpjj.ros... B yM -'t0 '0 ). With the
other half, Gorgias is to provide for both the testator 
and his estranged wife, and is responsible for the 
management of this portion which is bequeathed to him
A similar incident can be found in Menander's Aspis 
when Chairestratos says to Chaireas:
oij jj.lv  r j *  wJ>pyv
<*vrly/ %* T y *  i - fx y /  7~y[s ooe £<*.<>
vpolS ta xX *- r i p s  ^ ju o c iv r o v  x - V jo f o v s
(Men. Aspis. 278-281)
Here, the word 6 & refers to Chaireas, Chairestrato s 
stepson, and <x.~$rd s . ■ £*ce?.se>s to Kleostratos, who is 
believed to have died in battle.
I agree with MacDowell's argument that because it
is the plural of "you" suggests that Chairestratos wished
to adopt Chaireas as his son, otherwise he would have no 
right to any of the property. The reason why Chaireas 
would not be able to marry Chairestratos' daughter is 
because he is her uterine brother. In this passage, the 
speaker does not specify exactly how the property is to 
be divided between his daughter and Chaireas. However, 
the incident in Dvskolos suggests that Chairestratos
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probably intended Kleostratos and his daughter to have 
half, and Chaireas and his niece to have the other half.
Therefore, both Cnemon and Chairestratos wished to 
provide an heir for themselves in preference to waiting 
for their respective daughters to produce a son. In both
cases it seems as if the daughter is to be given half of
the estate, and the adopted son the other half. 
MacDowell states that this half-and-half arrangement was 
required by law (63). However, even though Isaeus states 
that the law required an equal division of property 
between an adopted son and any sons born after the
adoption (64), there is evidence that a father could, if 
he wished, give more property to one son than another
(65). If this could be done to legitimate sons by means 
of a will, then it seems possible that an unequal
division of property could be made by means of a will
between an adopted son and a legitimate daughter if the
son was not to marry the girl. Therefore, the 
half-and-half division of property which we find in 
Dvskolos was probably more in accordance with Athenian
"mores" as opposed to legally obligatory.
With reference to the care of womenfolk, Apollodorus 
alleges that his father Pasio was not entitled to give
his wife in marriage in his will because he was not 
her tc.'OpCD^ , . He quotes a law whereby the only persons
entitled to give a woman in marriage are her father, her 
homopatric brothers and her grandfather on her father's
side (6 6 ). However, the terms of the will of the elder
Demosthenes indicate that a man could dispose of his wife 
in marriage by means of a testament. In addition, the
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will of Diodotus, and probably that mentioned in 
Hyperides ii, both indicate that a man was also allowed
to provide a dowry for his wife by will. If a man made
no arrangements for the care of his wife in the event of 
his death, she would then return to her nearest male 
relatives if she had any (67). Therefore, the law quoted 
by Apollodorus very probably refers to women who were
either single or widows whose husbands had not provided 
for them. Therefore, Pasio was entitled to make
provision for his wife in his will. The fact that 
Apollodorus shared his mother's dowry and her other 
property with Pasicles and the two children from her 
second marriage, indicates that he did recognize the 
validity of the union (6 8 ).
The right of one who was himself adopted to make a 
will is disputed, and rests upon the interpretation of 
two passages:
i x ',0 ( t o c  £  r r &  i r s  £ y  \s r  o ' ‘ cfV'=- £ £ &  y  t-4-*
£ Jje JV*... i  £, , o r r^ n . L  ✓
d>s roTs ye ircx.^j'fcr^e.s d -< - *<.<
4 S*. a.  r t c  s r  e x j  c / L o v  y S y 6 c O s  e tT<*.
rc-''-<r j r y6<*>sr<x^, tLircS‘ £ 5 s *■ * r y /  4. * .ypo*ofA .'^s  r6?~s
et; t?■.)£<. ro J 97) w y6*.f±c sov
( [ Dem. ] xliv, 6 8 )
SlCW C£
L'C(>o„ ^uy 'etre rrofj /n, . J6
y j  r> G »r i ct <<£. t  w /  Lo r e  t t e y t ' -  /  V/[ / 6
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7\*‘ %a 'JTC‘Q S m B o  rru>i> <£V eQe^yj > . . . ,
( [ Dem. ] xlvi, 14 )
The interpretation of this clause of the law is very 
difficult. It seems as if the exception "those who had 
not been adopted when Solon became archon" does not seem 
to have been limited to those who were adopted in Solon's 
time, but also referred to those who were adopted in 
later years. This is indicated by the fact that the law 
is used as part of the argument in [Dem. ] xliv (69). 
Probably the point of the words of re- e^syec  r~y^
was to indicate that the law was not retrospective; 
namely that those wills which had been made by adopted 
sons before Solon came into office would probably be 
valid.
The least complicated way of interpreting these two 
passages is that the law ordained that any man who had 
been adopted either "inter vivos" or by testament, 
(posthumous adoption evolved after Solon's law of 
testament had been introduced) (70), could not adopt by 
testament or "inter vivos" himself.
If such a man died childless, the estate of his adoptive 
father would revert to the adopter's relatives
x  /
(y / r o t j 6 (x.?-i&/ov ). The reason for
this was probably that whereas the adopter would have
known the person he had adopted "inter vivos" or by
testament, and, in addition a son adopted in the former
manner might have even taken care of him (71), a son
adopted by the adoptee would have had no link at all with
r\
the first adopter, and might not, therefore, have beeaf so
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conscientious in preserving the religious rites of 
o
the . The property and the would, therefore,
be better cared for if it reverted to the relatives of 
the adopter who might from among themselves find an heir 
for the house by means of posthumous adoption (72). By 
this means, the second adoptive son would still have a 
connection by blood with the adoptive father.
Wyse translates the clause yOec>i, e t f y y y  as
meaning "such persons as had been adopted without
renouncing or obtaining a judgment before Solon's entry
into office" (73). He, therefore, interprets the
words $ 6 ^  /u.y7~e- citrein-&?v as meaning that "If a man
after being adopted had renounced the bond and gone back 
to his own family, he was not to be debarred from 
disposing of his own" (74). This was true to a certain 
extent, for a man adopted "inter vivos" could renounce 
the bond and return to his former family, as Leocrates,
the adopted son of Polyeuctus did (75), and in this case, 
Leocrates could dispose of his patrimony inherited from 
the family he had returned to, by means of a will. 
However, unless he had the agreement of his adoptive
father, an adopted son could not renounce his adoptive 
family unless he left a legitimate son in his place.
Wyse states that "the meaning of the second qualification 
cjere . . . f j . j r '  e is still disputed. I
think that Solon had in view the practice of posthumous 
adoption . . . . , and desired to guarantee liberty of
disposition to man who had succeeded to an estate as 
next-of-kin under a legal judgment, and afterwards from 
motives of piety of o/ the deceased owner" (76).
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However, Solon's law did not legalise posthumous 
adoption, but adoption by testament (7 7 ), and since 
posthumous adoption was a later development, Solon could 
not have borne this possibility in mind when he drafted 
his law. It is, therefore, more likely
that rJ &^ \  refers to the fact that when one 
was adopted, one could not claim any adjudicable 
inheritances from one's former family, since by being 
adopted a man severed all links with his natural family, 
and also refers to the right of one who had been adopted 
"inter vivos" to enter into an inheritance without 
an etrtS'i.^tiLe^cL . Therefore, a more feasible translation 
of the clause l/Osi>>. piy ' ■ d p j y /  would be "except those 
who had been adopted when Solon entered into office, so 
that they might not renounce or claim an inheritance by 
means on an e rri or a. ," and the
phrase t i c r e r  m  yre-
expresses two direct results of an adoption.
/
Whether the words £irt-rrc>. ys*~o refer to one
adopted "inter vivos" only or also to those adopted by 
will and posthumously is open to discussion.
Harrison follows Thalheim's arguments, and states 
that the reason why an adoptee "inter vivos" could not
make a will and others adopted by will or posthumously 
could, was so that the in the first
circumstance would not have an opportunity to claim the 
estate after the adoptive father' s death, because one 
adopted "inter vivos" could enter upon the estate without 
recourse to an dxf’-Ft to-y^cF**) whereas in the latter cases, 
the adoptee' s claim could be contested in a court of law,
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by means of a / before he entered upon his
inheritance (78). This seems unlikely because adopted 
sons "inter vivos" had a stronger position in law by 
virtue of the very fact that the adoption was definitely 
made with the adopter's full consent (79). In addition, 
even an adoption "inter vivos" could be contested in the 
courts (80).
Lipsius suggests that those who had entered an 
estate by means of an ^rri had the right to adopt
in their turn (81). The term £ r n w a s  used to 
denote the process of claim and award where no 
counter-claims were made, so presumably the reason why 
Lipsius suggests this is because the adoption was 
undisputed in law and, therefore, the claimant's tenancy 
of the estate was quite secure, since even though
y
the had had the opportunity to claim the
estate, they had not done so.
However, even though the claim was not disputed in the 
first instance, it was possible to dispute it later (82) 
and this would prevent the adoptee from adopting in his 
turn. Complications could have arisen if he had adopted 
a son "inter vivos" before the inheritance was 
contested. In addition, Harrison rightly notes that it
is not stated " whether one adopted "inter vivos" who 
had not the best claim "ab intestato", or who in default 
of the adoption, would have had to share with other iy*'6 ' 
-rtfs related to the de cuius in the same degree as 
himself, could, by waiving his right to enter on the 
inheritance s and submitting his claim to a
court retain the right to adopt if he begat no sons" (83).
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In view of the arguments against other possible 
interpretations of this law, the first point of view is 
the most plausible, namely that no adopted son, no matter 
how he had been adopted, had the legal capacity to make a 
will.
The law as quoted in [Demosthenes] xlvi, 14, is 
taken by Apollodorus to imply that new citizens had no 
testamentary rights:
a  T b L V V ' /  T 7 ~ ( K - r j f >  j ) 4 ( 3 v  & I T € = T r o C /j T O  & T T O  S y / i O x J
iToTutySj h$6 Te cy»8& icvjii tov'To e£yjv 8
Sto
( [Dem. ] xlvi, 1 5 )
Harrison says that this is not necessarily an example of 
"pure sophistry" but that "from the point of view of the 
phratry, an important point of view in Solon's day at 
least, a naturalized foreigner was as much as an
adopted son and it is by no means unthinkable that his 
right to dispose of his property by will in the absence 
of sons of his body might have been equally restricted" 
(84). However, Harrison does not venture to suggest who 
would have inherited a naturalized citizen's property 
and, therefore, any religious obligations on his behalf 
in the event of his dying childless and intestate. In
addition, a naturalized citizen had the same property 
rights as an Athenian citizen (85), shared the same 
liturgical obligations and could also hold office, so it 
is very improbable that they could not likewise dispose 
of their property by will according to the usual 
provisions, especially since metics had testamentary
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rights and so had freedmen under certain circumstances 
(8 6 ). Therefore, Apollodorus' remark is "pure sophistry".
A man who held office could not make a will until 
the accounts of his office had been rendered:
IfO AeL .
(Aeschines, iii, 21)
This quotation mentions the ways in which an officer of 
state could not alienate his property from himself, and 
the fact that his property was in the hands of the state 
until he had rendered his accounts. A man in such a 
position could not renounce his own ot*-0* by becoming the 
adopted son of another man CovS } tsc-troty t o v
ve.6 #ou ) . It is difficult to understand why a
man should adopt another "inter vivos" if the adoptive
son still had to render his accounts to the state, since
it would place his own property in the hands of the
state. These words, therefore, refer to testamentary and
posthumous adoption. The former, because the will could 
have been made before the man came to office, and, 
therefore, the testator would not have known the
beneficiary's future position. If the testator died 
before the accounts of his adoptive son had been 
submitted, the adoption would not have taken place until 
after the audit had been held. Likewise, if the officer
n 3 v  b  17 ( r V  Q - V i / U i 'S  c x v  / l o y O V
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were to become somebody else's son by posthumous adoption 
before the audit, the property of another man and not his 
own would be held as security by the state. Therefore, 
such an adoption would have taken place after the
accounts had been presented. Any will which the officer 
made before presenting his accounts would have been 
regarded as invalid since the state held his property, 
and it was not, therefore, his own to dispose of until
after his accounts had been given to the city. The
reason why an officer could not alter his property 
circumstances in any way was that if his accounts were 
not satisfactory and he was found to be in debt, the
amount owing to the state could be deducted from his 
estate (87).
The capacity of a woman to make a will was connected
with whether or not she could own property, and to what
extent her dowry and any gifts which she had received
were her own (8 8 ). A woman's dowry was given to her on
marriage by her father and then managed by her husband.
If she was divorced, she did not keep the dowry, but it
/
reverted with her to her former KVp'S* . Even her 
trousseau was not legally hers, but remained under the 
governance of her husband (89), although in practice it
would be the woman who would make use of it. A woman
could not, therefore, legally dispose of any property
unless her xpjpios permitted it, but the enforcement of 
this depended on the attitude of both woman and .
Furthermore, a woman could not make a contract above the 
value of one medim^nos of barley:
-1 37-
fTouSos y^P otJic StoLdjic-j* y‘e'/t&9oLL. ’ h o^jMOS
tci^^veu p'cu.Si, jxy e|etVocu 6 0(u.fii/o^cs/ f L y ^  
yV^oLL c^l ne/Ooi. jjL tSfjJ.t/0  V >Cpi,&(£v.
(Is. x, 10)
Harrison states that this passage means that an Athenian 
woman could not contract above the value of one medim/nos 
of barley unless her tcvpios permitted it (90); however, 
since the law does not include this provision, it seems 
as if a woman could not contract at all above this amount 
(91). In addition, the meaning of this passage is 
ambiguous, because it is not clear whether the 
phrase rr£p<*. icp\.&cb'/ applies to both a child
and a woman or to a woman only. Thus there is a 
possibility that if this phrase referred to just a woman, 
she did not have the same standing as a child, but was 
able to make a will for less than a medim^nos of barley. 
However, the amount of money involved in such a 
transaction was so little that it seems unlikely that a 
woman would have wished to dispose of such a small amount
by will. Therefore, it seems more probable that both
woman and child had the same testamentary rights. There 
are, however, some cases where a woman has been party to
a contract for a rather larger sum, and these contracts 
have been interpreted as wills.
In a speech of Demosthenes, Polyeuctus' wife lent 
Spudias, her son-in-law 1, 800 drachmae, and at her death 
left papers noting this transaction:
J j v  6^/ y * p  t o  k f > y v p i o v  r T c ^ p i k ryi 'H o a . v g v x - t o ' U
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C k v t  1 6  j u L t ^ o e ,  -y V  S u .L ^ c o s  J y f e i j J ' f J . v L r <* & j £ 6 T l S  a i
K * r £ x ir r & v  i .7 T o 9 v ^ 6  ( c o v 6  } g * c e £ t / y .
(Dem. xli, 9)
However, this was not a bequest in a will 5 but a 
loan which was noted in papers y/0oC/tjUoLr<*. which were
left behind at death. This is emphasised later when the 
speaker refers to Spud^ias as having regard for neither
the will of Polyeuctus nor the papers left behind (92). 
Therefore, the loan of Polyeuctus7 wife was not a clause 
embodied in a will to take effect after death, but a loan 
made while she was still alive and noted in papers which 
were found on her death.
The case of Archippe, Pasio7 s wife, who was left a
sum of money on her first husband's death (93) is a
little more complicated. She is said to have given away 
some of her property to the children of her second 
marriage, which Apollodorus claimed after her death: 
fa s  S ' d r e - K e Z  r y B € V  d tc e Z x /y  } e y x.S
Sp^pZLs rrpo$ *cs eScotce* i ^ e 's y  S
TO'iS rovTOv rT<*.<.S'Co(s y^/r l 6 h.o</ th/& . iokc
TjU'VoWj £6 v <0  (fix. ✓ r & t ,
(Dem. xxxvi, \ 4 )
Apollodorus himself states that when he last saw his
mother on her deathbed, she was no longer mistress of her
property and could not give him what she wanted to:
^u.r^Zo£> y*P & r v y y * s o * / **.1  i ^ j y  iS o v t* -
fl& <eu rrpoee^rove*, r y *  y v y y v  & f j w ,  ovu.'e-n rZ>v
£vr w  icvpZ* ot)6o< t i s r t £d>vuw e f i o v t e r o  puoc .
( [ Dem. ] 1, 60 )
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Gernet interprets the first passage as being an 
indication that Archippe had wished to give some 
advantage by testament to the children of her second 
marriage (94), and Davies states that the language in the 
second passage confirms this (95). However, the gifts 
mentioned in the first quotation were more probably made
"inter vivos" since there is no mention of Archippe 
bequeathing them on her deathbed, only that after her 
death, Apollodorus claimed this sum. Apollodorus7 
language in the second passage does not confirm the 
suggestion that Archippe made a will, since all he says 
is that his mother was not mistress^ of her own
property when he saw her, which only indicates that if 
Phormio objected to her giving away any of her goods, she 
could not do so (96). There is, therefore, no mention of 
a testamentary bequest here.
The passage which could be most easily described as 
a testamentary bequest by a woman is mentioned in Lysias:
ktteZsy rovrtf) ym a r y e e v  &.TTO8 <KrovsoLY ew-vTyv
i f f * ,  r p e t y / r t .  fo L Y t i  S& C v S e y  r rp o e 'jtc c rv 6 < *  tt< g ~ e v  e
eoLviys 7 p.✓oo cLpyjp^oVj
7u t t o v roi j Toi /  -bb v o v t * locvry5 .
(Lysias, xxxi, 21)
However, in this incident, as Schaps rightly states, the 
woman7 s son, Philo, is no poorer than he would have been 
if she had not given this money for her funeral to
Antiphanes (97). She is not, therefore, disposing of her
property by means of either an oral or written will, but
is giving Antiphanes the money with which to perform her
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funeral rites; money which Philo would have spent if he 
had the responsibility for them. There is no evidence 
that she gave Antiphanes any other property. Therefore 
this transaction is not a will.
Since none of the above incidents concern
testamentary bequests, one can conclude that it was 
contrary to law for women to make wills.
From the law as quoted in Isaeus, x, 10 '98), it is
clear that male children under the age of eighteen could
not dispose of any property which they might have by
means of a will. However, it is unlikely that a child
could possess anything of value which was not in reality
owned by his father, unless he was an orphan. In the
latter case, the orphan7 s property would be in the care
of a guardian until he should come of age. The right of a
guardian to make a will in respect of his ward7 s property
is extremely dubious, and there is no ancient evidence to
t
suggest that he could. There are two cases exjfant in 
which the guardian of orphans has died whilst they were 
in their minority. In Isaeus i, the first guardian, 
Deinias, does not nominate the second, CleonymuSy in a 
will (indeed the two men were allegedly enemies), but on 
Deinias7 death Cleonymus took charge of the boys, since
he was their closest relative (99). The Philosopher 
Fyjicurus, who was the guardian of the children of 
Metrodorus and the son of Polyaenus, ensures their future 
well-being by means of his will, but does not dispose of 
their property (100). Thus, it was contrary to law for a 
man to make a testamentary disposition of his ward7 s
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estate, but he did have the capacity to provide for his 
care.
In the evidence which survives from fourth-century 
Athens, there are arguments against the validity of wills 
which are from the following clauses in Solon's law of 
testament:
Slv y  y jy to s  r j y  w s o  v , y
yv/<*.uci n-ei.d6 yeso vrro r o v r w  ro'v Tr<xp#.v y* tjIT'
\'/&*.y>cys y  v *o  Seeyo'v *-*roc s.y ff 0e '$.
( [Dem. ] xlvi, 14)
The arguments which are based upon these clauses shall be 
discussed with reference to each case.
In the speech concerning the estate of Nicostratus, 
mention is made of the law of Solon by which a man was 
not permitted to make a will if he was senile and so on, 
but no attempt is made to argue that Nicostratus' will 
was invalid because it was made under such circumstances
Towards the end of Isaeus, ix, there is a reference 
to Solon's law of testament:
(Is. ix, 37)
This suggestion is, however, founded on probability.
There is no proof that Astyphilus was mad, just the 
implication that if he made such a will, he must have 
been mad.
(1 0 1).
y$Lp rovfov iirocyst^ro t>c/ ov r  
rrcjs o<l 8ote<- roZs <x.icoi>e -*-6
In Isaeus, vi, the Solonian law of testament is read 
out to the court and paraphrased by the speaker:
not included because "Isaeus did not wish to attract 
attention to the influence which ought have been exerted 
by Philoctemon's sister" (102). However, there is no 
reference to an allegation made by Androcles that 
Philoctemon made a will under the influence of his 
sister, so it is possible that Wyse is being a little 
over-suspicious here. In addition , it is not unusual to 
find the law of testament referred to only in part by the 
orators (103). The speaker then attempts to refute any 
arguments which could be made against the testator's 
sanity:
(Is. vi, 9)
This refutation is made in the form of a rhetorical 
question, and although the fact that Philoctemon died 
fighting for the city indicates that he was not ill or
VfTO
*AX0
(Is. vi, 9)
Wyse suggests that the clause i s
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affect ed by medicines etc., it does not prove that he was 
in his right mind when he made the will or that he had 
not been influenced by a woman or forced. Wyse states 
that Androcles "did not assert that Philoctemon was of 
unsound mind" (104). However, since there is no extant
copy of Androcles' speech , there is no definite way of 
knowing what Androcles alleged. It is possible that even 
if his main argument against the validity of the will was 
based on other grounds, he may have included a reference 
to this law in passing.
With reference to the will of Pasio, Apollodorus 
argues that the terms of the lease of the bank, which 
state that Phormio should not manage the bank without the 
permission of Pasio's sons, and the clause in the will in 
which Phormio is to marry Archippe are not compatible, 
and indicate that the will was made by someone of unsound 
mind (105). However, the clause in the lease ensured
that there would be some measure of co-operation between 
Phormio and Pasio's adult son (106), and the marriage 
with Archippe was included in the will to strengthen 
Phormio's ties with the family and was not uncommon 
amongs t bankers (107).
The speech in which the will of Polyeuctus is
referred to was made by the husband of the eldest 
daughter in an attempt to obtain the portion of his 
wife's dowry which was due to him and which was noted in 
the will (108). It seems as if Spudias questions the 
validity of this clause in the will:
-144-
i £.6 e r oCu S i JfoA.ijev^TO'/ tc*.i r y s  yvvoLC<.' olvtov^ *<.*.2
y j a t L  tt£.v t *. t ^ v Q* v r r J iy c o v  n e i & O i v r ^ s  . . .
(Dem. xli, 12)
f y * 1 '  %JTTJ k}J.C v TT& L6& &  ISToc T fo n 'l tV ic . 'T O ’S TTjOOB T ^ oll T O Ij S
t fp o  v s  6 T y&zLu. r<2 V '^t^jLOO'S; . . .
(Dem. xli, 16)
o ‘d jc 4 i TL TTo x v g v  k^ t o  s <\vre< r r e ^ € d ^ 2 s  i j u o 2
r f r *T’&?(OLp'£keTOj (Aj S eoi/c&v, o£a(\.‘ VyLerC^  OLUroCi 
(Dem. xli, 18)
In all of these quotations, the verb rre^QcJ suggests that 
Spudias is claiming that the speaker persuaded Polyeuctus 
to include the notification of the debt in his will.
However, if this is so, Spudias' case is not very strong, 
since there is no clause in Solon's law which states that
a will is invalid if made under the persuasion of a man,
but the relevant clause is limited to persuasion by a 
woman. It is possible that Spudias accused the speaker 
of using force, and this is cited in Solon's law as a 
reason for finding a will invalid (<)<7 ' X'-''x ^ £. 75 ). The
word k *v .y > c .y s maY imply physical force as opposed to
verbal force, although /3'*> is more common for the former
meaning. Therefore, the slanders which the speaker 
states are being levelled against him might be
accusations of or yfo'S , although in the absence of
Spudias' speech, this matter is open to conjecture. The
speaker cites as evidence that he had not persuaded 
Polyeuctus, by producing witnesses who testify that 
Spudias' wife, the testator's younger daughter, was 
present at the making of the will, that Spudias was also 
invited to be present, but was unable to attend and made
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no objection to the proceedings as related to him by his
wife (109). Evidence to this effect is convincing, since
if the speaker had used force on Polyeuctus, or had
persuaded him to write the clause noting the debt in his 
will, it is possible that Spudias would have objected 
before Polyeuctus' death.
In the speech concerning the estate of Cleonymus, it 
is argued that Cleonymus revoked his will (110), and this 
argument rests on the fact that on his deathbed,
Cleonymus sent for a magistrate:
(Is. i, 14)
Several aspects of this narrative are not clarified by
the speaker. It is confidently alleged that Cleonymus 
wished to annul his will ), whereas the only
evidence for this assertion is that he sent for a 
magistrate. If he did wish to annul the will, he would 
have been severely lacking in common sense if he told one 
of the beneficiaries this and asked him to send for the 
magistrate. Furthermore, it is alleged that Poseidippus
Xyj^Tj Tks S‘oLt)ytCoL$ dCYGXeLi/ it&Li irpo 6£7~c*.ge
rr c j t j v  ^P A J ^  6 Se p 'ovov
ei6 Jjj*.y6rst *AXjix d  Tov Tcji/ e i r t  t+^v
&vp*.v e ve^ye / ' & f > y i j r o t ’Xus ets  
■fojv TQr poLZoLV ^tOicX€sC IC/&.X&6 **. l  TO l/£  °  ^ T
‘fp o e  6 Tdl£  6
u pc tr /0 otA-X.y £
efcoLTrf/ys Tys> * v < r d s  r ^ v r y s
rroA-A-o ✓ ovgo3 y &xrrC$<*>v
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did not send for the official, but even so, he arrived
and was turned away from the house. If so, who sent for
him? If a slave went, there is no evidence that he has
been examined under torture or that a request for this
has been made. Kennedy suggests that the magistrate who
arrived may have been a friend who had nothing to do with
the will but who just chanced to call (111). This would
account for why he arrived without Poseidippus sending
out for him, but it would not explain why he was sent
away (*»t> r£v . - * t£ /  ). The fact that he was
asked to leave is the only portion of the narrative which
Isaeus provides witnesses for (112). Another
explanation for Poseidippus'action lies in the
words Koct c> ^  --- pit /os , which imply that Cleonymus
was in no fit state to conduct business. If the
magistrate was sent away because Cleonymus was "non
compos mentis", then it seems as if the same conditions
concerning the capacity to make a will may have also
governed the capacity to revoke or alter a will, and if
any change had been made by Cleonymus to his will on his
deathbed, they would not have been valid, because they
were taken while he was under the influence of sickness 
o
( U trep S06OV ) (113).
Much of the nephews' argument against the validity
of Cleonymus' will is based on the allegation that the
will was made in anger and that he later regretted it,
and wished to leave his property to his heirs "ab
o
intestate" (114). This anger was allegedly caused by a 
quarrel with this nephew' s guardian, Deinias. No reason 
is given for the quarrel from which the emnity arose:
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<■ s -« o i ._ -7 „  ^ J/ 1/
O iro re p o s  jx e v  0^ ^  A v r i* } *  y v  d ^ O f O 9^  ^ n o s  t
O&k. i(±6 \r epyO'S & 6T t tCoLTjy opeT \s *
(Is.i, 9)
Here, the words, . - . At«cr*yy ^ e-JV indicate that the
speaker seeks to dissociate himself from the quarrel, in 
that he does not state that he has no knowledge of its 
causes but that it is not his business to reveal them. 
Wyse is suspicious of this and suggests that "the subject 
of the quarrel may have been dangerous to touch, 
implicating not only Deinias but Deinias' whole family. " 
Wyse also adds "Men are rarely cordial towards 
impecunious brothers-in-law" (115). However, if Deinias 
was the children's guardian at the time of the quarrel, 
their father would not have been involved because he 
would have been dead. According to the speaker, 
Cleonymus did not wish Deinias to perform his funeral 
rites if /he died before his nephews came of age (116).
In view of the importance attached to these, as can be 
seen from other speeches of Isaeus (117), this argument 
is quite valid; for if Deinias and Cleonymus were at 
variance with each other, it is possible that the
p
religious observances due to the latter's q <.>co*, would 
have been neglected.
However, this does not explain why Cleonymus did not 
adopt one of his nephews and appoint a friend or relative 
as guardian if he wished his property to be inherited by 
one of them, or, if he wanted both o A  them to be his 
heirs, did not revoke the testament as soon as Deinias 
died. It is stated that Cleonymus declared before all
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the citizens that he had no complaint against the boys 
and their father. Witnesses are produced to testify that 
the testator stated that he had no grudge against his 
nephews (118). However, the fact that he was not at 
variance with the boys does not necessarily indicate that 
he wished them to be his heirs. This anger on making the 
will is then used to suggest that Cleonymus did not have 
the capacity to make a will:
i j j . « .p r v p v j 6 6 / Jj S op \j <■ £ 6 p .t '/O  5 d ic e i s ^  te a l Ovk,
ovXevop-esos, Ttn.’jyrok ttcSs y«.f Uv ezT <j)pos*Z^
& t l v S p e i c c u c c j c ,  Jp&s i f i a v  &"7 ro v  s yjyS&y
<\v to v yoi*.TjK oroi.Sj 
(Is. i, 11)
Here the speaker progresses from the statement that
Cleoynmus was angry and ill advised when he made the will
to the implication contained in the rhetorical question,
that he must have been insane ( r r£ $  ■ • • ) to have
drawn up such a document. Wyse states that the speaker
S
does not argue that the will Lyt invalid because Cleonymus 
was mad when he made it but because he must have been mad 
no to revoke it (119). However, the continuing 
references to the testator's anger on making the will 
(120) imply that the speaker wished to create the
impression that Cleonymus was out of his mind when he 
made the will. There is also the argument that the 
allegations of the heirs by testament that Cleonymus 
wished to alter or confirm the will indicate that he must 
have been insane to want to do this (121). Therefore, 
contrary to Wyse7s suggestion, it seems as if the heirs 
" ab intestato" allege that Cleonymus was mad when he made
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the will, because he was motivated to anger, and also
that he was mad not to revoke it. Therefore, the
argument against the will's validity is partially based 
on the supposition that Cleonymus did not have the 
capacity to make a will because he was mad
J /  \ -\
fjpy ). However, this argument is not
convincing, because even if the testator's motivation was 
anger, this does not necessarily mean that he was insane 
when he drew up the will, because one can be angty and
yet sane.
n
Much of the argument i$ Isaeus x is concerned with
the testator's capacity to own the property which has
been disposed of by will. This poses the legal question:
was a man legally entitled to dispose of property which
was not his by law? Although the answer to this question
may seem self-evident, it has been suggested that this
may have been possible (122).
In order to discuss this question, it is firstly
necessary to look at the background to this case.
By means of his will, Aristarchus (II) bequeathed
his property to his brother Xenaenetus (II). Both of
these men were the sons of a certain Cyronides who was
\> 3
the son of Aristarchus (I) but was adopted te- his
maternal grandfather, Xenaenetus (I). Following the 
death of Aristarchus (I) his estate was inherited by his 
son Demochares who died, as did one of his sisters. 
Therefore, the surviving girl became an
As such, she could have been claimed in marriage by her 
uncle and guardian Aristomenes or, failing this in the 
absence of other uncles, by his son, Apj^ollodorus.
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However, this was not done, and she was betrothed with a 
dowry to the father of the speaker, and Aristarchus (II) 
was adopted posthumously as the son of Aristarchus (I).
The speaker asserts that since the property did not 
belong to Aristarchus (II), he had no right to make a 
will concerning it:
- b  y * .f)  VOJ^OS jC&XanJ&L. rot /U-t/ &r<x.VT0V O T^J o<V
£ 0£ A j ~TcO/ S k  < x A A K~-6jOtD\/ Ve r r o i 'y  tee .
(Is. x, 2)
This is so. However, the onus is upon the speaker to 
prove that the property did not belong to the testator.
It is stated that Cyronides was adopted into the 
family of Xenaenetus (I) and thus had no right to possess 
his father's property:
tS y $  j u a /  o o y  o  ro -v S c  / r< * . ry jo  j& lc t o o
r i /S a  Tbv tc-Xyfio/ e^ovros <2 J’ £ rro ty <f ?s
t  r e p o /  o JL ic o / /  cJe  r a  o c o rc ^  tcov y . p y j t L r * * / ’ o  u £ e  /  a r c .
T * p 0 6 j ' A p t6 T ^ jp ^ o o  Se -noz? jrc*T /?os n o o rto /
TGXtuTy6(KSTOS Ay/U0^oi/Oyj (oJ> z)o$ p e  so juJS  t v /
}ce  ' s c v  JCocre6 r  y .
(Is. x, 4)
Here the order in which the events are described implies
that Cyronides was adopted as the son of Xenaenetus (I)
before the death of his father. If this had been the
case, he would have had no right to any of his father' s 
property. However, as Wyse rightly states, it is only 
suggested that the adoption took place before the death
of Aristarchus (I) (123). No specific information is
provided about how long before his natural father's death
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Cyronides was adopted, and evidence is only given to the 
effect that Cyronides passed into another family, not 
about when this took place (124). Such an omission 
suggests that it is possible that following the death of 
Aristarchus (I), Xenaenetus (I) adopted Cyronides as his 
son. If this had been the case, Cyronides would have 
been heir to half of his father7 s property, and thus his 
son Aristarchus (II) would have had a right to the amount 
of property inherited by Cyronides from Aristarchus (I). 
Witnesses are produced to testify that Demochares7 estate 
devolved
upon the speaker7s sister (125). This indicates that 
Cyronides was adopted before the death of Demochares, 
because otherwise Demochares7 estate would have devolved 
upon him rather than his sister. Therefore, the maximum 
proportion of his natural father7 s estate which Cyronides 
would have possessed would have been half of it. Wyse 
states that the speaker7s case "is terribly damaged, if 
not destroyed, if Xenaenetus (I) adopted Cyronides after 
the decease of his father" (126). However, this is not 
so, because it seems as if the speaker7 s mother did -ftot- 
have a right to half of the property.
The actions of the lady7 s guardian Aristomenes with
reference to her estate are then described1.
’A ptero /j-e^rjs  yap ocSexQbs iic & ts o u  rod
&VroB ctvr^ J tieos QVjvJpo* / y ck'jto ^ o iiry ^
*'j to j  j q j  .cA-'jfO'j ^
r o v r ^ v  p i ' /  otiSZ/ e i T i i y e t  / r y s  ce r c u
fivy^Tep:*. I  it c ryjs i ^ p  jj/y rp h s
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. K v p a *  cSiy ej>z$cJto(£\/ ....
(Is. x, 5)
Here, the words K*j6c<s> . . . SostC&v imply that
Aristomenes was not acting justly by the girl by neither 
marrying her himself nor having her adjudicated to his 
son. Wyse states that the next of kin need not marry a 
poor heiress but was entitled to give her away with a 
portion (127). However, this is not quite correct, since 
the law specifies that if the next of kin did not wish to
marry an heiress from the thetic class, then she could be
given to someone else together with a dowry and with her
property ( rrpos r^s o^ijrys ) (128). Roussel questions
whether it may have been possible for the marriage to 
have taken place before the death of Demochares, so that 
the girl could not rightly be called an (129).
However, it was possible for a woman who was already 
married to become an s (130). On the other hand
there is no evidence which states that this was the case
with this particular girl. The fact that the law
concerning heiresses specifies that the next of kin to a
to
poor heiress has p6 bothj^dower the woman and marry her to 
someone else with the property which belonged to her
if he did not marry her himself indicates that
. *Aristomenes was acting illegally if, as if alleged, he 
gave a woman7 s estate to his own daughter when he married 
her to Cyronides. Following this, the woman was married 
to the speaker7 s father:
p e r d  S e  r > v r > >  r j /  k p y *  p L yJ ' r e p < K
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/
TTo^rp *■> •
(Is. x, 6)
Here it is implied by omission that Aristomenes did not 
even provide the woman with a dowry. This would have the 
effect of making him appear as more of a scoundrel than 
he really was, since he did not give a dowry with her 
(131). However, no witnesses are called to prove the 
vera/fccity of these allegations.
There is an indication that these allegations might 
be true. This is the fact that the speaker attempts to 
refute the opposing party's allegation that Cyronides 
paid a judgement debt on the estate:
, » . tcctZ SiiC'fjx/ vWep TOvrcJ]/ n3v
s to v ttc^ t  epc< ro y ✓ ej*-7’&Tnces<x.\. J . . .
(Is. x, 15).
The fact that Cyronides is alleged to have paid a debt 
owed by the estate suggests that he possessed all of it. 
The speaker attempts to refute this statement of his 
opponent by stating that it was not Cyronides' duty to 
have done this and that if the estate was in debt, he who 
claimed his mother ought to have dealt with the matter.
He also uses argument by saying that since
such generosity is unlikely, the estate was free from 
debt (132). However, the fact that Xenaenetus (II) could 
argue that Cyronides had paid a debt on the property 
suggests that the estate may not have been unencumbered.
However, even if, as Wyse suggests, Aristarchus (I) had 
been in debt to the state and Cyronides had made this 
debt good so that his natural father's descendants need 
not suffer itXtpXoC (133), or if the debt outstanding was 
equivalent to or greater than the amount of property 
remaining (134) there is no evidence that the payment of 
this debt would have entitled him to the legal ownership 
of the whole estate. Forster suggests that Cyronides 
"was inspired by a desire to clear the memory of his dead 
father by paying the debt which he left behind him and to 
give him, by posthumous adoption, a son who would carry 
on his family and perform those rites at his tomb on 
which every Athenian set so much store" (135). However, 
there is some doubt as to when the posthumous adoption of 
Aristarchus (II) took place. The speaker alleges that it 
took place after the death of Cyronides (136) but he 
offers no proof of this. On the other hand it seems as if 
Xenaenetus. (II) has alleged that Aristarchus (II) was 
adopted before Cyronides'death (137). However, even if 
Cyronides himself after paying the debt had introduced 
Aristarchus (II) as the adopted son of Aristarchus (I), 
such inspirations, even if motivated by piety and 
generosity, do not constitute a legal right to own the
property concerned.
The legality of the adoption is questioned when it 
is stated that the only legal manner of carrying out an 
adoption is by will:
o ipcst ToCyvy u. ^ us ^ tl
(?
e ) * o O t y  7VJ / 4teiT0c.y rP  V yiyv'0\/'riL.
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S t  l o  ' t ' ru >  v  T e . a L V T O J 'S  V t ^ S  f t  0 4-0 V jjL.£. /  t J  ✓  j  o<?£K.cS> s  S e
06*.
(Is. x, 9)
Here, the speaker flatters the members of the jury by 
seeming to assume that they already know what he is going
^  ^j* S’
to tell them, (o^*- • • . e c o & ^ L  ). However, contrary to
the speaker's statement that no other form of adoption
besides that by testament existed there is evidence that 
two other forms were recognised as legally valid, namely 
adoption "inter vivos" (138) and posthumous adoption
(139). Furthermore, where adoption "inter vivos" was 
concerned, an adopted son might not necessarily inherit
his father' s property as soon as the adoption had taken 
place, but after his death (140), unless his adoptive 
father had become too old to administer his property 
himself (141). Therefore, the speaker's reasoning here is 
pure sophistry, and this means that the arguments 
following from this in which it is stated that neither
Demochares nor Aristarchus (I) had the right to make a 
will adopting Aristarchus (II) are based upon unfirm
precepts. In addition, the speaker states that he was 
compelled to alter his claim, and describes his mother as
the sister of Aristarchus (II) (142). This indicates 
that the adoption was recognised as valid.
There is a rather strange omission in the speaker' s
presentation of the case. This is that he does not state 
that an adopted son was not legally entitled to make a 
will unless his adoptive father specifically allowed him 
to do so (143). Wyse suggests that the speaker probably
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intended to "make two attempts on the property, first to 
attack the adoption, then, if repulsed, to bring a second 
action on the ground that an adopted son had not the 
power to make a will" (144). This seems quite probable. 
In addition, by entering into arguments that an adopted 
son had no right to make a will, the speaker would be 
accused of admitting that the adoption was valid, 
something which he wishes to deny.
It seems as if the jury's decision in this case 
would probably turn on the question of ownership. If the 
woman owned all or part of the estate, then Aristarchus
(II) had no right to the whole property, and would not be 
legally entitled to give all of it away. Since 
Aristarchus ((II) was recognised as the adopted son, he 
was not legally entitled to make a will at all, but no 
argument is presented to this effect.
There are also references to the clause in Solon's 
law which states that a man could not make a will if 
under the influence of a woman. However, this clause is 
not applied to wills in any of our extant evidence. In 
one case, it is used in reference to a division of 
property, part of which are claimed by Olympiodorus who 
was allegedly influenced by his mistress (145); the other
case refers to an adoption "inter vivos" which allegedly 
took place because the adoptive father was influenced by 
his first wife (146).
In conclusion, the right of making a will in 
fourth-century Athens belonged exclusively to males who 
had come of age, and in practice, if not in law, men with 
legitimate sons could dispose of some property by
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testament. Men who had been adopted, whether "inter 
vivos", by will or posthumously^could not make a will. 
Those who had been given citizenship had testamentary 
rights as did metics. However, a freedman could only
make a will if he was specifically permitted to do so by 
his former master. Guardians could not dispose of their 
ward's property by will, and neither women nor children 
had any testamentary rights . The fact that the clauses 
in the law of testament concerning the exceptions of 
madness and so on are referred to in the extant 
fourth-century evidence indicates that although these
clauses were deleted by the Thirty Tyrants, they were 
later restored by the democracy. However, arguments from 
these clauses constitute the primary argument in only two 
cases, that of Cleonymus and Polyeuctus, and constitute 
the secondary argument in four, namely concerning the
wills of Nicostratus, Astyphilus, Philoctemon and Pasio, 
and this indicates that other arguments such as forgery 
were probably more effective (147). In addition, it is 
probable that the clauses which governed the capacity of 
a man to make a will also applied to the revocation or 
alteration of the document.
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Chapter 6 
The Function of the Athenian Will
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to 
ascertain the function, or several functions, of the
Athenian will by examining the evidence concerning the 
testament in the fourth and third centuries. This 
chapter shall be divided into two main sections; the
first shall discuss wills concerning adoption, and the 
second shall treat of wills which had a function other 
than adoption.
Wills involving adoption
The Solonian law of testament legalised adoption by 
will, and by this means the religious observances and the 
property of the testator's o i w o u l d  be transferred to
the chosen person after the adoption had taken place
(1). There are some wills which involve just an 
adoption, but there are others which, although involving 
an adoption, are a little more complicated. Those
belonging to the former category, namely the wills of
Nicostratus, Astyphilus and Philoctemon, shall be 
discussed first.
Nicostratus
The will of Nicostratus was made not later than 374, 
which was probably the date of his death (2).
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Its validity is disputed in Isaeus iv, which was made on 
behalf of the claimants under the laws of intestate
inheritance, Hagnon and Hagnotheus. Chariades, the 
claimant under the terms of the will, was a fellow
soldier and a friend of the testator. At the beginning 
of the speech, it is implied that the will contained a 
bequest of property:
r«i Jj j A '- I 6 v f x / & e f i y  i t o T * .  S o K . e c  !*Q < - u f i Z r
y&vezG*.*. &V reKfjLTjpa*., %ru <x/r«*i/r <«r s» o £  T y ^
Tcov Nucog rpoLTo *v ol/u f t  6 f i y  ro 'Z ✓Tes d f  oc t r *  ol i  'UjAxi. & 
fio 'v 7^»/r<t ‘
(Is. iv, 1 )
Here the words *.x.r<£. r y * suggest that the will
contained a complete bequest of property without the heir 
being adopted as the testator's son. However, the
speaker later criticizes Chariades for not burying his
adoptive father:
'o'ttDv yoLp r^v ocvrov /r<? t y 6 * /■cfc*'0 * ovr >
&vtt7vkTc o v 't > qic.u 'o 6 ^  ovre ojg roAo y
TT*yr«. to? 5  fjL.rj$lv jrp o 6 y &ov 6 u tpxfyice troche / Vcos 
o^tc <^v/’ A/o6(.cir«.ros e iy  , os ruI TeOvecSn. p y Z e *
VCpLi'loplisuV TT0<,y6oL<> tioS jS-T*1* vkVTOV f^)0 /
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J^ LC^ j &AA* ynj i T t y u T c & V  crfSe v etTSvjGe^
r * jv  o ^b'C^v  ro 'O  fiJ itco€Tp*.Tov S ie ^ e rtp t6 & v
(Is. iv, 19-20)
The word rrat/y implies that Chariades alleged that
he had been adopted by Nicostratus. Although this could 
either mean a testamentary adoption or an adoption "inter 
vivos", it is very probably the former, because there 
would have been no necessity for Nicostratus to make a 
will if the latter had been the case. The burial of a
man was generally undertaken by his heirs (3) but
Nicostratus, being a mercenary soldier might well have 
died in action, as is suggested by the word x.&ro .
Since he died in a far-off land, it is more likely that 
he was buried in Egypt and his property, which was 
probably left in Ake, brought home, not his remains as is 
suggested by Wyse (4). If this is so, it is 
more likely that all the battle casualties were buried 
together, because of the hot climate in Egypt, as is the 
case in Menander's play, As pi s.:
O S' fjfUJV 0 1C06& ’ £ /«
jciifetv gtciOA/ufee/,
\>6T0 7^Dyyj6<^^j & V'/ « . y * j  3  ✓
r r * / r * $  S '  < * 9 p o o s  e z c L - u e e  ' f r S *  6 f c v & v j  t t ^ s v
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Je-uJ J e v & v s '
(Menander, Asnis 7 5-7 9)
This would explain why Nicostratus' remains were not 
buried by Chariades, and therefore the accusation of his 
opponent is groundless. There is no indication of the 
reason given by Chariades for not burying Astyphilus. In 
the quotation from Is. iv, 19-20, the word 
indicates that the testator is alleged to have placed his 
property into the care of Chariades. This is further 
proof that the will contained an adoption, since it was 
not unknown for an adoptive father to hand over his 
property to his adoptive son even before the adoption had 
been completed (5). The fact that the speaker does state 
that Nicostratus was Chariades' adoptive father indicates 
that the function of this will was probably adoption.
Astyphilus
Astyphilus served during the Theban war and then 
died on a naval expedition to Mytilene which took place 
after it (6). The next known expedition in the eastern
Aegean was that led by the general Timotheus in 3 66 (7),
which might have taken part in a minor skirmish at 
Mytilene. If this is the expedition which is being 
referred to in the speech, the will was made after the 
close of the Theban war in 371 and before Astyphilus set 
sail with Timotheus' fleet in 366.
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By means of this document he adopted the son of his 
first cousin, Cleon:
(Is. ix, 34)
As in the case of the estate of Nicostratus, allegations 
are made that the son of Cleon did not bury Astyphilus, 
his adoptive father:
(Is. ix, 4)
As is the case with the funeral of Nicostratus, the bones 
or remains of the deceased were probably not brought back 
to Athens from abroad, since such a thing would have been
very impractical, because in a hot climate bodies
decompose very quickly (8). Therefore, the reference to 
the testator's remains is an example of the orator
indulging in hyperbole to emphasise the of the
scene. The word with reference to the alleged
adoption is also an example of hyperbole, since Cleon' s 
son was not Astyphilus' long-adopted son, as it is
err&l £> QtcO)ut €&y Tbc C6r2 roH o j  & ju.e''
[ T f 0 6  TTCiOXl lx .e /0 %  r r d  ?^ ck.C £>o $ 6 ?  6 FTO cvj s d  ocL. ^
o t  € v 6 r p < * . r  i  l3 acl-, o f > £ > t£v m*. rt/O cx 4 / ^ ^
t&ppu6 r O V \ / r < * . ) i f j .6 S J OTJiC &TT  ^S '*]
(Cdj, TTfOV B & V ro  iCoCC Toe.W'*- 7c* VCfjL 4r
^rrotTj 6.*-^ ro s  ij^ LDv Tfar&ptK <*6 B t s o v s r ~
O L i s T o  v
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implied that it was by means of the will that Cleon's son 
was adopted by Astyphilus (9), so he would only be 
regarded as adopted once news of Astyphilus' death 
reached Athens and the adoption had been ratified by a 
court of law (10). Since the case is still in progress, 
this had not yet been done.
Philoctemon
Philoctemon was killed off Chios c. 367 (11), and
the will itself was made in war time (12), although it is 
uncertain whether it was made before the quarrel with his 
father Euctemon. In his will, he adopted Chaerestratus 
as his son:
kv tihv j <£) / ao p.0 v c yu- fry r*j$  y v '/^ ic o ^  yj
O U K -yv' ITolSZoV CV&gVj ffO ?l€ p*-0 U & ° / r ° s 
eicc to d  cifrre-b* toocl -rpcy p>atp^os
TT6W*.#.1$ &K. rThkt^'f> <K-VTCJ T<* Ot-UTOV;
\ y / s 7 ^ / ft s
h ’" ] £ p *"! P'S v  iCcLToc^f’ tT y  To v Olk .O '/ J £«• ft . Toj
p ^ y  ovy tfC-ur^J cS rrep J y e /fr6^ 7/  otmx.i£&
eTeAGVTnj s i r y v ' -roCv &&€r\^olZy -ry  eref>°t , 7J &
X«.< ,pe.«.$ s v ^ e i . ;  o w  Y  x,oL^ : ° ' /  a v S  c- i y i - ^ r o
*> ^
■tfOTCK«* i'V-y 6VV0LiCOve+l J Se 6 '7*<Sr/?<*>', 7f 6 'ovc£*ce '-
r  S t /  i f  t N C  ^ _ /  - r , ,  -rJl ^indLYO^rp^TOS 0VT06 L, Yj&T+jV V V  d-WO . t 0%>TC*>Y TOV
'XTpt$ fiv  T&po V TOVTOVi. p £ 6 Tp <*X10 V 6TT0u'yj  (tOCT 0 uOV
pcdLt e y p 'C ife v  0TJr u$  S * o c ^ x 4y , p v j y e ' JOLTo
d jo rv 77«.tSCc>/ ^  rys - rovrov
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tc?L'jpOv'OjU.<£?vr TU 3/ Qotv'r &'U
(Is. vi, 5-7)
The reason for Philoctemon wishing to adopt a son is 
given in this quotation, namely that he did not wish his
the speaker mentions the testator's concern for the
continuation of his , he does not state that
Chaerestratus claimed the estate as his adopted son as 
soon as he heard of Philoctemon's death. It seems as if 
the estate was claimed on the death of Euctemon, 
Philoctemon's father. Therefore, the testator's wishes 
were ignored. This was probably because Philoctemon's 
estate was not as valuable as that of Chaerestratus' 
father, Phanostratus, and thus it would be to 
Chaerestratus' financial advantage to remain in his own 
family until Euctemon died, and then to claim the estates 
of both Philoctemon and Euctemon (13). The terms of the 
will as mentioned in the quotation above indicate that it 
was possible for a man to dispose of his property 
conditionally. In this will, the condition is that 
Chaerestratus be adopted as the son of Philoctemon if no
child was born to the testator, b V  “
le^pcrop .e 'Zv  ~rc3s <-vrov. ) . It is not made clear 
whether this clause applied to a child of Philoctemon who 
was born after his father's death, as well as one who was 
born before his father's death. If Philoctemon's wife 
was pregnant by him at his death, it does seem probable 
that so long as she did not re-marry before the birth of
house to be without an  ^ Although
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her child, that child would become his father's heir. 
The birth of such a child would annul the will. No 
distinction is made between a possible male or female 
child in this will. A male child would prevent 
Chaerestratus from inheriting. However, if a female 
child were born, it might have been possible for 
Chaerestratus to marry her when she came of age, since 
she would be an ZirutcjLvjpoj* and he would be her next of 
kin, but in this case the estate would eventually be 
transferred to any male offspring. The relationship of 
the adopted son to the deceased is also indicated in Is. 
vi, 5-7. Chaerestratus is Philoctemon's nephew. The 
function of Philoctemon's will is, therefore, to adopt a 
nephew if the testator did not father a legitimate child 
before his death.
Dicaeoaenes (II)
Dicaeogenes (II) died in a battle off Cnidus in 
January 411 (14). Therefore, his will would have been
made at some point before his departure, and can be dated 
at 412 at the latest. By means of this will, he 
allegedly devised one third of his property to his nephew 
(15) whom he adopted as his son. The remaining two
thirds was inherited by the testator's four sisters. 
However, af t-e-r b**el-v-e yea-rs B i-e- Q-e o go nee fi-i-l-)- ol aimed the
whojre- oc tat-e e* the grettrrds that -he- h-adr been adeptod. as
a -o l - e  f e o i g -  by -hia uncl-e-. These events are narrated in
Isaeus v:
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•<itoQoty/ovros S’ ocvrov ocmetSos S**.&yx>y\r <py *6
77pojets0* o A t«.K l oye vo vs rroLTy^j y  7rt6 r+v+ocsrerS
oc y f ie r c e  <. Ifca-eyes €ise Lytocrrv t& y k.^ j ^ o v . *c.oc£ 
eirt. fj*\s -np rpc-r^j toG «-a.jjootj A ,*.#  coyevys
o&g Tc& M g \sejy ivo  v A.iKtx.LoyeveL, y {J trm6f>uj £d
j  1/aS &y lyyG T V  TJ^x-yT^S ' T& v  § £  J\oc/Toy
&ic*>CTy rb ycepos € rr&Si/c*-6  ocro tl3 v M e ts tfe s o v
Ovyci.tipcJ'/.
(Is. v, 6 ) 6 c TTodnitovToS refers bo Die eueo^  en.es ( u ) ).
According to the speaker, the estate was divided in 
accordance with these terms, and remained as such for 
twelve years. However, at a later date, Dicaeogenes
(III) claimed that he had been adopted as the heir of the 
whole of his uncle's estate:
A it-^ o y  & vys - - . yyctfe*/3yT&<- ocrTotsros roG  K A y p o u J
yjubic.z>* f ’ oAXf) rroiy ffyvoLL. voS vrro to G  SeCov rav t-r&yio u
(Is. v, 7)
The outcome of this claim was that Dicaeogenes (III) was 
awarded the whole of the property. In these quotations, 
only one will, not two, is mentioned. It is only later 
in the speech that the speaker states that two wills were 
produced before the court, one just after the death of 
Dicaeogenes (II) and the other twelve years afterwards, 
both of which were invalidated:
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SzJo <&iti,QijX'OL «■ j  ^ v  ttolkal  ^ y  £ £
rT07LXu) VbTbpOV' ICoiL *CoCT* jjL(,V yyV ff'oL'A.oL c U V, y *  0<TTe cf y V t
T Tp S fc v o s  o A iicol t o y e v o 'v s  t o v t o v I  n o t f y f > ;  e r r  I  r * y  
fp'C'ru) f^ e p e i ro'v iCK'^ jOo'if e y fyv trT c  r *J Qe'ccp -rut
'jp*TGp<p vos ttoitjtos, yv g ' ^ r o j  ii^ i^ yve
Ant*.Loy&\fy$  ^ &vrZ TToCVTi, to j  0(.tdJ . Te-CroLv 8£  roZv  
S^^v.tcLV njv p & v  Tfpo£e*os oLtre<fyv&y &iM-ocioye</y$
w  ^ v «. j  3 /i  ^ -y ti p\-rovs 5 i>c0L6 TtLS co$ o^u. (x,>wd'y] s e ^ y "  y v  be
Asx-oLLoytvy** vLrre^yvtVj  oc p c a p r v p y ^ y r e s  
t o y  Qe-'Cov rbv ijfx irepof $i*Aetb*LL M 6  <*y
pevSo
(Is. v, 15)
Here, the fact that two wills were allegedly produced 
before the court, each with different clauses concerning 
the amount of property left to Dicaeogenes (III) has been 
taken to imply that the testator left two wills, the 
function of the first being to adopt a son and leave a 
dowry for the testator's sisters, and the second to adopt 
a son and leave him all of the property (16). However, 
this view presupposes that a later will invalidated an
earlier one without the necessity of having to destroy 
the first document, and it is unlikely that this was so 
(17).
If the speaker of Isaeus v is telling the truth, one 
would reach the conclusion that it was possible to adopt 
a son and yet alienate two thirds of the estate from 
him.
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Norton accepts the speaker7 s statement:
"Isaeus tells of a case where a man without sons adopted
the son of a friend in a will, leaving to him only
one-third of his estate" (18).
However, Norton fails to refer to the successful claim of 
Dicaeogenes (III) twelve years later.
Wyse is a little more wary of accepting the 
speaker7 s allegations in chapter six of the speech:
"The language certainly leaves the impression that the 
sisters were not mentioned and claimed their portions "ab 
intestato;" but I should like fuller information before 
building much upon this incident. It is strange to find 
an Athenian adopting a son and limiting simultaneously 
the son7 s rights, it is stranger that in a will imposing 
such restrictions no provision should be taken for the 
disposal of the rest of the estate, and it must not be
forgotten that twelve years later Dicaeogenes procured a
judgment setting aside this will. Was some compromise 
effected between Proxenus on the one side and the 
husbands of the sisters on the other, Dicaeogenes at that 
time being a minor?" (19).
Davies is in accordance with Wyse7 s view, and states: 
"Given that twelve years after the death of Dikaiogenes
II his adopted son was able to obtain a judgment setting 
aside the will and giving him ownership of the entire 
estate of Dikaiogenes (II) (7-11) Wyse7s surmise (Isaeus 
414) is highly probable that the "testament" of 412/11 
was in fact no more than a compromise between Proxenos
(I) and the sons-in-law of Menexenos (I), Dikaiogenes
(II) being at that date a minor, and that when the latter
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came of age he was able to insist more exactly on the 
provisions of the will" (2 0 ).
However, Wyse does not surmise that there was only one 
will . Davies first seems to infer this from Wyse7 s 
question, but Wyse states that the earlier will was set 
aside, and this indicates that he thought that there was 
more than one will . On the other hand, Davies does 
distinguish between the "testament" of 412/11 and the 
later will.
The language used by the orator provides some 
insight into what might have occurred. The word which 
Wyse thinks leaves the impression that the sisters 
claimed the estate "ab intestato" is the 
verb £ it t in . This verb implies that the
sisters of Dicaeogenes claimed the remaining two thirds 
by means of an Si , an^ uncontested claim for an
inheritance (21). This, if it were true, could be taken 
to indicate that a man could make a will adopting someone 
as his son, and specify that only one third of the estate 
should be inherited by him, and leave the remainder to be 
claimed by his heirs by intestate succession, which is 
what Norton thinks. There are two wills which might be 
regarded as being similar. The will of Cnemon in
Menander7 s Dvskolos adopts Gorgias but simultaneously
alienates half of the estate from him. However, this is
because Cnemon has a legitimate daughter who is the
uterine sister of Gorgias, and thus is not legally 
permitted to marry him (22). In the will of Plato, the
boy Adeimantus is bequeathed the philosopher7 s paternal 
home, but the remainder of his property is not
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specifically disposed of, and is presumably to be 
inherited by his successors by the rules of intestate 
succession. There is, however, no evidence in Plato's 
will or elsewhere that Adeimantus was adopted as his son, 
so this can be regarded as a bequest (23). There is, 
therefore, no other example of a will with this function 
in Athens, and it must also be borne in mind that 
Dicaeogenes (III) later successfully claimed that he had 
been adopted as heir to the whole estate.
There is another interpretation of the events. When 
Dicaeogenes (II) died, his sisters, represented by their 
husbands, claimed his whole estate as heirs under the law 
of intestate succession. Proxenus then presented a will 
in which his son Dicaeogenes (III) was adopted as the son 
of Dicaeogenes (II). However, before a confrontation in 
a court of law, an agreement was reached, maybe with the 
aid of friends, that Dicaeogenes (III) should claim one 
third of the estate and the sisters of the testator
should claim two thirds. Dicaeogenes (III) was probably 
a minor at the time, since the speaker states that the
will was presented by his natural father
Proxenus ( f - . . t o o  r o u t rr^r^o ) a
similar situation is found in the speech concerning the
estate of Cleonymus (Isaeus, i) where the claimants under 
the law of intestate succession were awarded one third of 
the estate in an out-of-court settlement (24). Here, as 
in Isaeus v, the estate is divided not in half but in the 
proportion of one third and two thirds. The reason why 
the speaker of Isaeus v refers to the claim as
an iFtStt'OtA is because once the settlement had been
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reached, each party put in a claim for the portion of 
the estate which it was agreed they should have, and this 
claim was not contested. However, when Dicaeogenes (III) 
came of age, he successfully claimed the whole of the 
estate under the terms of the will written by Dicaeogenes
(II).
This explanation does, however, leave one question 
unanswered, namely: how can the speaker refer
to $vo SioLd-j^i (is. v, 15) if only one will had been 
presented to the court on two separate occasions? An 
explanation for this can be found in the fact 
that can mean a solemn compact or covenant in
addition to a will (25), and Isaeus states that oaths had 
been taken to the effect that both parties concerned 
would adhere to the agreement:
ifL06tu.*/re$ firij TT^.p<^(,e6 r*. cbfj.oxoy y , ....
(Is. v, 7)
This suggests that the speaker could well be referring to 
one compact and one will.
Therefore, it is most probable that the function of 
the will of Dicaeogenes (II) was to adopt Dicaeogenes
(III) as his son, giving him the whole of his estate.
Haanias
Hagnias died in 396 at the hands of the Spartans 
while he was on an embassy to Persia (26), and since he 
made his will as he was preparing to set out on this 
embassy (27), it can be dated at 396.
The case of Hagnias' estate is of particular
interest because there are two extant speeches about it,
both of which were written on behalf of different
claimants. Since both accounts are very different, it is
best to quote them together:
O'? V j  o r *  k t c r T \ e t v  r r * p e - 6 < z v * . £ ( r T o  / r p e - 6 S e ^  $  u > v
e i r t  ro n jT « .s  r + s  r? j /*■&«&<- W p .
o v *  6<// ' j f U ’ V t o T s  i y y v r * r < > s .  y & v o v s ,  e t  t c
T(k qV n *  icoc re  a  ir re  Vj cZxx* f c r r o L - f ie o c r o  8"<Jyn.rep #■ c l& to t )
tlSeXdj ' &t U  tl iCoLL a .v r* j rrxfioL, l r<*
2 > y r + .  ^ r S i S o u ,  pi £ e - A . Q f a r e .  o ^ L O f x y T f ^ c ^ '  f c * c l  r e c u r ’
| y  StpL&yiCA-Ls et/typocy/e;. S& 8 i# .ye *o /u & i'M ,/ pi&TM.
T*.vT*. re xtvroL ^ ev Evpov 7uh^ j^  -rerXei/rd 8'yL &vyiryp
%jv etroL 'jbocro %yvts^Sj Xjx^ v. / & l £&  to / K X y p o v
f  TW&lUA't icecr*. r y  $i*.d*jicy y.
(Is. xi, 8-9)
A different account of the events is given in the 
Pseudo-Demosthenic speech xliii:
7 o v r o v Z  y * p r o d T o l l S o  5
c
1 h j T T '
3  t t i s f y e s
$ i ) C a L b r < > S  j y e r ' t t - o i i e * . % y y V ~ ^ U r  to ‘A y r ' ‘ ° i r w  e §
D i O V j  £  ,r6-Si«6’6 « r - o TOV
f
i c K y p o ' u T O  7 (/ l y \ f C o v  tc.oi.'Hx. T C t} '
'T O fA .O 'T J i T O l f S  V ^ f r T ^ p O U ^ ' (C ed T t o * t o r  e
d p L ( ( i 6 j b - v j r y  G + . v r i J v octfrg T 0 v t c t ^ j p o v  T0VTO VC  ^ y £ S e c
f i€ r V  U s  6yy V T * p £ J Tl<? fc£y oSvTu'f r n j s
/
y u ^ cc l n o s  ,
t ) i S’ intrXtip-yjee-' evSeJs k ^ ^ o 6«... C^fLCteyeZr* /£*>
t ra .f i . iroL/r j^» r j s  y v v * . x . a i  e t 'c u  y t - K y p o s e  f i t . * .
-18 3-
/<<*»ToC 'T'y^  6 Tfetoc/S^B'jtCCK^ % l isevSerZs ytcos  
r\”  sU ^ o v  u ^ l*oLT*-£ <.eVC^biS\/Te^
rto.'lX'iJV 0C&&K$t)S (KVTO^
([Dem. ] xliii, 3-4)
These two accounts are so different that it seems as if 
either one or both of the speakers is lying.
Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain what exactly
the will of Hagnias stated about the property.
The adoption of the girl is only mentioned in Isaeus 
xi. Thompson asks whether Isaeus asserts that "Hagnias 
adopted his niece while he was still alive, or does he 
say that Hagnias simply left a will adopting her on
death?" (28). After comparing both the terms in this will 
to those in others and Hagnias7 position to that of other 
testators, he concludes that Hagnias adopted the girl by 
will. Wyse finds Isaeus7 language ambiguous, "since tuvT’
may refer only to the bequest to
Glaucon" (29).It seems as if the ambiguity lies in the 
fact that toc^ t ' can either be taken as meaning "these
words" and would thus only refer to bi r-„ . ..  tSi&o~u , or
it could be taken as meaning "these clauses" and would
thus also refer to the adoption of the girl. However,
the fact that the adoption allegedly took place as a 
result of Hagnias being called to take part in an 
embassy, (ore suggests that it was not
an adoption "inter vivos" which would have taken some 
time to complete (30), but was a testamentary adoption.
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Therefore, according to the evidence from Isaeus xi, it 
seems as if one of the clauses of Hagnias7 will was the 
adoption of the testator7 s niece.
[Demosthenes], xliii is silent about this adoption, 
since it is stated that Hagnias had died childless (31),
but not that he had adopted his niece. The second
passage quoted implies that Phylomache (who is referred 
to as the mother of the child) claimed Hagnias7 estate by 
means of an , an uncontested claim for an
inheritance, shortly following Hagnias7 death. However, 
since Hagnias died in 396 (32), and the deposition in
[Demosthenes] xliii, 31 dates the award of the estate to 
Phylomache at 361, the speaker is not telling the truth. 
His intention in this passage is to leave the impression 
in the minds of the jury that Phylomache was the first to 
claim the estate. Furthermore, it is not to his 
advantage to admit that the will of Hagnias was at first
regarded as genuine.
The precise function of the second clause of this 
will is difficult to ascertain. According to Isaeus, 
there was one heir, Glaucon; but in [Demosthenes] there
are two, Glaucon and Glaucus. MacDowell follows Isaeus
and states that Glaucon was the next claimant under the
will, and that he was to be Hagnias7 posthumously adopted 
son (33). Gernet makes two suggestions: firstly that
Glaucon was intended to be Hagnias7 posthumously adopted 
son; secondly that both Glaucus and Glaucon pretended to 
be the adopted sons of Hagnias by virtue of a will (34).
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Presumably these two suggestions are intended to clarify
the two different narratives, but Germet neglects to sav
which orator he believes. Davies states that the estate
of Hagnias was inherited by Glaucon (35). Wyse thinks
that Glaucon was bequeathed the estate (36). Cornet1 s
second suggestion is improbable, since there is no other
example in Athens of a man adopting two sons by will.
Since there is no reason for Isaeus not to mention
Glaucus as another beneficiary, it is more likely that
Glaucon was only made contingent heir in the will, and
that the speaker of [Bern. ] xliii is misrepresenting the
events, possibly by confusing Glaucus1 and Glaucon1 s
later claim by intestate inheritance (37) with a claim of
the latter by will. There is no indication in either
speech that the will contained a second adoption. In
/
Isaeus, diou/uu is used as opposed to irote-iO , which
implies a bequest. In [Demosthenes] no mention is made 
of an adoption, and one cannot be inferred since two 
heirs are named. Furthermore, if Hagnias had wished to 
adopt Glaucon, it seems more likely that he would have
been adopted first in the testament. By this means 
Hagnias would have had an adopted son Immediately, and
there would have been no necessity for him to have
adopted a girl and hope that she would produce him a son 
eventually.
A more precise definition of the function might also 
be found in an attempt to explain why, thirty five years 
later, the will was found to be Invalid. Thompson thinks 
that when the claim was first made under the will, 
although it might have been contested, there was
sufficient evidence to prove its authenticity, but in
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361/0 Glaucon could not prove that the same will was 
genuine (38). This implies that Thompson might be of the 
opinion that the witnesses in the former case might have 
died.
There is another possible explanation. A man with 
legitimate children could make a will if they were 
minors, disposing of the property if they were to die 
before coming of age or two years after they came of age 
(39). This might have been possible also if a man 
adopted a minor, either "inter vivos" or by will. In the 
latter case there would be no necessity to write another 
will, but a second clause could be added stating that if 
the child were to die, someone could inherit the 
property. If this had been the function of Hagnias7
will, then it would not have been valid after two years 
following his adopted daughter7 s coming o f age. This 
explains why, thirty five years later, Phylomache 
received the estate.
The fact that Glaucon claimed Hagnias7 estate thirty 
five years after his death indicates that Hagnias7 
adopted daughter either had no children or that her
offspring predeceased her. Davies suggests that she did
have a son, and that this son is the claimant Eupolemus,
who is mentioned in [Dem. ] xliii, 7 (40). However, if
Eupolemus had been the girl7 s son, then he would have 
automatically inherited the estate, and Glaucon could not 
have claimed it by means of Hagnias7 will. MacDowell7 s 
suggestion that Eupolemus might have represented Hagnias7 
mother (41) is therefore more credible.
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Therefore the function of Hagnias' will was two-fold.
It contained an adoption of Hagnias' niece, and a second
clause which bequeathed the property to Glaucon if the 
girl should die before coming of age or two years after 
she came of age.
There are two other examples of a girl being adopted 
by will.
Theophon
Theophon probably died c. 369 (42), therefore his
will would have been made in this year. The evidence 
concerning this will is found in Isaeus xi:
yAp 0 T*j$ yvv'pU.tcii < * . $ T T T b Q ' / ' f l 6 XOc^ 6t<TO
& V T O X /  T ^ v  € r t* .V ro V  e S u J i C e ^ .  ...
(Is. xi, 41)Uv'r°v refers to Stratocles)
Here, no mention is made of a , so it might be
thought that the adoption (irrot^ocro ) took place "inter
vivos". However, the word indicates that the
adoption was authorised when the adoptive father was 
dying which suggests that, since an adoption "inter 
vivos" took some time to complete, which could mean that 
if he was very ill, the formalities might not be
completed before his death (43), the adoption was
included in a will. The words r 2 *  Ke ^ r o v  indicate
that the girl was to inherit all of Theophon's property. 
Since is preceded by fe rroiy6oi.ro , it is clear that
this is not a bequest without adoption. There is no 
other definite evidence concerning other clauses in the 
will. The fact that Stratocles acted as guardian of the 
girl for nine years (44) suggests that he was probably 
nominated as such by Theophon, maybe by will, since if no
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such arrangement had been made, the duty would have 
probably devolved upon the nearest male relative (4 5 ),
and Stratocles was only related to Theophon by marriage.
It is not made clear whether this was an oral or written
will. Therefore, the function of Theophon7 s will was the
adoption of his niece by marriage and the appointment of 
her father as guardian.
Anollodorus
The will of Apollodorus was made before he set out 
for Corinth where the Athenian troops were stationed 
during the years 394-390 (46). The making of the will
was motivated by his setting out on this campaign (47),
so it can be dated between 394 and 390. By means of his
will, Apollodorus adopted a girl:
eis fapt-vBov re t* tl rvL&oy.,
Sie&GTO T y /  06 6 ^ /  ic *?  eStOtce T-vj ' i v o u  pUrV
Qvyoirpl; S(t f ty rp i ) ^.v t o v  Ee dSe-Tdfyjj SuiovS
A o c * v v  l e p o f i r r n j  ■
(Is. vii, 9)
Here, no adoption is mentioned, but, as Wyse rightly 
states, Apollodorus was not legally empowered to dispose
of his half-sister in marriage while her father, 
Archedamus was alive. This clause indicates that an 
adoption was the subject of the first clause of the 
will. Wyse finds the legal aspect of the case puzzling 
since "Apollodorus had not become the adoptive father of 
the girl when he made the will and settled the marriage, 
since the adoption was only to take effect after his
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death" (48). However, if Archedamus, the girl's father 
and therefore her i<(>p\o<, agreed to the adoption, he would 
be agreeing also to his Kope^ being passed to Apollodorus 
after death. The only way in which Apollodorus could 
exercise his tc.vp^*< would be to write down his wishes 
regarding her marriage in a will. This will was later 
rescinded as is indicated by the fact that Apollodorus 
eventually decided to adopt Thrasyllus, the speaker of 
Isaeus vii.
The final two wills to be discussed in this section 
of the chapter were both made by men with daughters, but 
the legitimacy of one daughter is disputed.
Pvrrhus
It is difficult to date precisely when Pyrrhus' will 
was made, because of the lack of internal evidence from 
Isaeus iii. Wevers, relying on his theory concerning 
prose rhythms, dates the speech at about 389 (49).
MacDowell's revision of Wever s) system implies a rather 
later date of about 380 (50), and I find MacDowell' s
arguments convincing concerning this. Since the will was 
made at least twenty one years before Isaeus iii (51),
the document would date at c. 401.
In Isaeus iii, Pyrrhus is stated to have adopted 
Endius, who possessed his estate for over twenty years:
^^roox.6 $iX.oc6'r<*.£, k ocEeXtfOb p.'Vf'rp'bs T y j
fT'SpptSy o[/r*U J)* 6 y 6 * T° tvE ic '/
\ %  ^ I
Tov 7"© /  £7^ 0 /  y<?v tb
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t-M jp b v ifto s  Q *  T V * ‘eteCvav eire/3fo ir te '.^  e Ty
y e*\cob <*j  \LoL<* 4/ y^P^Vc^  'tc6 ovtc+> e ^ c y ro s  %ic&Cvov
-T o / x,A.Tji?0Y cvSe^s rfzoTrore npoeeiro i ’f &*ro c i 5 }
f i y r y t e  ry s  icKypo*op'loL<, itc&'Ci/uj.
(Is. iii, 1)
In this quotation, the speaker does not state that the 
adoption was authorised by a will, and this implies that 
Endius was adopted "inter vivos". This could be because 
wills were regarded with a certain amount of suspicion in 
Athens/ because of the possibility of forgery (52). It
is only towards the end of the speech in chapter 56 that
the fact that the adoption was by testament is mentioned, 
when the speaker states that a prosecution for perjury 
against the witnesses to Pyrrhus' will is pending. The 
precise function of this will is difficult to discern. 
It is alleged by the speaker's opponent that Pyrrhus had 
a legitimate daughter called Phile, who was probably at 
least two years old when he died (54). If so, she would 
have been classed as an fetciiK-^pos and Endius should have 
married her when she came of age. Instead she was
married to Xenocles, an unrelated Athenian citizen (55), 
with a dowry of less than one tenth of the estate (56).
The arguments against Phile's legitimacy in Isaeus iii 
are not conclusive, and the fact that Phile contracted a 
legitimate marriage with an Athenian citizen, but did not 
inherit the entire estate, cannot be taken as definite
evidence that she was illegitimate or the opposite (57).
However, if she was legitimate, it seems as if she had
been defrauded of her rights as an
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If this were so, her husband could have taken action 
against Endius, but this might well have resulted in 
Xenocles losing his wife (58). A possible solution to 
this problem can be found in Menander's play, Aspis.
In Aspis, Cleostratus, a soldier, is believed to 
have perished in battle. His sister, who is being cared 
for by her uncle Chairestratus, is to marry his step-son 
Chaireas. However, since she has become an to
her brother's estate, she can be claimed in marriage by 
her uncle Smikrines, who is an old man but is her nearest 
collateral relative. Smikrines insists on his rights not 
because he is in love with the girl, but because he 
wishes to possess the property which he will receive with 
her. Chairestratus, therefore, offers to allow Smikrines 
to keep the property on the condition that he can marry 
the girl to Chaireas:
YM PE£TPPkTC <L
to  rrpviypt' 6v^y>cey irpos, 7 3/ deutV'T  rr - fx
AAWV
O l/ TV-
TffL'J B if£o<rre-p
y6S£v } so c. ' f-y/
7*<*.<ux/ frpc lc*ct
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i rP%&
 ^ 6 trttCfi.y -r i ~fS.^ oo
-fyjV 0^6 £«*.✓, TO'dtUJ $& T ^ V  «-0 p -j V it J  £
£✓' i'v y ^ r ^ c  TlbuS'ioV^  <fevy*) $(iCyjV
V - j
ri TOVTOVJ
(Menander, Asnis 2 60-2 73)
This quotation indicates that it was possible (although 
not necessarily according to Athenian "mores") to make an 
agreement whereby an heiress could marry someone nearer 
her own age, and her father's (or in this case brother's) 
property would be given to the person who should by law 
marry her. The quotation also shows, as MacDowell 
rightly states (59), that an heiress' property was 
neither her own nor her husband's, it belonged to the son 
whom she would hopefully produce eventually. It is 
possible that a similar sort of bargain may have been
made between Xenocles and Endius, that the former would 
marry Phile, with a small dowry (60), while Endius would 
keep the property, even though by law Phile should have 
married Endius (61). Since Endius never married, the 
property would be inherited by Phile's male children by
Xenocles (62).
Paoli draws a parallel between the assumption that
Phile was not an to her father's estate and the
will of Cnemon in Menander's Dvskolos, where the 
testator's daughter is only left half of the estate.
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He suggests from these two incidents that a legitimate 
daughter only had the right to a dowry and not to her 
father's complete estate (63). However, the situation in 
PygkQlQs is different because Cnemon's adopted son is his 
daughter's homometric brother, and it was illegal for 
uterine brothers and sisters to marry. It was therefore 
a logical step for Cnemon to divide his property in 
half. Endius, on the other hand, was Phile's cousin, and 
could have married her legally.
It thus seems most probable that the will of Pyrrhus 
adopted Endius and stated that he should marry Phile when 
she came of age. Although Endius did become the adopted 
son of Pyrrhus, he did not marry Phile, and it is very 
possible that a pact of the type mentioned in Menander's 
play Asris was made, whereby she married Xenocles and 
Endius retained the estate until he died.
Cnemon
Menander's play, Dvskolos was first produced during 
the archonship of Demogenes for the Lenaea festival. 
Therefore the evidence from the play represents the 
customs of about the year 317/6.
In this play, Cnemon adopts Gorgias as his son, but
as his daughter could not marry him, since they were born 
of the same mother, he divided his property in half, 
giving half to Gorgias and half to his daughter as her 
dowry. This will therefore has a two-fold function, 
firstly to adopt a son and secondly to provide a dowry 
(64).
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However, there is a great difference between Cnemon' s 
will and the other wills, because although it was made 
because he thinks that he is dying, it is to take effect 
even if he still lives. Unlike all other wills involving 
adoption, in which the adoption took place after the
testator's death, this authorises an adoption "inter 
vivos", by which means the property and the 
responsibility for the are handed over to Gorgias
immediately. This is indicated when Gorgias asks Cnemon 
about finding a husband for his sister, and Cnemon tells
him that this is no longer his responsibility (65). Thus
by means of a will, Cnemon renounces his position
/ j
as Kupt05 of his o^os and hands it over to Gorgias whom
he also adopts as his son. By means of this will he also
specifies his daughter's dowry.
It is notable that in the wills discussed in this
section, the majority contain the adoption of a
relative. The exception to this is the will of 
Nicostratus.
Wills not involving adoption
This particular section shall be divided into two
sub-sections, the first about wills made by men who had 
legitimate children, the second concerning those made by
men who had no legitimate offspring.
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Wills not involving adoption made bv men who had 
legitimate children
In this section, the wills of Dionysodorus,
Diodotus, the elder Demosthenes, Pasio, Polyeuctus, 
Aristotle, Conon, Euctemon and Euthycrates shall be 
discussed in addition to evidence found in Hyperides ii. .
Dionvsodorus
Dionysodorus was one of the victims of the Thirty
6
Tyrants, and his will was made just before he died (/£6 ). 
It would thus date from 404/403. The terms of the will 
are not related, and it is just stated that he disposed 
of his property as seemed fit:
Tot Tfc olicfrTe*. ^ J, (x t j t o v  £&€rTo 'ortoo s <*.-£$ tuj
(Lysias xiii, 41)
The word cftx-et*- , meaning either household property or 
things pertaining to the family, suggests that this will 
might have been concerned with matters such as the amount 
to be set aside for his wife's dowry and the appointment 
of guardians for his unborn child. Dionysodorus also
requested that vengeance be taken on his murderer:
tcoLL e ireeic-v j i f r e v  'e/j.oc 70 y r-c 'f, 7 ^
t K i / T O i )   ^ ic a d  ro7$ T T a .6 c
■btrep „ b r o v  ^  r y  r y OL V T frO
& r l 6 * y] ft r & f x v r y s  >cv&~v ej 0cbro-v ,  & '
yei/yjToL*- vL'b'ij ir& iS tov, (p/o r  £
ro / iT t-rip * otvrov £ a e x -r e is t .
u■ o r l.
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TiftojpeZ/  urov £jj (pose* ovr*. .
(Lysias xiii, 41-42)
Arnaldo Biscardi suggests that this request for vengeance 
was a function of Dionysodorus' will (67). It is, 
however, specifically stated that Dionysodorus' will 
related to 6i>c&t+- , and since it is not specifically
stated that the request to take vengeance upon Agoratus 
was part of the will, but is reported by the 
verb Vm.6 i r r t o it seems best to assume that it was not 
included in the will. Indeed, even if the request had
not been made, it was the duty of a murder victim's male 
relatives to take vengeance upon the murderer (6 8 ). 
Dionysodorus' solemn injunction can be regarded as
a , not in the sense of a will, but as a solemn
compact or covenant (69). The solemnity of the command 
is indicated by the use of the verb 'Gtnetc^ nrui . Such an
injunction would have been a covenant between two
parties, because one party demanded that vengeance be 
taken, and the other carried out the demand by 
prosecuting Agoratus for murder. Thus, Dionysodorus made 
two t one was a will, the other was a solemn
covenant, firstly with his friends and relatives to
avenge his murder, and secondly with his wife to tell her 
child, if she was pregnant, that Agoratus was his 
father's murderer.
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The will mentioned in Hvoerides ii (70)
The will mentioned in this speech was probably made 
at the latest in 336, the year of Dioxippus' victory at 
the Olympic games, since this was when the testator's 
widow re-married (71).
The text of Hyperides ii, For Lvcoohron is very 
a-og-rupt, so any attempt to reconstruct the function of 
the will referred to therein is based on the fragments 
which remain, and, to a certain extent, on the 
reconstructions which have been made with regard to the 
text.
It is not known for certain what the name of the 
testator was. The names Chremes and Charisandrus have 
been put forward, but neither of these suggestions is 
compatible with evidence from the text (72). Lycophron 
was charged with adultery with the testator's wife, and 
this speech is his defence. The woman was pregnant at 
the time of her husband's death, and this accusation 
calls the child's legitimacy into question.
The first indication of the function of the will in 
this speech is found in the following:
i-  rer
otvrov
t l  j  y ^ l y ] .......
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7i6£\oczr e j v o v  ^ T c ^ i ~ ro v$ . y e /o ^ te :  / o \ / -
(Hyp. ii, frag, iv, cols 46-47)
Here, there is a connection between a certain Euphemus 
and the testator, who is referred to in the) words 
GTe[A6rv r-ye dri/ .. . .. .  (fiiiv [evsj*
j
It seems as if it is with Euphemus that the testator 
leaves his wife when making his , will on his
deathbed V t !
since it is later stated that certain relatives tried to 
eject him from the estate, which indicates that he must 
have taken up residence there (74). The speaker states 
that this was in accordance with the
laws ") / and the fact that the wills of
Demosthenes (I), Pasio and Diodotus contain a similar 
clause (75) indicates that this is so.
The identity of Euphemus is uncertain. Blass has
suggested that he was the brother of the woman (76), but,
as Burtt and Curtis rightly state, this is improbable
because the speech suggests that Dioxippus, her brother,
attended her second marriage because he was the only one 
suitable to give her away (77). Therefore, they suggest 
that Euphemus was probably a friend of the deceased (78), 
and because of the reason mentioned above, this 
suggestion seems more probable than that put forward by 
Blass. The matter can be further elucidated by referring 
to certain other wills made by men with families.
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In the will of the elder Demosthenes, three men are asked 
to act as guardians for his two children and two of these 
are relatives of the testator; Aphobus, who was supposed 
to marry the testator's wife and live with the children, 
was his nephew and Demophon was also his nephew. When 
mentioning the appointment of the third man, Therippides, 
the speaker states specifically that he was a friend of 
the testator since boyhood (79). When leaving on a 
military campaign, Diodotus places his family in the care 
of his brother, Diogeiton, who is also the father of his 
wife (80). On the other hand, Pasio does not appoint a 
relative as the guardian of his young son, Pasicles, but 
a trusted freedman of his named Phormio who is to also 
marry his wife (81). This might be explained by the fact 
that Pasio was a freedman himself, and as such might not 
have been able to trace his relatives, or those that he 
knew about might have been slaves. Therefore, it seems 
equally probable when looking at the terms of other 
testaments, that Euphemus was a relative of the testator, 
if only a fairly distant one.
Later in the speech, there is mention of this 
Euphemus providing the woman with a dowry:
... y  6-udvs k^eSoQ-vj r j i x ^ / r o ^  LpyVP'-OV 
t r p o 6 0 £ / r o $  oc v r y  l. f r y M /  a r i  o v
t t v v +] 6 tfiei j
(Hyp. ii, 13) ( 7  refers to the testator's wife).
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Here, the word rroryp&S implies that it has been alleged 
that Euphemus supplied the dowry out of base motives. 
Maybe the opposing party suggested that Lycophron had 
made a form of compact with Euphemus in which the latter 
was promised some sort of financial gain if he did this. 
In view of this possibility, it is likely that if a dowry 
of one talent of silver had been specified in the will of 
the woman's husband, such a clause could have been used 
in Lycophron's favour, and he could have made a reference 
to it in order to answer the accusation. However, this
is not done. It is stated that Euphemus dowered the girl 
because of his enet This is translated in the Loeb
text as "kindness", (82) and rendered as such it implies 
that Euphemus provided the money from his own estate. 
This also suggests that no provision at all was made for 
the woman with respect to dowry in the will. However, 
this is contrary to other evidence found in the terms of 
wills made by men with families. In these documents, if
there is a surviving wife, provision is generally made
for her dowry, (83). The only possible exception is the 
will of Conon, but it is very likely that this was also 
done here (84). In addition, Epicurus provides for the
dowry of a female dependant in his will, but leaves the
amount to the discretion of his heirs (85). The 
word &rr<.4^£&can also mean "fairness”, and this 
translation combined with the evidence from other wills 
suggests that the testator had not specified a particular 
sum in his will, but stated that Euphemus could dower the 
woman from the estate as he thought was fitting, in a 
clause rather similar to that in Epicurus' testament.
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The woman was married as soon as the dowry was provided
have been pregnant at the time of her second marriage 
since such an arrangement would not have been very
would have been married after giving birth to the child, 
and its care would then be the responsibility of 
Euphemus, who would arrange for its care on the father's 
estate (87). That it was not usual for children to live 
apart from their mother is indicated by the fact that the 
children of Diodotus were evidently separated from their 
mother after she re-married (8 8 ).
Subsequent events suggest that the will contained a 
secondary bequest:
[el S', ijejtrep ]j
-& tr& 7\oislj}o\f rjei rr&pL ^iyJocuy qv
(Hyp. ii, rrag 4, coi. 4/;
There have been various interpretations of these events 
concerning what they suggest was included in the will.
for her (y\ . - £iiff'jjiO 'v ). It is unlikely that she would
practical (8 6 ). It is therefore more probable that she
piejA. r'vpy&oi.eiv c^lro'Cy ee-riv  ^  cx.’ctCk
j V A  v -s ^ Ae^cov. 7rfv$  ce rovrots itco* o <j <* imv  ^ e^ L tirouuev
f y  ' j  y t y \ / P f j L i ^ / O ^  / C c c l  & 6 7 e - ( ? 0 *  T o C D T a H S  T ql. C J>
oC<-* tsxvpZ *«*v' o(>1jtT>'V± iv' ^cts.......
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Curtis states that "a certain Euphemus, probably a 
friend of the husband, was to oversee the estate with the 
proviso that if the child died, the inheritance was to be 
returned to the husband's family. About three years 
later, when the child's good health lessened this 
possibility, certain relatives initiated legal 
proceedings against Lycophron in an attempt to prove him 
guilty of adultery and the actual father of the child, 
their ultimate purpose being to prove the will invalid, 
in which case the inheritance must revert to the family" 
(89). However, this does not explain the fact that the 
speaker's opponents, who were probably not the closest 
relatives and would not inherit if the will did state 
that the estate would revert to the intestate heirs, did 
not join with the latter in trying to eject Euphemus, but 
chose instead to rely upon the will.
Colin is a little more specific, he states that if 
the child were to die, the fortune would go to the 
relatives by marriage (parents par alliance); after the 
testator' s death, the nearest relatives questioned the 
will, but those further removed did not do so, because 
they kept in mind the fact that they might inherit
eventually, and that it was probably all these relatives 
who instituted the case against Lycophron in the hope of 
rendering the will invalid (90). However, Colin does not 
take account of the fact that if those who were not most 
closely related to the testator were to succeed in having 
the will declared invalid, they would not gain anything, 
because the property would be inherited by the closest 
relatives.
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In addition, it seems unlikely that those who stood to 
inherit in the event of the child's death were relatives 
by marriage and thus belonged to the woman's family, 
because of the nature of the charge brought, since it
would bring shame on the whole family. It is therefore 
more likely that even the more distant relatives were 
from the husband's family.
Burtt suggests that "certain relatives" (he does not 
specify whether close or distant) were to inherit the 
property in the event of the child's death 4 T^hese 
relatives accepted the will, but others disputed it;
three years later all the relatives joined together in 
an attempt to prove the child illegitimate (91). It is 
implied here that all the relatives involved were equally 
close to the testator, since they would all gain 
something if the child were to be declared illegitimate. 
However, this does not explain why they were divided over 
the question of the will's validity.
Therefore it is necessary to re-examine the evidence 
from fragment four in order to attempt to reconstruct 
what was written in the will.
If we are to believe the restoration, it seems as if
there was an attempt to eject Euphemus by the closest 
relatives (£ro^ l y y v j  r£rcJ ). The verb
implies that Euphemus was living on the testator's estate 
and he had to be removed. Since he had been appointed 
guardian of the testator's wife and child by will, this 
attempt at ejection would have taken the form of 
attacking the validity of the will (92), since if the
will were to be found invalid, then Euphemus would no
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longer be residing on the testator's estate because his 
guardianship would cease. The fact that the speaker's 
opponents opposed {'Ki^x-vet-v ) this attempt suggests that 
they were not in the same kinship group as those who 
contested the will, and as such would not gain anything 
if the will were to be declared invalid. The fact that 
they relied on the will becoming operative also if the 
child were to die ( e - l —  dxtfrous ) suggests that 
there was a second clause by which they stood to inherit 
the testator's property on the child's death. It is very 
probable that this clause was included according to the 
law quoted in [Dem. ] xlvi, 24, in which a man with 
legitimate sons could bequeath his property by will if 
his children were to die while still minors or two years 
after attaining their majority (93). Since there was 
more than one opponent to the speaker, as indicated by
S /
the plural olvtov<, t it is very unlikely that this clause 
provided for an adoption, but was a straightforward 
bequest of property. In view of the lack of evidence, it 
cannot be stated how the testator wished the property to 
be divided between these heirs, but unless he had stated 
otherwise in his testament, it would have been shared
equally between them (94). Since these people would not 
have anything to gain if the will were declared invalid, 
but would rely on the child being declared illegitimate 
for the secondary clause in the will to come into effect, 
they would not seek to nullify the document.
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Therefore, from the available evidence, it seems as
if the will mentioned in Hyperides, ii provided for the
guardianship of the testator's child after its birth and 
for the care of his wife; no specific sum was set aside 
for the dowry but this was probably left to the judgement
of Euphemus who would most likely deduct the sum from the
testator's estate; there was probably also another clause 
in which relatives more distant than those who would 
inherit in accordance with the laws of intestate 
inheritance would receive the property if the child were 
to die before two years after coming of age.
Diodotus
Diodotus was enlisted to serve under Thrasyllus in 
the Peloponnesian war. His will was made before he 
sailed to Asia in the archonship of Glaucippus 
(410/409). Therefore the document can be dated at 
410/409 (95).
The will of Diodotus is mentioned in Lysias xxxii, 
which has been preserved in part by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus (96). The testator, Diodotus, gave his 
will to his brother Diogeiton, just before setting out on
military service:
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ettco&t. julvcLs r y  y v t f *  t fc t kj* ±  tjolL k. w t v .
6ToLTyp*.s K v jfltcyro vs  *
(Lysias, xxxii, 5-6) CocurZ ko Z h o je i lo n )
In this passage, five talents in deposit are given with 
the will. Presumably this money is to be repaid to 
Diodotus on his return or given to his son on coming of 
age. The verb indicates that the financial
documents were not sealed as part of the will, since 
Diodotus shows them to Diogeiton. In addition, the will 
would have been sealed, and the seals of a will were 
broken and the will read on the death of the testator 
(97), whereas in the case under discussion, it would have 
been necessary for Diogeiton to have access to the 
financial documents while his brother was away on 
military service, so that the property could be 
administered in his absence, even if he were to return 
alive. That these documents were later sealed is 
indicated by the fact that further on in the speech they 
are referred as 7& pp.^'Twi. - - - 6e&-jpLec6fU' v*.,
(Lysias, xxxii, 7). Therefore, the terms of the will are 
those mentioned after itre* %£ . There is no
evidence whether the contents of the will are read out or
j <
shown to Diogeiton, but Diodotus commands ( ) his
j/
brother to carry out his wishes. The words n  
indicate^ that the demands to be made are those written 
in the will, since they are to be carried out after his 
death. By means of this will, both the testator's wife 
and daughter are to be dowered with a talent each (98).
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In addition the wife is to receive also the goods in the 
room ( t&L ^  This is presumably to be
given to her in event of death and not as part of the 
dowry since these words are the object of ‘^ovv'ot-c 
not i-in 5o . It is possible that this furniture
might have been part of the property the woman had
brought with her on marriage, but this is a matter which
is open to conjecture since there is no evidence. The 
wife is also bequeathed twenty minae and thirty staters 
(99). There is no complaint that this property and money 
was not given into the care of Hegemon, the woman's 
second husband, after their marriage (100). However, 
Diogeiton only paid five thousand drachmae of her dowry 
and kept the other thousand:
T y S  oc o(.-o ru iy  e tT  iSo*u s rr«-v'r «<
g*oc rrov' uj ✓ b o./'y p  o t v r ^ j ,
(Lysias, xxxii, 8)
In this quotation no mention is made of the furniture and 
the thirty staters and twenty minae bequeathed to her by
Diodotus as being part of the dowry, and this is a 
further indication that it was a bequest independent of 
the dowry.
One notable absence from Lysias' account of 
Diodotus' will is that the testator does not include the 
nomination of a guardian in the terms given. It is 
implied that he entrusted his children to Diogeiton 
without formally asking him to be their guardian:
. -208-
$£ V6rtrpo/ tox.TtKA6yei s> Ai'oSoros £^eT<l ®(0& 6 iS^ tvj
r c S /  < b i r \ i T u ) ' f /  h tfr. ~K(z 6  oc S T y  /  ^ « . V T  o'O y y \ / c ^ L .* c < * ^ J <x S  d-Xc^/
0~36<*.vf icoco 77)'✓ ix k t f  VctrepoL, K b ro v  £$
Ksi-~ &m£ e 'K ^ o tf f u o i r ^ T r r A n c r o ^  t Jj  ✓ jto uS^^o v  vc* . c
r*>^ , fy o v f ie  yos S loL Tasu Ta^s ri.s <* v'* y *:« l o t ^j r *  s
o M e v l  ju 3 .X \ j> v  6 ynce<- ✓ £ , . * .« w c ^  T t& p t t o t j s  o c t r o i !
rroi.2 (TO^-S ytvtz g O’u.Lj . . ..
(Lysias, xxxii, 5)
In this quotation, the very close relationship which 
Diogeiton has with Diodotus (brother and father-in-law) 
and his relationship with Diodotus7 children (uncle and 
grandfather) are stated in order to emphasise the fact 
that he was the obvious choice for the children7 s
guardian. The words 7^ .i. «v*yiax.LoTyT«s indicate
that the obligation was not one of law but of 
relationship. Furthermore, since Diodotus left his -wife 
and children in the care of his brother Diogeiton for the 
duration of his military service he might have just 
assumed that Diogeiton would continue this care if he 
were to die on campaign, and so did not write this in his 
will.
Thus, the function of the will of Diodotus was to 
arrange the dowry of the testator7 s wife and daughter and 
to bequeath some money and property to the wife.
Demosthenes (I)
The year of the elder Demosthenes7 death has been 
discussed in detail elsewhere (101), and occurred at the 
latest in 376/5.
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His will was made just before he died, and thus can be
dated at either 377/6 or 376/5.
The elder Demosthenes also made his will while his 
children were still minors, but unlike Diodotus, he made
it while he was ill and not before setting out on
campaign. Demosthenes (II) admits that he has not seen 
this will (102), so in attempting to assess what was 
contained in the document, it is necessary to be mindful 
of the fact that the orator relied upon the evidence of 
his mother (103).
Since the elder Demosthenes was dying at the time he 
made his will, it was necessary for him to appoint a 
person or several people to look after his property and
family:
a S e  vepc 6f*-€r'K**€- Tocfj
T  €r T q -v T uJ  l i c c J i  
k y p o fJ iv T 'L 7"*3 irte-? y Tovro*-s
©Vrotvt tcj
y < s - y o *o  r o t /  / <Tg Q rjp (-n ir 'tS v j tcj JT'<x<.ot.^ce^y y & s e rL
piZ/ $ '6 * -  nbu-SoS btrc^p^o^T <- •
(Dem. xxvii, 4) A
b f> 71~<*.Tn)pJ & oisfyes ^6 y sG ^ ro  ~rij+ /^^ o /
/ b e e /o '? ;  T O U r o  i f S  - r p & ? S  6VT<*-5>
ixo tvju i  r b s  xSerAtfo^ r X
h £ > l/L 4 jb f njjJLUJV € r is  T~oc s  iv e Q - '^ lc e r (/
- 1fc*.p<K tULToC fr'y /  €trO\/6/Ua^iO (/.
(Dem. xxviii, 15) B
(In this quotation the words r<9OT0V5 Tpe?* ofr«-s refer to 
Aphobus, Demophon and Therippides).
The first quotation is the beginning of the narrative
section of Demosthenes' first speech against Aphobus and 
as such is more factual and has less tr^ o s than the
second quotation. In A the relationship of the guardians 
to the deceased is stated. Aphobus and Demophon are both 
nephews of the testator and Therippides is a friend of
long standing. This is similar to the account of the 
occasion when Diodotus asks Diogeiton to care for his
family, since in both cases the relationship of the
picked guardian or guardians is stated. The
words WrraLsreL. refer to both the elder Demosthenes'
property and his dependants, and the word 
indicates that he is giving them over to the care of
Aphobus, Demophon and Therippides. In quotation B, the
scene is a little more emotional than that described in
A. Here, the elder Demosthenes describing his children
and wife as a "deposit" {e ro L p ^ ^ ro cQ ^ ^ y ) and, later in
the scene, Demosthenes states that he was physically 
placed on Aphobus' knees:
6rts toL roJTO'V y 6 / * '7~<*- 
(Dem. xxviii, 16)
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This alleged action of physically giving his little son 
to Aphobus would have a greater emotional impact on the 
jury than the description of the scene in passage A.
Furthermore, another witness to the scene is introduced,
namely Demosthenes' uncle, Demo, a person who is not 
included as a witness in xxvii (104).
The elder Demosthenes also made provisions for the 
dowries of his wife and daughter, and nominated a husband 
for each of them:
r^ v  ey^y* Svo t&'kx.v t '* &v &vs,
i fS & j ic e v  5"e TofjTop ryv pyrep*. ryr ipyv Xxtl
XTpfrtvL* byZb-j K o v r* .  psoiSj >c*-Z -pyr ot^ccxv <^oi)ceZv} pout
Ctc&-6e6^ y(py60eL<* TdTs y  yovpe-vo s^ , >coci ro ’dro 'v^
df & T *  o i  ic e i a 7"4 p  o d s  e<- p jb c  i r o ^ s e  c & v  O ^ u . o tv
irp o i7 6  v & y i f o t x  r o d j T y s  o ^ e - t o T ^  70s rrpo & y  e v o p & v y  £ .
(j> e tn . x x v i i j  S )  (o c & T d  £ £  Tof>Tctj  refers +o Apkobu.
Tyv pA\/ d.S&7L<(yi/ A  y p o ^  rr l Svo r*th*.rT ■* 7rfoZx**
S i S o v s  e i / B v s ^  k m X  y w * u K ~ J olv r ^ Ty x  & y y v £  v  ^  . t
(Dem. xxviii, 15)
Hcc? TbVTuJ T y  v f '  4 p y  *  p y r e p  '  £■ y yv<£  \/ S ST*-
b ySo^icavr^ p S o SS
(Dem. xxviii, 16) ( rodr^f refers to Aphobus)
In these quotations, there is a difference in the words 
used for the betrothal. In xxvii, is used,
t
whereas in xxviii,
JyyvO is used. The only other testament in which a 
marriage is arranged between the testator's wife and 
someone else, the verb used is (105). It is
therefore possible that iy y v ^  was the word used by the 
elder Demosthenes when he was telling those present of 
the terms of his will, but he actually wrote S'C-Scaj^ c 
in the as Pasio did. There is, however, a passage
in Menander's Dyskolos in which both tfyyvuJ and are
used:
 ^ // /, r -j
ro^yoLfiovv e y u y G  £ L°1 L
S'CSocfAL ttou/ tca'S [ tcZ ]'* Q&&V
t  fiCx-Acfy i6 T i-  it .[ -J  Gy 1 j 406 T p *-T ’t ,
(Menander, Dyskolos, 761-763)
The precise meaning of this passage is uncertain, because 
the text is corrupt, but it is specifically stated here 
that Cnemon's daughter is to be betrothed to Sostratus,
Jand the words used to denote this are both G-yyit** and SCScsp.<- 
However, later in the plav, only &yyvu) is used with 
reference to the betrothal (106). It ■'s, therefore, 
difficult to state which word was used in the will, 
because of lack of evidence. Whichever word was used, 
this will indi cates that one was alio wed by law to 
dispose of one's womenfolk in marriage in a will.
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Harrison states that the disposal of the testator's 
wife and daughter in marriage was "mortis causa" even 
though it took place "inter vivos", and therefore it 
could be thought that the k y y i j did not become operative 
until after the testator's death (107). The use of the 
present participle does imply, however, that
the i \ jy fvyj took place "inter vivos", and therefore it was 
probably the which was meant to take place after
the elder Demosthenes' death. If the testator were to 
recover suddenly after contracting the , it is very
unlikely that Aphobus would have refused to give him back 
his wife.
The dowry which is given to Aphobus with Cleoboule, 
the testator's wife, is larger than the dowry she had 
brought the elder Demosthenes (108). Aphobus is also 
given the use of the house and furniture of his ward 
(r^v ) , this is unusual, since it was
the normal practice in Athens for the bride to move into 
her husband's home, not the other way round (109), but 
maybe the testator envisaged Aphobus living in his house 
with Cleoboule and his children, and moving back into his 
own house once Demosthenes had come of age. However, 
even though Aphobus took the dowry, the marriage never 
took place. The reason 
implied that she refused 
o f  jJ&l/OC TTocfciS’fiS &6fL6r''
(Dem. xxix, 26) (110)
for this is not certain. It is 
to marry Aphobus:
/ d r y  , S t o & s  tc o L T t^ jp e v & e -OCi
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This quotation suggests that Cleoboule gave herself up to 
a life of widowhood p t v c e  ) because of her
children. If this statement is true, then one might 
assume that a woman had the right to refuse the man
her had chosen for her (111). it was, however, most
unusual for a woman in Athens to choose her husband
(112), and there is no other example in Greek literature 
of a woman refusing to marry the man picked for her, 
although there is an example of a woman allegedly 
refusing to have sexual intercourse with her husband
(113). Therefore, if Aphobus had wished to marry her, 
even if she did not agree with this, she would have been 
compelled to have married him in accordance with the 
terms in the will. Thus, the phrase is probably not a 
true statement of fact but an example of hyperbole used 
to add dramatic effect to Cleoboule's oath.
In addition to not marrying Cleoboule, it is stated 
that Aphobus refused to maintain her, even though he was 
in possession of her dowry:
oi) yvLf ScJo/ros ToxJrov -ry p y r p C   ^ r ' i j v
irpo?*' evo'/ToZ •
(Dem. xxvii , 15)
The dowry given to a woman's husband on marriage was 
specifically meant to provide her with some sort of 
maintenance (114). Even though Aphobus did not marry 
Cleoboule, since he had taken her dowry, he was supposed 
to have maintained her. The word tov in this quotation 
suggests that he even refused to give her food. If this 
is so, where did she obtain this from? One possibility is 
that she actually went to live with her sister and
brother-in-law, Demochares, who later had an altercation 
with Aphobus. However, Demosthenes does not specifically 
state that this happened, and such a statement would have 
had a very effective emotional impact upon the jury. 
Furthermore, if this had happened, it might have been 
possible for Demochares to bring a $ l g Z t ov against
Aphobus on behalf of Cleoboule (115). It is more 
probable that Aphobus had attempted to deprive her of 
some of her jewellery, as is indicated in his reply to 
Demosthenes:
k.ttX £t <- pLL*.f>o>/ e^yj it p is  r y *  p -y /e tp *
TTep I  ^pV 6iS C tJ*T £ / rc  &«.u .
(Dem. xxvii, 15)
Although it was morally wrong of Aphobus to have done 
this, it was not quite as bad as if he had deprived her 
of food.
Demophon is given Demosthenes' sister with a dowry 
which is far larger than that given to Aphobus; he has 
two talents, whereas Aphobus has. only eighty minae. This 
is very different from the will of Diodotus in which both 
mother and daughter are given the same amount of money as 
a dowry, and the wife receives some furniture and a 
monetary bequest as well (116). Demophon is to receive
the dowry immediately (ed& ds ), although, since the girl 
is only five at her betrothal, at least nine years would 
have to pass before her marriage. It is possible that 
this was done in order to ensure that Demophon would 
marry her when she came of age.
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However, he did not do this, and furthermore, he 
neglected to marry her to another man with the dowry 
specified by her father (117).
Another clause of the will contained a bequest to 
Therippides:
fx&V V SojuyicOVT*.
x*p-«MGx.6 0*'C T o z o v ro v  y o v o s ,  o c f jp  e?*ou
SeicipLO't&eLyy; c trcos ^  $ LJ £ rrl dv^iloLV ✓
J (6 ? p 6  \ /  TC T U f\/ e r jjrA i/ $ lO L>C y z z - i e v  "
(Dem. xxvii, 5)
The alleged reason for this bequest is that the elder 
Demosthenes was afraid that greed might otherwise tempt 
Therippides to mismanage the estate. However, this 
credits the testator with incredible foresight and 
incredible stupidity, for if he had thought that 
Therippides was not an honest man, it is unlikely that 
he would have been placed in such a responsible 
position. It is more likely that the elder Demosthenes 
included this clause in this will to compensate 
Therippides for the trouble which he was hopefully going 
to take caring for his wards' estate.
Another function of this will was an inventory of 
property:
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y*p &y6-yj7o(.Trro, ofs 4j (*-yr 'yp > £
tc#.r€K irT&* irocr^p rr^t/T'd^, . . •
(Dem. xxvii, 40)
The damaging admission that Demosthenes has not seen his 
father's will is left until after he has given an 
extremely detailed inventory of the property in the 
previous thirty chapters. If this admission had been 
made earlier, it would have been detrimental to his
</ Lcase. The words u)s < fy 6 is  y
p . j t 'y p  indicate that the inventory given relied on 
evidence from Cleoboule. This indicates that she. was 
acquainted with the details of her husbandys property, 
like Diodotus' wife and Polyeuctus' wife (118). This 
property was worth approximately thirteen and a half 
talents (119). The v  rre mentioned in xxviii, 6 did
not contain a complete inventory of the property:
0 tloTOvt* ru )*  x-x- r*- A&l rrofjukr i/ ua/  e y & y f* . rrrO j . . .
(Dem. xxviii, 6)
These might have been similar to the documents which were 
sealed and deposited with Diodotus' will, and which
contained information about certain loans. Another 
example of this can be found in Demosthenes, xli, where 
papers noting property matters are left by the wife of 
Polyeuctus and are sealed and deposited with a certain 
Aristogenes (120). In both of these examples, the papers
concerned only contained details about particular
property matters and were not complete inventories.
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Demo sthenes also alleges that his father wrote 
instructions concerning the letting of his property in 
his will:
kv  y t f  eykypocrrr'ij „ . . o i^ o v  /jh6&u)6o vsl
(Dem. xxvii, 40)
J / s \ ***
eirieicytTTUS JUU6 & CJ60CL T€r TO V oibCG|/.
(Dem. xxviii, 15)
Sometimes, if guardians felt unable to oversee the 
management of the estate they were to care for, it would 
be leased out to someone else who would pay rent for it 
and keep the proceeds (121), thus they would be able to 
make a profit on the estate without having to do much.
In these quotations, the word o ^ o v  does not refer to 
the actual family home, since Aphobus will be living in
this (122), but to the business properties belonging to 
the elder Demosthenes, such as the sofa-making factory. 
The word ty£yp<*xrro suggests that the testator had written 
specific instructions about how and on what conditions 
the properties were to be let, and the verb
indicates that the elder Demosthenes definitely wished 
this to be done. On the other hand, Aphobus stated that 
the deceased specifically ordered him not to lease the
property because his father Gylon had been a debtor to
the state, and if the property were thrown open 
to , its value could not be concealed
(123). Since the alleged debt would have been inherited, 
a prosecution for debt {*cwo ypdkf'y ) might have been 
brought, resulting in confiscation of property (124).
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However, the guardians placed Demosthenes in the position 
of v eviipjoptecs with a tax liability of three talents,
one fifth of the total estate (125), thus suggesting that
his estate was worth fifteen talents. By doing this they 
made public the value of the property, and if Aphobus1
argument that the debt owed by Gylon was still unpaid was 
true, a prosecution could still have been brought. It is 
not made clear in the text when the guardians placed 
Demosthenes (II) as , but if this was
done soon after the death of Demosthenes (I), they may
have thought that Demosthenes (II) would not realise or 
remember this fact. On the other hand, by the process 
of otico u  r they would have no control over
the property unless they themselves were to bid for the 
lease, and even then, it would have been difficult for
them to manage the property for their own benefit, since 
its value had to be declared on handing it over to the
owner when he came of age (126). It is therefore very
probable that the elder Demosthenes did indeed ask the 
guardians to lease the estate, but they did not do so, 
not because they wished to conceal its true value, since 
this was admitted by placing Demosthenes
v.
as 6vjAjiopioL$ , but because they wished to keep some
of it for themselves.
The third speech against Aphobus contains what might 
be regarded as being another clause of the elder 
Demosthenes1 will. This speech is not part of 
the errirpotT 'fj which Demosthenes brought against his
guardians but a defence of Phanus, who was charged by 
Aphobus with giving false testimony (127).
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This testimony stated that a certain Milyas whom Aphobus 
had demanded for torture was not a slave but a freedman, 
and as such could not be tortured to give evidence
(128). In this speech, it is stated that the elder 
Demosthenes freed Milyas on his deathbed:
i y d  ^  SuCoLS-nou., iccil 1T&pL
TO < $T oo X T c ^ p a .S o V  V * -i £><K6o L „ C £ & -a / act r e y ^ e i r r i Z v T o ^
(Dem. xx ix , 25-26)
In this quotation, the persons who witnessed the 
manumission of Milyas were some slave girls and 
Cleoboule, it is not stated that the guardians were 
present, whereas they acted as witnesses to the will
(129). Furthermore, as soon as Milyas is freed, he is 
regarded as such by the family, but if this had been done 
by will, Milyas would have been manumitted after the 
death of the testator, as happens in the wills of the 
peripatetic philosophers (130). Thus, Milyas was not 
freed by will, but "inter vivos".
T o y  &V frpK itfO  v  T w v r o i /
}sCuC'J v o u i t e e d ^
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Therefore, the will of the elder Demosthenes 
functioned as a document giving instructions for the care 
of both family and property. The security of the 
testator's womenfolk was provided for by the arrangement 
of both dowries and their future partners in marriage. 
It also contained a bequest to Therippides to repay him 
for the trouble he was supposed to take helping to manage 
the estate. The will also allegedly contained an
inventory of property and instructions concerning the 
letting of the estate.
Pasio
The will of the banker Pasio is recorded in
Demosthenes, xxxvi and [Demosthenes], xlv and xlvi. The 
first of these speeches was made in defence of Phormio 
who was the testator's freedman. The second two were 
speeches for the prosecution of Stephanus for bringing
false witness on behalf of Phormio.
The will of Pasio was made shortly before his death 
during the archonship of Dysnicetus in 371/70 (131), and 
unlike the cases concerning the estates of Diodotus and 
the elder Demosthenes, no family scenes are described in
the speeches concerning Pasio's testament.
Like the elder Demosthenes, Pasio arranged a 
marriage for his wife, and provided a dowry for her:
4IA0KK.H
Tv. Sir S ccS ero  $  y x p  S e r b s '  /
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' i i f i& S c j jn  ^ ‘Tmry t£.7w .vtov pX s |*. 7Te'tri^ f ' j ^ o v 3 
T&>7^ *.'/tcv to oci5r6tf&Vj swoctc'to^s ^ tc ^ ro ]/ ju. >/*j v
c^r/ f^W^ VecS teccZ r* <;, jc^z r«caa^ 0 4 *. e t r l v
bCijTvj t c* rToc^ Toc tocvtv. ^/^<-rr/rt7
( [Dem. ] xlv, 28
This quotation seems to be only part of the Sxn^-^j^'j of 
Pasio, since other clauses which were included in his 
will are not mentioned here. The reason for choosing 
Phormio as Archippe's future husband was that he would be 
more closely linked with the family and thus more 
inclined to care for the property (132), and carry out 
his duties as co-guardian of Pasicles (133). The wording 
of this section of the will is ambiguous, since S iS c ^ ^  
might not be regarded as being the equivalent of Ln^CSco^ 
Schaps finds it difficult in this case to discern 
"where the dowry ends and the gift to Archippe begins "
(134). However, Watkins states that a syntactic 
phenomenon of Greek is the "iteration of a compound verb 
in a succeeding clause or sentence by the simple verb 
alone, but with the semantic force of the compound"
(135). If this is applicable to the text of Pasio's
will, it is probable that the items listed formed 
Archippe;s\ dowry. Indeed, Apollodorus does not 
distinguish between his mother's dowry and trousseau, but 
treats the property mentioned as the former (136). 
Asheri states that this dowry constit/uted "a great part" 
of Pasio's property, and that this will indicates that by 
the fourth century one was legally empowered to bequeath 
such a large sum away from one's legitimate son (137).
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It is true that the dowry given to Archippe is a
comparatively large one (13 8), but since Pasio' s estate 
was worth approximately sixty six talents at his death 
(139), Archippe's dowry was not the large proportion of 
the property which Asheri says it was (140), for 
Apollodorus himself puts the total value of the dowry at 
five talents. Such a large dowry did not render
Ap^ollodorus penniless as he alleges (141), since he was 
capable of performing various liturgies (142).
According to Apollodorus, the marriage to Archippe 
took place while he was absent from Athens on a
trierarchy (c. 369/8) (143), and therefore took place a
little while after Pasio' s death. However, it is also
suggested that Phormio first married Archippe and then
took over the guardianship of Pasicles, Pasio's younger 
son (144):
*Eir&l§-yj -TO'Cwv 0 Thesis'S ^ T f r T e ^  V  T*y 7&CU Tot S luS
o^yOyui o v t o s c  v l^\ v <- Ty/
V  , T o v  S i r  6 f T ( r  T p  6  r r & ' v Z V  •
(Dem. xxxvi, 8)
In this quotation the fact that the marriage is mentioned 
first suggests that it took place before Phormio began to 
act as Pasicles' guardian. However, it would have been 
essential for Phormio to assume guardianship over 
Pasicles immediately, so that he could provide for his 
needs, but it might well have been more tactful to wait a 
little while before marrying Archippe, since it seems as
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if Apollodorus did not approve of the match. Later in 
Demosthenes xxxvi, it is stated that Pasio took this step 
for financial reasons:
(Dem. xxxvi, 30)
This quotation indicates that the marriage was arranged
that this was not the first time this had happened
be competent in order to be able to manage a bank, "with 
the direction of a bank, as with no other form of
inheritable property, an acute conflict was liable to 
arise between the claims of heredity and the requirements 
of professional competence, and a satisfactory solution 
was to be reached only if the latter had the upper hand" 
(146). Phormio was bought as a slave, but by 373 he had
become cashier of the bank (147). The bank was not
bequeathed to Phormio, but he was given the lease of it 
(148). This lease was not part of the will, but was 
handed to Phormio before Pasio' s death, presumably when 
the testator became too ill to manage the business 
himself in 371/0 (149). The terms of the lease of the
bank are quoted in the first speech against Stephanus:
o n f r p  '77^ .6 £ CJ> v  o  XTtU. T ' i jp  OOTJ T T p C o T b **  O Z /S i?  jfj^Q iSOS
b v £ J O L V T O V  O V & * T - O ^ S  V C G - V $ ^  O ^ X *
&/P&J V S c j -T 'IP  V d V s G H .V T O 'V  €-c
T d i j r o v  o c v 'i.y fc ^  t r o c y € e c e \ r  o i t C 6 - C o v
h o w re >  v  yv v+Zyc**. y S * 6 ^  &■ r £ f ? *  v  t o v  r u j .
for the safeguard of Pasio's estate and
(ot? trpi*To$ o v &  juLovo* ) (145). This was because one had to
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T p # T r e z . H $ .
ri ToL$& &■&&€€ rr« 6  LCO V TVjV TTf>&< TT(r^oCV
$ o p  ? £ » * < • '  f d p & L *  £ 0p t x < v v + .  r ' f s  rpot. r r e ^ 'j *  rc c s
T f * i 6 t  t o T 5 Wct.6 i  t*>v o S S 'tio  r c ix * *v T o C  kL*c c r e  T KOVTtt.
T c i ^ W V T O V  & i d * r * v y X*>pZs T f $  f c ^ Y / ^ K K  
6 / O t * y 6 f c u > 6  * 6 ^ 6 Z V e C * *  £&■ Trp *c/7 &j£t r€ \fe e *.t. -p^copc £
t y * p p * fa * uj  *  puif T r e 'e y  r e v s  / r # t o  2 s U*.sCt*vos  
&<fe£7*JrL V oL6£m V ilT c  TyV T p*C  TT G’J j* . V <M''<Tfir>c oC
TetXtL * r< 6^ 6 7^vJ TToifJot (C .*ro L & y  fCtLs
( [Dem. ] xlv, 31)
Here, the annual rent of two talents and forty minae is 
presumably to be taken from the profits of the bank. It 
is not stated in the lease what was to happen to the
remainder of the profit, but presumably Phormio was
entitled to keep this. As far as the rent was concerned, 
it is stated in xxxvi, 9 that half of it was given to 
Apollodorus, so presumably the other half was put aside 
for Pasicles. It is also stated that the two sons had to 
consent to the lease, but since Pasicles was under age
when the document was drawn up, this clause refers in
practice to Apollodorus. This consent must have been
given because otherwise Phormio would not have been able 
to manage the bank. The last clause of the lease is 
rightly explained by Davies who states that because 
Phormio was a non citizen and could not distrain for the 
return of loans which were held on the security of land, 
the value of these loans was transferred to Pasid's name
as a debt to the bank (150).
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Pasio's shield factory was also leased to Phormio 
(151), but the terms of this lease are not known. 
However, probably half of the profits from the shield 
factory were given to Apollodorus (152).
When Pasicles came of age, Phormio relinquished the 
lease of both these properties and Apollodorus took the 
factory and Pasicles the bank (153).
The will also contained a clause naming Phormio as 
co-guardian of Pasicles. The other guardian was a
certien Nicocles (154). This is similar to the will of 
the elder Demosthenes where one of the guardians is 
betrothed to the testator’s wife, and is thus in the 
position of step father to his ward. Even though Pasio's 
elder son Apollodorus was twenty four when his father 
died, this move was a wise one if the allegations of 
Apollodorus1 extravagant expenditure are true (155). 
There was no complaint of maltreatment brought when 
Pasicles came of age, so it can be assumed that Phormio
Pasio also set out how the property was to be 
divided between his two sons:
dutif ulj^ cared for the property in his charge.
ToT>rav fact £  rra >c<>*.'/& v o/rw /
n 3/
0C7«i * K
(Dem. xxxvi, 8)
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This quotation indicates that Pasio attempted to ensure 
that his eldest son had a means of income before the 
eventual partition of the estate (156). An equivalent
amount would be deducted for Pasicles when it came to the
time for dividing the estate Senjcei. . . . ivrt jA.6Lpe t* tu
v. y
'KOtn* \sepav) # and the remainder would be divided equally. 
Because of Apollodorus' extravagance, however, the
division had to be made before Pasicles came of age.
Pasio's will also contained a clause which
bequeathed Apollodorus a lodging house worth sixteen
minae (157):
.OTZ+.V jU&V T 0 “CV2>V T^jv * . y  V oLf>YVj Tot L , 7 1 W S
TTov Ttpeb f i t t e d  v - r y V  GU Cek V jc*criX- T*j V
TOTj T* £f»iOTaL T J oc V T 6 V .
(Dem. xxxvi, 34)
The reason for this bequest, namely that Apollodorus was 
the elder of the two boys^ is the only known example of 
primogeniture being regarded in Attic inheritance law 
(158). Usually, the inheritance was divided equally 
between however many sons there were (159). Maybe this 
was done to ensure that Apollodorus would have some
source of independent income, and therefore might not 
have to make too many inroads into the remainder of the 
estate.
The primary function of Pasio's testament was 
therefore to ensure that his estate be cared for properly.
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This was why he bequeathed Archippe to Phormio and why he 
placed Phormio and Nicocles in a position of guardianship 
over Pasicles. Even the clause bequeathing the lodging 
house to Apollodorus can be regarded as being a means of 
providing the young man with a private income other than 
the remainder of the estate.
Polveuctus
There is no internal or external evidence in 
Demosthenes, xli by which one is able to date the will of 
Polyeuctus, except that the speech is regarded as an 
early work of Demosthenes (160). Demosthenes' legal 
career commenced when he was aged twenty one, in 3 63 or 
364, and he probably ceased writing speeches in 346/5 
(161). Since it is regarded as an early speech, it could 
be placed within the first half of this period, namely 
364/3-354/3. The will was made just before Polyeuctus' 
death when he was seriously ill (162), and the case was 
brought soon afterwards.
The will of Polyeuctus is referred to in
Demosthenes' speech xli. Polyeuctus had no sons but two 
daughters. He married the elder to the speaker with a
dowry of forty minae and the younger to Leocrates, his 
wife's brother, whom he adopted as his son. Ten minae of 
the elder daughter's dowry was to be left unpaid until 
after the death of Polyeuctus when Leocrates was to
become responsible for the debt. However following a 
family quarrel, Leocrates was divorced from Polyeuctus' 
daughter and he left the family. The girl was then
re-married to Spudias.
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The speech was made in an effort to recover both the 
dowry, and the debts owed by Spudias.
The will of Polyeuctus is said to have recorded the 
portion of the dowry due to the husband of the elder girl:
os re A to rS y  L<ff>ov± &poc^/u£>v
kpcOi -r * j5 rrjPoticos i r r c  t -*j v
(Dem. xli, 6)
In the above quotation it is not made clear who exactly
was to have been responsible for the debt after Leocrates
left the family. However, since pillars are to be set up
on the estate recording the debt, it is possible that
Polyeuctus intended the money to be deducted from his
estate. The significance of the
is that the house was intended to act as the
So VKoi&
security for this debt (163), namerjry, the house could not 
be sold until the outstanding dowry had been paid. This
is the only example of a house being mortgaged by means
of a will.
It is not stated specifically whether Polyeuctus
included a record of the money Spudias owed him in his
will:
LTtf6V S'; to ily$f>£ S S
£fJL*.pTvp'9j <>'6/ 6 \ ✓ &rrO$Yzj6K.OYT *
JloftCg 'bK.f o V i<fe/&0ftivKS acvTip VoCf* ^  {jo^SYo^ ic^cl Toy
T o i c o r  ( t o O t o  S ' e e T L  y  o ' c i c e T b ' u  T i n  j } f t *
r \  ^ v  ^ j ^
0 Ti ^ y  ^  €fcet*tO
o v r *  r o t  ei$ ro /colvov &Y£YJ Y6 v t v )  y
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OICT t < ) C 0 6 ^ a  -S $ £  K«*c ? 7Tg /OL U>Y O ^ S ’ ± y o j y ' i
oj.S c*. ~r l n o  & e  j^ & L  S'C&et.iO 'S y V  y & f °
re  ty y v y io v  r y &  Mo'kv  e-Su t & i> S c -S ^ v e rity /e ye s ,
/  ^ p/ ^
ywcLLk>o $y yp«.fifitL.T«. S ' GGTlv  it. ic.tk.ri>^iTr&y
<d.iro Bv?j6x,ov 6 j . . .
(Dem. xli, 8-9)
The verb iy p o c x & v implies that the statement of the two 
talent debt was an oral one, and not written in a 
testament. Furthermore, this particular debt was also 
included in the documents left behind by Polyeuctus' wife 
at her death (164). Therefore, it is possible that 
Polyeuctus confirmed that this debt was still outstanding 
when he was dying. The other debt of eighteen hundred 
drachmae was also outstanding on Polyeuctus' death. This 
is indicated by the fact that the papers recording this 
debt were opened, copied and then re-sealed (165). Since 
Spudias was present at the time this was done, it is
probable that these papers were opened after Polyeuctus'
death (otherwise Polyeuctus would have been present 
also). Therefore, details of certain debts were not 
included in the will, but were sealed in other papers.
The will also included instructions concerning the 
distribution of property:
o r e  f lo /L V & v tc .T O b  S i e r t f r e r o  r0ciJr«*/ T f r - f ' y / p e V
L S S O —. I / x Vy rbWt>v 6JA.6'/ on rus rov ^rpo s
S f'd .Q -jjiCau* * . v y y y 6 - * . X j £ ’ / /  £  A. lK u> S ~7 * p . y d ' &Y  % 6 C \/
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GZyGV ifi-TiX* eV ot TToL£ IV £f7l .st*TTo'VTa,
(Dem. xli, 17)
This quotation implies, by the use of the word ukav 
that the estate was to be divided equally between the two
there is no evidence that Spudias was adopted by 
Polyeuctus after Leocrates had been renounced, this equal 
division of property was quite usual (166), and would not 
normally have been recorded in a will. However, the fact 
that Spudias had already borrowed money from the estate, 
and there were ten minae owing to the elder girl's 
husband, made it necessary to make specific arrangements 
concerning the division of the estate. Since the heir to 
an estate inherited all debts due to it and all debts 
owed by it, it is possible that before the division was 
made, Spudias had to repay all his debts and the claimant 
had to receive the remainder of his wife's dowry.
Therefore the will of Polyeuctus was concerned with 
matters of property. By means of his testament he 
mortgaged his house and arranged the division of his 
estate between his two daughters.
Aristotle
The will of the philosopher Aristotle (167) was 
probably made in Chalcis where he died in 322, since 
there is no reference in it to the school, and its 
property, and it is therefore uncertain whether or not 
the document came under Athenian jurisdiction.
daughters, who would in fact Since
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There is a possiblity that it might have done, since 
Chalcis had been part of the Athenian empire, so 
Chalcidian law may have borne some similarity to Athenian 
law .
Two copies of the will of Aristotle are extant; one 
is included in the biography of Aristotle written by 
Diogenes Laertius and the second is in an Arabic 
translation of the life of Aristotle (168). Therefore, 
when discussing this will, I shall quote from both 
versions (169).
In the Greek text, the will begins as follows:
fUrV a -  £<*.✓ Se n  6vjx^ , fC.Se %t£9ero 
(D. L. v, U)
This opening is not part of the Arabic version of the 
will. Chroust states that the words e6f~c*t, p e s were
common at the beginning of an Athenian will (170). 
However, this opening is found only in one other will, 
the will of Theophrastus (171). Therefore it is not as 
common as Chroust thinks it is. During thinks that since 
the other three wills of the peripatetic philosophers use 
the present tense >- rather than S i e d e - r e , the
words S i i & e r o  Ap'6-roTe are a paraphrase by Favorinus 
or Diogenes (172). However, the portion of the will of 
Pasio which is read out to the court begins with the 
words:
Si i&krb tToLtcoj'/ A i J  i  
( [ Dem. ] xlv, 28 )
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In addition, Plato uses the word G>i6&e~rt> at the beginning 
of his will (D. L. iii, 41). This indicates that the
making a will. It is therefore possible that the
the words which Aristotle actually used.
The Macedonian general, Antipater, is given the 
position of executor:
(D. L. v, 11)
"By this will I appoint Antipater for ever to be executor 
of everything that I leave". (D. IA)
Here, Antipater is appointed executor in order to ensure 
that all the conditions in the will are adhered to. 
There is no other example in any other extant Athenian 
will of someone who is not a beneficiary being appointed 
executor. However, the will of Plato is not clear on 
this point. The position of Hipparchus in Theophrastus' 
will is somewhat similar, since he is given control of 
some of the testator' s estate, but it is not identical
Five other executors are also appointed until 
Nicanor's arrival:
aorist form of the verb <■ could be used when
words locv... ' were not a paraphrase but were
(173).
Nix-softop ■pibTopjief'j'S
t I T  TT
(C o l I  V  J u c r o L A-c- Jtcrt S
(D. L. v, 12)
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"and until Nicanor shall arrive (and take possesson),
A
Aristomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus and Dioteles shall 
take charge of all matters that require attention and 
take the necessary measures concerning my estate, my 
servant Herpyllis, my other maids and servants, and the 
property I leave; and if Theophrastus consents and he is 
in the position to assist then in this task he shall take 
charge as well" (D. 1A).
The Greek text differs from the Arabic in two respects. 
Firstly, in Diogenes Laertius, the four appointed and 
Theophrastus if he so wishes, are given charge of not 
only the estate and Herpyllis, but also of the 
children, . However, in the Arabic text, no
mention is made of the children. This clause implies
that although Antipater is placed in the position of 
general executor, he will not be present to oversee the 
running of the estate after Aristotle's death, since
other men have been appointed to do this. Antipater is
therefore to ensure that the terms specified in the will 
are adhered to, but he is not to care for the estate in 
any other manner. The position of Aristomenes,
Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles and, (if he so consents)
Theophrastus, is only a temporary one .Tjthey are to act as 
guardians only until Nicanor arrives. This clause 
indicates that, if Athenian law was observed in Chalcis, 
it was possible for an Athenian to appoint temporary
guardians in a will who would hold the post until the one 
intended to care for the estate was able to take it up.
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The second difference between the Arabic and Greek texts 
is very important with reference to the position of 
Herpyllis, since in the Arabic version it is specifically 
stated that she is Aristotle's maidservant (174).
There then follows a passage with clauses concerning 
Nicanor, Nicomachus and Pythias. Since the positions of 
these people ha$v& been the subject of much recent 
discussion, I shall quote this passage in full.
KtUl* Or<*.y to p *  (ThcCSc J H V T y y  NdcyJSQpL
(D. L. v, 12)
"When my daughter shall be grown up, Nicanor shall 
administer her affairs; if she should die before she is 
married, or when she is married but before she has a 
child, Nicanor shall administer both her property and the
v e e r  a
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property of my son Nicomachus. It is my last will and 
testament that he shall take charge of this as he thinks 
fit, in all that concerns them, just as if he were their 
father or brother.
If Nicanor should die before my daughter is married 
or after her marriage but before she has a child, and if 
(in such case) Nicanor in his will has made arrangements
i
about the property that I leave, this shall be admissible 
and legally valid" . (D. 1B-C)
The girl Pythias, who is the legitimate daughter of 
Aristotle, is to be given in marriage to Nicanor
). The reason why this
stipulation is not included in the Arabic translation of 
the will is probably because the word fe*SiS°*l9k-has been 
misunderstood (175). A similar clause is to be found in 
the will of the elder Demosthenes, where Demophon is to 
marry the testator' s daughter when she comes of age, but 
is to take her dowry of two talents immediately (176). 
Aristotle, however, does not put aside a dowry for 
Pythias. To a certain extent, this question is connected 
with the vexed subject of the precise positions of 
Nicanor and Nicomachus in Aristotle's household (177).
Chroust thinks that Nicanor was the "interim heir 
designate" and he was to manage Aristotle's estate until 
his sons by Pythias came of age (178). Thus, Chroust, 
although he does not state this specifically, seems to 
suggest that Pythias was an
e n since her children were to be the ultimate 
heirs. In Athenian law, there was no such thing as an 
"interim heir designate", the role of the husband of
- 237 -
an 'en’itcX'Tjpos was to provide for her and care for the 
estate. He at no time was regarded as the heir, interim 
or otherwise (179). Chroust explains the position of 
Nicomachus by stating that since he was the adopted or 
legitimated son of Aristotle, "he could only acquire a 
life estate", and after his death the estate could revert 
to Nicanor and Pythias (180). However, if Nicomachus is 
to have a life interest in the estate, what is to happen 
to the children of Pythias and Nicanor during his
lifetime? Chroust does not suggest a division of the
estate, so it seems as if he envisages Nicomachus
controlling the whole estate until he dies, with Nicanor
ensuring that he did not alienate it. Such a situation
is found nowhere else in our sources for Athenian law, 
and does seem very unlikely.
During (181) suggests that since Nicomachus is 
universal heir but is under age, Nicanor is to take 
possession of the estate upon his return. However, he 
does not state that when Nicomachus comes of age, Nicanor 
is to cede possession of the estate. During uses the 
Roman term "heres institutus" to describe Nicanor's
position. This is an incorrect application of the term
because an "heres institutus" was given the testator's 
estate or part of it in perpetuity, "semel heres, semper 
heres", and such an appointment had to be written at the 
head of a will using a particular form of wording such as
"Lucanus heres esto" or "Lucanum heredem esse iubeo"
(182). This is not done in Aristotle's will. In
addition, the situation which ^.uring envisages does not 
explain the position of Pythias.
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Gottschalk is of the opinion that Nicomachus was 
heir and that Pythias had been betrothed to Nicanor at an 
earlier date. Since the dowry was arranged at a girl's 
betrothal (183), this would explain why no dowry is
specified in the will, since it might well have been paid 
to Nicanor earlier, just as Demophon was to receive the 
dowry of Demosthenes' sister immediately (184). There 
is, however, no indication in either text of the will 
that this took place.
Hug is of the opinion that Nicanor was universal
heir to Aristotle's property, and was to marry Pythias, 
and that Nicomachus was the testator's bastard son by 
Herpyllis (185). However, no monetary provision is made 
for Nicomachus, so this view does not seem probable.
It is implied in the Arabic translation of the will
that Pythias possesses property of her own, "Nicanor 
shall administer her property". Although it was possible 
for a woman to own a small amount of property, this 
generally tended to ber consist of some household 
furniture, jewellery and clothing (186), the words "shall 
administer" implies that she owned part of the estate. 
However, since this is wrong in law (187), because if a
man had a legitimate son, the property went to him (188), 
it seems more likely that the translator made a mistake 
here. No mention is made of a dowry in the Arabic text.
Since no dowry is referred to in either of the 
texts, it is most probable that the reason no dowry is to 
be given to Nicanor ^ because Nicanor is Aristotle's 
adopted son.
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Unlike Leocrates, the adopted son of Polyeuctus, he does 
not receive the whole of his adoptive father's estate 
(189). This is because there is an under-age legitimate 
son, Nicomachus. Under Attic law, an adopted son shared 
equally with any legitimate son born after the adoption 
had taken place (190). Therefore, the estate is to be
divided equally between Nicanor and Nicomachus after all
the bequests have been paid. In addition, since Nicanor 
is an adopted son and not the uterine brother of the girl 
(as is the case with Gorgias, Cnemon's adopted son) 
(191), he is to receive Pythias with his half of the 
estate, and no dowry is necessary.
The provision in the Greek text that if Pythias 
should die, Nicanor should be of the property
might be taken to indicate that he has complete oversight 
of the estate until Nic^omachus come of age and can do 
with it as he wishes. However, after Nicomachus comes of 
age, the estate will have to be divided equally, which 
means that Nicanor is not empowered to do with it exactly 
as he wishes. Such a division is not stipulated in the
terms of the will, but since it would have been in
accordance with Athenian inheritance law, it would not
have been necessary to do this. The only example of a 
clause in a will ordering an equal division between two
sons is found in the will of Pasio, but this is an
exceptional case, because Apollodorus is permitted to 
take money from his father's property before his younger 
brother Pasicles comes of age. The fact that this has to
be specifically noted in the will indicates that this not
usually permitted (192).
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Therefore, although Nicanor is appointed of the
estate by Aristotle, his powers were not as far-reaching 
as might be thought.
The provision that Nicanor is to care for Pythias and 
Nicomachus as if he were father and brother is found in 
both the Arabic and Greek versions of the will. This 
clause does not in itself indicate that Nicanor was the 
adopted son of Aristotle, but merely stipulates that in 
addition to ensuring the financial well-being of the 
estate, Nicanor is to have a close relationship with the 
children. It seems as if a similar situation was 
envisaged by the elder Demosthenes when he stated that 
Aphobus was to marry Cleoboule and have the use of the 
family home (193).
Both the Arabic and the Greek versions of the will
allow Nicanor to make a will concerning his portion of
— sthe property. The Greek words used, itcvw. k 6 6 tco are 
also found in a similar clause in the will of Lyco (194), 
and are to be understood as permission to dispose of the 
property by testament.
This provision has been a puzzle to some scholars. 
Bruns is of the opinion that it indicates that Nicanor
was not the adopted son of Aristotle (195). Chroust 
states that under Athenian law, neither a guardian nor an 
adopted son was allowed to make a will. He therefore 
suggests that Aristotle might have empowered Nicanor to 
make arrangements concerning only the guardianship of 
Nicomachus, rather than the whole estate (196).
Gottschalk, During, Hug and Mulvany fail to discuss 
this question at all.
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This clause does not conflict with the fact that 
adopted sons did not have testamentary rights (197), but 
proves the fact. If an adopted son was allowed to 
bequeath his estate by testament, there would have been 
no necessity for Aristotle to include a clause to this 
effect in his own will. In order to overcome this law, 
such a provision was necessary. Nicanor' s testamentary 
rights are limited, however, because he is only free to 
make a will if he and Pythias have no legitimate 
children, whereas men who were not adopted and had 
legitimate children could and did make wills (198). It 
is likely that the putative will of Nicanor might have 
included arrangements concerning the guardianship of 
Nicomachus, but such arrangements could also have been 
made by the executors. Indeed, after Nicanor's death, 
Nicomachus was cared for by Theophrastus (199). It is 
also probable that a will made by Nicanor might have 
included provisions for Pythias' dowry, and might have 
named a possible husband for her even though this is done 
by Aristotle in the next clause. Since Nicanor is 
Aristotle's adopted son and there is a legitimate son, 
Nicomachus, the former's testamentary powers will have
been limited to his half of the estate as far legacies 
were concerned, but he might have been empowered to 
provide a guardian for Nicomachus and a husband for 
Pythias.
Aristotle also makes provisions for the care of his 
two legitimate children in the event of Nicanor's death.
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(D. L. v, 13)
"If Nicanor should die intestate and if Theophrastus 
consents and is willing to take his place it shall be so 
in all matters in which Nicanor was in charge of my son's 
affairs and also as regards my other estate; and if
Theophrastus should be unwilling to take upon himself 
this trusteeship, then the executors appointed by me 
shall again turn to Antipater and together with him
consider what they are to do with my estate and then make
arrangements as they see fit." (D. ID)
These two quotations differ considerably. The 
provisor "if Nicanor should die intestate" is not found
at all in the Greek, and it could either be an
interpolation by the translator to explain the following 
clause or it could be taken to indicate that the will in 
the Greek text is an abridgement. Furthermore, there is
no mention of the girl Pythias in the Arabic translation, 
but there are two specific references to ter in the Greek,
( ■T'yji rro^ CBoi ). It is possible that the translator 
confused the gender and mistook tt<x i I o5 for ren> ttoclS^ o v , 
and thus the interpretation of this clause differs quite 
considerably from the Greek. The fact that the 
words rrpos (Oncost p*. are placed next
to v js indicate that he is not to take
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Nicanor's place in all things, that is, he is not to 
become the adopted son of Aristotle, like Nicanor, but 
that he is only to be "as Nicanor" with reference to the 
younger Pythias. Since Nicanor is instructed to marry 
the girl, these words indicate that Theophrastus is free 
to do this also if Nicanor dies. The Arabic text does 
not convey this sense, but states that Theophrastus is to 
take over the guardianship of the boy Nicomachus, but 
this is due to the probable confusion of -fys TTociSd*, 
with rov rrdud'tov . Therefore it seems as if the injunction 
in this clause is that Theophrastus is to marry Pythias 
if he so wishes. Such a position would probably be taken 
to include the guardianship of Nicomachus since Nicanor 
is to undertake this. Following the death of Nicanor, 
Theophrastus did care for Nicomachus but he did not marry 
Pythias (200), but this does not indicate that he was not
given the option of marrying the girl in Aristotle's will.
There is also a difference in the two translations
of the Arabic version of the will, During says: "my other
estate" whereas Chroust does not include the word "other" 
(201). If During is correct, the translation would imply 
that the estate of Aristotle was to be divided, probably
between Nicomachus and Nicanor, whereas Chroust's version 
implies that the property was to be kept intact. I have 
checked the meaning of this clause with the help of a
lecturer in Arabic, and the strict translation of it is:
"it shall be so in everything which Nicanor undertook
concerning the affairs of my son, and other than that
(ie. other than the estate of Nicomachus), consisting of
that which I have left."
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This indicates that Aristotle envisaged a separation of 
the estate into two; probably one part to Nicomachus and 
one to Nicanor, because otherwise it would not have been 
necessary to add the words "and other than that."
Both the Greek and Arabic versions state that if 
Theophrastus did not wish to assume this position, the 
executors are to consult with Antipater. However, the 
Greek states that this consultation is to be about the 
children, whereas the Arabic says that it is to be about 
the estate, but this is a minor difference, since the 
care of one would in practice include the care of the 
other.
Chroust thinks that this section of the will might 
well indicate that Theophrastus was related to 
Aristotle. This is because he thinks that the testament 
of Aristotle gives him "a position which is usually 
reserved only for relatives" (202). Chroust supports his 
suggestion by stating that Theophrastus brought up 
Nicomachus, and that in his will, Theophrastus refers to 
Demaratus, Aristotle's grandson, he bequeaths property in 
Stagira, provides for a statue of Nicomachus and appoints 
Callisthenes, a distant relative of Aristotle as trustee
of his estate. However, the position given to 
Theophrastus in Aristotle's will does not necessarily 
indicate that he was a relative, since it was not unknown 
for a non-relative to be appointed as guardian in a 
will. Phormio, in Pasio's will, was bequeathed the 
testator's wife and given the guardianship of his son, 
Pasicles, and Phormio was not a relative but a freedman 
of the testator (203).
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Furthermore, Therippides, one of the guardians of the 
orator, Demosthenes, was a friend and not a relative of 
the elder Demosthenes (204). It is a direct result of 
the will of Aristotle that Theophrastus brought up 
Nicomachus, so this is not indicative of a blood 
relationship (205 ). It might have been as a result of 
this that he owned property in Stagira, since it has been 
suggested that it was bequeathed to him by Nicomachus 
(206). There is, however, no evidence that this was 
done, and the question of how Theophrastus came to 
possess this property is open to conjecture. The fact 
that he did own property in Stagira does not necessarily 
indicate that he was a relative of Aristotle. The fact 
that Theophrastus refers to relatives of Aristotle in his 
own will only indicates that he was a trusted friend of 
the family. Therefore, Chroust is probably incorrect in 
his assumption.
The following clauses of the will concern the 
position of Herpyllis which is itself a matter open to 
dispute ( 207 ) .
6 O'fjLi rotJ $ jcacZ
f j L V j C & i / r a L S  t j u o v  ( T V  K \ . £ l o $  > %T l- 6 ir c r u <h£*.£“* .
boByj .
<7
(D.L. v, 13)
"The executors and Nicanor shall bear me in mind when 
they make arrangements for Herpyllis.
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For judging from what I saw of her earnestness in 
rendering service to me and her zeal for all that was 
becoming for me, she has deserved well of me.
They shall give her all that she needs, and if she
should desire to marry, they shall see that she be given
to a man of good repute,". (D. IE)
The first mention of Herpyllis in both of these
quotations implies that she was a servant or freedwoman 
of the testator, who did not shirk her duties. There is 
no indication here that Herpyllis was Aristotle's second 
wife, as is suggested by Bruns and Mulvany (208), or that 
she was his mistress as is stated in some ancient sources
(209). The provision that she be married, if she so 
wishes, in a manner not unworthy of the testator, also 
carries no suggestion that the two were married or that 
she was his mistress. It also implies that she was not 
of servant status, because there is no other will which
states that a servant be married to one worthy of the
master. The fact that Aristotle states that she is to be
placed in the care of the executors and Nicanor indicates 
that Aristotle was her and that she had no close
male relatives of her own. Therefore, she is to be cared
for by those nominated. It must be assumed that the
executors are to care for her until her death unless sho 
marries. No separate provision is made for a dowry, but 
she is bequeathed money, servants and the right of abode 
in part of the testator's property:
x rp li>  Tt>z J> u p c i - t p o v  S & b o p i f  y o \ s  Ico^c
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(D. L. v, 13-14)
"and besides what she already possesses, she shall be 
given one talent, equivalent to one hundred and twenty 
five Roman librae, and if she chooses to remain in 
Chalcis, she shall live in my house, in the guest-house 
by the garden; if she chooses to live in Stagira, she 
shall live in my father' s and grandfather's house, and 
whichever of these houses she chooses, the executors 
shall furnish them with such household things as they
think proper and as she may need, whatever she may claim 
as necessary for satisfying her wants. " (D. IE)
No provision is made for a dowry in either version of the
will, but presumably the possessions she is given are to
act in lieu of a dowry. Herpyllis already has a certain 
amount of property of her own, but how she came by it is 
not made clear. The Greek version implies, in the
words 1ryo«S . * • that it was given to her by
someone, maybe the testator, whereas the Arabic
translation is not specific.
The property which is given to Herpyllis bears no 
resemblance to the bequests to servants in other wills
(2 1 0 ), but it is very similar to the dowries and bequests 
given to the wife of Diodotus and the wife of Pasio,
(211). Since the former is bequeathed money and
furniture and the latter is given (or dowered with)
le
money, slaves, jewelry and furniture. However, in both 
of these examples, the dowry and bequest are given into 
the care of the woman's x^ptos , whereas Herpyllis is to 
live independently (212). However, this is probably 
explained by the fact that a woman who was not an 
Athenian citizen did not necessarily have a icypiO} 
(213). The right of abode in the testator's ancestral 
home which is given to Herpyllis if she so wishes, is 
unprecedented. The only one other example of a woman (in 
this case the testator's wife) and her future husband 
being given the use of the testator's house and furniture 
is in the will of the elder Demosthenes, and in this 
example the right of abode is granted only until his son 
should come of age (214). It is most unlikely that a 
freedwoman or mistress should be given this right. Since 
the tone of the clauses referring to Herpyllis seem too
cold in reference to a wife, it seems unlikely that she 
was married to hip*. However, the bequests to her are 
larger than any others given to a servant it thus seems 
more probable that Herpyllis was either a dependent or 
ward of Aristotle, as is suggested by Gottschalk (215). 
If Chalcis did abide by Athenian law, these clauses 
indicate that a non-citizen woman could be bequeathed 
property in her own right, and that she could possess it
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herself without having to give it into the care of
her .
The Arabic version of the will contains a clause:
"As to my estate and my son, there is no need for me to 
be concerned about testamentary provisions". (D. 2A)
This clause is probably an interpolation by the 
translator, since in law it was not necessary to include 
such a provision (216). Chroust thinks this stipulation 
indicates that Nicomachus was to have a "life interest" 
in Aristotle's estate (217). However, if this were so, 
it would have been necessary for Aristotle to make 
specific provisions in his will. In addition, this 
clause is probably not genuine, and it thus proves 
absolutely nothing.
There follows a provision concerning a boy named 
Myrmex:
& ay d *  N i i c * & v ‘u ) p  M v p / m * } t c o S  T o v  m x .(.£ 'fo ru>
o c j i t iO S  |T T OOi  t S ' t O lS  i  TTlicO jU 'G  S f j '
ST) V l o t s  V i r & p j C 'V G l S  *■ q Z / I  ocVTD-U .
( D. L. v, 14)
"Nicanor shall take charge of the boy, Myrmex and see 
that he finally is sent back to his home with all his 
property in the manner he desires." (D. 2A)
The exact position of Myrmex is not very clear. Chroust 
suggests that he was either a slave given to Aristotle, 
who provides here for his emancipation, or that he was a 
remote relative (218).
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It is unlikely that he was a slave if, as the Arabic text 
states, he had property of his own, since slaves 
possessed no private property because anything given to a 
slave remained, like the slave, legally the property of 
the slave's owner. In addition, he is to be returned to 
his relatives (T»r<> tS to is )# and if he were a slave, 
it is not likely that his relatives would have been known 
or that they had sent him to Aristotle with property. 
Gottschalk suggests that he was probably a ward of the 
testator (219). However, this seems unlikely since he 
had relatives of his own to look after him. It is more 
probable that he was a pupil of Aristotle, which is why 
he is to be returned to his relatives on the testator's 
death.
Following this there are clauses detailing the 
treatment of slaves and freedmen after Aristotle's death.
The first slave to be mentioned is Ambracis:
Se ft jul f i  p*. i* - '$  ^  ^x.fx>Bepo^v
y 77<*r 5 eric.d& > / 7 e i / T  eciCC6 c *  $ 
tcot-c r y v  T7-.suttK .'y j y  yV .
(D. L. V ,  14)
"My maid Ambracis shall be given her freedom, and if, 
after she has been made free, she remains in my 
daughter's service until my daughter marries, she shall 
receive five hundred drachmas and the maid she now has. " 
(D. 2B)
There is a slight difference here between the Arabic and 
the Greek texts.
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In Diogenes Laertius, no condition is attached to the 
gift of five hundred drachmae and the maidservant; she is 
just to receive these when Pythias gets married, whereas 
according to the Arabic translation, she is only to 
receive these if she remains in service to Pythias until 
her marriage. It is not possible to state which of these
two versions of the provision is correct, although the
Arabic translation does seem more logical. The fact that 
Ambracis has to be confirmed in her possession of a slave
girl {tcot-c ... &)(6l , she shall receive . . . now has)
indicates that any property which was given to a slave 
during his or her master's lifetime did not legally 
belong to him or her, and was returned to the estate on 
the master's death, unless instructions were given to the 
contrary.
The freedwoman Thale also receives a bequest:
Sc V V'oc ■- S'<2 L r r p $ £  'T y j  7ToC / y v
KsxZ fT * ^ <5Y* sc y  V
(D. L. V ,  14)
"To Thales shall be given the young girl that we recently 
bought, a boy from among our slaves and a thousand 
drachmas. " (D. 2C)
This clause does not, as Chroust suggests, provide for 
the emancipation of Thale (220), who was probably a 
freedwoman since she already has property of her own. 
There are two difference between the Greek and Arabic 
texts. The Arabic version states that a slave boy is to 
be given to Thale, whereas Diogenes Laertius mentions a 
slave girl.
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The Arabic version states that Thale is to receive two 
slaves (221), whereas the Greek states that she already 
possesses one servant (irpo$ T*j TTpuSib^ i f e f '  ) and is 
to receive another (222). Which of the two versions is 
correct is open to conjecture because there is no
additional evidence.
Simon, who is presumably another freedman because he 
already possesses a slave, also benefits:
c^op(,s> rvG rrpore-fc✓ & pyup' ov
& 1 &  P ' m. t S  *  y 7 u 4 . f y v p  i o v  i 77^ 0^ 7 sql .
(D. L. v, 15)
"To Simos shall be given, in addition to the boy for whom 
he already has received money, money for a boy whom he 
may buy for himself, and besides he shall further receive 
what the executors may find proper". (D. 2D)
Again, the two versions of the will differ here. 
Diogenes Laertius states that Simon is either to receive 
a boy or the purchase money for one and does not mention 
an additional bequest. The Arabic text, on the other 
hand, grants Simon both money for a boy and whatever else 
the executors may approve. It is not stipulated in the 
Arabic text that this additional bequest is to take the
form of money, as Chroust thinks, but the words "what the 
executors may find proper" indicate that this gift is 
entirely at the discretion of the executors, and can take 
any form. There is no example in any Greek text of a 
bequest to a freedman being left entirely to the 
executors' discretion, so I am inclined to believe that 
this provision is an interpolation (224).
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Further arrangements are made for the emancipation of 
slaves:
(D. L. V/ 15)
"As soon as my daughter marries, my boys Tachon, Philon 
and Olympius shall be given freedom.
Neither the son of Olympius, nor any other of the boys 
who have waited upon me shall be sold, but they shall 
continue their service as slaves until they reach their 
manhood, and when they arrive at the proper age they 
shall have their freedom, as to what shall then be given 
to them shall be determined in accordance with what they 
have deserved [if God almighty so decides]." (D. 2E-2F)
Here also there are differences between the two 
versions. In Diogenes Laertius, the son of Olympius is
to be freed, with his father, on the marriage of Pythias,
whereas in the Arabic text, he is to remr-sm in service 
until he reaches the proper age. What this proper age is 
is not specified, and there is no way of knowing what was
the servants shall be sold, whereas the Arabic 
translation specifies that no boy servants be sold.
t ^
Jb ' T e L I f  TTo l T s  g r > € $ o 9 f J j
$ f lu o v t t  tcecl t o y to i r x J .^ 0^ o c i i r o x j .
’F 'i* > 'K £ C v  $ £  TOO i/ T a u S t O ' s t K  fT£rU<>
L oL 1 / T o c $ ' 'o Toc. i/ S '  'S y  uJi/T~ac v.
p c v s  & (f le r  l t* * d £<'$<.✓
ai
actually the case. The Greek text states that none of
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Again, it is difficult to decide which version is 
correct, although it might be possible that a mistake was 
made in the translation into Arabic. The clause "as to 
what - - •decides" is not found in Diogenes Laertius, and 
is similar to the provision regarding Simon (225). There 
is no equivalent of this provision in any extant Athenian 
will, so I think that it is probably an interpolation.
The will of Aristotle is the first extant will in 
which there are clauses bequeathing property to servants 
(226). The only earlier will in whe-ih a slave is
manumitted is the will of Plato { 2 2 1 ) , but here no legacy 
is given to her. The fact that the testament of 
Aristotle is the first will in which a legacy is left to 
a freedman, and that most wills after this date contain 
clauses to this effect (228), indicates that this 
bequeathing of gifts to freedmen was probably a later
development in the function of the Athenian will.
It is at this point that the Arabic text ends.
However, the Greek text of Diogenes Laertius continues
with certain provisions for statues and burial.
He firstly decrees that statues of his family be set
up:
£7T(, f A , & K e T  tCOCw T O J /  e u ~ d £ r  S O j L U k V C J  *  £  I  X. & V  S  77*yi><X
I f?o T i j u t / 'd r r& j 6771 r *  * .*4  e ~ 6 i ^  y  T t-
A l o j >  y  ftp & /o y y £ x.'S'c v
I  y  r  ys p y r p o ^  T y £ Nt<.<*~*cpQ$ *cot c j~ ij s
' f l p ^ r  j e r o u  r y  /  *Tt- iro  o rT tJ  $
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K e n  ^ r y y }  r y $ p y r /o o  s ry s  er repots r y  A y p y rp * .
oitfeL'&g'ii/eLi Nfppk&oL 'S y  S l ro v  £4 1/ £o \cy  .
(D. L. v, 15-16)
The likenesses mentioned above, namely those of Nicanor, 
Proxenus and his wife (229), Aristotle's mother and 
Arimnestus, the testator's brother, had already been 
commissioned, so the purpose of the clause is not to put 
aside money for them, but to state that they are to be 
set up (Jfc < ✓, ru foz Scl v. ). The ordering of these
likenesses is indicative of the testator's piety, since 
although one had to perform the funeral rites for one's 
next-of-kin, it was not necessary to make arrangements 
for an additional memorial. It is uncertain what form 
the likeness of the philosopher' s mother took, whether it 
was a bust, statue or portrait, but it is the only 
memorial for which he suggests a place, namely the temple 
of Demeter in Nemea. The fact that Aristotle 
commissioned a statue of Nicanor, who was still living 
but away on a dangerous journey, is indicative of his
affection for him. These clauses of the will have a
two-fold purpose, firstly to inform the executors that
the likenesses had been commissioned, and secondly to
ensure that a place be found for them to be set up.
The next clause in the section concerns his burial:
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~IhjQifi.&os o6Tt< oiy^7\.6/reus $&TVou^  c^^rre-p cxVTy r r p o ^ & T"ai'j£ G \/t 
(D. L. v, 16)
This quotation indicates the testator7 s great affection
for his deceased wife Pythias and his respect for her
wishes. It is not stated whether her command that they
be buried together was oral or written, but it was not
contained in a because women were not permitted to
make wills (230). Aristotle does not set down specific
a&
instructions about his burial l>rke the other peripatetic 
philosophers did (231), but entrusts these to his 
next-of-kin, in this case his adopted son, Nicanor. This 
is not stated in the will because it was not necessary, 
since it was the accepted duty of an adopted son to bury 
his father (232).
The last clause of the will concerns the setting up 
of two statues if Nicanor returns safely:
4k 6 cVc*.» J & ic aCi. ft!t X-ol!/0pa*. y  /  ^ ^ X J  ^
odfToC v j'ir^ & p .y v ,  I/-*  - f c r p c L t t y ^ y  A ll  6 ^ T 'y X L
iUCL A Q y r o i  SiA) ^ T o c f t r ' i p c  t S ,
(D. L. v, 16)
This quotation is indicative of Aristotle7 s concern for 
the safety of his adopted son. Chroust states that
providing "for such votive statues in a will was not an
uncommon practice in Athens " (223). However, there is
no similar provision in any other extant Athenian will, 
so Chroust is incorrect.
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The words have been thought to mean " four
animal figures" but they mean "figures four cubits high", 
that is, life-size figures (234).
The testament of Aristotle is the only will of which 
there are two versions. The primary function of the 
document is to provide for the care of his family by 
naming a guardian and interim guardians for Pythias and 
Nicomachus, and arranging Pythias7 marriage. Secondly,
he ensures that his other dependents, Herpyllis, Myrmex 
and his servants will be cared for following his death. 
The third function is a religious one, and it is probably 
because of the religious aspect that it is not included
in the Arabic version (235). These final provisions 
indicate Aristotle7 s piety.
Conon
It is difficult to establish the exact year in which 
Conon died. He is last mentioned in connection with a 
mission to the Persian king (236). This mission took
place in 392, and after it he died in Cyprus, but it is
not known how much time elapsed between the mission in
Persia and his death. Davies dates the death at 389
(237), whilst Hammond states that it occurred in 392
(238). There is no ancient evidence to support either of 
these dates. The will was made while he was ill (239), 
although it is not made clear whether it was made during 
his last illness.
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The latest date for the making of this will is probably 
389.
The testament of the Athenian general Conon was made 
in Cyprus and did not come under Athenian jurisdiction 
(240). However, the document might have been influenced 
by Athenian legal principles because the testator was a 
citizen of Athens. The provisions of the will are to be 
found in Lysias xix, which concerns the property of 
Aristophanes. This property had been confiscated by the 
state and was not as valuable as had been expected. Part 
of the argument consists of the example of the property 
of Conon which was allegedly.of much smaller value than 
had been thought. A certain amount of caution must be 
employed when examining this will, since it is in the 
speaker7 s interest to minimise the value of Conon7 s 
property. In addition, it must be borne in mind that in 
his will, Conon only disposes of his Cyprian property. 
His property in Athens has already been given to 
Timotheus, his son by his first marriage (241).
The first provisions mentioned by the speaker are 
religious ones:
Tfj JL& yjip 'A&1J Voile*. feLS ckvet9 ijpolT* Kotl Y &
'Atto7v.7v. <jvc fel* rrevr 0 v  S
STaLT * jp < *  S ’
(Lysias xix, 39)
It is not made clear to which temple of Athena the 
of farmings are to be given, so it seems best to assume 
that since Conon was an Athenian citizen and because it 
is specified that the money for Apollo is given to his
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main temple, it is likely that the money for Athena was 
left to her biggest temple, which was in Athens. The
speaker does not state specifically how the money was to
be divided between the two temples, so in the absence of 
this information it cannot be stated what proportion of 
money was left to what god. This is the earliest will in 
which legacies of a religious nature are found, and the 
other wills whose terms are known which have such 
provisions, date from just after the end of the classical 
period (242). The sum bequeathed by Conon for religious 
purposes is quite considerable, five thousand staters 
being equivalent to sixteen talents and four thousand 
drachmae (243).
Bequests are also made to the testator7 s relatives:
7*5 ru> i<*vT<ny, -r~re\/
tfr«C fA.Lk'U*' -ffCC V Tot Tot ^  V k.vTTpuf J gSu)iC.£ri<' cS S pLVp toCi
$fiOL^ JJLoCS> j TU.7 8 £  TpCot
(Lysias xix, 40)
These bequests to Conon7s brother (244) and nephew are 
thought by Lacey to be gifts with no conditions attached
(245), whereas Davies is of the opinion that provisions 
for Conon7 s Cyprian wife and son are "implicit in the
legacies of his brother and nephew" (246). No mention is 
made in the terms quoted of the future care of Conon7 s
wife and child in Cyprus (247), but this does not
necessarily indicate that no such provisions were made.
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This is because the argument in this section of Lysias 
xix is concerned with the financial value of Conon7 s 
estate as indicated in his will, and any provisions other 
than financial ones might not have been included because 
they were regarded as being irrelevant to the case. In 
other wills whose terms are known, provisions are always 
made for the care of the testator7 s dependents, although 
these terms are not necessarily combined with a legacy 
for the guardian (248). In the will of the elder 
Demosthenes, three guardians are appointed. Therippides 
is given the interest on seventy minae, Demophon is to 
marry the testator7 s daughter and is to receive her dowry 
of two talents at once, Aphobus is to marry the 
testator7 s wife and receive a dowry of eighty minae and
the right to use the house (249). In the will of Pasio,
the testator7 s minor son, Pasicles, is to have as his
guardians Phormio and Nicodes. It does not seem as if
Nicocles received a legacy. However, Phormio is to marry 
Archippe, Pasio7 s wife and is to receive a considerable 
dowry with her. In addition, he is to receive any
profits over and above the rent he is to pay for the
shield factory and bank, while he is managing the
premises (250). In both of these documents, the larger 
legacy (if a legacy is given to all the guardians) is 
given to the person who is to marry the testator7 s female 
dependent. Therefore it might be possible that Conon
provided two guardians for his son, namely his nephew and 
brother. His nephew was to receive a legacy of one 
talent and forty minae and was to continue caring for the 
estate, and his brother, (if he was unmarried), was to
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marry Conon7 s wife and receive with her a dowry of three 
talents. These terms are implied by the legacies given 
to the testator7 s relatives, especially when they are 
compared to other wills made by men with dependents. 
However, it must be emphasised that such a conclusion is 
based on conjecture, even though it does seem likely that 
Conon7 s will did contain provisions regulating the care 
of his dependents.
It is difficult to assess the value of the estate 
which these two relatives were to care for. It has 
generally been taken that in the last clause of his 
will, he bequeathed his property to Timotheus, the son by 
his first marriage (251):
Tc* X o t r r *  T t j  ■yfct* ic u r  e  ►'rbk
(Lysias xix, 40)
There are two possible explanations of this clause, 
either the words t *. S* are misleading, and there
existed more property which was given to Conon7 s son in 
Cyprus after seventeen talents had been bequeathed to 
Timotheus, or the remaining property was not given to 
Timotheus but inherited by Conon7 s other son. If Conon
had written in his will that Timotheus was to 
receive f«£ , then the clause would have
effectively alienated all of his property from his other 
son, and this does not seem very probable, j^ o^ n the other 
hand, Conon did leave the remainder of his property to 
his other son, it might seem as if Timotheus was unfairly 
deprived of some of his patrimony.
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It is, therefore, necessary to attempt to examine the 
value of Timotheus' property. When Conon left Athens, he 
left his son by his first marriage his Athenian property:
(Lysias xix, 36) (The other man referred to here is 
Conon's staff-officer, Nicophemus).
does not seem likely that Conon would have sold his 
Athenian property and taken the proceeds, since this 
would have involved selling the family home. It is very 
difficult to assess exactly how much this property was 
worth. The speaker of Lysias xix suggests that 
Timotheus' whole estate was only worth four talents:
6 ^  T"t$ €T'V\/t Scos T{3 T-^ •/
feccYotrrui o v f e *  r r 6 m r e v e r e  € lh£ s
v e p c  t £ y  T * - d r - *  y v £ Y « L y  t * * ? *  \r
V*7 e*«T 'eat>v  & x . r * A Lrre T y  r<* &  a&.Tu*
This statement is based on probability^ g£>coS , but it
V01>
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S o f a s  rfs t y T v
(Lysias xix, 34)
This argument is purely hypothetical, and cannot be taken 
as evidence that Timotheus' property was only worth four 
talents. In addition, it cannot be taken as evidence 
concerning the value of Aristophanes' estate at his 
death, because there is mention of some land worth five 
talents (253). It is possible that Timotheus' estate was 
worth much more than this, but the speaker is 
deliberately underestimating its probable value in order 
to heighten the impact which his rhetorical question will 
have on the jury. Therefore, this estimation is not very
reliable, and it is necessary to look at other evidence.
At the time of his trial in 373, Timotheus possessed a
r
farm in the plain, which^ held as security by the son or
Eumelidas; and the remainder of his property - presumably
06 u-
this included his house in the Pire^s and maybe the 
family home - was mortgaged for seven talents (254). 
This property was worth considerably more than the four 
talents estimated in Lysias xix. In addition,
Nicophemus' son, Aristophanes, possessed an estate in
Athens which was worth approximately fifteen talents, 
excluding his father's property in Cyprus (255). Since 
the estate of Conon was regarded as being greater than 
that of Nicophemus, it is probable that Timotheus' 
property in Athens, including both his father' s estate 
and the wealth he had acquired on his own behalf, was 
worth more than fifteen talents, though how much more it 
is difficult to say.
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Therefore, in view of the fact that Timotheus was already 
in possession of a considerable amount of property, it is 
far more likely that the words v* 7 r *3 v & t
If. rre refer to a bequest of property by Conon to his
son by his second marriage. The reason this had to be 
specified in a will was because otherwise the two sons 
would have probably had to divide the property equally
(257), if Cyprian and Athenian inheritance laws were 
alike in this matter.
Therefore, the will of Conon was concerned with the 
regulation of property matters, but did not regulate the 
Athenian part of his estate which he had already given to 
the eldest son. By means of this document, he bequeaths 
over half of his residual estate away from his son by his 
second marriage, setting aside some money for dedications 
to the gods and a smaller amount for bequests to his 
brother and nephew. It is possible that these bequests 
also had attached to them the condition that these 
relatives care for the deceased's family. Finally Conon 
used his will to ensure that the son in Cyprus inherited 
the remainder of his estate.
Euctemon
The agreement between Philoctemon and Euctemon is 
referred to as a <SioJhj*-y because it supposedly concerned 
the disposition of Euctemon's property after his death
(258). The date that this agreement was made is not 
certain. A verbal agreement took place before 
Philoctemon' s death, but it is not made clear how long 
before (259). Therefore, it can only be dated before 367
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at the latest. It is not specified when the verbal
agreement was put into writing, but since this was done 
after Philoctemon' s death when Chaireas was setting sail 
with Timotheus in 367/6 (260), it would have been made at 
the latest in 367 and repealed two years later in 365/4. 
Before discussing the will, it is necessary to review 
briefly the background to Isaeus vi, the speech in which 
the will is mentioned.
Euctemon was a wealthy Athenian who had three sons
and two daughters by his first marriage. The speaker's 
opponent claimed that Euctemon was also married a second 
time to a certain Callippe by whom he had two sons 
(261). This indicates that he must have divorced his 
first wife, and even the speaker admits that Euctemon 
stopped living with her (262). It seems as if Callippe 
either died or was also divorced, since Euctemon was also 
betrothed to the sister of Democrates (263). 
Philoctemon, the last surviving son of Euctemon's first 
marriage, made a will by which he adopted his nephew, 
Chaerestratus (264). However, on Philoctemon's death, 
Chaerestratus did not get himself adopted under the terms 
of the will, but claimed both Euctemon's and
Philoctemon's estate after Euctemon's death ( 265).
In Isaeus vi, the speaker alleges that Euctemon' s 
sons from his second marriage are the illegitimate
offspring of a prostitute named Alee, who gained
ascendancy over Euctemon to the extent that she persuaded 
him to enrol one of the boys in his phratry as his son 
(266). However, Philoctemon objected to this and a 
verbal agreement was made whereby if Philoctemon raised
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no objection to the boy's entry, then the boy would only 
receive one farm from Euctemon's estate:
(Is vi, 23)
If this agreement had not been made, Philoctemon would 
have been bound by the laws of inheritance to divide the 
estate in half after his father's death, because 
homopatric legitimate sons, even if they were the 
products of different marriages, were entitled to share 
equally in their father's property (267). Therefore, in 
giving the eldest son of Euctemon's second marriage only 
one farm, this agreement curtailed his inheritance 
rights. Following Philoctemon's death, Euctemon put this 
agreement into writing and deposited it with a certain 
Pythodorus (268). It is here that it is referred to as 
a . The reason why it is referred to as a will
is because it is a document regulating the distribution 
of the testator's property and is to take effect after
his death. However, this written will would not have been 
identical in its terms with the earlier verbal agreement 
, because Philoctemon , the latter's major beneficiary, 
had died. Since Euctemon also possessed two surviving 
daughters by his first marriage, it is possible that the 
property which he had intended Philoctemon to inherit was 
to be divided between them, and the testator's son by 
Callippe was still to inherit but one farm.
6 t 6 * * y o i y £ T  v t o v t 6 v T  o *
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Wyse states that one of the reasons why Phanostratus and 
Chaereas, Euctemon's sons-in-law, agreed to the drawing 
up of this will was because they did not want "Euctemon 
to die sonless and intestate from fear that their wives 
would become ^rriSncot. 0 n^ (269). However, under the laws
of intestate succession, a son took precedence over a 
daughter (270), and since the boy had been introduced 
into his father's phratry he was legally the legitimate 
son of Euctemon. Therefore, in the absence of 
this , Euctemon's daughters were not entitled to
any of his estate and would not become . Thus
the will deprived the boy of the majority of his 
patrimony, which is presumably why Euctemon later decided 
to cancel it two years after making it (271). Wyse also
suggests that Euctemon might have "purchased the silence 
of his sons-in-law by dividing the bulk of his property 
between his two daughters; compare the will of
Polyeuctus, which forms the subject of Dem. 41." (272)
However, it is not possible to compare the will of 
Polyeuctus, because this was concerned with the repayment 
of debts owed to the testator's estate (273). In 
addition, this statement can only refer to the
written as opposed to the original agreement
with Philoctemon.
Therefore, the will of Euctemon was a document which 
deprived a legitimate son of his right to inherit his 
father' s property by only giving him one farm, which is
presumably why the document was later withdrawn.
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Euthvcrates
There is no precise information concerning when 
Euthycrates died, except that his death allegedly occured 
when Astyphilus was but a small child (274). It is not 
stated exactly how old the boy was at this time but the 
word^ i^ oV(L**/l+}suggests an age of about three to four. If 
Astyphilus was about twenty when he first undertook 
military service in the Corinthian War, during the years 
394-386 (275), the year of his father's death would have
been c. 410.
There is no definite indication in Isaeus ix that 
Euthycrates made a will, but there is some evidence that 
this may have happened. When Euthycrates was dying, he 
gave his family a solemn command not to let his brother 
Thudippus approach the family tombs (276). At this time, 
Thudippus was probably Euthycrates' next of kin (277), 
and as such would be Astyphilus' guardian unless 
arrangements were made to the contrary (278). However, in 
this position, he would have been responsible for 
Euthycrates' funeral rites, and he was specifically 
forbidden to do this. Therefore, it would have been 
necessary to appoint someone else as the child's
&guardian. Even though the speaker does not specify who 
this was, there is some evidence concerning this.
It is alleged in the speech that Astyphilus was 
brought up by his mother's second husband:
%re ykp 6 ^ K j J L j ® e b $ f > ° < £ T e s  b irocrjp Tys
4otX >Mrv<§1'scn) iTotfk CjepO X-\.£ovS; tC-aul
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vLirrS* ktcet\/ov evov^oc jj. jLp'bv oW<* J
\K.CX.U S it f r Z r o  n * f >
K*tCL.
(Is. ix, 27)
It is specifically stated here that Theophrastus was
nominated as the boy's guardian by will, but the fact 
that he brought up Astyphilus ) even though
he was not the child's closest male relative, suggests 
that he probably acted as such. It is likely that since 
he married his ward's mother, this may have been 
specified by will, as was the case with the younger
Demosthenes' mother and Aphobus (279). In addition,
(Is. ix, 28)
The fact that this was done, and the estate returned to
Theophrastus not only acted as the boy's guardian but 
performed his duty well. It is not made clear whether the
will contained any instructions concerning the leasing of
the estate, since the fact that Theophrastus farmed it 
himself does not indicate that this was not specified,
since a child' s guardian could undertake the lease of his
ward's estate himself.
Theophrastus allegedly cultivated Asyphilus' land:
eye& pye
Astyphilus doubled in value, suggests also that
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Therefore, it seems as if the will of Euthycrates 
appointed a guardian for the testator's child and
authorised the marriage of his wife to the boy's
guardian. Whether or not it contained instructions
concerning pncB oilS OiKOv open to conjecture.
Polvarchus
The alleged will of Polyarchus, the father of
Cleonymus, that his son's property should be inherited by 
his great-nephews, is found in Isaeus i:
... S e  "Jfck v j T o v  V oLrpbs ( r o v )  K x ^ u j v
Tfpo 6 £ o a r r o s y e "  r t  7TuOo^ k?ieroiv^jfAUJS
5 9 $dO vot-c. T 06 0c v r o u ,
(Is. i, 4)
Thalheim quotes this passage as an example of a testament 
made by a father with a legitimate son which was to take 
effect if he died before he came of age or two years
afterwards (280). Beauchet is of the opinion that
Polyarchus gave these instructions in a will, but does
not say whether this will was made before or after
Cleonymus reached his majority (281). However, the
word oLtrius implies that Cleonymus may have been adult by
the time of Polyarchus' death, in which case the will
would have no longer been valid. On the other hand, it is
not clear whether these instructions did take the form of 
a , because the verb Trp6€,T#£oc.sros
is not found in any other extant evidence with reference 
to a will. In addition, a was concerned with
what was to happen to the oc<o s after the testator's
death, not with naming heirs for the testator' s heir.
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This is shown by the fact that no will (except these 
alleged instruction) concerns the disposition of property
K
beyond the immediate adult heir or heirs (282). It is 
also dubious whether such a statement , even if it had 
been embodied in testament, would have been binding on 
Cleonymus unless it was intended to take effect only if 
Cleonymus were to die before reaching his majority or two 
years after it, and this is doubtful. Furthermore, even 
though these instructions are mentioned in the exordium 
of Isaeus i, no evidence or witnesses are produced later 
in the speech to verify that this happened. Since the
veracity of this incident is supported by no evidence, it
is possible that it is a fabrication. Therefore the 
passage cannot be taken as evidence concerning the
function of the Athenian will.
It can be seen from this section that wills made by 
men with families had various functions. The majority of 
them provided for the care of the family in matters such 
as a dowry for the female dependents, and maybe the
choice of a husband, and guardians for the children. In 
addition, a will made by a family man might include an
inventory, notification of debts, certain bequests, and 
arrangements for the treatment of slaves. The exception 
to this is the will of Euctemon in which the son of a 
second marriage is deprived of his patrimony.
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Will s not involving adoption made bv men who had no 
legitimate offspring.
In this section, the wills of Cleonymus, Aristarchus 
and Mneson and the philosophers Plato, Theophrastus, 
Strato, Lyco, Epicurus, Arcesilaus and Crantor shall be 
dis cussed.
Cleonvmus
There is no historical evidence in Isaeus i by means 
of which the speech can be dated. Therefore, it is 
necessary to rely on WeveA s; estimated date of 355 (283).
Even so, it is very difficult to ascertain exactly when 
the will of Cleonymus was made. The document was drawn up 
when the speaker and his brother were children under the 
guardianship of their uncle, Deinias (284). After 
Deinias' death, they were brought up by the testator, but 
they were not with Cleonymus when he died as is shown by 
the fact that they do not state that they were present 
themselves (285). This indicates that by the time of the 
testator's death, the speaker and his brother had come of 
age, since otherwise they would have still been living
with Cleonymus, who was their guardian. The opening 
chapter of the speech, however, implies that they are 
still young men without much worldly experience, which 
would make them about twenty years old. Therefore, a very 
approximate date for Cleonymus' will could be c. 370-365.
The validity of the will of Cleonymus is contested in 
the first speech of Isaeus. This will was made in favour 
of several beneficiaries:
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(Is. i, 3)
It is not made clear here how many beneficiaries there 
were under the terms of the will or what the names of all 
of them were. The speaker relates two indications that 
Pherenicus had incurred the testator's anger (286), and
since he is trying to prove that the beneficiaries were
not on good terms with Cleonymus before his death, it is
very likely that Pherenicus was a legatee. Both
Poseidippus and Diodes are mentioned in connection with 
sending away the magistrate who was allegedly called to 
revoke the will (287):
rreo $ TO’v ro y  yei/C>iTo i£TQ ref>o(j 75^ 5
s -  ✓ _ ^ - ✓ r  s
(Is. i, 23)
The fact that Poseidippus incurred Cleonymus' wrath 
through not carrying out his wishes implies that he was 
also a beneficiary under the will, since they would have 
had no reason for allegedly sending away the magistrate
cZ w fxo v  v irep  r * js r&vrc o/ v
TTe>ty6oCefru.C SJTOvS^Y JI’(>66rL&'i TTTTiO fU : ✓ O T L
I C a L T " * h O f & G .  V . o p  y i g  6 $  SoCu . A / e e M f l V t  roc-x^r*.
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if they had not been named in the document. Since 
Diodes is mentioned also, it is likely that he too was a 
beneficiary in the will.
It is possible that these men were related to the 
testator:
6c 'rt  ^ epoiTo *-<- oc^ c c C e i
KAypovtyoi. i & v T~£v t 'o v t '
eirrGtv Wtl  ** .1  tto&g v irpo6ytcov6 l
etceT vos u.£ to T& p p S v t i f  res*. in r i r y S & tu is
$u Zicetro
(Is. i, 36)
The word ?T<>-0 € ✓ indicates that the speaker is very wary of 
announcing the precise relationship of the beneficiaries 
to the testator, and because of this it is possible that
they are of closer proximity than the speaker would like
to admit. Since the claimants "ab intestato" are nephews 
of the deceased, it might be that the claimants under the 
will were first cousins on the male side (288). However, 
since the only evidence that they could have been this
closely related to Cleonymus is the speaker's reluctance
to state the proximity precisely, the matter is open to
conj ecture.
It is also disputed how many testamentary heirs there 
were. It has been thought that the following passages 
might provide some solution to the problem:
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JCti. C 0C p & V  O L f C & t - O L  iC o Z  & t  V p t b * J  K O V  T & 5  o t
TOVT&V otj* LOis 6C1/ TtiiY S/U07l.oyOVpe-
K x € r (£  t fV p .0 *  f c * - r e  *>11T6 L \S; o L V r o t s  i 6 0 jJ 0 L j> 'J J € <ic (.'
(Is. i, 2)
O VTOL  S '  e f y u >  7 L V O V 6 L V  e $ e 7 U > V T * s  i * o p O L p < j 6 * t c
r y b  o^6 ...
(Is. i, 35)
The word 160 fj.o<. pye#.*- in these two quotations implies that 
the estate was to be equally divided in the abortive 
out-of-court settlement. The proportions of the proposed 
division were one third to the heirs "ab intestato" and 
two thirds to the testamentary heirs (289). On these 
grounds, Schoemann has argued that there were four 
beneficiaries under the will (290). On the other hand, 
there is a parallel of a possible similar decision in 
Isaeus v. Here, the estate is divided into the same 
proportions as the estate of Cleonymus, but the adopted 
son is to receive one third of the property and the heirs 
"ab intestato" are to have two thirds, which is to be 
shared equally (291). Therefore, it is possible that the
word ice>fxOLf*j6^ L refers to the fact that the two parts of 
the estate were to be divided into equal shares 
respectively, not that the heirs "ab intestato" were to 
receive the same proportion as the testamentary heirs. 
In addition, when witnesses are called to give evidence 
concerning this decision, it is not stated that an equal 
partition of the property was proposed:
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TO 'l V 'U V  & S  o t  T o v r w v '  < f f * 4 > L  v '5 f>C $
v e l v e t * r^y ai^tec/ r* rp 'CroV fx&foo^
y fL & S  G ' f i e i V  i . T e h / ' r u V  T % v  K * * * *  V"ufJLO v  , yCoCc 
TOJ'TiJ't jaAi. Koctn^ i t-prvpeL^'
(Is. i# 16)
Here, th^ word v^(f4«.6&^ does not necessarily indicate that 
the estate was to be divided into equal shares, even
though the verb 'Uofnu^cJ could have been used instead. 
Therefore, witnesses are called to give evidence not that 
an equal partition was suggested but that one third of 
the estate be ceded to the heirs &xr by the laws of 
intestate inheritance. Furthermore, the speaker only 
specifically names three opponents, Poseidippus and 
Diodes who allegedly were asked to send for the 
magistrate, and Pherenicus who was supposed to have
incurred Cleonymus' anger. Therefore, it is more likely 
that there were three beneficiaries named in the will of 
Cleonymus.
There is also the problem concerning how closely the 
heirs by the will were related to each other. Albrecht
has suggested that they were brothers (292). The
evidence for this is the following:
6 .1  fjL 6  v  ( ^ e p iv L i C O S  y  T i S
irtKev j • - - *
(Is. i, 45)
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However, Wyse rightly indicates that the meaning is 
ambiguous.
"It is not clear whether this means one of his 
(Pherenicus' ) brothers' or one of ' the brothers' , a group 
contrasted with Pherenicus" (293).
In the speech, Diodes and Poseidippus were with 
Cleonymus before he died, and might well have been 
present at his death (294), whereas Pherenicus is 
referred as incurring the emnity of the testator at an 
earlier date (295). It therefore seems more probable 
that Diodes and Poseidippus were brothers, but 
Pherenicus, although possibly a relative, was not a 
brother of the other two.
Wyse suggests that although there is no specific 
statement that this will involved an adoption, it is 
possible that such a clause was included:
"There is nothing to show whether the testament enjoined 
that any of the heirs should enter by adoption the house 
of Cleonymus. It is not to the advantage of the speaker 
to mention such an injunction if it existed. His silence 
on the pathetic subject of the extinction of a family may 
be considered a sign that Cleonymus' will did provide for
an adoption" (296).
De Ste. Croix is also of the opinion that this case is one 
of the instances in which an adoption can be inferred 
even though it is not mentioned (297), but he does not 
give his reasons for stating this.
On the other hand, Norton argues that Cleonymus' will 
did not contain an adoption, because the heirs seemed to 
share equally (298), and the word is used instead
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of KJ^jfov in referring to the inheritance (299). In saying 
that Isaeus i contains an "appeal to prevent 
fragmentation of an oikos" (300) Lacey seems to assume 
that Cleonymus did not provide for an adoption in his 
will.
(■o^UbvP
There is nothing in the speechjrthat an adoption had
taken place, and in two other cases where the heir "ab
intestato" questions the validity of a will involving
adoption (301), he does not try to hide the function of
the will. It could be that the reason that nothing is
Osaid about the extinction of the oOuch is because the 
nephews of Cleonymus did not perform his funeral rites, 
but these were left to the heirs by testament. In 
addition, there is no other example of a will being made 
in which one beneficiary is adopted as the testator' s son 
and given some property and the remainder shared amongst 
other testamentary beneficiaries. The only possible 
parallel can be found in the will of Dicaeogenes in 
which, according the speaker of Isaeus v, the testator 
adopted Dicaeogenes III and gave him one third of the 
estate, but left instructions that the remainder was to 
be divided amongst his heirs "ab intestato". However, it
is very likely that Dicaeogenes III was adopted as 
universal heir, and the division amongst the heirs "ab 
intestato" was brought about as a result of an 
out-of-court compromise (302). Therefore, it is not 
probable that Cleonymus adopted one of his testamentary 
heirs, but that they were heirs by bequest.
The speech contains no information about how the 
estate was to be divided between the testamentary heirs.
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Norton thinks that the heirs were to share in the
property equally (303), and states that this is indicated 
in the following:
~ru.Z$ a£ y o v T £ s  tJS
jjLerev eju tiers c>v 7Ltj6*l l
$ c i * A A  J e tTck*o/9 Q&Cia. l K.tcu
c c f it iv tL-irax:* T y *  $u>pe Lv»
(Is. i, 18)
There is, however, no indication of an equal division in 
this quotation. The fact that various friends had 
suggested that two thirds of the estate was to be divided
equally amongst the heirs by will does not necessarily
indicate that they originally received an equal amount of 
property.
It is probable that in stating what each beneficiary 
should receive, Cleonymus wrote down an inventory of his 
property, as happens in the will of Plato (304).
Therefore, the will of Cleonymus did not contain an 
adoption, but bequeathed his property to three heirs ,
who were probably relatives of his. There is no way of 
knowing whether the property was to be equally divided 
between the testamentary heirs or not, but it is possible 
that the will contained an inventory of property.
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Aristarchus
The will of Aristarchus was probably made during the 
Theban war, just before the testator's death (305).
Therefore, it can be dated at 378-1.
The will of Aristarchus (II) is contested in the 
tenth speech of Isaeus. In order to discuss the function 
of this will, it is necessary to recount briefly the 
events preceding the speech.
Aristarchus (I) had two sons , Cyronides and
Demochares, and two daughters. Cyronides was adopted by 
his maternal grandfather, Xenaenetus (I). At some point, 
Aristarchus (I) died, allegedly leaving the estate in
debt (306). Demochares and one of the daughters also
died. However, it is not clear whether the adoption of
Cyronides took place before or after the deaths of
Aristarchus (I) and Demochares (307). The surviving
girl's guardian, Aristomenes, married this daughter to 
Cyronides, giving him the estate of Aristarchus (I). 
Thus, the surviving daughter did not become an 
, but was married with a dowry to a man who was not a 
relative. Cyronides had two sons, Aristarchus (II) and
Xenaenetus (II). After his father's death, the former
was introduced as the posthumously adopted son of
Aristarchus (I) (308). Aristarchus (II) fell in battle 
(309), and made a will in which his brother was to 
receive his estate.
The speech in which the will is mentioned does not
state specifically what the function of the document was. 
The verb is used with reference to the will (310),
thus implying that it contained a bequest rather than an
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adoption. The hypothesis states that Aristarchus (II)
made his brother, Xenaenetus (11)^ his heir (KP^ypovtp-o 3
) (311). However, the use of the word £Kypo\/6po<> does not
0/
necessarily indicate tl^ t Xenaenetus (II) was adopted, 
since it is used with reference to the testamentary heirs 
of Cleonymus who were not adopted by him. The fact that 
Xenaenetus (II) was named after his maternal 
great-grandfather indicates that his father intended him 
to remain in the oi*OS of Xenaenetus (I). In addition 
there is no evidence in the speech that Aristarchus (II) 
had adopted his natural brother in his will (312).
Therefore it is likely that the will of Aristarchus 
did not contain an adoption, and is an example of a man 
bequeathing his whole estate to someone else without 
adopting him as his son.
Mneson
Mneson died at about the same time as his brother 
Thrasyllus who died during the Sicilian expedition (313). 
Therefore, his will can be dated at c. 415-3.
There is a passage in Isaeus vii which suggests that 
a will was made:
£i;trox»s ov/ ocvt& v s av  puKpu.
&.TTO /Kot-'J t. T i 3 v  ju & r ~ w v  otXOu*. 7" 6 ✓ p L k  V
A!V'yfiwvoS j / I /t o a x i rfo6yj K. e tq
yp.UC7\.yp<-0v j VocVTtx ftS ✓ iTtrpt e'rtOi.y  ^ <foc6<Ccov
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vlvt£> %o v v ^ k. •rbv' i/L$e*.<p‘6 v , *. .
(Is vii, 6)
(Here, Eupolis and Mneson were brothers, and Apollodorus 
is the son of the third brother, Thrasyllus.)
The fact that Eupolis claimed his brother's whole estate 
(o-o ) indicates that a will must have
been allegedly made by Mneson' otherwise the estate would 
have been divided equally between Eupolis and Apollodorus 
in accordance with the laws of intestate succession (314).
The function of this will is disputed. De Ste. Croix 
is of the opinion that an adoption can be implied from 
this passage, but does not support his statement with any 
evidence from the text or elsewhere (315). Gernet is a 
little more dubious and states that the passage might be 
referring to an adoption by will (316). On the other 
hand, Wyse thinks that if Mneson's estate was claimed by 
will, this is an example of a testament not containing an 
adoption, since he finds it "improbable that Eupolis 
pretended to have been made his brother's son" (317).
There is no other example of a man being allegedly 
adopted by his homopatric and homometric brother.
Therefore a possible testamentary adoption here has no
precedent. It is not stated when Eupolis' three children
were born, but if they had been born before the death of
Mneson, it is more probable that he would have adopted
one of them to continue his line as opposed to his
oJ^brother, and there^examples of the adoption of a niece or 
nephew by will (318). In addition, the word Sov 
implies that the estate was allegedly given to Eupolis
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without the condition that he become the adopted son of 
Mneson.
Therefore the function of the alleged will of Mneson 
(319) was probably the bequest of an estate without
brother's estate under the terms of such a will indicates 
that such a function was permissible in Athenian law in 
fourth-century Athens.
Archeoolis
There is also some fragmentary evidence from Isaeus 
concerning the will of a man named Archepolis. There is 
no information by which the date of this testament can be 
established.
This evidence has to be regarded with a certain amount 
of caution because one is unable to reconstruct the 
speech from it, even though a summary is provided by 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus. The information is as follows:
“TOC-UT-y/ T b Z v u v  f ' i j v  0 L W 0 * p i 6 LV $  to t .& 'j ic .J  /
ClS. 3, 1/ Tha.lKeirr»^
& TO-V H.'A^ jpO'V rr‘*-p<*.ypc£^ e'TbCL f
Sog, 0e<-z. A £ y  tO V gtcvfu? 7*^ , <e<-r<x, £  < ot 9 y  iC <*-£ ,
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus,   aeo, 15) (320)
It seems as if these two quotations concern the same 
speech, because Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that 
the opponents are Aristogeiton and Archippus, and in
adoption. The fact that Eupolis was able to claim this
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Thalheim, the two extant fragments are attributed to a 
speech entitled Agai ns t Aristoaeiton and Archinnus 
concerning the estate of Archenolis (321).
There is a difficulty here in that although there are two 
opponents named in the title, and the fragment of Isaeus 
quoted uses the plural forms of verbs 6uvj e je c t* .*
) with reference to them, Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
states that only one of the speaker's opponents was in 
possession of the estate, (o Sc rov xx-jpov Kpv-rdv ). it 
is possible that the reason two opponents are named was 
because even though there was only one testamentary 
claimant, the other opponent had stated that the document 
was deposited with him. However, because so little is 
known about this speech the matter is open to 
conjecture. Nothing is said about the function of the 
will in Isaeus, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his
document. This implies that the will contained a bequest
of the whole of the testator's estate to a man who was
not to be adopted as his heir.
Therefore, from the little information available, it
seems as if the alleged will of Archepolis contained a
bequest without adoption.
The will of Plato was made in 347 at the latest, in 
the year of his death. It is quoted in Diogenes Laertius' 
biography of the philosopher. The document opens with 
the following words:
summary uses the verb in reference to the
Plato
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T<*S« K *xiK trre  ic*£ Sue Be t o '
(D.L.iii, 41)
The verb K*.r«tA.€. i rr o> is not found in the opening of any
other extant will, and is only found once in a surviving 
testament with the meaning "to bequeath" (322).
However, is used later in this will to refer
to slaves left as part of the estate, and it is used in 
other wills to denote the testator's estate (323). 
Therefore, it seems best to translate K*.r£i\irre as "leave 
behind", and this interpretation indicates that the will 
is to contain an inventory of property as well as 
arranging the disposal of the estate.
Plato firstly arranges the disposition of part of his 
landed estate:
T6 k v  J , f i£ rL o c $ C A > v '  £  y G Z r u v  f i e p p o i B t v  -Jj
7"av f I £ tot 6 l* ceyt/o tj j ro && v to
ic\6lov j-o e v I<f t6ne*.$tots, TTpos yjutv fe t&r(.oVTOS
p x  &  6  r p t L T  * 5 CT/9o<, ^ A l O V
S v o p e v w  § t \ ir r n o s  XoAT^e'iSrjS' icocu jmy e^6broa
r o v r o  uyiS&'/l ULyTGr £>rttto6B *.L zxyre kat.6 u,
Sl> YttLTO V ’
(D.L.iii, 41)
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The piece of land to be bequeathed is specifically 
defined by its boundaries, which is not found in any 
other will. This property is left to a boy (TiceiS'Cov ) 
Adeimantus (II). Davies suggests that he was the 
grandson of Plato's brother, Adeimantus (I) (324). This 
is probable because the two bear the same name, which 
indicates that they might be from the same family. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that he was the son of 
Adeimantus (I) because he was a boy at the time the will 
was made (c. 347) and Adeimantus (I) was born c. 430
(325). Bruns suggests that Adeimantus (II) was the sole 
surviving descendant of Plato's brothers and sister, 
since otherwise the estate would have been shared amongst 
all of the heirs "ab intestato" (326). However, the fact 
that Plato specifically bequeaths the land at Iphistiadae 
to Adeimantus (II) indicates that there were probably 
others who had either an equal right to inherit or an 
even greater right. In addition, the fact that 
Adeimantus (II) is made partial heir shows that he was 
probably not the only heir "ab intestato", since if he 
had been, he would have taken possession of the estate 
without formality. Hug is undecided as to whether
Adeimantus was adopted by Plato or was his heir " ab 
intestato" (327). No mention is made in the document of 
an adoption of Adeimantus (II) by Plato made either 
"inter vivos" or in the will, so it seems as if 
Adeimantus is to be partial heir without adoption, and is
'P
therefore to remain in his father's as opposed to
transferring to Plato's one ( 328 ).
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It seems as if this estate was inherited by Plato and 
not bought by him. This is because he specifically 
states that the other estate in Eiresidae was bought from 
Callimachus ( Sv rrotfCc v
), and no such thing is said about 
the property given to Adeimantus. The fact that the 
estate at Iphistiadae is Plato's would account for
the restriction on sale or exchange ( puy r  & ino f£edei.u
ecu ) t since he would wish this property 
to remain intact and in the family. The fact that this 
was possibly his iTccrput* might well be the reason behind 
him bequeathing it to Adeimantus, since he might not have 
wished it to be divided between his heirs "ab 
intestato". The restriction on sale or exchange is
presumably also a safeguard against Adeimantus' father or
guardian either doing what Dicaeogenes is alleged to have 
done, that is, buying it himself (330) or from selling it
to someone else, and thus depriving Adeimantus of the
real estate.
The words ro Sv y #.to \/ are rather difficult to
interpret and this expression does not occur in any other 
will. The editor of the Loeb translates this as "to all
intents and purposes", but this is rather vague, since 
Adeimantus was a minor when Plato wrote his will, so he 
was legally unable to perform transactions amounting to 
more than one medimnus of barley (Isaeus x, 10). He 
would only be able to assume complete authority over the 
administration of the estate when he came of age.
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Therefore e U  r& SW*roV cannot mean "let it be in the 
power of Adeimantus", as in meaning "let him have 
complete authority over it", because such a clause would 
be contrary to law. It is possible that these words may 
be an expression of a wish for the future, that is, "let 
it be for the authority of Adeimantus", it being
understood that this would only be so when he comes of
age. This suggestion would fit in with the immediately 
preceding clauses barring sale or alienation, and thus
seems quite possible. This clause in the will is 
contrary to the arguments of both Harrison and Gernet, 
who state that a man had not such a free right to dispose 
of his jToLTpfij*. in a will as that of d crhcT'tj r*. (331).
The next clause concerns some other landed property:
T0> d *  £  T T n .fi* .
KtCWLpLii^ov i irpc&fi-yj Yj co yeC roS
jfvffvjuediJv Mvfifi l^ ov610 $ , voTo&e^ fd *'Tfibcro s
’Cjv rTfrrn.icj v/ crfidS ytSov dLvtdvros ^vpvpeScjy/ 
tyvppi vovi  iO s j  TTfi o s yAxon  Svopevo-u K y f t e S i .
(D. L. iii, 42 )
It has been suggested that this piece of land was the 
site of the Academy (332). However, if it had been, it 
seems more likely that it would have been left to Plato's 
fellow scholars, as happens to the school of the 
peripatetic philosophers (333).
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In addition, no restriction is placed on sale or
exchange, which would probably have been the case if this 
property was Plato7 s Academy. Bruns is of the opinion 
that this estate was inherited by Adeimantus (334). 
However, the text contains no specific indication that 
this was done, and since Adeimantus is named as heir to 
Plato7 s other piece of land, it is probable that he did 
not inherit the estate at Eiresidae. It is more likely 
that this land was to be divided amongst Plato7 s heir or 
heirs "ab intestato". No heir or heirs are named for the 
remainder of Plato7 s property, either:
& f > j v p ' o v  r p e t s .  k p y v p t Z y  e / u c o v * * /
W p f t c O v  t L y o V  p - G ' ,  $ o c * r v 7 L i o v  \ ^ p ^ j € o n ) v
v > f  } / _  /  .  r  i
6  VbJTLOV ^ P ' V & O V V  (XyOVTeiL 6 'UV'oC jJL<y U3 6
o f i o A o V  S  y  '  ’ • €LiCeTeC.S K-tLToc. 7Lft CrtnJ
S t  1C  Tei. t y f r o  r c n i * v c £ r j v  A i  O'TOtcO V .
S K & V n y  K. . . TOC y ^ y p o o i l  V k v r ' i . y
(D. L. iii, 42-43)
It is very likely that these effects also were to be 
shared amongst Plato7s heirs " ab intestato", since he 
bequeaths them to no one in particular. The inventory of
os.
furniture fcxe-uy t*. does not form part of this will
but is written in a separate document.
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Since this document is referred to as r<2 as
opposed to , it would not be a will as such, but
more similar to the notes left by Polyeuctus' wife
(335). It is enough for Plato here just to refer to this 
other document and not re-record the furniture he leaves.
In this testament, Plato also notes a debt owed to 
the estate:
£ j*./ws£S-^ 5 6 poc Tp6.7$ ^<*5.
(D. L. iii, 43 )
By noting this debt of three minae, Plato ensures that
his heirs are aware that they can claim this sum. Since
no person is named as the recipient of the money, it is
probably to be shared amongst Plato's heirs "ab 
intestato". The testator also states that he is in debt 
to no-one:
©jdtV.
(D. L. iii, 42)
Both of these quotations refer to the law whereby the
heir to an estate inherited all the debts to it and by
it, so it was wise to make note of these (336).
Plato also provides for the manumission of one of his
slaves:
(D. L. iii, 42)
This is the earliest extant example of a slave being
freed by means of a will (337). No bequest is left to
the girl, and the testator does not even state that she 
is to continue to possess the personal effects such as
clothing which she would have had the use of.
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Such matters are left to the heirs to decide upon.
Finally the executors are named:
i t r t i jp o  no t £  ireve in n  os A .v jn y r p io $
c//yfo6S E 'O p v p .iiu i'/  s * €  t rr r r o $.
(D. L. iii, 43)
This is the first extant will in which persons who are 
not specifically mentioned as beneficiaries are appointed 
as executors to an estate. There is no indication as to 
who these men are, whether some or all of them are the 
heirs "ab intestato" or persons who are completely 
disinterested. One of these men, namely Demetrius, also 
possesses the inventory of Plato7 s furniture. The role 
of these men is presumably to ensure that the estate is 
equally divided between Plato7s heirs "ab intestato", and 
that the estate given to Adeimantus is administered 
fairly until he comes of age.
Therefore the will of Plato has several functions.
Its primary purpose is to list the effects of his entire 
estate, part of which he bequeaths to Adeimantus, and the
rest of it is to be inherited by his heir or heirs "ab 
intestato". He also uses his will to state a debt owing 
to the estate, and confirm that he is in debt to nobody, 
to free a slave and appoint persons as executors.
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Theophrastus
The will of Theophrastus was made at the latest in 
286, the year of his death, and is of particular 
importance from the legal aspect because this philosopher 
was the author of several works concerning law (338).
The testament opens as follows:
£*r«. I j l e y  ev • ioLv $< rt , reuSfi &G. ^  ©ti *
(D.L. v, 51).
This is the first extant will in which the present 
(middle) form of is used in the opening
sentence. In three earlier wills, namely those of Pasio, 
Plato and Aristotle, the aorist form of the verb is used
(339).
The heirs to much of Theophrastus1 property are named 
first:
j/ietf 0LU.OL 7r*/r* SiSoJpn. M e rA jk r r y
Vv*yie*/9Go*T l rdlSk A£ovro&.
(D.L.v, 51)
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Theophrastus does not state specifically the whereabouts 
of the property which is to be inherited by Melantes and
y
Pancreon, however the word t indicates that this is 
his property in Eresos in Lesbos, the place of his birth
(340). The word iw/rot indicates that Melantes and 
Pancreon are to receive the entire property. No 
instructions are given regarding the division of the 
estate, so it seems best to assume that the beneficiaries 
are to share equally, as was the case under the rules of 
intestate succession (341). The use of the word 
indicates that this is a bequest and that no adoption is 
involved. Therefore, this is an example of a 
man's 'ir+xpu <*. being bequeathed without adoption ( 342). 
There - is no indication in the will of the relationship of 
Melantes and Pancreon to the testator. Gottschalk 
suggests that they are Theophrastus' nephews, since 
Melantes was also the name of Theophrastus' father
(343). This suggests that Leon is the philosopher's 
brother. However there is nothing in the text which 
indicates that they are the testator's nephews, because 
although Melantes is a family name, it is possible that 
the Melantes named in the will is a more distant
relative. In addition if Melantes and Pancreon had been 
Theophrastus' natural heirs, as Gottschalk suggests
(344), there would be no need to name them as 
beneficiaries, since they would have been entitled to 
inherit anyway, unless there were others of the same 
relationship with Theophrastus whom he wished to deprive 
of their inheritance. It therefore seems improbable that 
they were his closest relatives and the only heirs under
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the law of intestate inheritance but were more distantly 
related to the testator.
Following this, reference is made to the property 
entrusted to Hipparchus (345):
property, his money in Athens as well as the school and
Theophrastus' ownership of the school. Bruns is of the 
opinion that Theophrastus must have been granted Athenian 
citizenship because he left property in Athens (347). 
Gottschalk thinks that Demetrius of Phalerum, a fellow 
pupil of Aristotle, helped him to obtain the right 
of ijicT'jeis by which means he became the owner of the land 
on which he built his school, and that this probably 
occurred at some point after 317 when he was appointed as 
governor of Athens by Cassander. He also adds that the 
help given might have been partially financial (348). On 
the other hand, there is some evidence presented by
Whitehead that the division between citizens and 
non-citizens had lessened by the turn of the fourth 
century to the extent that eventually the status of the 
metic simply died out (349). If this was the case, then 
it might have been possible for Theophrastus to 
obtain eyiT y G iS . Diogenes Laertius speaks of the
intervention of Demetrius of Phalerum as follows:
& ITo Tco V
ju>L. $ov\0 fMm. yevet-Q*
(D. L. v, 51)
The word 6 1 refers to Theophrastus' Athenian-
garden (346). There are several views concerning
- 295 -
l& y e ro c .c  $ *  u n i  c S t o v  u ,y n o v  6 ] ( & V  y i& n <.
Ty v )ip16rore^ovs hyj^y^ftov rov
Q'KKyp6u>%/ r j\f  jcul yVtofijLos ocdru> j  r o v ro
€ vf*. rrp & ^n  \sro $ •
(D. L. v, 39)
The word cv T^r^ Jot^ T-os offers no clue about what really 
happened, since it does not specify the form of help 
given by Demetrius of Phalerum to Theophrastus. Since no 
mention is made in Diogenes Laertius that Theophrastus 
was made an Athenian citizen, it seems unlikely that this 
was so. In addition, Bruns7 suggestion offers no 
explanation and takes no account of the intervention of 
Demetrius of Phalerum. The passage in Diogenes Laertius 
does not give any indication of the nature of this 
intervention, therefore it is necessary to examine in 
brief the position of the metic with reference to land 
ownership. In classical Athens, a metic was not legally 
able to own land or a house unless he was granted the
right of €j*-Trfbi5> yys **u. oi-<inh> (350). Some
inscriptions exist conferring this right on metics. One
of these inscriptions specifically states that the
metic7 s right of (fyvryjbis is to be passed down to his
descendants (351). This indicates that the right
of was only hereditary if it was specified in the
>
decree. The word used to specify descendants is e^ y^ oc, 
which indicates that the right is limited to the children
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and then grandchildren etc. of the recipient, and not to
other family members such as nephews or uncles.
Therefore if a metic who was granted this particular
privilege were to die without legitimate children, the
right of s y n r j€ iS would not be inherited by the man who
stood to inherit his other property. It is possible that
this particular right was given only to men who had
legitimate children. In other inscriptions, a limit is
set on the value of the land which the metic is allowed
to own (352). The fact that some of these inscriptions
date from the third century indicates that even though
there is some evidence that the differences between a
metic and a Athenian citizen began to fade during the
turn of the fourth century, the restrictions on the
ownership of land still remained. Therefore, it does not
seem very likely that Theophrastus would have been able
y
to buy land without the right of 6/5 . In his will,
Theophrastus makes arrangements for the school, in effect 
bequeathing it for the use of scholarship and at least 
one of those who are to participate in overseeing it is a 
metic himself (353). This indicates that
the is yys granted to Theophrastus included
the right of disposition of this land by means of 
a . According to the available evidence, a
privilege of this kind was not granted to any other 
metic. Therefore, it is possible that Demetrius of 
Phalerum helped Theophrastus to obtain and also
ensured that the decree included freedom of disposition
(354).
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It is this Athenian property which Theophrastus 
states that Hipparchus should make arrangements for:
(D. L. v, 51-52)
The fact that some of the building of the school had 
fallen into disrepair when Theophrastus wrote his will, 
as is indicated by these instructions, was probably a 
result of the siege of Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes
(355), and does not suggest that the school was receiving 
insufficient care from its owner. The fact that the 
likeness of Aristotle and the maps are to be put into 
particular place^implies that they might have been there
cLAXjD Tr&jOl oLVTK<, e.Tr*.<t>b l iv j& C j  yCKL TTffO S 7~0
IcclK^ i o v ' &ir6cT-t*. r y v  ^ A f'tro t e t ic o ts *  eis
Tt> iepiv SCoul TV. 7ux.cc* X if <*• 06<x, trpo T&fOov
vtr fp x« -v iv iru> termed ‘ ra $ t-^S lo\/
jJL0V6€rL.m J4.TJ
•trporepov' x.
v
tfcrvs
previously, but had been removed in a time of danger.
The word indicates that before the upheaval, the
i
school had been kept in good repair. The testator's 
order of priorites is indicated by the fact that he
mentions the f4.dv6£<-ov t th e  place of learning, first.
He does not specify how it is to be repaired but trusts 
those concerned, presumably the executors of the will
(356) to ensure that everything is done well
( *.<*✓ r l ........
). It is not stated what form the likeness of 
Aristotle took, whether it was a full-size statue or a 
bust (357). The altar is also to be rebuilt 
( 4tr« 6K6-U*. 6 0-y ✓olc. ).
Provision is also made for the completion of a statue 
of Nicomachus:
fi>ovh-0 /U«u Se r y v  AJi *cojul^ ov gu
t i syv . r'o /<.6v r y  s ir \*L b € o J ji r z
S’ \0  (<V Tujhoo lt*Tr° TovroV
$£ %TTOV Sotcy ro ts  k*.1 rw/ /■ ip&xovfLZi/cn*
T'uO\f £ / r y  Sx ic,j
(D. L. v, 52)
It is very possible that this life size (?fcy\/ ) statue
of Nicomachus was to be of Aristotle's son of that name,
since Theophrastus is named in Aristotle's will as the
boy's guardian in the event of Nicanor dying (358).
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The payment for the moulding (rr^oC6tf^?s> ) of the statue 
had already been made, but the remainder of the cost was 
to be borne by the testator's liquid assets left in the 
care of Hipparchus. The word suggests that the
statue was to be made of metal, presumably bronze, since 
a mould would not have been necessary for a stone 
statue. The place where the statue is to be put is not 
specified, but the testator leaves this for the executors 
to decide.
The section concerning various expenditures to be
made ends with the following:
Ikt-i Tot, rrepo ro1 tepdy rZ
TOV rfi t/ rov' Tporro s.
(D. L. v, 52)
This sentence has no particular purpose besides showing 
the reader or listener that there are no more provisions 
concerning repairs to the school and so on.
Theophrastus next disposes of an estate in Stagira:
 ^ C \  ^ \ j C / ( ( .To oe To 2.T<^ y&L fees Jjuc /  virtLp^ ov
Si’Su)jA, i* JCql7\.7VL\/CJ *
(D. L. v, 5 2 )
The testator does not state how he came to possess this 
property, and it has been suggested that Aristotle's son, 
Nicomachus, bequeathed it to him (359). There is no
evidence to prove that this was done, except the fact
i
that it does not seem likely that Theophrasjus would have 
wished to buy property in Stagira himself.
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That there was a bond of affection between Theophrastus 
and Nicomachus is shown in the following:
exaggeration by Aristippus for an affection which did not 
cross the bounds of decency. It seems very unlikely that 
Aristotle would have nominated Theophrastus as the 
guardian of his son if he had possessed strong homosexual 
tendencies. Therefore, although it is possible that 
Nicomachus bequeathed his property in Stagira to 
Theophrastus, it is not proven.
The testator's library is then disposed of:
r *  Se ir&r*. A/y^ ,e? .
(D. L. v, 52)
It is thought that the library included the works of 
Aristotle, and that after the death of Theophrastus, 
Neleus took them to Scepsis, where they passed into the
hands of his heirs who were uneducated men, and neglected
until they were bought by Apellicon of Teos and returned
to Athens. According to tradition, they were afterwards 
eA
siezed by Sulla, and then taken to Rome where eventually 
they were restored by the grammarian Tyrhanio(360). To 
discuss the truth or otherwise of this talejis beyond the 
scope of this thesis and is very well discussed by 
Gottschalk (361). The will provides no clue to the
T O ’O  k p t J T i i c i Z s
iCcLLirep oYToL 5*6 typ'trc rrrra S, Qv
TTepl
(D. L. v, 39) (o£ refers to Aristotle)
The sexual implication in might well be an
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story' s veracity, except to the fact that Neleus received 
Theophrastus' library. It is probable, as Gottschalk 
suggests, that Theophrastus intended Neleus to be his 
literary executor and arrange his papers for publication 
(362).
Following this, the testator states what is to happen 
to the school:
To *  Se icJj (Tov T ov jrept xToctw ice^l rk s  oijcucs
r * s  rrp&i -ry *r£6<*.$ %iSu>^L t£ v y e y fX j tp k w v
(D. L. v, 52)
This clause specifies the purpose for which the 
philosopher's property in Athens is to be used. It is to 
be a centre for communal scholarship. The fact that it 
is to be under group ownership is indicated here by the 
prefix 6v✓ in the verbs 6vQryo7^(.t)a ^  and . At
this point, Theophrastus does not name the persons who
are to administer the school (363), but just states that 
he is giving it to fellow scholars who wish to use it. 
The worded indicates that it is always to be kept for 
the purpose of study. This point is then expanded upon:
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l/OV
U-’yjd e v o > / otAJl Oi ✓ L e p ^ s  liC O ^^j ice  >c.Tyjlj i . 6 V d i t$; U 4 0 - t #-
P ’P 0 S % )& \y K 6 v $  Q itc .e -t iJ S  icoco ^/At-tws yjo<A pu6vo
Us (Ttsp It P 0 6-Jj lto\f 7C#Si $ t i a x . L O \ / ,
(D. L. v, 53)
The first section
(erreiSyirep * • - «~e>cTyp,e i/oi s ).*cetc7" allows for the fact that not
of this quotation
all the scholars may be present, and specifies that the 
property is not to be given into private ownership but is
placing a certain restriction of freedom of disposition 
on those who are to administer the property, because even 
though it does not state that they are not to be allowed 
to make a will concerning it, it is not to be made the 
private property of anybody. Therefore, this clause does 
not completely curtail freedom of disposition, but only 
states that those men who live and study in the place are 
not to give the property to anyone. It is not made clear 
whether the ten men named by Theophrastus were to be 
succeeded by their own sons or other heirs. The
word itp ^ v seems to lend an air of sacredness to the 
bequest, and implies that the school is to be respected 
as a temple of learning. Those who study there are to 
live together in a spirit of affection and friendship
J , S' v.( o u tC- £•> i. ^  S iCoC*
k -o S Theophrastus then names the men whom he
wishes to have joint care of the school:
to be held in common ). This clause seems to be
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e trv e o L tf  toow &i/ov vre*> ^rrtroLpxos, A J y A ev S j
^ .rp L r& y , fa-AAZvitS; Ay/u-orfjuo&y KouO'i6$<'\/'y<i^
A/g-Aii.VTy$ ^  7i*y<-p&u)\/y A /ficm  /ro$.
(D. L. V/ 53)
Gottschalk states that:
"The legatees are a group of ten fellows who are to hold 
the property as a joint trust for the benefit of all the 
resident members of the group. The enjoyment 
obviously - and probably the right to a voice in the 
control of the property was limited to those who were 
resident at any one time, a fellow who went away and 
subsequently returned to Athens would resume his right on 
his return" (364).
This suggests that the list of ten men was fairly rigid 
and would not be added to. Bruns is of the opinion that 
only these people were to care for the school (365). 
However, Strato, who was later voted head of the school 
(366), gave Lyco the property to administer in his will,
which was made in 268 (367). It does not seem probable 
that this would have been done if Lyco had not been a 
member of the institution earlier. Since Lyco is not one 
of those named in Theophrastus' will, it seems as if the 
members named by Theophrastus allowed others, maybe some 
of the older students, to partake in the governing of the 
school when they were deemed suitable. It is possible 
that those named by Theophrastus were those whom the
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testator deemed most suitable for governing the school
and possibly teaching in it. Provision is also made for 
Aristotle's grandson to study in the school:
$ £  fio u*j0fj.eist*3 tf/K otocf6-Cy M -pisro r e K & L
■f*J M y rp o $ (S /> o v  K-aSc. H v B l& S o c , k jc l  fu L ^ T e y e iV
I f r v r u v '  iCgu  ^ o L v ro o  tC&Gncv jro  i & V  6 & ** c
7^5 fT ft>€6fivr& TO 'V S / lo t tu j$ % t l  h . rrf> o °c ^ 0 y
(pt A .0 6 C $  'oL V.
(D. L. v, 53)
Aristotle is given the right to associate with the ten
fellows only if he so wishes ( ) ,  and if he
does do this, then the eldest members of the group are to 
oversee his studies, as is indicated by the
word ✓ , which would not refer to care in the
manner of a legal guardian but to care in the capacity of
a student supervisor. The fact that Theophrastus makes 
this provision indicates that he was still on fairly
close terms with the family of Aristotle the philosopher.
The testator then makes arrangements for his burial:
0<LycM ' j f * *  orrov kV “boKjy l &PjA.r> t t v v
73 £ K-yrcov T rep 'ep yo v  pL-jrc  irep i T y '  'T'ttfyY
jA y -n r  ire  p i  t o  ttolovvT il S
(D. L. v, 53)
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Here, Theophrastus does not request that he be buried in 
his paternal estate in Lesbos but in the garden of the
a /
school (too K^ rrou ) . it is not specified who is to take 
care of his burial, but since Hipparchus is to preside 
over Theophrastus' liquid assets, it is probable that he 
is to provide the finance. If this is so, then this is 
the first known example of the cost of a burial being 
defrayed by someone other than a man's legal heirs 
(368 ). It is possible that the other executors are to 
ensure that the terms laid down concerning the place of 
burial, (which is not specified but has to be 
fitting, ), and the expenditure are adhered to.
If so, it seems as if the obligations concerning the 
burial of the testator are legal and not moral.
Provision is then made for the daily care of the 
grounds:
uonti><> y pc&iu 7* y /< *s  evjjLfSotisroiLj
-nepc to Lepv *  k a t  to p e? o / to v
k - i jn t v  k«l£ to/ w ep 'iT ocT ov 8ep*. rr t v o
<*<- t**-? Tfop.trvhJD* tov ruS 6TTou<ovSr<*~
o l v tZ /  k -olo r j s  -rC ov l^ >/ t t  a t
y  ✓ jrCeit 1TpOT&ft>'/'
(D. L. v, 54)
Here, Pompylus, a philosopher and a freedman of 
Theophrastus (369) is to share caring for the property 
with, presumably, the ten named by the testator.
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The word implies that some sort of verbal
agreement was made to this effect. The fact that the 
care of Theophrastus' monument is to be shared by a
freedman indicates a further removal of the moral
obligation of the testator's heirs to look after it to a
legal one placed on the ten "fellows" of the school and 
Pompylus. It is possible that the reason behind this was 
that Pompylus lived nearby {GtToacoCvTy. ) and would be 
able to maintain the grounds on a regular basis. He is 
also confirmed in his previous position in which, it 
seems, he exercised some care over the property.
The interpretation of the sentence
. Ty& $6 T\1>e ( T G A.&Z oC-S dlTtjU &A€r ~6&'oLL oc TOV s 5
bfiO*T‘ *~S Tcx-VTou.
(D. L. v, 54)
is a little difficult if taken out of context, but since
it comes between two passages concerning Pompylus, it 
probably means that the ten administrators of the school 
are to care for the freedman's interests (370).
Following this, Theophrastus confirms Pompylus and 
Threpta (371) in their possession of a certain sum of
money. By doing this he grants them the freedom to 
bequeath it by will (372). They are also bequeathed a 
maidservant:
P o c v r o T S  tcec l T 'J  /
TToLiS * £ I/’
(D. L. v, 54)
It is not stated whether they are to possess the right of 
disposition over her. Therefore it is probable that after
-307-
the death of the couple she will be inherited by
Theophrastus' heirs (373). Since Pompylus lived near the
school and was closely connected with it, it is most 
likely that the decision concerning Somatale after his 
death would rest with the administrators of the school. 
Pompylus is also bequeathed some furniture:
tcD v  eUc'tjiACLruciZv 6 t(s v c Z v  £ iT o S tS o \/T * .s  U o^.iiijA u»
$6 J oLv $ o * ty  t v T s irrLju&A'vj t* ?  b 7^
> i L /
\0 c rroc e v ct-py'tffs 6*l c ,
(D. L. v, 55)
The sort of furniture to be given and how much of it is 
left to the discretion of the executor. Since Melantes 
and Pancreon are to receive all Theophrastus' property in 
Lesbos, it is most likely that <. k-m *
refers to the furniture in the philosopher's Athenian
home.
There are also provisions detailing the treatment of 
slaves after Theophrastus' death.
Some slaves are to be manumitted:
t £> V S &  tT e L C S w  M*>A<OVoL *  ICACu CL
(D.L. v, 55)
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The word r i  indicates that these three slaves are to
be liberated immediately, that is, as soon as the will is 
read.
Other slaves are to be freed only under certain 
conditions:
ZicLl/'ijv %e KoLc. jCoL?.7UoC V TT^pt.fA.&'l V«~VToLS *  r J
/  ) ^  /  /  .
Te-TToLpt*- r u  ^ ft-e  v o v s >cocc
i.\s *./A *p rji~ o v $  yesoyceifov s s
(D. L. v, 55)
Here, the two slaves Manes and Callias are to be freed
only if they work in the garden for four years and behave
well. The fact that these conditions are made indicates
that if the two slaves do not keep them, they will not be 
manumitted after four years.
Some slaves are given to people:
SlSiyJjisCL fA.0 7"pcul } JS. t> 1/oc^ iCJK- Sd
MyX£rL'
(D. L. v, 55)
Both of the recipients number amongst those appointed as 
members of the school and the executors. In addition,
Neleus is bequeathed Theophrastus' library.
One of the slaves is to be sold:
£ ■ > / n C  / <T S  A.c—v p o :-°v  o ot~o<3££cr<*o. ,
(D. L. v, 55)
This is the only will in which it is specified that a 
slave is to be sold (374). Presumably this is because
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Euboeus had not proved himself a particularly good slave, 
otherwise it seems as if such a decision would have been 
left to the discretion of the heirs.
The testator also bequeaths some money to Callinus:
Callinus, the beneficiary, is both an executor of the
will and one of the administrators of the school, and the
money which ^  is to receive is to be taken from the
testator's liquid assets entrusted to Hipparchus.
Earlier in the will, Hipparchus was made in charge of 
certain funds (375). The reason why this is done is
given after the statement of the bequest to Callinus:
tie  T jx /T ' j  Se >6«c£ ff(X.y>c/%sCivrL /*<?/ yt^ y 4 copaj yU e /
^TntoLp^o/ -jj+z j  TTpor&joov j p a  C *-/
L J / .    S
§C-r*0 TfoLpyo $ Tp^J/iX C ocS
(D. L. v, 55)
61/^0 Lac O v
V  i T e ^ p ^ o L v o  i /  7 -£  r<*. r  T T o cp **-
;i c r  ,  f c r c j  i'Lrrvr<*. iC~oc -  T ^ y *.fC -c  <■ y
4 * ^  re- ✓ ' S>.8 £  S  '  creepyyo /  to  <.5
%tr t Toll <, eC  s roc. oc roc Snx.SC/cy
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y G ' j P t * . - T & u $  eriCx*6T0’J Kxn-^pOvS T & / £*77*.^ptLfeoV.
ot'Covofj.yensT*. Sfe TPLvrn. uZrrrrtc f^o* k r r y K l \ ^ ^ LL
Cvfxfio Ao^Ciuiv TuIV TTpoS & jte  t rk ir r id v • te.tcc T l
fc jri t*ov feyUO v uJ.rrTrtx. fip o S
£  V /^OC \tci-SU J <‘Z tr  irLp-^nv t o u t *
(D. L. v7 55-56)
At the beginning of this passage, the testator explains 
why Hipparchus is to be responsible for Theophrastus' 
money. It seems as if Theophrastus would have wished 
that the responsib/ility for his finances could have lain
with Melantes, Pancreon and Hipparchus. However, the
fact that Hipparchus is in debt to the estate (odwio^o^y- 
-^✓roc ttoO'twv ) renders this impossible. The nautical
if. ^
word \sevo<.vjyy ic o t<*s implies that the nature of the debt is 
concerned with the failure of a shipping venture. 
Therefore, Theophrastus thinks it better that Melantes
and Pancreon receive a talent each, which is more 
profitable (pitJ6ur&Aeoref>o \S ) than if they were to
oversee the philosopher's finances with Hipparchus and 
divide the residue into three. Therefore, since
Hipparchus is to oversee the money alone, he will be left
with less than one talent for himself once the relevant
payments have been made. Hug is of the opinion that the
fact that Hipparchus is ^charge of Theophrastus liquid 
assets indicates that he is the chief heir (376). 
However, Hipparchus is only left with less than one
talent, whereas Melantes and Pancreon are to receive a
talent each as well as the testator' s estate in Lesbos.
Furthermore, Theophrastus agrees with Melantes and 
Pancreon, not with Hipparchus, that Pompylus and Threpta 
should keep their money in perpetuity. Therefore, Hug is 
incorrect (377), since the terms of the will indicate 
that Melantes and Pancreon are Theophrastus' chief 
heirs. Hipparchus is to act with the executors in making 
the relevant payments from Theophrastus' estate
... <£*.77bi * r*°v ). Gottschalk states that
Hipparchus had a position "analogous to that of the 
Bursar in a college today" (378). However, the position 
of caring for the finances of the school is not conferred 
on Hipparchus in perpetuity, but he is only to oversee 
the financial provisions made in the will. Therefore, 
Gottschalk is incorrect. The word indicates
that Hipparchus had made certain contracts with 
Theophrastus. The fact that he has to be released from 
them ( )  means that these contracts involved
Hipparchus in some sort of debt to the testator, and that 
unless Theophrastus specifies otherwise, he would have to 
repay them to the testator's heirs ( 379). In addition, 
it seems as if Hipparchus has made certain contracts in 
Chalcis in Theophrastus' name, and the testator
specifically states that Hipparchus is to be responsible 
for these. Even though it is not specfically stated, it 
is probable that the clause was included to safeguard 
Melantes and Pancreon from any debt incurred by
Hipparchus in Theophrastus' name.
Following the clarification of ’ the position of 
Hipparchus, Theophrastus names his executors:
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Sfi' i ’G T J J e o i . v  T&S v  T y  ^ioL& ’'t j tO * j
/ t/—  - ^
- )ejppififi>e\/cJv ■LcrvriLpypS, AyAe-vs ; Kec^xl i/o^
A ^ o T t ji os  ^ /(.rycK p^oS-
(D. L. v, 56).
Of the seven executors, there are some who have been 
given legacies, namely Hipparchus, Neleus, Callinus and 
Demotimos. All of them except Ctesarchus are named as 
governors of the school. Thus Ctesarchus is the only 
completely disinterested executor.
The remainder of the will concerns witnesses and the 
whereabouts of other copies of the document. This 
information will be discussed in a later chapter (380).
Therefore, the will of Theophrastus has several 
functions. In it, he disposes of his paternal estate to 
two men who were not necessarily his next of kin, and 
gives his estate in Stagira to one of his fellow 
scholars; he ensures that his school will continue to be 
used for the purposes of study, and names those who are
to administer it; he provides for the care of his 
freedman Pompylus and states what is to happen to his 
slaves; he also makes arrangements concerning the debts 
owing to the estate and names his executors as well as 
noting the witnesses and the whereabouts of other copies 
of the document.
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Strato
Strato was the- philosopher who administered the 
peripatetic school from 286, the year of Theophrastus' 
death, until 2 68, the year of his own death. Even though 
he was not specifically appointed as head of the school 
by Theophrastus in his will, it is probable that he was 
voted into this position by the other members of the 
peripatos_(381). Diogenes Laertius has preserved his 
will, which he found in the works of Ariston of Ceos 
(382).
The will opens as follows:
.-f2U* S«*tC j
(D. L. v, 61)
The form of the verb which is used here is the
same ad that used by Theophrastus and Lyco (383). The 
verb ir«L£j(£j is not used in the opening of any other extant 
will.
The testator firstly bequeaths some property to two 
men, Arcesilaus and Lampyrio:
Tot, /A6 V o ticol l<#.r*.X6'Crro} ttClvT*. / W  rr up t tjv' o K-otl
JAp%G<>1 •
(D. L. v, 61)
It is not stated here how these two men are related to 
the testator. Arcesilaus was the name of Strato's 
father, and Diogenes Laertius thinks that the beneficiary
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of that name is the testator's father:
.A itSeJfocTo $ ;oid-rdv r-yV J ij-p ^ r^ v  to v
, / -A . .
A^piyd. \£*j v'OSj Qy ictu, ^  Toitj iiv.&'tjtcoL I ^
e ^ v ^ iv e v ^ e v '
(D. L. v, 58 )
However, this seems unlikely, since it is improbable that 
the philosopher's father would have survived him unless 
he lived to an extremely old age. This is because Strato 
would have probably been a fairly mature man in 286 to be 
placed as head of the school, so by his death he would 
have been at least in his fifties if not sixties. His 
father would have been about thirty years older. In 
addition, there is no indication in the will that 
Arcesilaus is the testator's father. Bruns suggests that 
Arcesilaus was either a son or a nephew of Strato, but he 
dismisses the former suggestion on the grounds that one 
could not make a legal will if one had a son, and 
concludes that he must have been a nephew (384). Hug is 
of the opinion that Lampyrio and Arcesilaus were both 
brothers and nephews of Strato (385). Gottschalk thinks 
that both of these men were nephews of the testator and
probably his legal heirs (386). Arcesilaus is a family 
name, and the heir of this name is later given a certain 
amount of precedence. He is also to be the ultimate
bearer of the funeral expenses, and this implies that he 
might have been Strato' s next-of-kin, and the reason he 
is specifically named is because he is to share the 
property bequeathed here with Lampyrio. The two men are 
bequeathed Strato's property in Lampsacus, his paternal
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home, (ro& /te v- ooksx* j (387). This would presumably
consist of the testator's paternal estate in addition to 
any other property which he had acquired in Lampsacus. 
Strato then mentions his burial:
(D. L. v, 61-62)
Here, the responsiblity of carrying out the testator's 
funeral rites rests not with his major heir, Arcesilaus, 
but with nine men who are appointed as executors,
was not expected to be in Athens at the time of the 
testator's death (388). It is not implied, however, that
Lampyrio would be absent. Thus, the obligation to carry 
out the funeral rites of the testator is specified by
means of this will. Although the executors are to have
the responsibility of arranging for the financial outlay 
for the funeral, which is to be neither too expensive nor
too frugal, the ultimate bearer of the cost is to be
Arcesilaus. This is because the rest of Strato's money 
in Athens is to be given to him (389).
roci. ). This is probably because Arcesilaus
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Strato then makes arrangements concerning the school: 
i<u .To i.7ce£rri4  S i  t y *  A v k . 4 y L.? e i r e c ^
jJL&Y er'st* xrp€6(&vTerf>o I f q£
6 J Q'S TTtusiZtv tcptX o t Xotrroh 
£aiy^ otr«ctfjc-e^ <*j^ ov're’£ ro*yr^.
(D.L. v, 62)
Here, the testator nominates Lyco as his successor to the 
school. At first, it might seem as if the conditions 
laid down in the will of Theophrastus (390) are being 
ignored here, in that it seems as if Strato is disposing 
of it as if it were his personal property. However, the 
testator gives reasons for his decision, namely that the 
other scholars are too old ( r r f iv r & p o  <. ) Gr too busy
to administer the school. In addition, Strato is not 
giving the property to Lyco for his own personal use, but 
for the purpose of administering it, and he exhorts the 
others to assist him in the school's organization
(KLocACuS . .. fOVfyj ) .
He also bequeaths some property to Lyco personally:
K*cr «- £  CTU) & J<n.dr *3 K *. o Tci. /Si f t  /U,tL TT& Y V  ex., 7T A-^  i/
y e L 'O ro t Toe e i c e O y
ro 6 v 6 $ 'r io Y  r«L Grpc*/L*.Tv- ru.
noT-jpi.*..
(D. L. v, 62)
Here, as is the case with Theophrastus (391), Strato 
leaves his books to a fellow philosopher.
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However, this bequest does not include the books he
himself has written which presumably are to be kept in
the school. Bruns suggests that these books are part of 
Strato7 s household property, and refers to the words at 
the beginning of the will, "H* w-^-th
reference to this (392). However, these words refer to 
Strato7 s property in Lampsacus, and it seems very 
improbable that Strato would have kept his scholarly
works in Lampsacus when he was head of the school in
Athens. Therefore, the books bequeathed to Lyco are 
probably part of Strato7 s Athenian estate. The furniture
in the dining room, and the room7 s cushions and drinking
cups (one assumes that these objects would be found
nowhere else in the school), are presumably not 
specifically part of the school property provided by 
Theophrastus, but were Strato7 s own possessions which he 
had permitted the school to have the use of. It is 
possible that if he had not bequeathed them to Lyco, the 
heir to Strato7 s Athenian property would have received 
them.
There follows a bequest:
Sorti>6<x.'/ Sti &£ ferr<./u£’A.-y rixu J£V i«^ ocffi- r^oc <c.06 £«. s
iC#-* o / (v / Sax-fj « A_ < * . ,
(D. L. v, 62)
Epicrates is one of the executors himself. Presumably
, N
the reason why it is stated that the are to
give the money to Epicrates is because Strato wishes to 
emphasise that this money is to come from his Athenian
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property. The slave to be given to Epicrates is probably 
one of the philosopher's slaves in Athens, since it seems 
unlikely that he would receive one from the testator's 
estate in Lampsacus.
A certain agreement is also cancelled in this will:
KUc <rpc5rov /lU v ica.1
oi*p 'LcB Tels 6 V V iCoLS <*$ £ 0 AoCYtrfrOS
v r r e f  pn^ae v o f t - uAer^o /^ .yre-
/ \  v-fA.tr vpiu)vL -raT$ AtK/jiTTiJjO CtJ\so $ *c A -y p oyGjA.O<*
oc A.A. J oi.ipyA jroti/r"o S ro'v ^^4.^8 o^*.^iou .
(D. L. v, 63)
Strato does not specify the exact nature of this 
agreement. The fact that Iraeus is not to owe anything to 
Lampyrio or his heirs suggests that the agreement may 
have been a private one between Lampyrio and Daippus on 
behalf of Iraeus. However, if this had been so, it would 
not have been Strato's concern. Therefore, it is more 
probable that the agreement to be cancelled was one made
by Strato with Daippus, and that on Strato's death, 
Lampyrio would stand to benefit, hence the reference to 
Lampyrio and his heirs.
There is also a bequest to one of the men:
§rfru)£ou-/ SVvtJ d t  i r T L f A ^ r ^ l  &f>yvf>Ccv
fjLe\soi>
rrerToLx^oeLtcs <ccc
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r& V  T7* 'S (a>'/  J Q ✓“
:> s , oV^u s rro X X vc.
V. ^ ^ -y
/cocu mx./*&6^JjUe>'OS
> /  ,
(D. L. v, 63 )
Here it is not made clear who eudrcg refers to. It is 
unlikely that this word refers to Lampyrio, because he 
has already been given half of the testator7 s estate in 
Lampsacus, and could already support himself fittingly, 
whereas the beneficiary of this bequest is in need of it. 
Therefore could refer to either Iraeus or Daippus.
It seems unlikely that Strato would not have specified 
the beneficiary unless there was no possibility of the 
bequest being given to the wrong person. A possible clue 
to this problem can be found in the fact that the 
agreement was made on behalf of (iWejO) Iraeus. It might 
be that Daippus was the father or legal guardian of 
Iraeus and acted on his behalf, but by the time Strato 
made his will, Iraeus had come of age and Daippus had
died . Indeed, Iraeus is mentioned elsewhere in the will, 
whereas Daippus is not. If this is so, then would
refer to Iraeus. The fact that he had worked with the
testator (oVws   ) suggests that he was either a
fellow philosopher or a sort of secretary or clerical 
assistant. This bequest is probably to be taken from
Strato7 s Athenian property.
The testator then manumits some of his slaves:
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oCffiyjfAc 6 Tieu Bxcpo \S Kacl A iQ&X.&cC
kjLL '%(> O V  y - - os^ t'yA< *• %(r )CoLL Aj0o o^ oi.
ijU zti B tfo tf.
(D. L. v, 63)
The fact that Dromon is mentioned in a different sentence 
and after another disposition has been made, probably 
indicates that he was either added as an afterthought or 
that the testator had forgotten to include him with 
Diophantus, Diodes and Abus.
Between these two sentences is another bequest.
.S/^ u/k.V' $6 ci rroStSiJfCL fijOK&e iKvLtO 
(D. L. v, 63)
Here, Arcesilaus is to receive one of Strato's slaves.
IPVvovA
Simias is the only slave wh-i-oh Arcesilaus is to receive 
from Strato's Athenian property, because other than this, 
he is only given money (393).
The testator then states what is to happen to his
money in Athens:
rr&-f> rpLu Afiictet \oi.os , 6 *■£
^Ip*.tos> p e r  * *.occ Jj£iru<p£.rovs r<3/
oL7\.'7uJ'f 4 IT <• jue^^j T V To ytyov'oS ^  yoi <*. € rnj /
k o Q o p w  k^lZ Tc*.A.h#> rv- is o i* (£ 6 fx e s *. ro  Se We^(ov
& p yC f» iB sf A f  tee-6 t A o to  *  J T c L f' 0 \  \iy . n
|  <x.TJ7*a/ toxjs  x + c < . p o - d i  *<-otu
JTOJ5 ^ 8 / 0 ^ 5 '
(D. L.v, 63-64)
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Here, Iraeus together with Olympichus, Epicrates and the 
other executors, is to prepare an account of the 
expenditure of the testator's funeral. It is difficult
refer to, unless they are a reference to the ninth day 
offerings which took place after the funeral (394). It
seems as if Olympichus is the one who is to have a 
greater responsibility for the money, since it is he who
is to hand the remainder to Arcesilaus. Arcesilaus is 
only to receive the money {<kp y v p io v ), and nothing is
said about any other property in Athens. It is possible
that this only consisted of the books, slaves and
furniture which Strato has already disposed of (395).
An agreement made by the testator is to be cancelled:
ctp&.$&co /cocc 7<scs 6'uvd'jicoLS £s
gfi&ro isTysbcTov trpo$ 0 - \ lccc£ 'ftfteLvtiLv,
(D. L. v, 64)
Nothing is stated about the nature of this agreement and 
only the persons with whom it was made and the depositary
are mentioned. Arcesilaus is to have the responsibility 
of cancelling this agreement.
The final clause of the will concerns the making of 
the testator's monument:
‘7"cC SV PT6rpu TO fJLVy/U-6?QV rrOLCrcTUl 6tC\/ o* ** GC v
Sotc-Tj <oLi X'V/ix'T ^  v <_ .
(D. L. v, 64)
to ascertain what the words rvc o^Xw. 77*.
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The responsiblility for overseeing the making of the 
monument rests with Agees i2raus — who is to hand over 
Strato's Athenian money to . ,  and Lyco, who is 
to be head of the school. It is not stated who is to 
bear the expense of erecting this monument, but
presumably the money for it is to come from the 
testator's money in Athens, and thus ultimately
Arcesilaus who is Strato's major heir.
The will of Strato, therefore, has various 
functions. It serves to dispose of the testator's 
property in Lampsacus and Athens, and to arrange the
future well-being of the school*.In it Strato appoints
executors, cancels two agreements, arranges bequests and
frees slaves. Central to the carrying out of the 
testator's wishes is Arcesilaus, who is to approve the
slaves given to Epicrates and Iraeus, cancel one
agreement and act with Lampyrio in cancelling another, 
and is to oversee the making of the testator's monument.
LycQ,
The will of Strato's successor, Lyco, made c. 225, is
also found in the works of Diogenes Laertius, who does
not state his source for the document, but merely says 
that he stumbled upon it {rrtpi^rv v ).
The document begins as follows:
trepl tov tcxr* tp*. vrt>vi e«.v
Sw-y 9% T 'jv  roLVT'yjv' v n e v G y ’
(D. L. v, 69)
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The words -rZ\s kut > t y w r o v ' refer to the testator's 
property which he is to dispose of in his testament. It 
probable that the pct>6'T‘c- r e f e r r e d  to here is the gout 
which Lyco was suffering from at the time of his death
(396).
The testator then makes arrangements concerning his 
property:
7& p e  V trivTc* S iS o jp c  T d l i s
A t T V & . V o H C T L  ICK.O A v i c & G V L .
(D. L. v, 69)
\ jt
The words rx... are ambiguous. The translator of the
Loeb edition renders them as "all the goods in my house"
(397). However, there is an example of antithesis
here, r« y-'ev &v ql*coj - - _ -ri £''</✓ oCer&<- k-occ ii/
, (398) and this indicates that it is his
property at home, in Troy as opposed to that in Athens or 
Aigina which he is disposing of. In addition, the 
words ev are used later to refer to where Lyco
wishes to be buried (399), and in this case, they can 
only mean "at home" in Troy. Therefore, it is very
j  ?/
likely that the words fiv refer to Lyco's paternal
estate in Troy. This property is bequeathed to the
testator's brothers, Astyanax and Lyco. Bruns states
that these men were not the philosopher's brothers but
were the sons of brothers, and points to the fact that
later in the will, Lyco is referred to as a nephew
(400). However, in the list of the persons who are to
take charge of the peripatetic school, two men called
c
Lyco are named, the latter one being referred to as o
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S6i> ' it j_s probably the first-named Lyco who is
to inherit the testator's property. In addition, if the
philosopher had wished to bequeath his paternal property 
to his nephews, they would have been referred to as such 
and not as brothers. There is also a complication in
that one of the beneficiaries has the same name as the
testator. Gottschalk suggests that they might both be 
half brothers (401), but does not express an opinion as 
to whether they were homometric or homopatric brothers. 
Lyco (II) is obviously the younger of the two, since he 
is like a son to the testator (v io v  le^yj^oTu. )/ and
this suggests that he is probably the issue of a later 
marriage of one of the philosopher's parents. Owing to 
the Greek custom of calling a man by his own name and 
that of his father, it seems unlikely that there would 
have been two men named Lyco, son of Astyanax (402),
since this could have led to confusion. Furthermore, if
Lyco (II) had been the son of Lyco (I)'s father he would 
have had the right of disposition over the estate (403), 
as Astyanax seems to have. The latter is indicated by the 
fact that Astyanax is not specifically given the freedom 
to dispose of the property, which suggests that he has
this already. On the other hand, in order to ensure that 
Lyco (II) can dispose of the estate as he wishes, the 
philosopher has to grant him this right (404). No
regulations are made concerning the division of this 
property, so it is probable that Lyco (II) and Astyanax 
are to share it equally. It is partially from this 
property that the testator' s debts are to be paid (405).
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Lyco (II) is also given additional property:
r *  $ > w  & r e t ,  * * 1  A ^ t s y  J th
To x-oc-t, row^yU«t jepm V yf**>v tcocl i~&Tpc<y£i/'0^ t,
rrx *c »  y p f r w  <kpesrZs> tcJlvv, K+tiJcrr&p S (± o llo *  
jv ro* zliov ro^Jt/
(d :l . v, 70)
Lyco (I) does not specify exactly what his properties in 
Athens and Aigina consist of, but he leaves all his 
possessions in both of these places to Lyco (II). The 
fact that these are left to his half-brother and not to 
Astyanax might indicate that they were not wx-t/om*. 
but rnct-hjr«_ . The fact that the beneficiary is like a
son to the philosopher (n>r KO ) does not
indicate that he is an adopted son of Lyco (I), but just 
that he takes the place of one (406). This emphasises 
the fact that Lyco (II) is very much younger than the 
testator, and supports my suggestion that he was probably 
the son of a later marriage of one of the testator's 
parents (407). There remains the difficulty concerning
why he has been living with the philosopher for such a 
long time. If he had been orphaned, it seems more likely 
that he would have been placed under the guardianship of 
his natural father's relatives, as was the case with the 
younger Demosthenes and his sister (408). It is more 
possible that he was sent to the peripatos to be 
educated, and took up residence with his elder 
half-brother.
The management of the school is the^ mentioned:
"fo * S i Tr&pZ IT ttT O V  KJXLffX 'h ^ 'i TTU) r U>)/ p 'l j j .  U3V TQZ £
f io v \O jx e *o lb  t k x l v #  t ’f tp C s r « / < v  'A p fv ia v u ,
AOtc^vij I f i j f a t f i ,  )A p i6 'ro p .& ^  J iXeZcjj f Zjvico/AySeL,
/[viccJvl. r% &$e7Kf(Sci • rrfoeryeC* 9-6*6 *i/ S>0<.»To'i <>V
v r r o K c L l St*. p G s e lr  errZ tqv rrpokyptoc res 
K.OCO /d /U g r*  $v*y66  6 &«-i.
6vyiCjocr~a. 6 tcei/ocjf e T£J6<*.v S i  *c*cc o t A-Ouiro c
/ > , — / /
'jVU>p(,p.O (* t C * p 4 V  TO-0 T o  7TOZ) J(OC f  L\/.
(D. L. v, 70)
Here, the administration of the school is bequeathed to 
ten fellows, as happens in the will of Theophrastus
(409). No head is appointed, as Strato appointed Lyco
(I), but the responsibility of appointing a new head 
rests with the ten scholars. This might be an indication 
of what happened when Theophrastus died, namely that the 
ten who were left the school appointed a head from 
amongst themselves. Lyco (I) also appeals for
co-operation for the sake of himself and the place. What
happened to the school after the death of Lyco (I) is not 
known.
There are clauses in the will concerning the
testator' s funeral, but since these are scattered 
throughout the text, it seems best to discuss them
together. He firstly states that the money for his 
funeral is to come from his estate in Troy:
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e-U
*4 * ©<•^ 4.fltu' fetV k r r o S o & y v ^ c  octto
£  «✓ Gt* T’^v' GX-Cfop * yf <*/ctA <4 0 y
'/ \ vf /
n-AJVoC T«i .
(D. L. v, 69)
The words Jin>s Tt>Cro>^ refer to the estate in Troy which
Lyco (I) has just stated will be shared between Lyco (II) 
and Astyanax. There is no mention of who is to actually 
oversee the funeral here, but later he names the people 
who are to do this:
(D. L. v, 70)
Here, Bulo and Callinus as well as their friends are
charged with the funeral and cremation. As happens in
the will of Strato, the testator wishes that the
expenditure be neither too extravagant nor too mean
(410). As is the case with Strato and Theophrastus, men 
who are not the major heirs are to take charge of the 
burial of the testator (411). Bulo and Callinus are also 
to provide the initial financial outlay:
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* ) (  $6 i^cZ ^^XXT VO £>
& r j v  h tc fopkv k s / * . * c J & v j  jcclc
r^ AX«t r i .  M/AC^O/*£✓*.. K 6  ) j . t 6  * * 6  9 i*)6 « -V  $ 6  r c c V T *
/ \ M  ^ */ -* / otfro rw v  &v ooic^ J x jo w fj u-*-'r<*-\&<.rro juLevt#'/
k(A. <fo repots i  rr> ejj6\> >
(D. L. v, 71)
The wording in this quotation is ambiguous, since the 
word & .}*.< f(rrep 0 i* might be taken to refer to Bulo and 
Callinus. There is, however, no reference in the will to
either of these men being bequeathed a house either in
common or separately, and since the words €+ cn-**f can 
also mean "at home" (412), and there is a clause at the 
beginning of the will which states that the money for the
funeral is to come from the testator's Trojan property,
the word re p o t * refers to Lyco (II) and Astyanax who
are left the testator's ■tr*Tf> . Gotts chalk states that
the money for the funeral is to be provided mostly from
the testator's liquid assets in Athens (413). It seems
as if Gottschalk might be confusing Lyco (I)'s will with 
that of Strato in which there is a clause to this
effect. However, Lyco (I) specifically states that the 
money is to be claimed from his estate in Troy.
Following the funeral, Lyco (II) is to take
responsibility for the burial:
ITGpZ d£ k k v  T '  o t v r o v
fiv i< c o V  Q tc c T T & ^ j ek 'S  T J e *  o t i c * , o u r ^  r r o c e u r ^ .
TTttT£rL y k p  c t ^ T ^ V  Z j r n > V  e jjLO V
6V\S6p3.tf T6 e'L>6'V+)HJ> ✓
(D. L. v, 74)
The burial mentioned here (-rfs $ ) does not actually
refer to the burial of the body as such but to the burial 
of the ashes, because Lyco (I) has said earlier that Bulo 
and Callinus are to oversee his funeral and cremation. 
Therefore, from the various clauses in the will 
concerning his funeral, it seems as if Lyco (I) wished 
Bulo and Callinus to oversee the funeral, pay for it and
reclaim the money from the testator's. estate in Troy,
thus transferring the expenditure to Astyanax and Lyco 
(II). Following this, Lyco (II) is given the
responsibility of interring the ashes.
The source for the repayment of the testator's debts 
is also not made clear in the will. At first, it is
stated that they are to be paid from the philosopher's 
property in Troy:
oZfJUL'- bsTto2o9^jv».L otno TOVVUJV 06 * -
ttoLp4 r u / o $  y  J&ICt trir '
(D. L. v, 69)
This quotation indicates that the testator's Athenian 
debts are to be paid from the property bequeathed to 
Astyanax and Lyco (II). This is because the
words ktf© tovtwv refer back to the previous sentence in 
which Lyco (I) disposes of his . However, later
in the will, Lyco (II) alone is given the responsibility
of repaying certain debts of the testator:
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8e t& s  c favico)'/ v.cro%6roj irZ a c.
TT&f * to * rt ttp o etfl.v j< f*, f ie r U  r y *  k n o S y p u t * . *  r « f *
Gtuwov-
(D.L.v, 71)
This clause seems to contradict the earlier one in which 
all that Lyco (I) has spent at Athens is to come from his 
Tro an property, because here, certain debts are to be 
repaid from the property in Athens, (^v x6T6 t ). The 
debts which are to come from this source are those which 
the testator incurred after Lyco (II)'s departure. It is 
not stated where Lyco (II) has gone, or how long ago he 
left. From the fact that he is to be one of the members 
of the school (414), it is possible that the testator
assumed that the absence would only be temporary, and 
occurred while Lyco (I) was ill. Therefore, it is
probable that only the testator's more recent debts are 
to be met from his Athenian property. Following this, 
there is mention of the payment of the doctors:
TlfJLVj£>bTCd6 / $6 tC*U TO^S i^ pox>S U*. 6 i (Ji t V
0 /Toci teed, $ l&- T y  ✓
to j*  irept 
&Tl> •
(D.L. v, 72)
Here, it is not made quite clear who are to pay the 
doctors, but since the nearest possible subjects
of 7Vfi7 6 o L r a r e  Bulo and Callinus, mentioned two
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sentences earlier, it is possible that these men are to
above quotation, it is stated that the money which Bulo 
and Callinus spend on the funeral is to be repaid from
possible to infer that the payment for the doctors is to 
be met from this source also. Therefore, the majority of 
the testator's debts are to be met from his estate in 
Troy, with the exception of any recent monetary advances 
which are to be repaid by Lyco (II) from the
philosopher's Athenian property.
Lyco (II) is also given other responsibilities. He 
is to make over to the young men the oil from the 
testator's olive trees in Aigina:
T u  y I '& v  f^ot* 'fbrofJL.e /U6-7*. r-yS
y > ,
(D. L. v, 71)
In this quotation, it is not specifically stated who the 
young men are who to receive the oil, whether the young 
men attending the school or all the young men in Athens. 
Since the philosopher enjoyed partaking in gymnastics 
(415), it is possible that the oil might be intended for 
the use of young men who also partook in this form of 
exercise. This is to be done in the testator' s memory 
and also for one who honoured him, ( ozr&£ - - -
meet this particular debt. In the sentence before the
the testator's Trojan property. Therefore, it is
r6*Jfi6iCO^S e h  € Atci0^py6TCeC\/ f o M S  ICtLpjOV (c * l 
ro v  rif+ybH-srot, e /*e  ^yyfJLvj y i/rfr* .!. &i*. r y j
/ W' c 'v (K.vryj >i Trpo6yix.ove*u.
-332-
). It is not stated who this man is, but it is 
possible that this man is Strato, who made Lyco head of 
the school. However, this is open to conjecture. Lyco
(II) is also to put up a statue of the philosopher:
H&.Z i y $ p c**''foL a t* * r b *  £& T 6 n o v y
fe'/rwi £t j oy6rr*ov g  Ti jS * * 4  i rcj g\ 6 p L  tcj  
t<M.u S v y  ^ p o L j f ia c re  v  9 y r i* )  & l o  <(<*■ *'r d  & Kaub
Mptctc j\.ki8y& A y ju y T p io v .
(D.L. v, 71)
This statue was presumably to be set up in a suitable 
place in the school. This contrasts with the wills of 
Strato and Theophrastus where the testator does not 
provide for a statue of himself.
The remainder of the will is concerned for the most 
part with minor bequests and the emancipation of slaves.
Certain bequests are made in favour of the family of 
Callinus:
SCSuijun. * 0 \j TTk l $Ci£ fc XG /
Jfei?y0.Sj Kou -py jvwLLic.1 *  vt#v fo Jto^ -ic cJ \/ jfevyeZ;
lj> iAOr£.Tl oL Tot-trOY, TTkJpiBT TTflO 6 U^r<f 4c Ku. <.«.
$ v c  rii 0 eKTt6 Tc*> ru)v J>s ’oc*
i<f C&os zrpoS TifJL-tj*; <Oul ‘ TOv T jOv
i < i, / J*<ftn,su>p& * p y  tx .y^y /j.o /ts  ovre*,'
(D.L. v, 72)
These bequests of household goods are made in gratitude,
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presumably for past services rendered, but it is not
stated what these services were.
Lyco (I) then introduces the clauses in the will
which are to follow:
JT&pt Se B^ v^ xr&vovTi^ v ky.oL'vrbv ovruis* co ‘
(D. L. v, 72)
The word 0ef>**ir£'vov ’r **v SUggests that these clauses are to
deal with those who cared for the testator in his illness
since befd-lt&vu? usually refers to looking after someone
who is ill.
Firstly, Lyco (I) provides for this freedmen:
4 ^jX^T'pCCO j j c i v  tX tV & b jQ  U) 17ocA.occ 0  ^T<- *< fC yp4 .L  T*-
/tlW p # *  KJK.I I t e v T C r  JA.I/OLS hC.OC.il C ^ A V -T c O *  K-oC.<~
'j^lT£0 \/ol.} \Ixtok'sU crovyj iccj s jjcer' i^uo-v
y^xq^oc * Kp<-T~cJ v  L S& Y&JW-^ $  o l. i£> } iCocu
y / _ ^ _ X*
T O V T C O  T" ex. T l v ' T ' p  <x K-ocJl 4 T Z rT T < x -p & -  S
jx^oi s.
(D.L. V ,  72)
To Demetrius, who has been freed for a long time, he 
remits his purchase money, and gives five minas and an 
under and outer garment. The reason why these bequests 
are made to Demetrius is so that he will be able to 
maintain himself respectably. Criton is bequeathed four 
minae and his purchase money, thus indicating that he 
also was a freedman.
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A slave boy named Micrus (his youth is implied by 
his name), is to be set free:
kclZ r o xs Mucpdv fybpeirc*)
A 6^ CtJV $cz)t0\/ ic#Si TfcuS t^/TO T©V y/’V^ ^pOVOV GrTy
(D.L. v, 72)
The boy is to be cared for and brought up by Lyco (II).
The period set aside for his upbringing is six years,
after which Micrus would presumably come of age. 
Therefore he was probably about twelve years old when the
will was made. Since Lyco (II) is to bring him up,
presumably the testator intends the two to live together.
A slave named Chares is also emancipated:
ICeCL YoLpvjTaL j i  tQ^yfd. i. A& ^  ' 'X-Otl d p € p (C ru >  A v iC U lV
olvt ov. S'Oo fcotc . roLfA#-
ri y *(J6p. e /*«- ’
(D.L. v, 73)
It seems rather odd that Lyco (II) is to care for Chares, 
who has already attained his majority, but the
word 9p&’f * ' TU* might refer to the fact that Lyco (I ) wishes 
his heir to oversee his studies. That Chares is a 
learned man is indicated by the fact that he is 
bequeathed the philosopher's published works. Bruns 
finds this bequest of the books to Chares strange, but 
points to a parallel in circumstances with Pompylus, the 
freedman of Theophrastus, (416). Bruns is correct 
insofar as Chares was probably a philosopher like
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Pompylus, but this is as far as the similarity goes.
Pompylus had been a freedman for a long time, whereas
Chares is only to be freed following the philosopher7 s
death. Pompylus was also not bequeathed Theophrastus7
writings, but these were part of the bequest of books to
Neleus. Furthermore, unlike Pompylus, Chares is not
given the responsibility of caring for the philosopher7 s
monument. Therefore Bruns is not quite accurate in the
parallel he draws. Chares is also bequeathed two minae.
Lyco (I) then makes provision for the care of his
U>
unpolished works:
"fa & fcveuSo r «. ojtcJS bCVT** ,
(D.L. v, 73)
This clause is actually a departure from the introductory 
sentence to this section of the document in which Lyco 
(I) states that he is to deal with those who are his 
slaves and freedmen (417), since there is no evidence 
that Callinus was of servile status. It seems as if this 
clause was probably added here as an afterthought, 
prompted by the bequest of books to Chares. Callinus is 
to edit these unpublished works and then, presumably,
publish them.
The testator then returns to the treatment of those 
who have been his servants.
Lyco (I) firstly mentions Syrus:
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k*4, r y s  M *j\/o  S iStffju .' icx.L e t f r£
pot- o ife iA t'-j ol& toj *
(D.L. v, 73)
Syrus, who is already free (e M v d e p ^  a ^ r u  ), is given 
four minae and Menodora. It is possible that she is his 
concubine, since otherwise it is more likely that Syrus 
would have been given a man as his personal servant. He 
is also released from any debt which he owes the 
testator. This is probably any of his Tv^ Tp^  which is 
still outstanding.
Hilara is bequeathed certain household goods:
ifei/re i<-*2 A/y.tffr'gcrrtv 8"*° f * A -
on* T re r 'e rp u fA * ^  jW  <*V f l a v o r * ,  l
(D.L. v, 73)
In addition to the furniture, she is to receive five 
minae. The words y *  jSor/n^reLu indicate that she is to 
choose which couch she wishes to have. The fact that she 
is given property of her own shows that she is a 
freedwoman, even though the testator does not specify 
this, because slaves had no property of their own.
Lyco (I) then frees certain other slaves:
S' &A£V icccl fyS TdV ft'ttfQ-J pjL'Vjr&f'*-
No j^jA.0 /*» (Set*)**.
E v  $P&- V0{><*- 4 LEjDjUGruOt.i/,
(D.L. v, 73)
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Here, no bequest is given to the slaves# and they are to 
be freed as soon as the will is read.
Other slaves are to be given their freedom after a 
certain amount of time:
*<**«- zr*.p&.fjL.eir*vTo^ ckrf eZ e 8
e?4r'6 0epov ’ ICoU, 70VS <foper*-<(6fO'V£. 'LTL(f Cr A.£ OJ v#t tCoZi
/T o6 &<-& l * *  re TTu.p*- %Ty ( T \su.i/ rxbi .
(D.L. v , 73)
Agathon is to remain in service for two years before 
receiving his freedom, and Ophelio and Posidonius are to 
serve for a further four years before being freed.
To three of those who have served him, Lyco (I) gives 
an additional bequest:
Se ic*X iC p i r ^ ^  £^r>pcj
S C X * — /jcAii'y*' icaic. crc*. tcj /
at &V pa.C’/yT'*-c Avtc^\/i ‘Ccl'kIJ5 £^£L''. 7#.dr*
fc<S-r*> u & T o Z s <i cr o J ^ ^  OfP 8^ S S^i/
%*-oC6rot re-T*-f fcgrso c
(D. L. v, 74)
The gifts of a couch each as well as such coverings as
Lyco (II) thinks proper are to be given to Demetrius, 
Crito and Syrus in return for services rendered. All of 
them were already free when the will was made.
None of the freedmen are bequeathed money or goods in
perpetuity. In the case of those who were part of the
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testator's property in Athens (418), this would have 
reverted to Lyco (II) or his heirs after the decease of 
the beneficiaries, if they had no relatives (419).
Lyco (II) is then given the freedom to dispose of the 
testator's Trojan estate:
b(t I ot. oi ICOrtjAy T L UAtpLox ^(TT'LJ
F i $ rto ✓ £vri*J5-6L. ,
(D.L. v, 74)
The words rw‘/’ refer back to 4/ ocicuj in the previous
sentence but one, and thus indicate that this clause 
concerns the property in Troy. Certain provisions have 
to be met before he can dispose of the estate. It is
probable that the words m u r x -refer to
the obligations placed on Lyco (II) which are written in 
the will. Some of these he will always have to carry 
out, namely the provision of the oil from the estate in 
Aigina, and the care of Chares and Micrus. Therefore it 
is very likely that Lyco (II) will only be able to 
dispose of the property at his death, and such a
disposition would probably be included in a .
This clause indicates that Lyco (II), who was not the 
testator's heir by the laws of intestate inheritance, was 
not legally able to dispose of the *. of the
philosopher unless he was specifically given this
privilege in a will. The words used here are similar to 
those employed by Aristotle when he gives Nicanor the 
right of testamentary disposition over his estate (420).
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Thus, in the intervening century between the making of 
the will of Aristotle and that of Lyco, the law had not 
changed in this respect.
The will ends with a list of witnesses (421).
Thus, the testament of Lyco (I) has several 
functions. By means of this document he bequeaths 
his tToarpt?*. to Astyanax and Lyco (II) as well as giving 
Lyco (II) additional property in Athens and Aigina; he 
provides for his funeral and for the payment of debts 
owed by him; he lays various obligations on Lyco (II) in 
return for the fulfilment of which he is given the 
freedom of testamentary disposition over the Trojan 
property; he also provides for his freedmen and manumits 
some of his slaves.
Epicurus
The will of Epicurus was made at the latest in 271, 
is quoted in the writings of Diogenes Laertius and is 
partially discussed by Cicero. The former quotes two 
documents*', the first is the will, referred to as 
, and the second is a letter which was written by the 
philosopher just before he died. The will is introduced
with the words /du e an£ after both the
will and the letter, the words l& i Seedero c
are written. This indicates that Diogenes Laertius 
regards the letter as a form of testament. The letter 
contains a request which is to be carried out in the 
event of the testator's death (422), and because of this,
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I shall include the relevant clause in my discussion. 
Cicero differentiates between the two documents, first 
mentioning the letter, then discussing various clauses in 
the will (423). Bruns neither quotes nor discusses the 
letter in his article.
The will opens as follows:
fa r* . r£Se ‘%‘t'Suip. c -Tbl 77#i^ TV» ’fifA-Vi/Of,
(^iXOK-pw.rt'Ob &o l t Q& v (C&.1 TipLou-p o ire -  c r p tb T J
fierot.jA’t y  K oLtk. T'vj'J 6 / rw
(D.L. x, 16)
Here, Epicurus leaves all his property to Amynomachus and 
Timocrates. Both men are identified by means of their 
father7 s name and name of deme. This identification 
indicates that they were both Athenian citizens and were 
probably not relatives on the male side, if relatives at
all, of the testator since Epicurus belonged to the deme
of Gargettus (424). This indicates that they were
probably not Epicurus7 heirs by the laws of intestate
succession, since heirs through males took precedence 
over heirs through females. The will itself does not 
contain an inventory of the property which is to be left 
to these men, but this is to be found in a document 
deposited in the temple of Demeter (425). This document 
is not referred to as a will, but as a bequest, $o$jS 
The word can not be interpreted here as a bequest
"inter vivos" since Epicurus is giving all he has and
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such a gift should leave him in penury. It seems 
unlikely that there would have been any necessity to 
include a clause naming the beneficiaries in this will if 
this had been done in an earlier bequest. Therefore, it 
is possible that the written bequest firstly contained an 
inventory of property and then stated that this was to be 
given to certain persons who would be named in the will.
The property named in the document, since it is T*. ip u v T o d
rf& \rr+- , would have consisted of the testator' s ttw'.jyQ** 
in addition to acquired property such as the school. 
This clause is an example of a man bequeathing his
to two men who were probably not relatives.
Timocrates and Amynomachus are Epicurus' principal 
heirs on the condition that they give the school over to 
someone else:
* u? T"t fO V  p_£ V iCyTTOV iC&X Tot TXpO & 0 x/Toc Tip
TTo^p&^OVS ‘-v' ''Bp ^ Ayt/uoprov M vt i 7^j *<-<*.<- fof s
\Ot>O$0V 6 oclrru 0 l$
K&.ra.'tS*rr-y (f t XO 60 ft /
t^ccrZ t({\D60d/<a-\s'
(D.L. x, 17)
Epicurus bought the garden for eighty minae, and it was 
here that his friends came to live with him (426). 
Therefore, during the testator's life, it was his own 
personal property. Here, it seems as if the school is to 
be given over to common ownership, since it is to be made
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over to Hermarchus and others who wish to study in it, 
and this might seem to be similar to the provisions in 
the will of Theophrastus in which the peripatetic school 
is given over to common ownership (427). However, Epicurus 
did not believe in the principle of common ownership 
(428), so such a clause would have been contrary to his 
philosophy. In addition, Hermarchus was a metic, and as 
such he could not own land unless granted the right 
of (429), and there is no evidence that he had
this privilege. It seems more probable that Epicurus 
left the legal right of ownership of the school to
Timocrates and Amynomachus, but wished it to be given 
over to Hermarchus and others for the purposes of study.
This would not mean a transferral of ownership but one of
authority, and Hermarchus, who is later referred to
as 6 vj*<(fKD6 0 <f6 -L}\/ru>'S (430), would be in the
position of a college principal or school headmaster 
today, in that he would not own the school but have 
powers of administration over it. The only difference 
between Hermarchus' position and that of a principal or 
headmaster is that he is able to leave the school to 
those who will be his successors in
philosophy o U -----<f)i 6 o <$'<.*-$>) . The
word yo t-* is used as opposed to tc.Ky>o\/o
because the person or persons whom Hermarchus chooses to 
succeed him will not own the school either, but it will 
continue to be owned by Amynomachus, Timocrates and their 
heirs. Those studying in the school are to aid 
Amynomachus and Timocrates and their heirs in maintaining 
the property:
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Hkl ike? $£  r o z $  <f/*JD6o<j)oVGLY %rr**s>
S.^  t v  ^AfA.wejUL&r^cJ x jx l T ’tp.o'cpo* 7'6' L
K*-r«c ro Swocrov, r ^ v  £ <y rig  u^yrrco S ^ r p c # ^ ' /
rpx.p*.*c*.r<x t L  &ep<^L r o Z i t**-4>tQ>v ^ y o v o ^ (^  £v
£ j fCiTe.-* Tpottcj L e  <{*.*£& TITO'S +j , o V « i
*v MrLu.eCv’O^ S i^ r y p C o s ^  T% ^  ic y  ito*, i c o l r rep fc a it 
CLljrOi, e ls  * - v  o t  OLTO ^Jpcov <g , * r06O<f0'V vTfrS  W=*.p<zE£>6t.vr •
(D.L. x, 17)
This passage is not addressed only to Hermarchus but to 
all those studying in the school. This quotation 
indicates further that Amynomachus and Timocrates are to
own the school since otherwise they would probably not 
have to continue their association with it. It is not
made clear in what way the scholars are to aid the
owners in preserving the common life of the school. 
Maybe the members of the school are to help in some 
practical way, such as caring for and cleaning the 
property, in addition to ensuring that the frugal 
lifestyle (431) of those living in the school continues.
From the property bequeathed to Amynomachus and 
Timocrates, the use of a house in Melite is to be given 
to Hermarchus and his fellow scholars for a certain time:
tCoCi, 1 > c p o c T y  S {£/,Ow<-&u s  pOkS  T~0 V $ j J &  l J
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(D.L. x, 17)
This house is only to be given to Hermarchus and those 
who study with him for Hermarchus' lifetime, therefore, 
after Hermarchus1 death, his fellow scholars will no 
longer have the usufruct of the property. It is not 
stated what is to happen to this house after Hermarchus' 
decease, and in view of this it seems best to assume that 
it will then be set aside for Amynomachus and
Timocrates to use as they wished.
Provision is to be made from the property left to 
Amynomachus and Timocrates for certain observances:
*L h * $ £  T z S v  y t-is0j u £ v o ) } /  rr f>06 o $ u J \S  $&■
n e
e ro v* r y  trp o re fc t betcx. r y  rov s,
ti67 r& p  icolZ Grih yuSQfLG'S'y 1/ 6 V v o £o \ /  f r c x *
jj-yvo *  r*Z% &ticoL6^ ev/u<ftk d & c <fo-6\/Tc* r  yj/*.Zv
Z-jv n& text M y  rpohSy?o\> (javyjm y \/^ > *coc r*.re-
(D.L. x, 18).
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The finance for these observances is to come from 
Epicurus' estate, and the reason the heirs are to consult 
with Hermarchus concerning them is probably because some 
are to take place in the school. Firstly, Amynomachus 
and Timocrates are to provide for the offerings for the 
testator's mother, father and
brothers ffit-s re ru _ —  £.SeA.<fio<.s )  m This is
indicative of Epicurus' regard for his family's religious 
observances, since he places a moral obligation on those 
who are not necessarily relatives or adopted sons to 
continue these, even though his own oU«>^  will become 
extinct after his death. It is not stated when these 
offerings are to be made, but it is possible that they 
might take place on the anniversary of the death of the 
person concerned (432). The provision for the continuation 
of the celebration of Epicurus'
birthday ( ■ '^u v  vo is criticized by
Cicero as being opposed to Epicurean philosophy about 
death (433). Cicero argues that it would have been
more appropriate for Epicurus and his school to celebrate 
the day on which he became a wise man:
"Quod si dies notandus fuit eumne potius quo natus an eum
quo sapiens factus est. "
(Cicero, De Finibus II, xxxi, 103)
However, Cicero is being a little facetious here, for the 
acquisition of wisdom is a gradual process, and cannot be 
confined to one day only. Epicurus also asks that a 
monthly meeting in memory of Metrodorus and himself 
continue to be held. It is probable that prior to 
Epicurus' death, this meeting was held in honour of
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Metrodorus only, since observances in one's memory are 
only held posthumously. Epicurus does not specify that
this meeting is to take the form of a banquet, as is
stated by Cicero (434), since the word does
not necessarily mean this, since when this word is used 
in reference to a meal, this is specified by the word
It is possible that a form of colloquium was 
intended to take place as opposed to a feast. The fact 
that Cicero refers to a banquet indicates that by his 
time, the meeting had come to take this form (435). This
provision is similar to a clause in the will of Lyco in
which the philosopher asks th&T his main heir to give the
oil from his olive trees in Aigina for the use of young
men in memory of himself and a benefactor (436).
Epicurus also makes provisions for observances in
the memory of his brothers and Polyaenus:
61) A.G L Tl^ 69*,^ S& K0CC- T~'Vj\/ jP o^V TOV
TF0 6 & £ - j y r & i .  Jjs’ icecc
T'ov £  Lr~ cj y IT p  tC«LL y
(D. L. x, 18)
In this quotation, there is no indication that these 
ceremonies were already observed by the school, but the 
words kCadd*-xr&p *#1  ^  peZs
indicate that they were kept by the
philosopher himself. It seems as if Epicurus wishes the
school as well as Amynomachus and Timocrates to observe 
these days commemorating his brothers and Polyaenus,
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since he has just referred to other observances to be 
adhered to by his heirs and the school.
The testator also provides for the care of certain 
children:
(D. L. x, 19)
The children to be taken care of are the son and daughter 
of Metrodorus and the son of Polyaenus. The latter was a 
fellow scholar of Epicurus (437), and it is not clear for 
how long his son had been orphaned. Metrodorus was also
a fellow scholar of Epicurus, and Diogenes Laertius
states that after meeting Epicurus he only left him once
for a total of six months (438). His closeness to the
philosopher is testified by the fact that his son is also
given the name Epicurus. Since there is no mention of 
him taking a woman as his wife but cohabiting with 
Leontion, an Athenian courtesan (439), it is probable 
that the children were offspring of this union. 
Metrodorus predeceased Epicurus by seven years, so his 
children had been orphans for this period (440).
“jt sitoA.-W9Ct/ \ZQ-\J
zpftiLfyov. u><s cl-otuOs  rys. b $ vy
M  y r  p a S i J p o v  7 ~ y *  t t o l  e - C e  & u i 6 t x . \ / ,  *& x.c
— \
£A.0 OVtfatv V a} ocv' f*. t £ p O
%^  r to v  (fiKob o<po{j\/ p e r *  # .v i - o v y o & 6 y s
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Bruns states that in this clause, Hermarchus is made the 
children's ycopios (441). However, the
participle gvjwi/T’w/ indicates that the boys are 
already living with him, and since this is so, it is 
probable that the girl is also in this position. The 
boys are old enough to be studying philosophy, presumably 
with Hermarchus in the school, which would mean that they 
were probably in their early teens. There is no 
indication as to the age of the girl, but Epicurus states 
that she is to be married, when she comes of age, to a 
philosopher whom Hermarchus shall choose. There is a 
condition attached to this, namely that she be well 
behaved and obedient to Hermarchus. This condition shows 
that even though Amynomachus and Timocrates are to care 
for the children, they are not intended to live with 
them. This is rather similar to what was intended to 
happen to the children of the elder Demosthenes, who 
lived with only one of their guardians, Aphobus, who was 
supposed to marry their mother (442). However, the 
similarity between the two cases ends with this, because 
the money for the elder Demosthenes' children was to be 
deducted from his estate, whereas Epicurus asks his heirs
to maintain them:
Si$ 6 A p v Ti puou. pJc. Tyj  eu. ru>v
cbv y p X /  Trpdf'ccio'S r p c f y *  r & u r O iS ;
b  T  - <*■/ oCVTC~$ ^ 7* ' f / i A V r o /  £ J7 iS £  v £6 3 <*. L
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So&y 6*>ofrov^esois fjLed ' ''b p jjk p ^ o o .
(D. L. X/ 19)
The maintenance which Amynomachus and Timocrates are to 
pay is to come from Epicurus' estate which is left to 
them. They are to consult Hermarchus concerning this 
matter, and this indicates that Epicurus has probably not 
set aside a particular sum for maintenance. There is no 
other example in surviving evidence of a man providing 
sustenance for orphans who are children of another man, 
from his own assets in his will.
Provision is also made for the girl's dowry:
S& trp o  Zx. «
>^U<£-iou/ j
iifxoupd. r ys o fo  v 
o<^pov s re S
(D. L. x, 20)
It might be taken that the word -3 refers to
Epicurus' estate, since Amynomachus and Timocrates are to 
be taking the money. However, just before this passage, 
Hermarchus is made os of certain funds (443), and
the reason why Amynomachus and Timocrates are mentioned 
here is that Epicurus wished them to consult with 
Hermarchus about this matter. Therefore, it seems as if 
the dowry money is not to come from the testator' s estate 
but from the funds at the disposal of Hermarchus.
t Q  j & rrertSoL.'j
pLCr/9l 6 L  Tui £ &.S OS tCaco
fcV Ittl y r<x<- C.tto tz3 v
L r  / '
C-ppi&.p^Q'V
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Epicurus also makes provision for the children in 
the event of Hermarchus dying before they come of age:
(D. L. x, 21)
Here, only the children of Metrodorus are to be provided 
for by Amynomachus and Timocrates. It is possible that 
the son of Polyaenus is not included here either because 
the philosopher overlooked him or, more probably, because 
he was nearing his eighteenth year, and would soon be 
independent. The money for their care is to come from 
Epicurus' estate. This is a repetition of the terms of 
an earlier clause in which Amynomachus and Timocrates are 
to maintain the children, and it is likely that the
purpose of this repetition is to emphasise that the
financial provision is to continue insofar as the
children of Metrodorus are concerned. No provision, 
however, is made concerning who the children are to live
with if Hermarchus dies. It is possible that Epicurus
assumed that his heirs would ensure that all would be 
well in this respect, or it might be that in view of this 
omission, Epicurus charged Idomeneus to take care of the 
children of Metrodorus in a letter written just before he
to t  v  Se T<- TU)S lc Y $ p  id T r i 'S ^ V
TTpO 7~0V r~* M y  1~po S tapov '(X.
V t f O f A Z L y o V  'T l jU L O K .p * - T 'y v  j  S  i V
r o u -istojv e H-octT-c*. y t v y r o c L  ro3 r  
f&uV \j !colZ tJV y iCeC7sL ~TO <5 WoeTo ✓ l* JTO 7~D V
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died:
6*v $ J T*j$ ix *  fA .ecp ti.ic 'L  o v 7 e to $
rrp&s 6yU& teed. 6o effort/ 4  rr c/ue-T^ov T£ v ir*Z S  coov
M*Jrpo S co p o \> .
(D. L. x, 22)
Idomeneus was a fellow scholar of Epicurus and the 
children7 s uncle, since he married Metrodorus7 sister, 
Batis (444). Idomeneus was not the children's closest 
relative, since Metrodorus had a brother named Timocrates 
who was a former member of the school (445). It is
possible that the reason that Idomeneus is asked to care 
for the children as opposed to Timocrates is probably
because Timocrates no longer belonged to the school and 
was out of sympathy with its members. The fact that
Idomeneus is asked to care for the children here suggests 
that he had not previously done this. Since Idomeneus, 
like Hermarchus, was a member of the school, it is 
possible that Epicurus wished him to take the place of 
Hermarchus, if he died, with respect to living with the 
children. On the other hand it might be possible that
Epicurus merely wished to provide another guardian for 
the children. Even though the nature of the request is 
not made clear, the first suggestion seems more probable, 
because the children already possessed three guardians, 
and there would have been no need for another one,
whereas it would be necessary for them to have someone to 
live with if Hermarchus were to die. Cicero finds this 
request, made just before Epicurus' death, out of
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character with the man7 s philosophy, and states that this
proves that he was a man of upright character:
"Nam ista commendatio puerorum, memoria et caritas 
amicitiae, summorum officiorum in extremo spiritu 
conservatio indicat innatam esse homini probitatem
gratuitam, non invitatam voluptatibus nec praemiorum
mercedibus evocatam".
(Cicero, De Finibus, II, xxxi, 99)
However, in stating that this request was made "in 
extremo spiritu", Cicero omits the fact that Epicurus had 
made provision for the children7 s care in his will, and 
in neglecting this he bases his argument on unfirm
precepts.
These careful provisions for the son and daughter of 
Metrodorus and the son of Polyaenus suggest that Epicurus 
had been appointed as one of their guardians. This is 
because this is the only will in which the care of 
children other than the offspring of the testator is so 
carefully provided for. If Epicurus had not been a 
guardian of the children, it is unlikely that he would 
have had any right to say who was to take care of them. 
It is probable that Hermarchus was not appointed *6ptos of
the children by Epicurus as Bruns states (446), but was 
appointed as co-guardian and asked to live with the 
children by Polyaenus and Metrodorus, since he was 
already living with them when Epicurus wrote his will. 
Therefore, Epicurus and Hermarchus were probably already 
guardians of the children, and in his will, Epicurus 
bequeaths his share of the responsibility to his heirs.
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Hermarchus is also to be in charge of certain funds:
( D . L .  x ,  2 0 )
That these funds would have been inherited by Amynomachus 
and Timocrates if Epicurus had not included this clause 
in the testament is indicated by the fact that they are 
asked to place Hermarchus in charge of them. These funds 
were probably those which were placed at the disposal of 
Epicurus by his friends (447), and it probably would have 
been more sensible to have the head of the school in 
charge of them than for them to be given over to 
Amynomachus and Timocrates. It is from these funds that 
the dowry of Metrodorus' daughter is to be paid.
Provision is also made for others:
IT  u  f j .  & X .& L 6  S e  JCact. N i i O v .  S O f iO  S  j  tc o tL
y p e ?  5 f *Lv* o 6 o l  t £>v yp&'f'- i/ e v
J /  V  V __
r t * V  T rp 060Q<+>'SJ L l/bc f iL fs T V - TOi> 6 V y i* .C * y  t y  y  p * .  k ^ o r o s
4 / /^A.06 o <( ( Keen*  p .fi& tsov yyepLOsoz
To>v ^ ^ / A -0 6 0 ^oui/r^ r-ot y C s y r ^ u ,
a t x - e c .O T 'i j  -Tot. ) j.£ s S 0 l 6 v p * C 0 j r * . y y p V  p i e d *
VjpiZv fTpOe^ AO /^T’O i s  iK06C<('x. } p y t i t s b b  T ^ S
(D.L.x, 20)
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It is not specified who Nicanor is, but since he is
grouped with philosophers who have done good to the
testator, it is possible that he might be one of these.
The fact that plural forms for the subjects are used in
the remainder of this clause ( i f *  * - - - gv/o 
indicates that other philosophers are to receive aid 
also. It is not made precisely clear what form this aid 
is to take, but since Epicurus states that he would like 
to keep those who have helped him from want, the help 
will probably be of a financial nature. Since this 
clause is grouped in the same paragraph as the passing 
over of certain funds to Hermarchus, and the recipients 
of this aid are to be philosophers of the Epicurean
school of which Hermarchus is to be made head, it is most 
likely that the funds which Hermarchus is in charge of 
are to pay for this. The plural form of the verb 
£m. jj.e A . t '6 6cx /^ which is used here indicates that not
only Hermarchus is to take care of the philosophers in
need; but it is probable that Amynomachus and Timocrates
who are mentioned in connection with the dowry for
Metrodorus' daughter are to have some say in the matter
as well, although since Hermarchus is k^P10* of the
funds, he is probably the one who will decide how much 
each man is to receive.
Hermarchus is to receive the philosopher's books:
&(£ T a i  fb  t foe. V  Toi. /
TToi
(D. L. x, 21)
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The books are to be both those which Epicurus has 
written and those written by others.
Following the request that Amynomachus and Timocrates 
care for the children of Metrodorus if Hermarchus were to 
die, Epicurus refers to the carrying out of these powers:
(D.L. x, 21)
Here, Amynomachus and Timocrates are probably referred 
to, since they are mentioned earlier in the paragraph 
with reference to the children of Metrodorus. Since 
these men are to take charge of the other things laid 
down in the will, it seems as if they are being appointed 
as the executors as well as being the main heirs.
Finally Epicurus arranges for the manumission of 
certain slaves:
$£ tZS TtoSS^ Mvv,
k  { L^^ J/Uc Sb PC*.*- 
(D.L. x, 21)
The slave Mys was a member of Epicurus' school (448 ), but 
there is no evidence concerning the others freed here.
/c t£>v
TO i *  j u b ^ / o x /
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None of those manumitted are bequeathed any money, but it 
is possible that if they were philosophers, they could be 
aided from the fund which was placed in the charge of 
Hermarchus.
Therefore, the will of Epicurus has several 
functions. In it, he bequeaths all his belongings, except 
for his books, to two men who are probably not 
relatives. These men are to make over the school to 
Hermarchus who is named as its head in the document. 
Provision is made for the continuation of certain 
celebrations in honour of the testator and Metrodorus, in 
addition to certain sacrifices for Polyaenus and
Epicurus' family. The testator also ensures that those
dependent on him be cared for, and this will is the only
document in which the transferral of guardianship from 
the testator to his heirs is to be found. In addition, 
certain funds are placed into the hands of Hermarchus, 
slaves are freed and Amynomachus and Timocrates are made
executors. Diogenes Laertius states that the will
indicates the philosopher's goodness (449), as indeed it 
does.
Crantor
The philosopher, Crantor, died c. 290. There is no 
specific statement that he left a will. However, Diogenes 
Laertius states that Crantor left Arcesilaus all his 
property:
Tviye'O*-*- S i  o<J6Lot~f xWotii rre? *  Wptceg p
T'ocX^.^rcoV ov6<*.v .
(D. L. iv, 2 5)
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Arcesilaus was not related to Crantor, but, in iv,25, 
Diogenes Laertius seems to suggest that he was probably 
either a lover or a very close friend. Therefore, in 
order to override the claims of his closest relatives it 
would have been necessary for Crantor to write a will. 
There is no indication that Arcesilaus was adopted as 
Crantor's son, either in this passage or in Diogenes 
Laertius' life of Arcesilaus, so it is more likely that 
the will did not contain an adoption, but a complete 
bequest of property.
Arcesilaus
Arcesilaus died in 242, so his will would date from 
this year at the latest. The document is not preserved in 
full by Diogenes Laertius, but there is some information 
concerning it.
It is stated that he left his property to his 
brother, Pylades:
k \ <r» S  ^ '  S ^/ lo i-no ✓ 5$ npo s yeyo^ e^ os,
K**TcL'h.(tKC LtT& Tc£5Va.<^ cj Toe cedTOlj, . - •*
(D.L. iv, 43 ).
Here, it seems as if the testator's entire estate (
) was left to Pylades who is probably both his homometric 
and homopatric brother (450), and would thus be his heir 
by intestate inheritance anyway, so it seems as if it 
would not have been necessary for Arcesilaus to write a 
will. However, a further indication of the document' s 
function is found in the letter which was sent with the 
will to Thaumasias, the testator's relative and a
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depositary of the document (451):
Si*. y * p  Tb  TToXl - ’cA t a s  & . p p X i 6 r & ? \ f  jcclx 7-0
cL 6 & & ' /M  S  4 - ^ 6 6  v  p.01. Si ec^ ^ 6  Sot. i y  c V '  fi-c' r c
y  t i / O c T c >  &A*oc oVy j j . y r  l  £ &  ^  6 i < y  u ccj s o < r t t c o  T o «/
t J/ j f ~ c/ <
g-i£ fiyU, ^iCT'fev/^5 6V7*« iT G r (0 t K b T  LfA.'lj f*.€: V  O
(D. L. iv, 44)
Here, the reason given for making the will is so that
Thaumasias will not suffer as a result of the 
philosopher's death (u/ ' - .. r r e Q i K o  r  i j u y p Z v o s  ) . This 
suggests that Arcesilaus may have made certain
provisions, possibly a bequest, in Thaumasias' favour. In 
addition, Arcesilaus gives Thaumasias the following
injunction: (
/7ecpcZ q v v  j S i o t l  && ^  s
©4 y < a. to T *~T y  s/ jr<x p  « *.*. r  o*. T l &  & i^ol l j ( o 5 pcy/
v./ c/. J s \ Nl/ orr^ js o6 0v e/rc ££<. 7"ot c o tT ' e}A.6r
G'tJ<»Xyp.byStJ$ 2] p -O L  S lU J .
(D. L. , iv, 44 )
The words oVws .. . suggest that Thaumasias was
Ipof
responsible irn* ensuring that the clauses in the will were
carried out fittingly, which implies that he was 
appointed as executor. Whether or not he was the sole 
executor is not made clear. It is also not clear whether 
this charge was also laid upon him in the will. However, 
if it had been, such an injunction would have been 
superfluous.
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Therefore, the will of Arcesilaus contained the 
bequest of the majority of his property to Pylades, but
financial nature, in favour of Thaumasias.
Plato7 s Laws
There is a passage in Plato7 s Laws which is relevant 
my discussion of the function of the Athenian will. It 
begins with the mention of what is supposed to be an old 
man7 s complaint:
a 6) & BeoCj e£ i f * *  4/*e>i
(Plato, Laws. 922 d)
This quotation implies that the putative speaker is 
complaining that he is not allowed to give his property 
to those who merit it because he is prevented from doing 
so by the laws (452), thus suggesting that the law 
forbade testamentary freedom. However, the fact that
Kleinias, the Athenian7 s interlocutor, states that the 
complaint is a valid one (453), indicates that there was 
probably a certain sector of the Athenian populace who 
felt this way as well. On the other hand, the Athenian 
goes on to say that the ancient law givers {ot, rr
were soft hearted  ^ ) and gives the
following reason:
probably also included provisions, possibly of a
& r rotou
yoGOtb, Ot* $* G \/
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4 ®  Tov T-o'yo^  to v t o Vj ( p o f i o d / u e v o L ,  T b v  w'fjyu-ov
i tL 9 e 6 c c ^  t & v  e £ e i\ /o c * . -r<* e o L u r w  S t o i T ^ e e & t c  & urr'K 6 j*  
oV^os ri^ *v<*-p£.jt&-v j .. .
(Plato, Laws, 922 e)
Here, Plato does not name those who, according to the 
speaker, allowed complete testamentary freedom. Since 
Solon introduced legislation permitting the making of a
will in certain circumstances, it is possible that it is 
this law which Plato is referring to. The
words i *l ii°n>Tov - . - ri*p^-tToc/ suggest that at the time Plato 
was writing his Laws (c. 350-343) complete freedom of
testation was permissible, and this had been the case for 
long enough for the introducers of this law to be 
referred to as "the law givers of old". However, the 
extant evidence concerning testamentary inheritance in
fourth-century Athens indicates that a man with sons was
not able to dispose of his property completely as he
wished, since in all the wills ’ written by men with
children at this time, provision is made for offspring
even though some bequests are made from the property 
(454). This suggests that in classical Athens, a man was 
not allowed to disinherit his son, as is implied in the 
passage. On the other hand, in fourth-century Athens, a 
man who had no legitimate children was able to dispose of 
his property as he wished, as is indicated in the wills 
of Cleonymus, Aristarchus and Plato himself (455). Thus, 
it seems as if the author is indulging in a little
-361-
hyperbole here, and because of this, the passage is open 
to misinterpretation and cannot be taken as definitive 
evidence concerning the position of Athenian testamentary 
law at the time Plato was writing.
Isaeus. iv. 8
There is also a sentence in Isaeus which touches upon 
the subject of this chapter:
^  l- OCVTij) Nt t c & G T jO  & .T O  V  OCtTOLVTcL. 7e* VTfl'iE;
(Is. iv, 8)
At this point in the speech, the past claimants to 
Nicostratus' estate are named in addition to the nature 
of their claims. The word would not refer to a
gift "inter vivos", since the whole property was alleged 
to have been given, and it is very unlikely that 
Nicostratus would have left himself in penury. 
Therefore, this is probably a reference to a bequest by 
will, even though the verb & ***  6e6§oci is not used. The 
wording here suggests that the speaker would have the 
jury believe that Telephus alleged that the deceased gave 
him all the property by will without adopting him. Wyse 
states that Schulin "rashly" gives this as an example of
a man disposing of his property by will (456). It is 
indeed unwise to take this sentence as an example of an 
alleged bequest of property by will, since there is not 
enough information for one to assess what Telephus had 
stated in his claim for the estate. From the information 
given, it might be better to say that it was possible to 
allege in court that a bequest of property had been made 
without adoption. That such an allegation could be made
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and possibly believed, indicates that it was not illegal 
to make a will in which one7 s property was given as a 
whole to someone without adoption.
Conclusion
By way of conclusion there now remain^ to be 
discussed various opinions concerning the function of the 
Athenian testament with reference to the evidence which I 
have presented on the preceding pages (457).
There are certain persons who are of the opinion 
that wills were primarily concerned with adoption.
Humphreys states that the most usual form of will 
was the conditional testamentary adoption by a childless 
man, and that wills did not regulate details such as 
outstanding debts and burial (458). Presumably the
condition referred to by Humphreys is the acceptance of 
the person (or his or her guardian) nominated by the
testator as the one to be adopted, but Humphreys does not 
state whether she is limiting this statement to the
classical period or not. The table at the end of this 
thesis shows that out of the thirty eight wills we know 
about, ten concerned adoption, and this indicates that
Humphreys is incorrect when she says that adoption was 
the most usual form of the Athenian will. If Humphreys is 
only discussing the extant evidence from the classical 
period, she is also incorrect, since from the extant 
evidence, nine wills concerned adoption and eighteen did 
not. Furthermore, she does not take into account the 
wills of Plato and Polyeuctus, both of which contain
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clauses making note of debts due to the estate. Indeed, 
it seems as if the will of Polyeuctus was solely 
concerned with this matter. In addition, if Humphreys is 
referring to wills outwith the classical period, the 
wills of Theophrastus, Strato, and Lyco all make 
provisions in this respect, thus indicating that it was 
possible to regulate details such as burial in a
testament.
Wevers states as follows:
"Since the only testamentary method of disposing of one's 
property involved some kind of adoption, every time there
is mention of a will, an adoption is implied.
Furthermore, no adoption of any kind was permissible if
the testator had a legitimate son of his own.
Consequently every time a will or adoption is mentioned,
if one trusts Isaeus, it is implied that there was a man
without male children"(459).
Wevers7 opinion, based as it is on the evidence from
Isaeus only, is a little one-sided. Even so, he does not 
take proper account of the fact that Isaeus i and x
probably concern complete bequests of property by
testament. Since Wevers limits his discussion of the
function of the will to Isaeus, he neglects to take
account of evidence in Demosthenes and Lysias, in which 
wills written by men with children are to be found.
MacDowell takes account of the other evidence in 
Demosthenes and Lysias, and comes to a fairly similar 
conclusion:
"Apart from adoption, there was not much scope for a
will. A man could not use a will to bequeath his
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property as a whole to anyone except by adopting him as a
son. There was a law permitting a man to make a bequest
to a bastard son, provided it was a fairly small amount
--- and in the fourth century, we know of a few cases in
which a man who had sons made a will to give instructions
about the sharing of property between the sons or„v.for a 
Iro
dedication a god; but that is all. It was not until
the end of the classical period that it became possible 
for an Athenian to use a will freely to bequeath all his 
property to anyone he wished." (460).
The first sentence quoted there implies that there is 
more evidence about wills which concern adoption than 
there is about wills concerning other matters. However, 
the reverse is true, since there is slightly more
information pertaining to wills which had functions other 
than adoption. In addition, the author neglects to take 
account of the fact that in certain wills namely the 
wills of Pasio, Diodotus and Demosthenes (I), the 
guardianship of children and the care of the wife is
provided for. In two of these cases, namely in the will 
of Pasio and that of the elder Demosthenes a husband is 
chosen for the wife as well as a dowry provided. The
elder Demosthenes also does both of these things for his 
daughter. Another function which MacDowell neglects to 
note is that the will could also act as an inventory of a 
man7 s property, and include such items as debts owed to 
and by the testator. The testament of Plato has such a
function. As can be seen in the evidence concerning the
testaments of Cleonymus, Mneson and Aristarchus, it was 
possible for a man to bequeath his property as a whole to
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someone without necessarily adopting him (461). In the 
case of the will of Aristarchus, it seems as if the 
testator's estate was bequeathed as a whole to one man, 
Xenaenetus, who was not adopted as the testator's son. 
It is probable that Mneson also bequeathed all his 
property to his brother, Eupolis. Therefore, the 
evidence indicates that MacDowell is not quite correct in 
his assessment of the function of the classical Athenian 
will.
Gernet states that it was only in the third century 
that the testament came to function as a document which 
did not necessarily include adoption (462). De Ste Croix 
holds the same opinion (463). However, both men ignore 
the fact that in fourth-century Athens, the will did 
concern matters other than adoption, and that there are 
some wills which contain complete bequests of property.
Lipsius is of the opinion that in general, Athenian 
testaments concerned adoption, but they could also 
include the regulation of family matters and small 
legacies (464). However, this statement is not quite
accurate, since there are also wills which contain 
inventories (Plato and Demosthenes (I)) and wills in
which the testator's i are bequeathed without 
adoption (Cleonymus, Aristarchus, Eupolis and Plato).
There are others who believe that the Athenian 
testament had a wider range of functions and was not 
limited to adoption.
Lacey thinks that wills could also be used to 
regulate the management of the testator' s estate when he 
had sons who were still minors. He states that the will
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of Pasio was not contrary to law because one out of his 
two sons was still a minor and arrangements had to be 
made for him (465). However, Lacey neglects to mention 
the fact that another function of the will was the 
bequest of a man's property without adoption if he had no 
legitimate children of his own.
Harrison writes that the Solonian law of testament
later conferred "complete freedom of testament on a man 
who had no legitimate issue," and by the fourth century, 
men with legitimate sons could leave legacies to others 
from their property, but that there was "a fairly strong 
probability that a man had, whether by custom or by
statute, a freer right to dispose of iwcT-vjm. by will than 
of TW/ov*- " (466). The fact that there are wills in
which men with legitimate children bequeath their 
property to a person or persons who are not adopted by
them indicates that a man without legitimate children did
have a greater freedom of testament than one with
legitimate children. There are four bequests of
in the classical period (467), and in all these
cases, the property is bequeathed to a relative or 
relatives. It is not until the Hellenistic period that
we find a man's bequeathed to persons who were
probably not relatives of the testator, as is found in 
the wills of Epicurus and Crantor. In addition, it is
possible that Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, 
bequeathed his estate to Theophrastus who was not a 
relative but a friend of the family. The other bequests 
of n a f t e r  the classical period are in favour of
relatives. In none of these cases is a man with
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legitimate children the testator, which indicates that 
even in a later era, a man could not disinherit his son. 
The evidence from the wills which are extant indicates 
that a man with legitimate children could leave 
, acquired property such as slaves, money, etc. , to men 
who were not necessarily relatives as well as relatives. 
This happens in the wills of the elder Demosthenes,
Pasio, Conon, Diodotus and Aristotle. The fact that only 
men without legitimate sons bequeath their croi.rpcooc. 
whereas men with legitimate children only dispose 
of i rn X ’T'tjreL , indicates that a man did have a greater
freedom to dispose of ^aCtcr^rc^ than rr*TpZ>*.. The fact 
that there is a law which specifically states that any 
will made by a man with legitimate children would take 
effect if they died before reaching the age of twenty
(468) indicates that this limitation on disposition
of TTv-rpCeL on men with sons was a legal one. Harrison
fails to note that in classical Athens there is only 
evidence of a man bequeathing -twQW  to relatives without 
adopting them, and this suggests that it was not
customary and probably not legal for a man to bequeath
his wrjo^ oc to one who was not related to him unless he
adopted him, as Nicostratus is alleged to have done.
Norton ends his study on the will with the following 
conclusion:
"We may then conclude that at the time of the orators a
man could dispose of his property by will without
adoption, that wills not including adoption were perhaps 
unusual at that time, but became more and more common
until, in the third century, the will came to be entirely
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divorced from the idea of adoption which had given it 
birth" (469).
Here, Norton is incorrect when he states that wills not 
concerning adoption were unusual in the age of the
orators, because there are more testaments from the 
classical period which have functions other than adoption 
than there are those which involve adoption. Norton also 
neglects to note Hagnias' will in which the testator's 
niece is adopted and which also contains a secondary 
bequest in event of her dying within two years after
coming of age. It can be seen from the table at the end
of this thesis that there was indeed a gradual alteration 
in the function of the will as time went on. In the 
early fourth century, 415-389, we know of nine wills,
four of these concern adoption, one of the four contains 
a secondary bequest, and five are probably not concerned 
with adoption but with family matters and bequests. On 
the other hand, in the period 378-330, there is
information about four wills which concern adoption and 
eight with other functions and there is only one extant 
record of a will concerning adoption after 364. This
indicates that Norton is correct when he states that
during the fourth century adoption became less common as 
a function of the will. However, the function of the 
testament at the beginning of the fourth century was less 
concerned with adoption than Norton's conclusion would 
have us believe. In addition, Norton is not correct when 
he states that in the third century the will was
"entirely divorced" from the idea of adoption, since the 
evidence from Menander, concerning Cnemon' s will,
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indicates that adoption was still a function of the 
Athenian testament in the post-classical period.
Arnaldo Biscardi states that there were nine major 
functions of the Athenian will; 1. the nomination of a 
guardian for minors and a *o/&ios for women; 2. the
provision of a second marriage for a wife; 3. the 
betrothing of a daughter; 4. to make an inventory and
consolidate the family's financial affairs; 5. the 
provision of a dowry for wife and daughter; 6. the 
statement and division of duties concerning the
patrimony; 7. the giving of instructions for one's
funeral; 8. the giving of legacies and donations outside 
the family; 9. the commanding of one's son or unborn son 
to take vengeance for one's death (470). Here, Biscardi 
does not include the function of adoption, but this is
acknowledged at the beginning of his article (471), and
this list provides a statement of what Biscardi sees as 
the other functions of the Athenian will. However, he 
does not include the fact that it was possible to
bequeath all one's property to someone without adopting 
him since number eight implies that only part of the
estate could be given away in this manner. Biscardi also
does not take account of the fact that a man could make 
provision in a testament for a bequest in lieu of his 
child or adoptee dying. Functions number six and seven 
are only found in wills after the classical period and 
indicate that the author is taking these into account. 
However, he neglects to include the function of the 
manumission and care of slaves in his list, and this is a 
common feature of the wills from the Hellenistic period.
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This function of the Athenian will seems to have been a 
gradual development, since Plato's will (c. 347) is the
first document, and indeed the only one from the 
classical period, in which a clause to this effect is 
found, whereas in the post-classical period, most of the 
wills in extant literature contain clauses providing for 
the manumission and care of slaves. The citation of the 
request for vengeance as a function of the Athenian
testament is based upon the evidence in Lysias, xiii, 41
(472).
Asheri suggests that even if a man had a natural
son, he could bequeath all his property to someone else
(473). This concurs with Plato's view as expressed in 
Laws 922 b-e, but it is based on a misinterpretation of 
the function of the will of Pasio and can thus be ignored 
safely.
In conclusion, it is necessary for me to list the 
various functions of the Athenian will which can be found 
in the available evidence:
1. adoption of a (male or female) relative;
2. adoption of a (male) non-relative; (it may be just 
accidental that there is no evidence of adoption of a
female non-relative);
3. complete bequest of property to a relative;
4. complete bequest of property to a non-relative 
(post-classical period);
5. complete bequest of property in the event of the 
death of legitimate children or adoptee;
6. guardianship of children;
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7. provision for the care of children placed in one7 s 
charge;
8. naming of husband for wife and daughter;
9. provision of dowry for wife and daughter;
10. inventory of property;
11. statement of debts owed by and due to the testator;
12. list of executors;
13. list of witnesses;
14. manumission of slaves;
15. care of slaves;
16. miscellaneous bequests to relatives, friends, 
freedmen and slaves freed in the document;
17. expenditure from the estate other than that named in 
ljjj7 above, such as donations to a god, or for a statue;
18. provisions for the care of estate (e.g. schools);
19. arrangements for burial;
20. the provisions for the continuation of the keeping of
certain observances of significance to the testator^'
1.1, teCUfcGS1*' l&QtttvvsAH S0»v£ .
Most of these things could pronably have been done by a 
man with legitimate sons, except for the first four. On 
the other hand a man with a legitimate daughter could 
adopt, but had to marry the girl to the adoptee. An
exception to this rule is found in Menander7 s Dyskolos.
but this can be explained by the fact that the adoptee
and the daughter are uterine brother and sister, and
i
marriage between persons so related was not permissible.
Legally, at the advent of the fourth century, Athenian 
testaments could contain most of the functions named
above, with the exception of number four. At the
beginning of the fourth century, there was a greater
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tendency to adopt by will, and this gradually died out 
towards the end of the period. Even though no will in 
extant literature from classical Athens has functions 
eighteen or nineteen, it seems very improbable that such 
clauses would have been illegal, since Athenians attached 
great importance to religious observations.
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Chapter 7
The Legal and Formal Requirements f
Making. Safekeeping and Revocation of Athenian Testaments
or the
The Solonian law of testament, in the jform in which
it has survived in our extant sources, dbes not seem to
i
have laid down specific requirements fob: the making,
Therefore, it 
3 involved in 
der to find out 
tie fourth and 
as the form of 
d or not, and
safekeeping and revocation of wills (1). 
is necessary to discuss the formalitie 
making the wills about which we know in or 
whether there were atiyj legal rulings in t 
third centuries concerning matters such 
the document, whether it had to be witnesse 
so on, or whether these were merely custpmary, and thus
left to the discretion of the testator.
Witnessing
When a man was making his will, he may have called
|
in persons to witness the document soj that if its 
validity was questioned in a court of law, they could
give evidence in favour of it. The purpose of this 
section is to discuss how many people could be required
to do this, what connection a witness might
testator, whether it was a legal requirement to have
have with the
one7 s will witnessed, and whether those present were
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inf ormed of the contents of the will.
Isaeus argues that it was in the testator7 s best 
interests for him to summon as many persons as possible 
to act as witnesses for his will:
ot7foc/ro<. 8e  T o tv T o t fJLv.fri.6T> o r  l y e w c r ^  & £  U r e v
TiOV o u t  C I . W  T & V  ecLVTO -0 T ik i) T T G t o t r o ,  icX'frk. JTpM TO V
j i l t f  t v y p / e c b  T r y p t ic  A f r e e t s ,  i ' r r e v r *  Se f p b r e p  « .s  lull % y p .a n cs 
KxTbi-Tcfr tc jv  i t  A fru v  e T r L T y S t 'iu v  o 6 o v s  $ v  r»Ltrv n X G rt6 rc n > s  *
(Is. ix, 8) |
This statement is developed into the argument that the 
evidence of these persons, to the effect that Astyphilus
did not make a will, should be preferred to the testimony
i ) /  iof oc e^Tv^ovres that they were present when Astyphilus
made his will (2). The evidence from Isaeus, ix, 8 has
been regarded as the usual custom with reference to thej
persons required to witness a will byj Lipsius (3),
I
Beauchet (4) and Norton (5), although the latter two 
scholars state that it was possible for a! man to call in 
only a few witnesses to his will, but |that this was 
unusual. However, there is nowhere a detailed discussion 
of all the available evidence concerning this matter. I
!
shall therefore discuss each will aboutj which there is
some information aOseirt— wiiieh— there irs aonvc— infornnation
about the number of witnesses present.
In the case concerning the estate of Dicaeogenes (II) 
(no. 10) one of the witnesses to the second testament, a 
man named Lyco, was found guilty of bearing false witness 
(6). According to the speaker, Menexenus who prosecuted 
Lyco was bribed by Dicaeogenes (II) . As a result of
-404-
this he ceased his action against the other) witnesses:
. . . T V V f j  Sg Ifi’j r r t o  ioCAu3<oroCS r£>V jA tf l 'C p o Z V  u < fe Z \ * - \ . .
(Is. v, 13)
The plural forms used here suggest that there were at 
least two more witnesses to be prosecuted. This
I
indicates that there were at least three persons who 
alleged that they had witnessed the making of the second 
will of Dicaeogenes (II).
The case of the will of Diodotus (no. 
clear with reference to the witnesses t 
leaving^military service, the testator
12) is not too 
o it. Before 
called together 
them a will, 
xxxii, 5). It
his wife and his brother, Diogeiton, gave
and related its terms to them (Lysias, 
seems as if the document was copied and sealed in the
presence of the testator's wife and Diogeiton (7).
Therefore it is likely that these two people can be
regarded as having witnessed the will.
When the witnesses to Pyrrhus' will (no. 14) are
referred to
is not stated
mentioned, they are merely
as toZs jA.£fA<*.f>Tvp*j •cobL'S (Is. iii, 56), but it
who they were or how many there were. However, the
plural form suggests that there were at least two persons
i
who alleged that they had witnessed the will.
!
Dionysodorus (no. 13) is recounted ap having made
his will in the presence of his wife:
'k/oc/fi.ov' Se rys  tx.Se’xtfy $ t~js & toweoShtp
7*w. « .U T 0 v  S<- iQ e r o  <? XT CO 5 acVTiD i S o  t . . . .
(Lysias, xiii, 41)
This quotation suggests that the speaker's sister, who
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was also the testator's wife, was the only person present 
when the will was made. However, the setting of Plato's 
dialogues Crito and Phaedo suggest^ that lit was probably 
normal for a prisoner to receive daily visits from his 
male friends. In addition, the speaker continues by
stating that Dionysodorus also told his wife that
|
Agoratus was responsible for his death!, and that the
!
speaker, the testator's brother Dionysiusj and all his 
friends (to ls ) should take vengeance on him
(8). This suggests that Dionysodorus' will was witnessed 
by at least four other people in addition to his wife.
It is rather difficult to ascertain how many
witnesses were present when Hagnias (no. 15) made his 
will because of the lack of information. However, it is 
alleged that Theopompus gave testimony in favour of
Glaucus' claim to the property by will:
KbO- ® € o r r ^ n - o s  o To'vro'vt rr^ rZjp M«.*tcpr#.rci> ijcexv-ois
o^TToivrw. recur* 4 ^ * ^  rvpe<. tolS TTA£<6n*-s ptvf
( [Dem. ] xliii, 4 )
This quotation suggests that Theopompus may have been a
I
witness to the making of Hagnias' will, since he gave
evidence in favour of it. No reference is made to 
persons who gave similar testimony, but. the will of 
Hagnias had been found invalid over thirtyj years after it 
had been made, and it is possible that if there had been 
other witnesses, they may have died in fche intervening 
years.
According to the speaker of Isaeus: vi, there were 
several persons present when Philoctemon made his will
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(no. 26), as is indicated by the words ' rr*p<*.yev6pevc>L'
/jLttprvpyGovec (Is. vi, 7). However, it
is not stated how many of them there were and whether 
they were connected with the testator in any way.
The situation concerning the witnesses to the will
of the elder Demosthenes (no. 19) is not j made entirely
i
clear. The fact that Cleoboule, the testajtor's wife, and 
his children are placed into the hands of ; the guardians
i
and called a "sacred deposit" (9), in addition to the 
fact that Demosthenes (II) incorporates Cleoboule's 
evidence into his speech (10), indicates) that she was a
witness to her husband's will. However, it is not stated
i
precisely who else was present. In Dem. xxvii, 4, it
j
seems as if Aphobus, Demophon and Therippjides were the 
only persons present when the elder Demosthenes made his 
will, whereas in Dem. xxviii, 15, Demophon' s father, 
Demo, is said to have been there as well (11). If this 
was so, his evidence concerning the will would have been 
of much use to Demosthenes (II). However, there is no 
indication in the first case against Aphobus that he was
j
called upon to do this. Pearson suggests that this could 
be either because Demo had died before | the case was
brought to court or because he was unwilling to give 
evidence against his son Demophon. However, it is stated 
in Dem. xxix that he subsequently gave evidence against 
Aphobus, and that Aphobus gave testimony against him 
(13). This indicates that he was still alive when 
Demosthenes (II) brought his guardians to court. It is 
therefore more probable that he was unwilling to give 
evidence against his son. Therefore, there were four, or
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maybe five witnesses to the making of the elder
Demosthenes' will, one was a woman, two or three were
relatives and one was a life-long jfriend of the
testator. If Demo did act as a witness, jthen according
to the terms of the will (14), he was the only
disinterested person present.
In Isaeus, iv, the speaker refers to the witnesses 
who seem to have given evidence in favour o|f the will:
fd jT t fXoLprvpojy rov rtK evr-jeocvroz £m  rTj8et<*>v ovrc^y
)(<Kpi,*$0V. . . •
(Is. iv, 23)
Here, it is implied that several persons had given 
evidence that they were present when the will was made, 
but it is not stated how many of these there were. 
Later, it is stated that certain persons have given 
evidence that Nicostratus was the son of Smicrus as
opposed to the son of Thrasymachus as is suggested by the 
speaker (15). Wyse wonders whether the witnesses to the 
will are to be distinguished from these relatives (16). 
However, it is stated that these supposed relatives only 
gave evidence concerning the paternity of the testator
(17). In addition, the will was made in a distant land, 
so it probably would not have been possible, to have had 
relatives present except if they were on the same
campaign, and there is no evidence in favour of this. 
Even though the speaker alleges that the witnesses were 
only friends of Chaereas, it is possible that those
present were friends of Nicostratus too.
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At first, Euctemon7 s will (no. 27) was an oral 
agreement made with the collusion of relatives (18). It 
is not stated how many people, if any, werei present when 
this compromise was reached. However, it is alleged that 
when Euctemon wished to make a written record of his
• k0 took certain persons, whose identity and 
number is not stated, to where the boat of his son-in-law 
Phanostratus was anchored. He then made his will in the 
presence of Chaereas, who was there also, Phanostratus 
and the persons whom he took with him (19). This 
indicates that there were at least four persons who 
witnessed the will being made, two of whom were 
relatives. It is not stated whether Pythodorus, the 
person who was the depositary of the will (20) was a 
witness to it being made.
When Polyeuctus made his will (no. 28), it seems as 
if he called together various persons to witness the 
fact. It is alleged that Spudias was requested to be
present, but was not able to come, so he stated that it 
was sufficient for his wife to attend (21). That the 
testator7 s other son-in-law was there is indicated by the 
fact that he is accused of exerting force on Polyeuctus
I
!
(22). There is no definite statement that the other 
daughter of Polyeuctus was there, but the verb
(Dem. xli, 17) seems to refer to both the speaker and his 
wife. It seems as if Aristogenes also witnessed the
will, since he told Spudias of what had taken place
(23). It is also stated that there is testimony given by
persons who were there when the will was made (24). The
fact that these persons are referred to as t o v6 . . .
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indicates that there are several of them, but 
there is no indication as to their number. It is 
possible that Aristogenes was one of these. There were, 
therefore, at least five persons present when Polyeuctus 
made his will, his two daughters and a son-in-law, 
Aristogenes, whose connection with him is not specified, 
and at least one other.
Cnemon's will (no. 32) is made in Menander's play, 
Dvskolos. Even though it is a fictional testament, such 
a disposition of property would have had to be credible 
to an Athenian audience. At the time he makes his 
disposition, he has been rescued by Gorgias after falling 
down a well, and it is Gorgias whom he addresses 
concerning his dispositions. It seems as if Myrrhine, 
his estranged wife is present, since he addresses her 
(25). The fact that Cnemon's daughter is also there is 
indicated when he requests her help (26). It seems as if 
Sostratus is standing in the background, since Gorgias 
points him out as a possible husband for the testator's 
daughter (27). However, it is likely that he may not 
have heard the terms laid down by Cnemon, since he is 
told to come forward (28). There were, therefore, at
most four witnesses to Cnemon's will, two of whom were 
women.
At the end of his will, Theophrastus (no. 34) names 
certain persons as witnesses:
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666 p  w'ot «- J fjS<*- fA.Z’V TToLpk. ^ZtTTToc^ q u "
p £ p T v p € $  Kk.AX.t r r  n o  z> 7IU aa.^ v e v s, (fit. A o p . y  T'-os Z Z v u iv v p .e v s ^
ACeoLvSpc^ 'Yp^.SySj (£??*wv d&v. r y v  S ‘ eref>(*.v
l Oavjjl rr icSe/Oo pkprvpGS S' oc *  orot . Ty ✓ <3 1 
(^repoc* g A a ^ U v  A S e ' l p  s a / to  sy  * . r r y y e y t c e  Z i  iA v S p  0 $ d e v y s  
o v l £ s '  juocp n *p e  s A pZj^vy g t d $  K A tro fio v  Ao-v, A 'O i  i& r  p  #~to s 
fye'CStJ'SO s> < $ * . 6 1 0 * 3 ,  ^ rrp & .T & v  ^A p^eG iA ^ox,  / l * u y  A ic y  v o S j
® y & i r r T 0 i ,  Q y b t n t r o - o  &*-  k-Gpetpg c j v ,  A io  G f c o v p t S y  S
A*0'SV6to\s 'ErTiK-y Cgl o s.
(D.L. v, 57)
This passage has been given various interpretations. 
Wyse states that the people named here acted as witnesses 
to the making of the will (29), whereas Norton states 
that the persons named as witnesses were present when the 
will was deposited (30). However, Norton does not cite 
any evidence in favour of his opinion. The fact that a 
different set of witnesses are named with reference to 
Adeimantus, to whom a copy has to be sent by 
Androsthenes, suggests that the witnesses named in both 
cases are those who were present when the document was 
deposited. Only one of the witnesses is named elsewhere 
in the will. This is Strato, who became head of the
Peripatos. Since Theophrastus might not have known who 
would have been present when the copies of his will were 
deposited as he was writing the document, it is possible
that this paragraph was added later. This also suggests
that Theophrastus kept the a copy of the will, otherwise 
he would not have been able to add this information. In 
each case there were four witnesses, whose identity is 
clearly stated by means of his father' s name or by the
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name of his place of origin.
The philosopher Lyco also names witnesses at the end 
of his will (no. 37):
(D.L. v, 74)
The relationship of these people to the testator is not 
made clear, and one of them is not a beneficiary under 
the will. It is possible that Callinus may be identical 
with the person who is to oversee the expenditure for 
Lyco7s funeral (31), and whose wife and child receive 
small bequests (32). It seems as if both Ariston and 
Callinus are nominated as fellows of the school (33).
Therefore, in all the wills about which there is 
information concerning witnesses, more than one person 
acted as a witness to a testament being made. For the 
most part, in the fourth century, these seem to have been 
family members in addition to friends, although when 
relatives were not available, friends alone could act as 
witnesses. The fact that Isaeus argues that the evidence 
of "chance comers" that a man made a will is not to be
trusted in comparison with evidence from his family and
friends that this was not done (34), indicates that
Athenian juries may have been suspicious of wills
whichwere not witnessed by relatives and friends of the 
testator. However, no law is referred to which stated 
that a will had to be witnessed by persons connected with 
the testator, and this suggests that having one' s will 
witnessed by persons whom one knew was a customary as
fitL pr-of>€s c£pp4.tovevs ^ iCeZo+j
iot.vce.vs.
-412-
opposed to a legal obligation. In the wills which we 
know about from the third century, two were witnessed by 
persons whose relationship to the testator is not 
specified, whereas one was witnessed by the testator's 
family. This suggests that by the third century evidence 
from friends and acquaintances concerning wills was on an 
equal footing with that of family members. This was 
probably a change in custom as opposed to a change in 
law. In all examples, it seems as if those called were 
not necessarily fellow deme and phratry members, although 
this may have been the case where relatives on the male 
side and some friends were concerned. Furthermore, with 
those wills where we do have fairly specific information, 
it seems to have been the case that the number of 
witnesses did not have to be as large as Isaeus suggests 
in ix, 8, and in fact that to have such a large number of 
persons present when making one' s will was perhaps
unusual. Furthermore, even in this passage, the
word 6 toc suggests that although Astyphilus' will
would be most effective if it was witnessed by relatives 
and so on, it seems to imply that it would also be valid
if this did not happen. However, in view of the fact
that the validity of a will could be questioned many 
years after it had been made, as happened with the will 
of Hagnias, it would have been a sensible precaution to 
have many people to witness its making. There seems to 
have been no legal ruling concerning the number of 
witnesses needed. This seems to have been left to the 
discretion of the testator.
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From the wills discussed in the above pages, it can 
be seen that women sometimes were present when a 
testament was being made. Cleoboule was present at the
making of her husband7 s will, as was the sister of the
speaker of Lysias, xiii and the wife of Diodotus.
Polyeuctus7 two daughters were present when their father
made his will. However, in none of these examples was a 
woman called into court to give evidence in favour of the 
document, even though it might well have been 
invaluable. Instead, this testimony is incorporated into 
the speech, as in the case of the evidence of Cleoboule 
(35). There are various opinions concerning the matter 
of women appearing as witnesses in a court of law. 
Bonner (36) and Leisi (37) hold that a woman was not 
allowed to testify in court, whereas Lacey states that in 
legal actions "Athenians allowed their womenfolk to give 
evidence" (38). However, there are no examples of this 
happening in a court of law. On the other hand, 
MacDowell states that "women and children seem never to 
have given evidence, though it is not clear whether that 
was because a law forbade them to do so, or just because 
it was considered socially improper for them to speak in
a public court" (39). However, the fact that Diodotus7 
widow was prepared to swear an oath concerning his 
property anywhere her father wished (40), indicates that 
it was very probably not contrary to law for a woman to 
testify in a law court, but it was not customary for her 
to do so, since there is no suggestion in the extant 
part of the speech that she did swear an oath before the 
court. Therefore, because of this convention, it would
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have been wise for a testator to have his will witnessed 
by at least one male in addition to a woman.
There is some evidence that it was not necessary for 
a will to be witnessed for it to be regarded as valid in 
Athenian law. The passage cited by various scholars with 
reference to this is in Isaeus,ix:
I tu  S', 4? iis/SOB g ( /ue\f 0 $  €r vbi.
(rfio iJh&TO ore TO y i i o v  erroie-o t o J brc
SiSL&'jiCX.*
s
0 L s \  7 /JLyS&vet*.
& y y f t * y p *
(Is. ix,
i  v r£
12)
fj.ot.pTvf> tt-
Lipsius (41), Beauchet (42) and Norton (43) have regarded 
this passage as an indication that it was not necessarily 
a legal requirement for a man to have his will 
witnessed. However, as Harrison points out (44), the 
wording in the passage is ambiguous, since the word oU\o^  
could be interpreted as "anyone other than Cleon" and 
thus suggest that only the writing down of Cleon' s name 
as a witness was necessary for the will to be regarded as 
a valid. Wyse states that "there is an erasure in the 
ms. before jvybe large enough to contain as the
word would have been written by the scribe" (45). This
possibility adds to the ambiguity of the passage, and 
suggests that it might well have meant "no one other than 
Cleon". Therefore, because the passage is ambiguous, in 
its meaning, it cannot be regarded as satisfactory 
evidence concerning the witnessing of wills.
Therefore, since the evidence to the contrary is not 
satisfactory, it seems as if a man was formally obliged 
to have his will witnessed, although the number of such
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persons was left to his discretion.
It is now necessary to examine whether those who 
witnessed the making of a testament were informed of its 
contents or whether its clauses were kept secret, also, 
whether there was any legal ruling concerning this matter.
There are various opinions concerning the secrecy or 
otherwise of a testament. Beauchet states that witnesses 
were only able to testify to the fact that a will had 
been made, but were unable to say whether the document 
produced in court was identical with that made by the 
deceased, and that if a witness were to be told the 
contents of a will, this would compromise the document's 
secrecy, so this was rarely done (46). Lipsius states
that witnesses did not testify to the contents of a will, 
but only to the fact of its having been made (47), and 
this view is held by Norton (48). Both Jones (49) and 
Guiraud (50) state that the contents of a will were not
usually revealed to those who witnessed it. Harrison 
states that "where there were witnesses they did not 
necessarily, though they might, know the contents of the
will. They were simply witnesses that a will had been
made, and, when it was in writing, it is at least
doubtful whether they could vouch for the fact that the
document produced was the document they had witnessed" 
(51). However, none of these scholars has discussed all 
the available evidence concerning this question, and for 
the most part, they seem to base their conclusions on a 
passage in Isaeus (Is.iv, 13). In addition to looking at 
this passage, I shall discuss the evidence concerning 
whether witnesses were told of the contents of a will as
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it occurs in individual cases.
The passage mostly relied upon by scholars who state 
that the terms of a will were not related to witnesses 
reads as follows:
€T<- y o tv S p e s ,  icacl r<3's S iol e>o trox^o  I
toZs P'aLpc0.y '^j\^o^Lt\/oiS o To £1*. ,  o t\X J otv7T3v
J^tOYOV TOX> i^TcOXoTT&C ✓ c<> (ThLp(sTdL.\/ToL^J _ ..
(Is. iv, 13)
At this particular point in the speech, the speaker has 
recently stated that in inheritance cases, proofs by 
argument should be preferred to testimony given by 
witnesses (52). This quotation seems to fall into the 
former category. The passage contains no reference to 
the standing of the law on the matter of! relating the 
contents of a will to witnesses. The words' r*? *
0 i  'iTowol are not exhaustive; they suggest that the 
majority of testators, but not all of them, did not tell 
the witnesses of their wills' function; thus suggesting 
that for the most part, a man would be unable to testify 
to the clauses in a testament. However, since the orator 
is attempting to disprove the validity of the will of
Nicostratus, it is possible that he is using the 
rhetorical device of hyperbole in order to heighten the 
jury's suspicion. The quotation contains no indication 
as to whether the witnesses who gave testimony in favour 
of Nicostratus' will were able to state its contents. 
Wyse states that it is not possible "to discover what 
amount of truth is contained in this generalization" 
(53). However, the fact that the speaker can make such a
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claim suggests that in some cases the witnesses were not 
told of a will's contents, but it should not be taken as 
precise evidence of the legal formalities concerning this.
In another speech, Isaeus compares an adoption
"inter vivos" with an adoption by testament, and states 
that the latter is more likely to be questioned by 
relatives because the provisions are (Is. vii, 2).
This generalization suggests that the contents of a will 
were kept secret.
There are also some cases in which it seems as if 
the witnesses were not told of the contents of a will.
At the scene of the making of the will of
Dionysodorus (no. 12), there is no indication that the 
witnesses to it were told its function.
The validity of the will of Pyrrhus (no. 14) was 
questioned about twenty years after it was made by the 
means of the husband of Pyrrhus' legitimate daughter
prosecuting the witnesses to it:
^  ) * P  h p . o ^ & v  6 r r  e r o  ro Z s  ico6LV
£TTC ry tC^ j TOV TivppOXJ .
(Is.iii, 56) (54)
Here the words &.<- suggest that
the witnesses were only able to testify that they were 
present when the testator made his will, and were not 
told of the terms contained in the document.
Witnesses are called to testify that the will of
Philoctemon (no. 26) was made and give evidence in favour
of it (55). However, it is not stated whether these
people were told of the will's function at the time of
its making. It is later stated that Androcles, the
speaker's opponent, alleged that Philoctemon neither made 
a will nor adopted Chaerestratus as his son:
/{}✓ $e yio* v *  ris rrepL<PoiveGrepo\/ 
y lAejuLt**!0 r v p y  y  z "  r ts w r o *  zp o L rro
iA'/ty°*'A.eLSs nus (j)tXo^cTyixo\/ * otl ovr-e S^ d^^ To
o ^ i~ e  v d * / X <x.L f€6 t pocro<J grro i.y6oc.-rc> j  o ts  f j .e  / y
f i S  TToCp G y  £r t e - r o  ^ C i c ^ c o v ^  &  *  e  S y  p l b L p T ' j y S & V  11 J
ots $& yiy TTotpe y  e * & r 0 < £ > _ a  ' yicovee t -l ^ o s  j
JL«.oyv TVfOgZy ■
(Is. vi, 53 )
Here, the speaker's argument is not quite correct. In 
opposition to Androcles' allegation, no reference is made 
to persons who have given testimony both that Philoctemon 
made a will and that by it Chaerestratus was adopted as
his son. It appears that he is arguing that Androcles 
cannot have known that Philoctemon did not make a will. 
The speaker is incorrect when he states that hearsay 
evidence was permitted, because this was only allowed if
the person who had witnessed the event himself had died, 
and this was not the case with Philoctemon's will, since
the evidence of the witnesses is given earlier on in the 
speech (56). Therefore, it seems as if those who gave 
testimony in support of the will might not have been able 
to testify to its contents.
On the other hand, there are cases where it seems as 
if the witnesses to a will were told of its contents.
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When the speaker of Isaeus, v is recounting the 
prosecution of the witnesses to the will of Dicaeogenes 
(II) (no. 9), he states that one of them, a man named 
Lyco, had given the following testimony:
(Is. v, 12)
This quotation suggests that when the will of Dicaeogenes 
(II) was probated the second time (57), Lyco was able to 
give precise evidence concerning it, not only stating 
that he was present at its making, but also that he knew 
its function, which was to adopt Dicaeogenes (II) and 
bequeath him all his property as opposed to just one 
third.
In the speech concerning the will of Cleonymus (no. 
24), it is stated that there were questions put to him by 
Deinias, the guardian of the heirs " ab intestato" irott/r^ v 
t&v' jtok.it Sjv g/aci/rCo/ (Is.i, 11). Wyse states that these 
words suggest an altercation before the assembly, but 
quite correctly adds that this vagueness "could be a 
cloak for lack of testimony" (58). Indeed, no witnesses
are called to verify this statement. Wyse states that 
the fact that the will was lodged with an ]_ed
Deinias to assume that it either abridged! or abolished 
the rights of inheritance of the heirs-at-law, thus 
implying that the contents of the will were kept secret
(59). However, the fact that this allejged altercation 
was in public and that Deinias asked whejther Cleonymus
I
had any quarrel with either the heirs or their father
Los p y 6 e  &i*M.i(>yevyv noLy9y\te.L t o v V vv
l) 7TO ToO Q g C o v
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(60), suggests that he knew the function of the will. In 
addition, the mere fact that a will ; was made and 
allegedly deposited with a magistrate does not 
necessarily indicate that Cleonymus had abridged or 
abolished the rights of his heirs "ab intestato", since 
it was possible for a man to regulate the disposition of 
property between his heirs by means of a will, as Pasio 
did (61). Wyse also suggests that the making of the will 
of Cleonymus was accompanied by public formalities at 
which Deinias happened to be present (62). However, 
there is no evidence in the speech which; supports the 
suggestion that it was not an ordinary will and that it 
was made in public. Therefore, if the alleged public 
altercation did concern the terms of the will, it is 
possible that the document's terms were told to those 
present.
In Isaeus ix, the speaker alleges that if Astyphilus 
(no. 22) had wished to prevent his will from being 
challenged by his heirs "ab intestato", he should have 
called many people to witness the will, but if he did not 
wish anyone to know that he was intending to adopt 
Cleon's son, he had no need of witnesses (63). Wyse
rightly states that the underlying assumption of this 
argument is that "witnesses may be expected to have
knowledge of the substance of a will" (64). This is
indicated in the words oru T>° v v o v
‘eiroLt'Zro . if witnesses generally only testified to
the fact that a will had been made as opposed to also 
stating its contents, this argument would be based on 
very uncertain grounds.
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The will of Euctemon (no. 27) is a rather
agreement between Euctemon and Philoctemon arrived at 
with the collusion of relatives:
(I s. vi, 2 3)
It is not stated who these relatives were, they are
Since these persons persuaded Philoctemon to accept a 
compromise, it is possible that they would have either 
known of or even proposed its terms. If these relatives 
were identical with the principal witnesses of the 
writing down of the agreement, who were Philoctemon7 s 
brothers-in-law Chaereas and Phanostratus, then the 
will7 s contents would have been known to them.
It seems as if the will of Diodotus (no. 12) was 
probably made in private (65), but the description of
what happened before he set out on military service,
where he is said to have related the document7 s contents, 
and probably copied the document and sealed it (66)
indicates that the function of the will was told to those 
who were probably inscribed as witnesses.
The younger Demosthenes7 second speech agianst
Aphobus indicates that there were two opposing accounts
of what happened when Demosthenes (I) made his will (no. 
19). According to Aphobus, he did not agree to the terms 
of the document:
complicated matter. This testament was at first an oral
simply referred to earlier in vi, 23 as ot < * ✓ < * . .
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q v to s  $e X-&2, pceroLirejxtf tfi.6K.uOV d iro  ro d
rtcLrpos y k#X  i? i0cov e is  ry jv  o i< Z # .\/} ei6eA .@ eTv ju e v  
oo tfyecv cos r& s  p.&TcL.jreju^fip.evo v,  otjS  S/uoA.oyy6o(.i. 
TT6pl 7-o J r to v  o J U v ,  & y/A .otf£vro%  l J A k o v Soli
■yptiLfAfJoLTeZov <&v*Lyt,yvco6kco^r os kl#1  Q yp u  rr rrCSou
Tsityovros £j s eic&C*ob rcKdir*. § ceder-ro^ ....
(Dem. xxviii, 14)
Here, the words S’ ^tcove*-*. . . . & v *y indicate
that Aphobus admitted that he heard the terms of the will 
being read out, and therefore suggest that he knew what 
these terms were. However, the words &v blv . .. toCtoov
o66ifV suggest that he was not actually present in
the room when the will was made. He states that he was
acquainted with the document's terms by hearsay 
(AfcuT - - - $<.Gr&£-ro ). However, Demosthenes (II) alleges that
Aphobus both knew and agreed with the terms of the will:
- _ - /<Kl rr/DO£.<-& er*~y K-01.Z lt,rrc*-rro<. Suojuo^oy y p -t S
TTpOS T(> *  / T « . r f c / O x y Lo 6 « T T e p  6 K .e Z S o $  y p *> y ra c $  tcocT’&A.t. i
(Dem. xxviii, 14)
Here, Aphobus was allegedly the first to be present
( rrfo e i 66^*} x-u 9cos ), and was told the terms of the will 
by the testator, which is indicated by the fact that he 
allegedly agreed with them. Indeed, since Aphobus seems 
to have been nominated as the person who would marry the 
testator's wife and thus live with the children (67), 
this allegation seems quite plausible. Furthermore, in 
the scenes where Demosthenes (II) describes the making of
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his father's will, the terms of the docum
the care of the testator's dependents and the estate, but
not, it seems, the inventory of property, 
before the elder Demosthenes' wife- and
three nominated guardians and, in xxviii, 15, Demo.
ent concerning
are read out 
children, the
The
orator and the 
very important 
e testament was
some respects,
account of Aphobus as stated by the 
younger Demosthene*s^ account agree on one 
point, namely that those present when th 
made knew its terms.
The will of Pasio (no. 21) is, in 
very similar to that of the elder Demosthenps. There is 
no evidence concerning whether Phormio witnessed it or 
knew of its terms. However, the very nature of the
responsibilities placed upon Phormio, namely marrying the 
testator's wife and being guardian of Pasicles (68), are 
very similar to those placed upon Aphobus. Therefore it 
seems possible that Phormio was a witness to the will and
that, like Aphobus, he was told of its terms.
If, for some reason a man wished to make 
arrangements for the disposition of his property after 
his death by means of an oral will (69), it would have 
been essential for persons to know of his wishes, since
if they were not told, there would be no way of 
discovering the deceased's intentions.
Thus, the will of Polyeuctus was) witnessed by 
various members of his family, one of whom was Spudias'
wife. It is said that if there had been any terms which
!
she had disagreed with, these would have b|een reported to 
her husband (70). Furthermore, Spudias was jalso given an 
account of the proceedings by Aristogenes and made no
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objection (71).
In addition, all those present when Cnemon made his 
will knew its terms (72), except, perhaps, Sostratus, 
who may not have heard the proceedings.
Therefore, the evidence from our extant sources 
suggests that the witnesses to a testament were more 
often than not told of its contents. In the cases where 
an oral will was being made, this would be essential. 
However, the fact that Isaeus could suggest that the 
contents of wills were often kept secret implies that in 
a minority of cases, witnesses to a will could only 
testify that they were present when the document was made 
and could not give evidence concerning its contents. 
Since there is evidence in favour of Isaeus' statement,
but also evidence against it, it seems most 
there was no legal obligation placed
probable that 
on the testator
either to tell witnesses of the terms of his will or keep 
these matters secret. This was left entirely to his own 
discretion.
There is also the question whether, it was a legal
necessity for certain clauses in a will to be told to the
persons whom they concerned, and their consent accepted.
The fact that Aphobus was able to arjgue that his
agreement had not been obtained, wherejas Demosthenes
(II)attempts to prove that it had (73), seems to suggest
that where guardians were nominated in a will, the
testator was probably obliged to procure ;their consent,
and if this was not done, then the relevant clauses m
the will would not be valid. In addition, j it seems as
r
though it was probably a legal requijement for a man to
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request permission from the adoptee's father if he wished 
to adopt someone by will and that person was under age 
(74). However, in both of these cases, these persons 
might not necessarily have acted as witnesses to the 
document (75).
In conclusion, it seems as if it was probably 
legally obligatory for a man to have his will witnessed 
by at least one person. However, what sort of people and 
how many these witnesses were, and whether they were told 
of the clauses which the document contained, were matters 
left to the testator's own wisdom and soundness of 
j udgement.
Form
In this section, I shall discuss matters such as 
whether an oral will was permitted by law, whether there 
were any legal obligations concerning the set pattern a 
written will might have and the sealing of the document.
The concept of an oral as opposed to a written will 
has been little discussed. Both MacDowell and Jones (76) 
seem to assume that testaments were written. On the 
other hand, Lipsius, Paoli and Harrison admit this
possibility (77).
3
The will of Cnemon in Menander, Dvskolos. (7^0-739)
is an oral disposition of property, since there is no 
indication that the testator writes down his wishes. 
This could be because it may have been thought to be 
dramatically effective for the character to be telling 
his listeners his last wishes than merely writing them 
down. However, it seems as if this scene might be
-426-
equally as effective if Cnemon were to recite the terms 
of his will as he was writing it. Paoli states that 
this is not formal in character (78), but he
does not explain exactly what he means by this, since he 
later states that the terms of this will! are just as 
binding as if it had been a written document (79). It 
could be that Paoli is referring to the fact that the 
will was not written down, and there would therefore be
no document to refer to after the testator's death. The
opening words of the will are fairly similar to those of 
the testaments of the peripatetic philosophers, in that 
it begins with the words:
(Men. Dvsk. 729-730) (80)
It is therefore possible that even in an oral will it was 
a formality to open with a clause stating "if I die". 
That this was probably not an obligation is indicated by 
the fact that some wills did not start in this manner 
(81). However, Cnemon adds a clause that states that the 
terms of his will are to be carried ! out even if he
survives, Sfc <3 , (Men. Dvsk. 731). The
terms of his will are in the following order: the
adoption of a son and the bequest of half of his property 
to him, and he is given the care of the testator' s 
daughter and told to find a husband for her, the 
provision of a dowry for the girl, and the request that 
the adopted son care for the testator and his wife from 
the remaining property. For this scene to be plausible, 
it must not have been completely unknown for a man to 
dispose of his property in this manner.
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Paoli suggests that the will of Demosthenes (I) was 
an oral dispostion of property (82). However, there is 
evidence from Demosthenes' (II) speeches against Aphobus 
which is contrary to this idea. The orator states that 
Aphobus had agreed with the terms of the will which his 
father had written:
. . M i  $LUf*e?LOfy}*.Zvoi jrpos -rbv jrArLp->., %e*ir»p
^ / /y p o i C f i . r e X ' - r r e V .  1
(Dem. xxviii, 14)
Here the word specifically indicates that the
testator's wishes were written down. In addition, 
Aphobus alleged that he heard Demophon reading something:
&yjpco(fij\/Tos jp^ptpc^TeCov IsVtK^yvcoeicovros___
(Dem. xxviii, 14)
There are also other references which indicate that the 
will was a written document as opposed to an oral
declaration (83). Therefore, Paoli's view is mistaken.
The will of Polyeuctus has been thought by Lipsius 
Beauchet and Gernet (84) to be an oral* testament, but 
none of these scholars quote specific evidence in support 
of this. On the other hand, Harrison also thinks that
Polyeuctus' will was not written, and supports his 
suggestion with the following:
Ol? £*VjTrO\) tc a - t  Tvpat. $ .. . p  6 v S j  fJiO -  ^  TVf> £  L V
. . . T o t ) 5 TO  T“£ Ajs.VT'ofc.C®* Toi*$ £<*.3 [fa -p t* y & /G
(Dem. xli, 16)
He rightly states that this quotation implies that the 
terms of the will could only be discovered1 by questioning
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witnesses (85). In addition, if the will had been
written, it would have been very reliable evidence to 
present to the court. However, this is not done; the
only papers which are presented to the court as evidence 
are those which Polyeuctus' wife left and in which
certain debts are recorded (86). Furthermore, there is 
no specific reference to the fact that the; document was 
written, since the verb used to referi to the actual 
making of the will is which can refer either
to a written or an oral contract (87). Thus it is very 
probable that the will of Polyeuctus was oral and not
written.
Therefore, it appears that it was not contrary to 
law for a man to make an oral as opposed to a written 
will. It is self evident that in the case of an oral 
will witnesses would have to be present, otherwise no one 
would know its terms. Besides this formal necessity, an 
oral disposition of property seems to have been allowed 
by law in addition to a written testament, although since 
the only means of discovering its terms was by the 
testimony of witnesses, it was not such a reliable way of 
disposing of property. There is no evidence that there
were legal rulings concerning the form of such a 
declaration.
I shall now discuss whether there were any legal 
obligations concerning the manner in which a will was 
written, such as the order in which its terms were 
presented. There is no reference to a law which states 
that a testament had to be written in a particular way in 
order to be legally valid, as was the case in ancient
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Rome (88). However, Ziebarth states that there are 
various similarities in the forms of wills found in 
Attica, other areas of Greece and in Egypt. They begin 
with a date, a personal description of the testator, and 
have a euphemistic formal opening. This is followed by 
the regulation of goods, the appointment of executors and 
the documents end with the naming of witnesses (89). My 
discussion is limited to wills from Athens, few of whose 
texts are extant, but I shall attempt to examine how true 
Ziebarth's list is with reference to these particular 
examples.
Even though the will of Pasio (c.370/1) is 
introduced with the words SJ*-v T o t s>
<x-vtyv ([Dem. ] xlv, 28), thus suggesting that the whole 
will is to be read to the court, its functions (90) 
suggest that in fact only the first part of the document 
is read out. It begins with the words:
TiSfc S^teBero ffoc6
( [ Dem. ] xlv, 28 )
Here, the aorist form of £»o</r'I9y i*u is used, and the 
testator identifies himself by the name of his deme. 
This is followed by clauses dealing with the care of his
wife Archippe. Since this is the only part, of the will
which survives, it .^s impossible to state in what order
the other terms were written and whether executors or
witnesses were named.
(c.3>+*)
The will of PlatoAbegins with the words:
IAS*
(D. L. iii, 41)
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Here also, the aorist form of S^riby/Xi, is used, but the 
testator only identifies himself by means of his own 
name, as opposed to naming his father or deme. This is
/j
followed by a bequest of the testator's and an
inventory of property. The document ends with a list of 
executors.
Cc- 3U)
The opening words of the will of Aristotle/as 
preserved by Diogenes Laertius are:
EgT'La, fxz./ e v  Tfc j tJ.S& Ss.'tbkro
(D. L. v, 11)
This is the first time that both a wish that everything 
be well and a conditional clause are found; again, the 
aorist form of ' is used. This is followed by th^
appointment of executors,^clauses regulating the care of 
his dependents and the disposition of property, and^ends 
with provisions of a religious nature. The opening 
sentence is not found in the Arabic version of the text, 
neither are the religious provisions.
The will of the philosopher Theophrastus (c. 288-285) 
begins as follows:
E&TCH.L e,V Goiv $€ TL } ToL£& SI 9 €jjtoLt'
(D. L. v, 51)
Here, the first three words are identical with those used 
by Aristotle in the opening of his will. A conditional 
clause is also found, but appears in the present
tense. There are then clauses dealing with the 
disposition of property, arrangement of burial and the 
care of slaves. The document ends with the naming of 
executors and the witnesses to the depositing of various 
copies.
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The will of Epicurus (c. 270) has no formal opening,
but firstly orders the disposition of the philosopher's
property. There are three various religious clauses and
the document ends with orders concerning the care of 
dependents. There is also a letter which can be regarded 
as an additional (91), and this opens with the
statement that it was written on the last day of the 
testator's life, r e  v  r<u.to<. v  j f c e p n v  t q v  f i i o v  (d. L. x,
22). This letter solely concerns the care of the 
children of Metrodorus.
Strato's testament (c. 269) begins with the words:
7*c<fd Siolt' / rt 60
(D. L. v, 61)
Here, the present form of and a conditional
clause is found. This is followed by various 
dispositions of property, the naming of executors and 
further clauses regarding property. The testament ends 
with provisions for burial.
The will of the peripatetic philosopher Lyco
(c.228-224) opens as follows:
7£Se irep l x*.r> e-jj-x.v-ro^
T$j V ».pp*J 6 r C <* / Tc*. v T'J V virtue y v '
(D. L. v, 69)
Here, the present form of is used, and it is
followed by a conditional clause which suggests that the 
testament was written during the testator's last 
illness. There are then various dispositions of 
property, clauses relating to burial, further 
dispositions of property.
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The document ends with the naming of witnesses.
In the majority of the Athenian wills whose texts 
are extant, there is no indication of when the document 
was writtenv ~fhis is only found in two of them, namely 
the will of Lyco and the letter of Epicurus.
It is only in the earlier testaments, namely those of 
Pasio, Plato and Aristotle, that the testator names 
himself at the beginning of the will; this is not done in 
later testaments. In addition, in those wills which have 
formal openings, the aorist tense of S i t - r C -j_s  found 
in the earlier documents, whereas in the later wills, the 
present tense is used. Both of these differences between 
the earlier and later wills seem to indicate an
alteration in custom as opposed to law, since it was 
possible not to have an introductory sentence as is 
indicated by the will of Epicurus. Only in the wills of
Theophrastus and Aristotle which begin with 
can the opening be regarded as remotely optimistic. In 
the main body of the will, there seems to be no set
formal pattern, sometimes executors and witnesses are 
named, sometimes they are not, although clauses dealing 
with the disposition of property often, but not always,
follow the opening sentence. The diversity in the 
setting out of the clauses in the extant Athenian 
testaments indicates that there were probably no legal or 
formal requirements concerning this matter, but that this 
was left completely to the discretion of the testator.
From the extant Athenian testaments, it can be seen 
that only in the will of Lyco are the witnesses to the
document written in it (92). In addition, Isaeus states
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that if Astyphilus had wished to make his will in secret, 
he need not have written the names of the witnesses in it:
(Is. ix, 12)
This quotation suggests that the names of the witnesses 
were sometimes written in the will by the testator, 
probably in the manner in which they are written down in 
the will of Lyco (D. L. v, 72).
There is a problem concerning whether witnesses 
could write their own names in a will, Beauchet, quoting 
Isaeus iv, 13 which states that most witnesses are not 
aware of the contents of a will, suggests that this 
indicates that witnesses did not write their own names in 
a will (93). However, Isaeus is rather misleading in 
this passage, because witnesses often did know the 
function of a will (94). In addition, it could have been 
possible to keep the secrecy of the document by means of 
placing something over the writing of the bequests and so 
on while the witnesses signed their names. There is, 
however, no evidence that this was done. In view of the
lack of evidence concerning this matter, I would
hes£itj?ate to agree with Beauchet, but state that this is
an open question.
Since there is only one extant example of a will 
which contains the names of witnesses written in it, it 
seems as if the other testaments were either not
witnessed at all, or that the identity of the witnesses
was recorded elsewhere. Bunsen (95) suggests that the
[IcLpTTJpt*.
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names of witnesses could have been written on the outside 
of the document as opposed to being written inside it. 
However, there is no precise evidence which suggests that 
this was done, except that the names of witnesses were 
not written inside the other wills, which does not 
indicate anything. It is also possible that the 
witnesses may have attached their seals to the will and 
indicated by this means that they had witnessed the 
document (96).
In order to ensure that his will was not tampered 
with, a man could seal the document. This could also act 
as a means of identification. The material which was 
used to make the seal is not stipulated. Bonner suggests 
that the material may have been some sort of adhesive 
clay (97), citing the following passage as his evidence:
J V  TO V TuSv yj M .  9 * p o S ;  6  ^ jU ol LY(& T °c l
\ \  x  -/ S'
t t b p ^  7**<> ^  A  i* 6 6 O  V  it-cC i- (•JT& cTo<» 6jJ(ACit*mV T ~ jO io o*.
€’iTcn*/\.i.6a.s i r r t o v  S *-.*- r ^ o v '
(Herodotus, ii, 38)
However, since in this section of the Histories Herodotus 
is describing the customs of the Egyptians in their
religious practices, this cannot be taken as conclusive
evidence that the Greeks used clay as a sealing material
in addition to wax. Bonner states that the "brittleness
I
of the clay as compared with wax in all probability led 
to the use of protective caps" (98). However, since 
there is no evidence that clay was used as a sealing 
material in Greece, and bearing in mind seals could be 
tampered with or even forged (99), it is even more likely
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that seal caps acted as a measure to protect the seals 
from unscrupulous persons.
There is a problem concerning the question of 
whether a man allowed his witnesses to seal his will in 
addition to sealing it himself. Since the names of 
witnesses sometimes were not written in the document, 
this would be a means of identifying these people.
Isaeus has stated that witnesses to a will could not 
say for certain that the document produced in court was 
identical with that which they had witnessed being made 
(100), and this has been cited by Lipsius and Beauchet as 
evidence that a will was rarely, if at all sealed by the 
witnesses (101). However, there is other evidence which 
these scholars have not taken into account.
The peripatetic philosopher Theophrastus also refers 
to the practice in his will:
oct SldL&^KtLL KeZv'TaLL ZiVTt y 7; £ (*)eO<fjOK6> TO V
$*.tCTV beby . . .
(D. L. v, "57 )
Here, the fact that the testator specifically states that 
the document is sealed with his signet ring (Sslx.t v 'X^cJ )
indicates that there was only one seal affixed to the
document.
On the other hand, Wyse states that "there is also
no evidence that the practice of sealing by witnesses was
unusual, or forbidden, or considered inexpedient" (102), 
and he refers to two passages in which the seals of a 
will are mentioned in the plural form:
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 £* ry $  tlKVj Kott rdO r* 6yy**c 1 tSfiL / oc
yufrvf Si*.oc6Tpcl T6 rrp H y i* ' eyi/&J6ot.Vj . . .
( [ Dem. ] xlv, 17)
*x*fci.v yjA4.Z$ pLmp*. ryV tc*.<pu.\yv € ^ n o \/re s  r y
XAc, *7 * 7  Tty /Tc^vrv C e /tM * r t ls  i r r o i 6 y , . . . .
(Aristophanes, Wasns. 584-585)
These passages are an indication that a testator may have 
asked his witnesses to join with him in sealing his
will. On the other hand, Bonner states that since these 
wills are both examples of documents which were presented 
to the court, the original seals must have been destroyed 
to enable the heirs to read the contents (103).
There is also another case in which seals are 
referred to. This is not a will but the papers left by 
Polyeuctus' wife which record various loans made. In 
this instance, the seals are referred to in the 
plural, (Dem. xli, 17). The papers were
written in the presence of the lady's brothers who were 
witnesses to the act (104). This is taken by Bonner as 
evidence that the testament was sealed by the lady's 
brothers as witnesses "and possibly by herself" (105).
Lipsius disagrees with Bonner, and states that the seals 
on the will did not belong to the woman's brothers but to 
the lady herself (106). However, this does not explain
why more than one seal was attached to the document. It
is possible that since the document had several seals and 
since it was written by Polyeuctus' wife, one of the 
seals belonged to her, but it would not have been 
necessary for her to seal it more than once, so the other
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seals probably belonged to her brothers who had witnessed
the document. It is possible that since women were not
allowed to make contracts for more than a very small
amount (107), this is the reason why the document bore
more than one seal. On the other hand, this example
could be regarded equally as a slight proof that the
witnesses to a will may have been permitted to seal it.
Although Bonner is correct in stating that the seals 
mentioned in the passages quoted by Wyse were not those 
put there at the making of the will, he does not suggest 
how they came to be there. A solution to this problem
can be found in reference to the will of Demosthenes (I): 
&7lV ) inetS-y ’e rtA J tv rye tv  b TTotryp ,
J / / \ t j%
6i6K^kX£ 6oLrTvL£ p.<**pTirpoi.s TToLpol&y
i t . e A . t v .
(Dem. xxviii, 5)
Bonner states that this passage shows the " witnesses
did sometimes affix their seals to documents" (108). 
However, the words eiret-dy... rrtt.^yp indicate that
Demosthenes is referring to events which should have
taken place after his father's death. Therefore, the 
persons whom the guardians were supposed ) to
call in would not have witnessed the making of the will. 
Demosthenes (II) does not make it quite clear what
exactly these persons would witness, but it may have been 
the opening and reading of the will. The word 
suggests that it may have been customary for persons to 
be summoned by the relatives of the testator in order to 
witness the opening and reading of the will, and that 
they would then be requested to seal it.
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A similar situation occurs in the case of the 
document left by Polyeuctus' wife:
(Dem. xli, 21)
Here, no witnesses are called to be present at the 
opening of the document left by Polyeuctus' wife. 
However, the genuineness of the seals is agreed upon by 
the daughters of the lady, and this is witnessed by their 
husbands who then break the seals and take copies of the 
document. It is not stated that anyone else was present 
when this was done. Therefore, in this case, the 
original seals of the document are replaced by others, 
and these are the seals of the persons who opened and 
read the document.
Thus, it is possible that Athenian wills could 
either be sealed by the testator only or by the witnesses 
as well, although the latter was perhaps uncommon. After 
the testator's decease, the original seals would be
broken, the document read and then re-sealed. Where 
there were witnesses to this, they might seal it, 
otherwise the persons who broke the original seals would 
replace them with their own. There is no evidence that 
it was legally obligatory for a man to seal his will, but 
even though this was probably only customary, it would 
have been most unwise for this precaution not to be 
taken, since sealing a will could act as a deterrent for
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unscrupulous persons.
Although the testator's seal would be a means of
identifying a will, a testament might also have the name 
of the testator written on the outside, as Pasio's did 
(109). This would have been a very prudent step to take 
if the will was to be deposited in a public place (110).
Another form of security would have been to make 
copies of the will and deposit them in various places so
that even if one was tampered with, another could be
produced. There would, however, be the problem of 
deciding which would be the true copy if this happened. 
Even though Bonner states that " testators did not as a 
rule leave duplicates" (111), there are various cases in 
which it is evident that copies were left.
The document alleged to be the will of Pasio which 
was produced in court was a copy of the original
testament, and evidence was furnished in proof of this 
(112). Apollodorus, in arguing that this copy was a 
forgery, states that:
j j . i j , ot'u avcTfrts rrwrroTS ie.vr'lyfoctf
^ttol^6ccto j 6'vy'jpa.<f'i*)V yuiv' '"tv*. finj
, &QC$y v S i oi>. tov tov o^cjo
ttov6 ^  ot >/OL^  <^ 'oC
. V"£$ Vfl€r?5 <crrt-
titv-r'lyp £^TtV rt3 / o & 7* £/
rif y p * - yey/Ooc^.ev* ^
( [Dem.] xlvi, 28)
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Here, the words - - - eiroi-ybx-To imply that copies of
testaments were never made, which suggests that the copy 
of the document produced in court was not genuine.
However, if copies of wills were contrary to both law and
custom, it would have been very unlikely that Phormio 
would have won his case, since in Dem. xxxvi, the
speech on Phormio7 s behalf, the will is specifically
referred to as a copy of the original (113). The reason 
given for never making copies of testaments was that the 
will would no longer be secret ( t V S i ^  an(j
from this passage, Beauchet concludes that if copies were
made during the testator7 s lifetime, the will7 s secrecy 
would in some way be compromised (114). However, Wyse 
rightly states that "the logic is bad, since a duplicate 
may be kept as secret as the original" (115). This is
because it was within the testator7 s power to make copies 
of his testament and not tell anyone of their contents in 
the same manner in which he could keep the function of 
his will secret. In addition, it is incorrect to say 
that the contents of a will were not divulged to anybody, 
since there is evidence to the contrary (116). Harrison 
suggests that Apollodorus could either be lying or
"expressing in a very misleading way the fact that no one 
was obliged to make a public copy of what was written in 
his will" (117). However, it is very probable that 
Apollodorus is lying, since he specifically states that 
no one made a copy of a will. Apollodorus7 statement is 
also contrary to the other extant evidence.
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The will of Diodotus is at first referred to 
as (Lysias, xxxii, 5). However, later it is
stated that copies were left behind. Since these are not 
mentioned at first, it is possible that both the 
and the ypJ.iAfAti.rot, were copied in the presence of Diogeiton 
and then sealed (118).
Diogenes Laertius states that the philosopher 
Arcesilaus made three wills:
T f tT i rt. $l<JL.b'’JtCeLS TfOC^ j fjLp'SrU'OS - -
(D. L. iv, 43)
These words are ambiguous, because they could be taken to 
mean that three separate wills were made whose provisions 
may have differed. What was probably the case is
indicated in the testator's letter to Thaumasias. Here, 
Arcesilaus refers to the document he is sending to 
Thaumasias as Six.U’j** .'1* &fAx.vrov t ancj those in the keeping
of his friends and Amphicritus as old-tol*- (119), which
implies that they are copies of the testament sent to
Thaumasias. Thus, it seems as if two copies of the will
of Arcesilaus were made.
The philosopher Theophrastus records the copies
which were made of his testament in what seems to be an
addition to the original will (120). This suggests that
the testator retained the original document and made 
three copies of it.
There is also a reference to the copying of the 
document left by Polyeuctus' wife. In this case, copies 
of the document were made by the parties concerned
following the lady's death. This suggests that even if 
no copies of a will were made, it may have been possible
-442-
for those affected by it to make a copy of it after the 
testator's death.
The fact that there are only four examples of copies 
of wills made (this is excluding the left by
Polyeuctus' wife) indicates that it was perhaps not usual 
for this to be done, but also that it was not contrary to 
law.
Depositing
In order to attempt to keep his will safe, a 
testator might deposit the document in the care of 
someone whom he trusted. That this was sometimes done is 
indicated in Isaeus, vii when the speaker, in comparing 
the trustworthiness of an adoption "inter vivos" to 
testamentary adoption states that the latter was effected 
by means of a sealed up document which was deposited with 
certain persons, t< # .rl9 6 r-o -r»«c
(Is. vii, 1). Even though the plural is 
used here, unless copies were made, the document would 
only be deposited with one person (121).
In some cases, a will would be lodged with a 
relative. The will of Philoctemon was allegedly
deposited with his brother-in-law Chaereas (122), and the
will of Astyphilus was left in the safekeeping of his
maternal uncle, Hierocles (123). The will of Euctemon
was deposited with a certain Pythodorus of Cephisia who
/ > ^is described as a relative of his, wvru cCV>T^> (is.
vi, 27). In these cases it seems as if the person who is 
to take charge of the will is neither a beneficiary nor, 
in the wills where an adoption is the function, the
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father of the adopted son.
The will of Diodotus and a copy of it were left in 
the house:
(Lysias, xxxii, 7)
Wyse states that one copy of the will of Diodotus was 
left in the keeping of Diogeiton and the other was left 
in the house (124). This suggests that the copies were 
left in two different places. However, Lysias does not 
state this specifically. The word suggests that
both copies were left in the house, and since Diogeiton 
was probably asked to care for the children (125), a task 
which most likely would entail remaining in the house, it 
is possible that one copy may have been left with him. 
It is not stated with whom the other copy was left, but 
is is possible that it was entrusted to the testator's 
wife, since Diogeiton allegedly took certain papers from 
her following Diodotus's death (126), which either may 
have been financial documents, since she seemed to have 
had knowledge of her husband' s financial circumstances
(127), or a copy of the will, or both.
In the speech concerning the estate of Dicaeogenes 
(II), it is not made very clear who his will was 
deposited with. The speaker states that the will was 
produced by Proxenus:
«*crac. 7l <• cru) i/-
(Is. v, 6 ) (128)
-444-
This suggests that the document might well have been 
deposited with him. Thus, it seems as if the father of 
the adopted son was requested to keep the will. In 
addition, Proxenus was a relative of Dicaeogenes (II), 
very probably his cousin (129).
It is not specifically stated with whom the will of 
Hagnias was deposited. In Isaeus xi, it is stated that 
if the testator's niece and testamentary adopted daughter 
were to die, then Glaucon was bequeathed the estate 
(130). However, in the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech 
concerning Hagnias' estate, it is alleged that both 
Glaucus and Glaucon produced the will:
S i S e  'JjiCO* K,#.rv.5Jdevoc6*.^ T"6-S /*Axtv»coS rfe- o
0  Z o v
( [Dem. ] xliii, 4 )
Here, Glaucus, the one who probably did not benefit under 
the terms of the will is mentioned first, and there would 
have been no necessity to mention him at all unless he
was giving evidence in favour of his brother's claim.
The fact that the word K.#.'r+(,yce\*L6*.\rre<-, applies to both 
Glaucus and Glaucon and only the latter was a beneficiary
suggests that Glaucus may have been entrusted with the 
safekeeping of the testament. Glaucus was Hagnias' 
homometric brother and the full brother of Glaucon the 
secondary heir.
In his speeches against Aphobus, Demosthenes (II) 
does not state clearly with whom his father left his
will. Following a detailed account of his father' s 
property, the orator states that he is not in possession
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of the testament which contained these details:
L SJ ik*C't0l'fie6T€po\/ IzyvtJTj vC^j Gl yU0u TbLi SMudyiceuij oie 
b rrocryp Ktt-reK i rr& /, q &ro c £.iro Sov hm. y &c? V.
(Dem. xxvii, 40).
Here, the words ZLW0$6 vrtCL y B (r^ y b ^ \/ suggest^ that even
though the will is not produced, it still exists, and 
that the reason why it is not brought before the court is 
that the guardians do not wish to give it up. Towards
the end of the speech, it is alleged that the guardians
have made the document vanish:
o t  Ty \/ $ y$t n / 'lic * .6 i\/ . • •
(Dem. xxvii, 64).
This suggests that the will might not exist any more, an 
idea which is developed in the second speech against 
Aphobus:
7T iv r c o v  S 'J i r o T T M r o c r o S  e c r c v ,  T ie yo o rcc s  c o t o n*.r-yy>  o v <
T o *  O t^-O V  ^  ^  ic'tj \ /  j j .y  $  tLftO’O
T*.vT yV  TTO cj out ve^ - 'Sj ir jf yS y v  boS&t'b-L
TyM‘**L ^ 'ry \/ S f*V6r\.OVT‘oL.$ fJV-pTVfoiv-V oyV^JS £>c/6-60OCl
Se-£V [ fts re r ''& 6  &■(*.>- rroLpJ
(Dem. xxviii, 5)
Here, it is not only stated that the guardians refuse to 
produce the document, but that they have destroyed it,
(we-XovTot-s ).
Because of the lack of evidence, it is difficult to say 
whether the will was still in existence by the time 
Demosthenes (II) brought the case against Aphobus.
-446-
In the three passages quoted, the plural forms suggest 
that all three guardians were responsible for not 
producing the will, and thus imply that it was deposited
with all of them. However, it seems as if they did not
reside together, and because of this, it would not have 
been possible to deposit the will with the three of them 
unless three separate copies were made, and given to each 
of them, but there is no evidence for this. Therefore, 
it is likely that the plural is used here to heighten the 
effect of Demosthenes' plea; he is an inexperienced young 
man conducting a case against a fraudulent guardian who 
has connived with the other two in keeping his father's 
will from him. A greater indication of the identity of 
the depositary is found in speech xxix. Here, it is 
stated that Aphobus alone was responsible for not 
producing the will:
_  _  _ ToLvryv jMrV ovu. . - .
(Dem. xxix, 42) O nctTyv refers to
Here, the third person singular form of the verb
suggests that only one person refused to give 
up the will, and since Aphobus is being referred to here, 
it suggests that only he was given the will. In view of
the fact that there is no evidence concerning whether or
not copies were made, this seems more plausible. Thus, 
it seems very probable that the will of Demosthenes (I) 
was deposited with his nephew Aphobus.
The will of Arcesilaus was deposited with several
persons. One copy was sent to Thaumasias:
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T^ jv Se rpor^v 1/ eis ail^ OV rrpos Q « ’UjiaL6ioi.\/
%'S#* T ii/*  Tfijs & y *y  iCcLi,tJv j  ctjg loO€*-& Si*Tyjoy6oCL 
(D. L. iv, 43).
It is not stated how Thaumasias was related to the
testator, he is simply referred to as one of his
relatives. It is probable that the word ot^ov refers to
the testator's home, Pitane in Aeolis. It seems as if 
Thaumasias was a beneficiary under the terms of the will
(131). A copy was also deposited with a certain 
Amphicritus, and another with certain friends in Athens:
ty & y /y e iv  rr*-pcL r t 6 tc3 /  y /uptfjLLo ✓
(D. L. iv, 44 ).
Here, in his letter to Thaumasias, the testator does not 
state whether Amphicritus was a friend or relative of 
his. In addition, he does not state who the 
acquaintances in Athens are. However, the fact that one 
copy of the document was deposited with several persons, 
and there is no evidence that further copies were to be 
made, suggests that either these persons had a common
abode or that they would jointly take care of the 
document which would be placed somewhere where they would 
all have access to it. Since Arcesilaus was the head of 
the Middle Academy in Athens, and several persons were to 
have care of the will, it is possible that the document 
was to be kept somewhere in the school, and thus in 
effect be deposited with more than one person.
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Therefore, in the case of the will of Arcesilaus, it was 
deposited not only with different people but in three 
different parts of Greece. One of the depositaries was a 
beneficiary, but there is no evidence that the others 
were, although it is possible that those in Athens were 
fellow scholars of the testator.
The peripatetic philosopher, Theophrastus also 
deposited, copies of his will with various persons. One 
copy was lodged with Hegesias, the son of Hipparchus, 
another with Olympiodorus and a third with Adeimantus
(132). None of these persons benefitted under the terms 
of the will, although Hegesias' father, Hipparchus was a 
beneficiary. It is not stated whether these persons were 
friends or relatives of the testator (133). The 
depositing of these copies was witnessed by certain 
persons, and this is the only extant evidence that the 
depositing of a will was witnessed in addition to its 
making.
The text of the will of Pasio which is produced in 
the court is not the original document, but a copy of it, 
so it is presented to the court together with a challenge 
and evidence:
-rS ji S iu .9 -yu s ij$  ^  To i v r C \ j P *  4 o v  iOxX T y v  rrpo*. s  r b t i / r y v ' i  kuci
p-eLfiT vpi*. * TV.UTi*-6w i  1 fTcL/>} ol& out ShlS'G fCOU- K.6-2V 7-bU. 7 •
(Dem. xxxvi, 7). J J
Here, the genuineness of . the clause rrot/>- • - has
been questioned by Huettner, and it is possible that it
could be an interpolation, maybe from a marginal gloss.
Sandys finds the plural inaccurate, since "the
-449-
will appears to have been deposited with one person only" 
(134). On the other hand, the plural rus y m u p T v suggests 
that more than one testimony was read out, and if the 
clause iwyJ'— j_s genuine, this would suggest that 
the will of Pasio may have been copied out more than once 
and deposited with more than one person. However, there 
is no evidence in any of the speeches concerning the case 
that this was done. In addition, there is some
indication concerning the nature of this evidence in a
later speech, when Apollodorus refers to it:
o j4.£* jp*-fjLfA(KTero'S e f ' c S c<-
zr&jAP&eLS O rro t o v t o v  -rovto,
6c 5^  ij" ijsevSoSt j »/ &■<-£&</<*•
( [ Dem. ] xlv, 18 )
Since this quotation appears in the first speech of 
Apollodorus against Stephanus, it is- probable that the 
evidence referred to was that mentioned in Dem. xxxvi, 
7. In the above passage, the first person mentioned 
seems to be the depositary who claimed he had (fcxecl/ ) 
the will, and the second is Amphias who produced the 
document before the arbitrator Teisias (135), and alleged
that he was sent by the depositary &no TorUTr>{J ).
This suggests that only one person gave evidence that the
will was deposited with him, and thus is further evidence
that the genuineness of the clause tlk.p - - <ce< - i s
<0
dubious. The testimony of the depositary Cephis/phon is 
then quoted:
-450-
M A P T X P I A
fojtfl60(ficdv 'ftcpiS^cCCkO$ jJL^upTvptZ /<*T 0^ 7L^ ) & -yV«J~
t>rrb to v  traLrpos ypt^pLjA^re'Cov ^  edf J % in~Ly p o i^ & o u *
‘SifUb^ icy [JoU 'L^VO <* .
( [ Dem. ] xlv, 19)
This deposition suggests that after a will was opened and
-ho
read, it could be returned to the person witHi whom it was
entrusted for safekeeping. The words ^ - •
o *
indicate that Cephis/phon inherited the will
from his father Cephalion. There is nowhere any specific
indication that a man was legally obliged to take care of
a document which had been deposited with his father.
However, since a man inherited all the debts owed to and
by his father's estate, it is very probable that he would
have also inherited all the other obligations concerned
with the property, and this would include the
responsibility for any documents placed in his father's
care. There is no indication of the connection between
the depositary and the testator, but the fact that Pasio
was a freedman suggests that he was probably a friend.
There is no evidence to suggest that Cephalion was
involved in the business of banking as is implied by
Davies (136). Therefore, a copy of the will of Pasio was 
deposited with Cephalion and this was inherited by his 
son Cephisophon. There is no indication that the
depositary benefitted under the terms of the document.
It is alleged by the speaker of Isaeus i that the 
will of Cleonymus was lodged with a magistrate or several 
magistrates. For the most part, when referring to the 
depositing of the document, the speaker refers to
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magistrate in the singular (137), although he twice 
refers to magistrates in the plural (138). The function 
of this magistrate is indicated when the speaker produces 
witnesses concerning the alleged attempt by Cleonymus to 
get the document back:
T f p v r o v  j / * v  fyr/ X T d L p e ^ O ^ L . p Z p T V p * *  . . .
iT o te t& ir r r r o v  ' i fT e fA y e v  Tov Ic tT W o p L O Y j av rO S  5 l a £  f i .O V 0 Y
otvros dJk. e \4 6 v ro t  e r r i  r o j y  $vf)ot.Y
U r r i t r e u y e v .
(Is. JL , 15).
Here, it is stated that the magistrate was an astynomos,
and it is implied that his name is Archonides (139).
However, there is no evidence that an astynomos had the
care of private documents such as wills as part of his
official duty (140). The official functions of the
astynomos were mainly concerned with matters of
cleanliness of the streets and the enforcing of sumptuary
laws (141). Demosthenes describes the man likely to be 
A
elected as astynomos, or any other minor official, as:
f  > j s  \ J  / votr bjpno5 /<<*■<- id m ry s  tcocc urrecfas /euc
(Dem. xxiv, 112 )
Even though the orator is probably indulging in a little 
hyperbole here in order to heighten the contrast between 
these minor officials and wealthy ambassadors, the 
impression this quotation gives is that the former had 
not much experience of public office and this would 
suggest that it might not be wise to deposit a will with 
such persons. Indeed, since the astynomoi were not
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appointed by election but by lot, )'
this explains why they would be inexjperienced. In 
addition, since this method of appointment j was used, it 
would have not been outside the realms of possibility for 
Deinias to be elected and thus have custody of the
Idocument, a likelihood which the testator may have had to 
bear in mind.
Kennedy has suggested that the a 
friend of the testator who just happened to
(142). However, this does not explain whe 
was permitted to deposit a will with 
astynomoi.
stynomos was a 
call on him 
ther or not one 
the board of
The will of Cleonymus is the only exanjple we have of 
a testament allegedly being lodged with an astynomos^. 
Because of this, Wyse has suggested that ijt was not an 
ordinary will and its making "was accompanied by public 
formalities at which Deinias happened to be present"
i
(143). However, Wyse nowhere states in what way the will 
of Cleonymus could be regarded as not ordinary. Its 
function, namely bequest without adoption j(144), although 
not very common in fourth-century Athens, was not 
extraordinary enough to require a public meeting, and
there are other examples of wills which had a similar 
function and there is no evidence that public formalities 
were called for in these cases (145). There is, however, 
an article in Harpocration concerning the word Sons :
S&a' cfctJS 'rocs ‘p jro p e i
T l 6 TU $ i $ c 5 T i  VL StOK. d c p ^ o v T U i iJ
(Harpocration, v° )
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This passage might be interpreted as meaning that it was 
only with the permission of the archon that a man could 
give all his property to someone by bequest without 
adoption. However, Beauchet states that Harpocration 
probably made a mistake, because the Athenians did not 
give their magistrates the responsibility accorded to 
their Roman counterparts, and follows Roeder in offering 
the explanation that Harpocration probably only intended 
to say that an heir by testament was instituted by means 
of the adjudication of the archon or the tribunal over 
which the archon presided (146). I find this explanation 
convincing.
In view of the fact that the keeping of documents 
was not an official duty of the astynomos, that there is 
no evidence that any magistrate had documents deposited 
with him because his duties entailed this and that 
Cleonymus would necessarily know the identity of the 
person who would be caring for his will, it is more
probable that Cleonymus deposited his will with a certain 
Archonides, who may have been either a relative or a 
friend, and who happened to be in the official position 
of astynomos in the year in which the testator died (147).
It is not stated with whom the will of Epicurus was 
deposited. However, there is a reference in the
testament to a $66 IS which is lodged in the Metroon:
TocSfc ToL ijJ.ti.VToi} TTcO'T'oC f a j j S O V O 0
f i* .T jQ e v Koa TifjL0*f>~T6i- h y f y r p t o v  Tys
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e v  r y  M y p t p u  S o * l v  . . .
(D. L. x, 16) *
Bruns finds it strange that a document which was in 
effect an inventory of property (148) was not included in 
a will but deposited in a state archive when it was 
possible to deposit such a document with the archon for 
greater security (149). However, he cites no example of 
a will which was deposited with the archon (150). The
Metroon, where Epicurus states his Sons was lodged was
used as a sort of public record office (151). There is
evidence that charges against a person were kept there 
from the late fifth century (152), and that affidavits 
and records of decrees were also deposited there (153). 
The records lodged here were placed in the charge of 
a $*jf*o6tos or public slave (154), who would have no 
personal interest in them at all, and thus be a very
trustworthy guardian. The fact that there is this 
reference in the will of Epicurus that a could be
kept in the Metroon suggests that it might well have been 
possible for a icy to be deposited there as well.
Therefore, it was customary for a will to be
deposited for safekeeping, and this was generally done
with a friend or a relative, although it may have been
possible for a man to deposit his will in the Metroon.
However, there is no evidence that it was a legal
obligation for a man to deposit his will, so it was
probably possible for him to keep it himself, although
this would not be a very practical arrangement if the
CASfe <ty,r\9
testator was making a will in bfeg—ft^ ent of,,hi« dying
while on military service. The majority of the wills
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from the classical period about which there is
information concerning their depositing, were lodged with 
relatives, whereas the wills from the non-classical
seems to indicate an alteration in custom as opposed to 
law.
Codicils. Alteration and Revocation
Once a man had deposited his will, he might have 
wished to alter his dispositions of property, or revoke 
the document altogether. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the legal formalities concerning these matters.
It is alleged by the heirs "ab intestato" of 
Cleonymus that a testator could alter his dispositions by 
means of a codicil:
e r e  S i  e i  T L  n p o f y  f t c y ' f i i * ,  T O ~ O T O \S  G /S o  V , S i *  T L  O X ) <
kv St
TTecpv. U f ^ o v r u i v  o x >k  e S v v ' j B y  * D L j3 e ~ v / ' u y e 'K e b s
/ . y y .c   . i . “  j/_ >.
i
(Is. i, 25)
At this point in the speech, the heirs "ab intestato" 
have been arguing that Cleonymus wished to revoke 
(6/e-x.e^ / ) his will and it was for this purpose that he
sent for the magistrate, as opposed to the claim by the 
testamentary heirs that he wished to alter the bequest
period seem to have been deposited with friends. This
ncLpoc rj j
ifiov ’Kero tcocl 1
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(155).
There have been various views expressed concerning 
the legal significance of this passage. Beauchet, 
Guiraud and Lipsius are of the opinion that it indicates 
that the terms of a will could be altered by means of a 
codicil (156). Norton states that "if codicils were not 
permitted, such a question would have been absurd in the 
mouth of the most sophistical lawyer and before the most 
ignorant judges" (157). On the other hand, Wyse argues 
that the passage does not prove that codicils were known 
in Athenian law, and that the function of a codicil is 
not sufficiently explained by those who state otherwise, 
and asks the following questions: "If the former
dispositions of a testator could be altered in a 
supplement, what prevented the use of a "codicil" as an 
instrument to revoke a prior will? And if the same 
solemnities were required for "codicil" and testament, 
how were the two distinguished?" (158) Goligher agrees 
with Wyse, and asserts that a codicil was more or less a 
new will (159). Harrison states that the meaning of 
Isaeus, i, 2 5 has been obscured by commentators, but 
neglects to give his own interpretation of the passage.
However, since he fails to mention the possibility of a 
man making a codicil, it seems as if he accepts the view 
of Wyse (160).
In view of the different arguments concerning the 
passage, it is necessary to re-examine it. The crux of 
the argument in Isaeus, i, 25 rests on the possiblility 
that Cleonymus could have made certain alterations in the 
form of a codicil if he had been unable to obtain the
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document from the depositary. If codicils (jr^«£yu./A*Ta<. )
were not allowed, then, as Norton states, this argument 
would not be credible. On the other hand, the 
words .. . &f&4 v \ t r o  imply that the testator could
have written anything he wished in such a document, since 
no limitation is stated. However, this could be 
interpreted as being tantamount to making a new 
testament, and it is very probable that a later will did 
not annul a earlier one, unless the earlier one had 
actually been destroyed or defaced before a second one 
was made. Therefore, the argument in Isaeus, i, 25 
suggests that it was probably legal to make a codicil, 
but its implication concerning the function of such a
document is misleading.
Thus it is necessary to examine the probable 
/
function of the which the heirs " ab intestato"
are referring to. The fact that the testamentary heirs
allege that Cleonymus called for the astynomos in order 
to correct or alter the bequest in some way (161) 
suggests that this could not be done by means of a 
codicil. Indeed, a substantial alteration, such as 
possibly cutting Pherenicus out of the will (162) could
be regarded as functioning as another will altogether, 
since the bequests to the other heirs might well be 
increased as a result. Some clue to the probable
function of a ' codicil' can be found in other inheritance
cases, where there is mention of certain • The
will of Diodotus was deposited along with 
certain which contained information concerning
investments, loans and so on (163). The wife of
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Polyeuctus left behind ypK/ifLcLT* in which were written 
details concerning her husband's property (164). 
Furthermore, Epicurus left an inventory of property, 
a So6<$ / which was deposited in the Metroon (165). It
was also possible to leave such details concerning 
property in the will itself, as Demosthenes (I) and Plato 
did (166), but the examples of Diodotus, Polyeuctus' wife 
and Epicurus indicate that it was possible to write 
financial details in a separate document, and such a 
document was referred to as jpLppv-T*- or . An
explanation for such a practice could be that after 
making his will a man may have advanced a loan or 
incurred a debt or thought it advisable to make an
inventory of the property he possessed, but did not wish 
to recall the original document from the depositary.
These details would therefore be written in a separate
document, sealed and maybe deposited, either with the 
will or in a different place. Such a document would not 
constitute a new testament, since it would not contradict 
or alter the clauses and bequests in the testament, but 
would just add further details. It is perhaps misleading 
to call such additions ' codicils' since in English law
this word is used to refer to a document which can either 
modify or revoke a will, and this sort of document was 
not in accordance with Athenian law, and is not the
function of the in inheritance cases about
which there is information.
Therefore, it seems as if codicils as they are
referred to in English law were not valid in Athenian
law, but that documents which clarified matters
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concerning property were legal. Thus, Cleonymus' heir 
" ab intestato" is being deliberately misleading when he 
states that one could write anything one liked in a 
' codicil' , since this was not so.
There is very little evidence concerning the 
formalities involved in making a document such as this. 
The speaker of Dem. xli states that the brothers of 
Polyeuctus' wife were present when she recorded the debts 
owed to and by her husband's estate (9), and these papers 
were then sealed (21). There is, however, no evidence 
that witnesses were necessary when a man made such a 
record. These could either be deposited in a
separate place from the will, as happened in the case of
Epicurus, or, alternatively they could be deposited with 
the will, but not necessarily sealed with it, which seems 
to have been the arrangement made by Diodotus (167).
Very much connected with the making of codicils is 
the question whether a later will could automatically 
invalidate an earlier one without the latter having to be 
recalled.
The speaker of Isaeus, v alleges that two wills 
which were made by Dicaeogenes (II) were produced before
the court, the first in 411 and the second in 399; the
former ^as found invalid and the credibility of the
second was brought into question by the condemnation of
one of the witnesses for perjury (169). Wyse finds it
unlikely that Proxenus, with whom the first document was
tofOfrry
deposited was accused of p-er^U3?Y his own son, and
suggests that Dicaeogenes III "may have asserted that the 
will which he put forward in 399 was made after the will
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confirmed by the court in 411BC, and rendered the earlier 
document null and void" (169). Thompson interprets the 
events narrated in Isaeus v as follows:
"As I reconstruct the affair, the test 
made this will to assure that his sister 
adequate dowry, but once they were all mar 
his will, and gave his heir the entire 
This second will was not discovered unti 
been probated. If the man who had custody 
was abroad for several years in the 
would explain why it took so long to come to light"
(170).
Thus, Thompson's suggested function of Dicaeogenes (II)'s 
first will rests on the assumption that a later will 
automatically invalidated an earlier one. However, his 
argument is not quite clear, since th!e words "but
ator originally 
s received an 
ried he changed 
estate (5. 7 ). 
1 the first had 
of the will 
Ionian War that
estate" suggest that Dicaeogenes (II) act 
the will and made alterations to it, 
sentence immediately following this, it 
Thompson is assuming that Dicaeogenes 
wills. The only evidence for this is the 
speaker states that two were made
term ^  can be taken in this context
ually recalled 
whereas in the 
seems as if 
(II) made two 
fact that the 
However, the
as meaning a
as a "will" 
n this speech
"solemn compact" or "covenant" as well
(171). There is no specific statement i
that a later will automatically invalidated an earlier 
one.
Thompson also refers to a fragment of Isaeus in 
support of his argument:
-46 I-
T + v ry v  t c & w v  - l y *  iz r o n p i 6 ( v  e re f> < *v ' £ /c c 0 ^ c *y t/ 
§*0^6* v, j \  e feL G o tl ' f \p ^ e  rra'A.LV &  A y p v i J  S p x A e e fa C.
quotation, the
that he takes
ater will could
the speaker's 
c /
as meaning
(Is. frag. 1, Thai. )
Although Thompson does not discuss this 
context in which he refers to it suggests 
it as evidence concerning whether a 1 
invalidate an earlier, since it states that 
opponents alleged that Archepolis made another {£-r&poc* )
will in Lemnos. Thompson takes eripct.v'
'second' (172). However, in the second fragment, the 
speaker refers to four wills being foirged by his 
opponents:
A i0J)'I*'Zjv TesrrJLpcJV v ^ J &£yce-v° croiy^LernJV,
(Is. frag. 2, Thai. ) 
cTherefore eT^rAV in fragment one might not refer to the 
second of these wills. Neither of these two fragments, 
which are all that remain of the speech, cajn be used as:a
evidence that a second will invalidated the first, since
even if Archepolis did make another will on 
may have happened after the first doc
Lemnos, this 
ument had been
destroyed. In addition in the account of the speech
given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, it is stated that 
the main matters disputed are whether a wild was made or 
not, and, if the will is challenged, who should possess 
the property. He does not state that' there is an 
argument put forward that a later willj invalidated an 
earlier one (173). Therefore the evidence from this 
speech which Thompson refers to is inconclusive.
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nce concerningOn the other hand, there is some evide: 
the question whether a later willi automatically 
invalidated an earlier one in Isaeus i:
<X71710 j P ^ h t L r e t O  V
PI
^ TO TToLptL T ^ j
(Is. i, 25)
terpretation of 
st.
There are various views concerning the in 
this passage, and I shall discuss these fir
Lipsius finds the wording of this clause absurd and
states that it cannot be regarded as aj "mark of an
advocate's chicanery", adding that if a new will could
invalidate an old, this argument would be untenable, and
suggests a different reading:
o v ^ oto5 r J +jv 'jpccfj-p& 're Vo) j  r o  T q
i i .p ^ * j  iC&LjM\A>V'
(174)
However, I would hesitate in agreeing with Lipsius' 
emendation of the text, since the fact that the passage 
is obscure as it stands to the reader is an inadequate 
basis for adjusting it.
Norton agrees that a later will could not invalidate 
an earlier, but adds that there seems to be no serious
objection to a codicil whose corrections could virtually 
render the will null and void. He also finds the
words . . . ictiyevo'S "such a peculiar statement as to
awaken suspicion either that the text has been corrupted
in transmission or that the orator was intentionally 
obscure at this point (175). However, Norton's view is
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not consistent, because if a man was able to make a 
codicil which would render his testament null and void, 
such a document would amount to a new will, and so 
suggests that a later will could invalidate an earlier 
one, something which Norton denies.
Goligher argues that the case of the heirs "ab 
intestato" rests upon the argument that Cleonymus called 
for the astynomos in order to revoke the will. 
Therefore, if he could have revoked it in any other 
manner, their argument would be untenable, and the 
validity of the document would have been questioned on 
the grounds that it had been made when the testator was 
mad or forced by someone, but they "nowhere deny that the 
will had really been made in a perfectly valid manner". 
Goligher explains the reference to the allegation that 
Cleonymus made the will in a fit of anger by stating that 
these are put forward "solely to make it probable that 
the plaintiff's interpretation of their uncle's action in
sending for the will is the right one", 
that a later will did not invalidate 
(176) However, the argument that Cleonymus 
thus out of his mind when he made his wil
He concludes 
an earlier one.
was angry and 
1 does not seem
to rest solely on the nephews' interpretation of the
testator's later action, but seems to ; constitute an 
additional argument, namely that the wiljl was invalid
because it was made under the influence of anger (17 7).
Harrison states that the nephews' argument in i, 25 
"would be grotesque unless there had been a rule that one 
will could not automatically be cancelled by a later one" 
(178). However, he does not elaborate further on the
-46^-
matter.
On the other hand, Wyse translates as "to
take back", which is a possible translation of the verb 
in addition "to revoke", and proposes that the 
sentence b v z M g C v .ic b lp tv O 'S  is such an obvious statement 
that it can be taken as indirect evidence that the
Athenians did allow a later will to invalidate an earlier 
one. Wyse refers to the case of the testament of
Dicaeogenes II with reference to this matter (179). 
However, in addition to using the verb when
suggesting Cleonymus' motives in sending for the 
depositary, Isaeus also uses the verb 'VGWl , which in 
the context can only really be taken to mean "to annul" 
(180), therefore, even though i/eAi'tv' can mean "to take 
back", it seems best to translate it as "to revoke". 
Furthermore, Isaeus v, the speech concerning the estate 
of Dicaeogenes II does not proffer any conclusive 
evidence concerning the vitiation of an .earlier will by 
the writing of another.
The fact that it is stated in Isaeus, i, 25 that 
Cleonymus was not able to annul any other will than that 
which was deposited with the magistrate Is self-evident
and cannot be taken as definite evidence that an earlier 
will had to be returned before a latjer one could be
written, but only that the document lodged with the 
astynomos was the only will which he could revoke.
However, much of the argument of the heirs "ab intestato"
is based on their interpretation of the reason why 
Cleoymus sent for the magistrate which allegedly was to
revoke (ivexfciv ) or annul (a-v 6ocu ) his will:
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§£ "ftpo -TOV $0t\/0 (-TO TJ ) TT€.jJL\^oL$ JJc& G 'C S '-m T  C>\/
%nl r 4 1/ o^ pyvjV7
✓(Is. i, 3) (The object of e*o>6€ is S t d & y ^ V  )
^5^ m v  i -h.v T'vjv T y ^  S/Q 6 0 V -js
erte‘Kjkvr^^6\/J Tcivt*cs r«ti Sifit&ytc*<.s c<K€>ter^
TTpo66Tu.jjG ffoeetScrrrrp r^V ol/^yV eiGtcycLyecv- 
(Is. i, 14)
In the first quotation, the aorist form e*-v (,€ denotes a 
completed action, so it indicates that the speaker wishes 
to convey the impression that the will was annulled 
because Cleonymus sent for the magistrate. In the second 
quotation, the fact that it is stated he wished 
(epoVK^d'*] ) to revoke the will is followed by the 
statement that he sent for the magistrate implies that 
this could only be done by sending for the depositary and 
thus, presumably, having it returned to him. This 
suggests that the annulment of a will could not be 
effected merely by the writing of a new one, since if 
this were legal, the argument of the heirs "ab intestato" 
concerning the sending for the magistrate would appear 
ridiculous. Therefore, it seems as if the only way in
which Cleonymus7 will could have been annulled would have 
been by either destroying or defacing it.
Another case which does not seem to have been 
discussed concerning this question is the will of 
Euctemon. By means of this document, Euctemon limited 
the inheritance rights of the eldest of his two sons by 
Callippe to just one farm (181). If Euctemon had been 
able to revoke the document merely by writing a new will
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by means of which his eldest son by his second marriage 
received his inheritance rights, as opposed to recalling 
the old one and physically destroying it, there would 
have been no necessity to bring the depositary to court 
in order to revoke it.
Therefore, there is very little extant evidence 
concerning whether a will could be invalidated by the 
writing of another one. However, the evidence cited in 
favour of this is neither conclusive nor convincing, 
whereas the arguments of Cleonymus' heirs "ab intestato" 
concerning his motives for sending for the astynomos and 
Euctemon's action in bringing Pythodorus to court to 
revoke his will would seem pointless if there was a law 
that a will did not have to be destroyed before a new one 
was made.
There is also the question as to whether it was 
possible to confirm a will. When Cleonymus was on his 
deathbed, he requested the return of his testament. The 
testamentary heirs claimed that this was because 
Cleonymus wished to alter his will:
y^f3 T+ZS StoU^ iCoc.i.S f
(Is. i, 18)
Wyse states that a gloss of the orator, but
suggests that the testator may have wished to change the
avoid some loophole (182). However, it is later stated 
that this form of bequest was unassailable:
p u r s u e } *  t r e r o  r^/ Jiueoo.
kirvLvop&toC*-*- f<oLL- f ie •< (- G ^ L 6 l v
wording in the testament, (€ i r « . ), in order to
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'Tp'Cs ykj» ol^ kjois o v t o s  %&t L vj 2> t & s g u ip e d * .
(Is. i, 24)
This quotation suggests that there would have been no
necessity to confirm the will or to correct an ambiguity
in the wording. Isaeus does not clarify what he means by
the word . There is no reference to the
f
conformation of a will in any other text, and the fact
that it is stated that such a will was the ultimate form
of bequest suggests that it was probably not customary
for a man to confirm his will.
Since one was not legally permitted either to write
a codicil in which the dispositions in a will were
altered, or to revoke a will by writing another, it is
necessary to discuss whether any formalities, such as
witnesses, the presence of a magistrate or even the
iat*?permission of the testamentary beneficiarieSj was 
necessary in order to render the action valid in law.
Norton states that it was probably necessary to have 
a magistrate and preferably the witnesses to the making 
of the will present at its revocation (183). Guiraud is 
of the opinion that it was desirable to have a magistrate 
present when a will was revoked (184), and Beauchet
suggests that a man had to declare his will null and void 
before witnesses (185). None of these scholars state 
whether either of these conditions were necessary when a 
man wished to alter his will.
The case of Cleonymus is cited by Norton with 
reference to the necessity for the presence of a 
magistrate at the revocation of a will (186). However, 
if, as I have suggested, the depositary of the will of
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Cleonymus just happened to be an astynomos in the year in 
which Cleonymus died (187), then this case cannot be 
taken as evidence concerning the view that it was 
advisable to have a magistrate present at the revocation 
of a will. There is no indication in Isaeus, i that 
persons were called to witness the revocation or 
alteration of the will. Even though the astynomos was 
asked to return the document, there is no evidence that 
he would have been asked to stay. It is also apparent 
that Poseidippus and Diodes were in Cleonymus' house at 
this time (188), but again it is not stated whether their 
presence would have been required at the alteration or 
revocation of a will.
The case of the will of Euctemon is a little more 
complicated. The testator allegedly recalled the will 
from the depositary, Pythodorus:
SJ Q E v k -t^ cjv' evSvs r ^ r e i  t s v
to j^ocji^reZo^ 'rrposGictLh.&t&To qis
I f r L r ^ S T a C f tv. ic .a c r * .6 T * i \S T  OS T T f o i  l~T> Y X. y 
(Is. vi, 31)
Here, the fact that an action was brought against 
Pythodorus for the return of the document suggests that 
at first he refused to give it up, which meant that a
taken against a depositary who refused to return a will
legal remedy had to be found, 
that the action
This passage indicates
could be
(189). The words Kttr^e-risros . . . cyS indicates that
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during the course of this case, Euctemon had to declare 
before the archon that he wished to revoke )
his will. However, the fact that the archon was present
when this occurred, cannot be taken as evidence that a 
magistrate had to be present when a will was revoked,
since the only reason the archon was present was because 
Pythodorus firstly refused to submit the will, so the
testator had to bring him to court to get it back.
The revocation of Euctemon's will was also witnessed 
by other persons. These were Pythodorus, Phanostratus, 
the of Chaereas' daughter and other persons whose
names are not mentioned (190). It is not made clear 
whether the unnamed witnesses were the persons whom 
Euctemon brought with him to the quayside to be present 
at the making of the will (191).
Even though it was probably a formal obligation to 
have one's will witnessed at its making (192), there is 
no evidence that it was legally obligatory to have 
witnesses present at the document's revocation. The only 
case which remains extant in which a will was revoked is 
perhaps unusual in that the depositary refused to return 
the will, which meant that a case had to be brought
before the archon.
There is also the rather complicated question 
concerning whether the permission of the beneficiaries 
was needed when revoking a will. Beauchet states that 
the cases of the wills of Euctemon and Cleonymus could be 
taken as evidence that this was necessary, but concludes 
that this probably was not the case (193). Wyse and 
Lipsius agree with his conclusion (194).
Harrison agrees with this to a certain extent when he 
states that "it must have been common for beneficiaries 
not to know that they had been named in a will until the 
death of the testator" (195). However, he also asserts 
that "where a will gave posthumous effect to an adoption 
inter vivos we must suppose that it could not be revoked 
without the consent of the adoptee, since he by his 
adoption had sacrificed all rights of inheritance from 
his father" (196).
In the case of the will of Cleonymus, it is very 
probable that if the testator had wished to make 
alterations to his will, it might have been to disinherit 
Pherenicus with whom he was at emnity (197). However, 
there is no indication that he was present when the 
testator sent for the depositary, but it is stated that 
Poseidippus and Diodes were there (198). Even if 
Cleonymus wished to revoke the will altogether, the fact 
that Poseidippus and Diodes were asked to send for the 
magistrate does not indicate that the beneficiaries'
permission was necessary for a will to be revoked, since 
Pherenicus also stood to inherit, and there is no
evidence that he was present when the testator made his
request.
The case of the will of Euctemon is slightly more 
complicated. The depositary, Pythodorus, agreed to the 
revocation of the document, but on the observance of a 
particular condition:
etr^cBy o fivdo£u>f>os iic e '* * *  jcm.c t Q  t£*.vc>6'r{)*,Tw
rr<*.poSTL <UyK-0 Xoy 0CViUyP6 i ^ , TOxf $'& X°l’L^ e Q V f^oO
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tt>3 6 v jjc * r * .  0e ju£vov ' j *  y s  e v c c B y
icvfitos i^ r ^ r o L ty  j ro rk ofc/’exeM/; k« l o
i i p ^ u i v  q v t  OJS %yiy y c o € i c e ,  ■ ..
(Is. vi, 32)
This passage has been a source of perplexity for many who
attempt to account for the fact that the appointment of a
guardian for the daughter of Chaereas or his presence
(199) was necessary before the will was revoked. Norton, 
Lipsius and Wyse all suggest that the document was, in a 
certain sense, a contract between Euctemon and his
son-in-law, and as such, could not be revoked without his
permission (200). On the other hand, both Beauchet and
Harrison disagree with this opinion. Beauchet states
that a cannot be regarded as a contract because
the clauses which it contains, which might be adoption,
cannot be put into practice immediately (201). Harrison
states that in Isaeus' usage, normally means
"will" (202). However, both of these omit to state a 
proof which is of fundamental importance; namely that
the of Euctemon detailed the disposition of his
property after his death, which indicates that it is a
testament as opposed to a solemn compact or covenant
which is to be put into effect immediately. Harrison 
states that the girl in question was a beneficiary under
the terms of the will and that " we cannot be sure
whether in this particular instance the testator had an 
absolute right of revocation, and the action of 
Pythodorus, backed as it was by the archon, suggests that 
it was a moot point" (203). Beauchet states that this
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request by Pythodorus could be taken to indicate that the 
permission of the heirs nominated in a will was necessary 
before it could be revoked, thus suggesting that the girl 
stood to benefit from the will, but he later rejects this 
suggestion (204). Hitzig is rather more cautious and 
states that it is not specified whether the son-in-law is 
mentioned in the testament and thus must be present at 
its revocation (205). This suggests that all those 
mentioned in a will had to be present when it was 
revoked. However, from the case of Cleonymus, it is 
evident that this was not necessarily the case. Wyse 
states that Chaereas was a "depositor" of the document 
and that it was necessary for his representative to be 
present in court (206). He also asserts that the will
was a compromise " which could not be abrogated without 
the consent of the three contracting parties". However, 
it is not stated that Phanostratus consented to the 
revocation, only that he was present
( TiJ obTp^Tcj TToLpo'ST <-  ^ The word
provides an indication as to what might have been the 
case here. The word can either be rendered 
"co-depositor" or "party to the agreement". The former
suggests that Chaereas also deposited a document with 
Pythodorus, and there is no evidence in support of this. 
The latter suggests that the document was a compact
between Chaereas, Phanostratus and Euctemon which it
probably was not. There is another interpretation, 
however, namely that Chaereas may have been one of
the <*■ <*~Vo^  who had persuaded Philoctemon to make the
agreement with Euctemon (208), which explains why he is
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described as 6'VyiO'<ToL-&6fLe</o<i . He was also one of the 
witnesses to the actual making of the written will 
(209). Therefore, it is possible that Pythodorus 
demanded that the guardian of Chaereas' daughter be 
present because Chaereas had been both instrumental in 
the preliminary oral agreement, and had been one of the 
witnesses to the will. These could be the reasons why 
the archon supported his demand ( it___
Therefore, Pythodorus' demand that a representative 
of Chaereas' daughter be present at the revocation of the 
will of Euctemon does not indicate that the permission of 
the beneficiaries under the will had to be obtained 
before the document could be vitiated. What it does
t
show, is that the depositary did have the right not to 
give up the will with which he had been entrusted unless 
certain conditions were complied with.
Harrison cites the case of the adoption of Leocrates 
by Polyeuctus with reference to the question whether the 
permission of a testamentary beneficiary had to be
obtained before a will was revoked (210). Leocrates was 
adopted "inter vivos" as the son of Polyeuctus and given 
the hand of his adoptive father's daughter. The fact
that while his adoptive father was living he was 
designated as his heir is indicated by the description of 
him as foore’ju.#.s (Dem. xli, 5). Following a quarrel
between the two men, the girl was divorced from Leocrates
and married to Spudias, Leocrates brought a suit agi-a-nst 
Polyeuctus and an agreement was reached (211).
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Harrison states that even though it is not specifically 
stated, " it is clear that there was a will which had to 
be revoked because it was tied up with Leocrates' 
position as heir and adoptive son of Polyeuctus" (212). 
However, this is not clear at all, and there is no 
indication of Polyeuctus making a will with reference to 
Leocrates. In addition, Harrison does not state what he 
means by a will giving "posthumous effect to an adoption 
' inter vivos' ". If a man adopted a son ' inter vivos' he 
was recognized as such from the time of his adoption 
(213), and there is no indication whatsoever that an 
adoption made under such circumstances could be given 
"posthumous effect" in a will. Therefore, I disagree 
with Harrison's suggestion.
On the other hand, Harrison' s argument raises the 
question as to whether an adoptive father was legally 
required to ask permission from the one whom he had 
adopted by will or his if the person concerned was
under age. There is no evidence in any extant text 
concerning this. However, it seems as if the adopted son 
would probably know of the arrangements made, as 
Chaerestratus, the adopted son of Philoctemon did (214),
and would probably have consented, since an adopted son 
lost all rights of inheritance within his natural 
family. This suggests that it was probably a formal 
requirement to inform him if the will was to be revoked, 
but it seems unlikely that a testator was legally 
required to ask his permission.
Therefore, it seems as if there were few formalities 
necessary with regard to the alteration or revocation of
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a will. It was probably not a legal requirement to have 
witnesses present when a testament was being altered or 
revoked, but it may have been customary. In addition, it 
probably was not necessary to ask permission of the 
beneficiaries before revoking a will, but it may have 
been customary to inform the person if he was to have 
been adopted by means of the document.
In conclusion, there were few legal rules concerning 
the making, alteration and revocation of a will. It was 
advisable to have witnesses present at the making of a 
testament, but how many people and whether they would be 
relatives or friends of the testator was not defined by
law. There was also no rule that the contents of a will 
had to be kept secret. It was not illegal for a man to 
make an oral disposition of property. There was no fixed
order in which a man had to make his dispositions, and it
does not seem to have been a legal necessity for the
names of witnesses to be written in the document, since
it is possible that their identity may have been 
discovered by their seals on the outside of the
testament. Even though it was not common for a man to 
make copies of his will, this was not against the law.
It was commonplace, but probably not a legal obligation 
for a man to deposit his will with a friend or relative, 
and it is possible that it could also be deposited in the 
Metroon. A codicil by means of which one altered or
revoked a will was not valid in law, but one could write 
an additional document which contained an inventory of 
property or just notes of debts owed to or by the 
estate. It was not necessary to have witnesses present
-47b-
when a will was altered or revoked, and neither was it 
legally obligatory to ask permission from the 
beneficiaries before doing either of these things.
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Chanter 8
The Genuineness of the Athenian Will
As can be seen from the evidence in the preceding 
chapter, there were various means by which a man could 
attempt to ensure that his will be regarded as genuine. 
However, in spite of these, the testator's disappointed 
heir or heirs "ab intestato" could question the validity 
of the will on two main grounds, firstly that the 
testator did not have the capacity to make it (1)and 
secondly that the will was not genuine. The purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the latter arguments, which 
were mainly factual (2). I shall discuss each will which 
is relevant to this Chapter in the same order as I have 
done in Chapter 6, Function.
Wills involving adoption
Nicostratus (no. 20)
Chariades' claim by testament (3) is contested by
Hagnon and Hagnotheus, who claim the estate as heirs "ab 
intestato". The speech which remains on their behalf is 
an irr'y^o'yoi) , (4) and this would mean that the majority
of evidence would have been presented in the first speech.
An indication of the sort of evidence which was put 
forward in the earlier speech is found when the person 
speaking on behalf of the claimants "ab intestato" states
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that in cases of inheritance, proofs from argument are 
more reliable than witnesses:
Iv T*eCs V  K * -y p tJ V  e L 6 * y & y t C c s  S om e?  p u o i.
T T p G C i j  T e t c p c y  j o C o l S  p iS ilC h J O V  y j j J L + . p T V G L V
T r i e r e - u e t v .
(Is. iv, 12)
This statement, implies firstly that the case of Hagnon 
and Hagnotheus is supported mainly by p i o v  as
opposed to j A * p T v p  l * . and secondly that their opponent
Chariades was able to produce concrete evidence in the
form of witnesses in favour of the will (5). The speaker 
gives his reasons why proofs by argument should be 
prefe^ed in inheritance cases:
TT&p'l S i ,  T iJ V  ncJS  n s  y v o i ^ j  Tot) s  p t y
Ttifi.'yj B y A6yO>'T*£-S; €<- fJL'ij tv£.\fx> pL&yvt,*+L St*.<p£povTtx.
j  o d j T o v  p L e v  i c c c @ '  0 \> p L t c p T V p o  { j 6 L T&0 v  & <3~ro%J T-u»f 
S& 6vy y  e v & v  fjL'vjSev to ) v rre. rrp
t.oSoTOJVj  T q -u  S e  £ ?U=ry^OU fA ^I $*-po t2 i£  hsH-jO tjS o 'u S
/
y t- y v o p L e s o v  ;
(Is. iv, 12)
Whereas at first the speaker has stated that in cases of
/
inheritance generally T A H f^ P 'O v should be preferred
to /u ttfT v jx *- / here he limits this to *-*-L . ■ It is
possible that this subtle change from inheritance cases 
generally, which could concern rival claims by heirs "ab 
intestato", to cases just concerning wills, might have 
been made because Athenian juries were suspicious of 
wi 11 s ( 6 ).
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The words e i imply that the witnesses
Chariades has produced to testify to the genuineness of
the will concur in their evidence. It is suggested, by 
means of the word , that these men are bearing
witness against the deceased, and thus that the document 
allegedly written by him is not genuine. In this
particular case, the fact that the testator's relatives
knew nothing of the will being made Se... e iS ir a v ) is
irrelevant, because if Nicostratus did make a will, it 
may well have been drawn up while he was abroad (7), and 
it is unlikely that his relatives would have known of 
it. Furthermore, contrary to the speaker's statement
that there were no certain means of proving a will false, 
it was possible to do this, as can be seen from other 
cases (8).
Part of the speaker's case rests upon the fact that 
witnesses have been produced to state that Chariades and 
Nicostratus did not know each other:
vvv Se o vT e  ro v s oxrre <#£\ox>S oS 'r* i v
T y  W  T  o v T c o v  S 1 & /W-EV
(Is. iv, 18)
o %J u p ^ p mr ^ p * c s . . • s
t N 9 C — j fl ^ C v sov to  6 <- o-vooLftiAts o v r J evcroi.de o -v r*  erru
6 T f > v . r e v e ^ p y T O  rp<x.T (g , £rc Se
T y v  tt OLi ’^ v i j  y  o v r o s  i e ^ v p e j e r ^ ^
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Ov6*.V.
(Is. iv, 26)
If this is so, the will would rightly be declared a 
forgery and thus be regarded as invalid, since it would 
be very unlikely that a man would adopt someone whom he 
did not know. However, at the beginning of the speech, 
it is admitted that the speaker is unable to produce 
evidence for events which took place in a far-away land, 
but that his evidence is limited to what happened in 
Athens (10). This indicates that the witnesses produced 
can only attest to the fact that Chariades and 
Nicostratus were not friends, or in the army together or 
had a business association when the testator was in 
Athens eleven years ago (11). It is possible that the two 
men only became friends at a later date after Nicostratus 
left Athens, a possib/ility which the speaker is unable 
to disprove by his own admission. Thus this argument is 
not convincing (12). However, the fact that the admission 
of lack of evidence from abroad is placed far from the 
references to the witnesses who have been produced means 
that this weakness in the argument would only be apparent
to the most alert listener.
The speaker attempts to undermine the testimony 
given by those who state that they witnessed the will by 
alleging that they were not friends of Nicostratus but 
friends of Chariades (12). However, there is no mention 
of any evidence which has been produced to prove that 
this was the case. Furthermore, it has not been proven 
that the two men did not know each other while
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Nicostratus was abroad, and if they were friends, it is 
possible that they would have had friends in common.
Arguments are also presented on the basis of 
kinship. It is stated that kinsmen have a greater right 
to inherit than testamentary heirs because their 
proximity to the deceased cannot be disguised (13). 
Witnesses are produced to testify that Hagnon and 
Hagnotheus were Nicostratus1 cousins, and that they were 
not at variance with him (14). In addition, it is argued 
that if Hagnon and Hagnotheus had predeceased 
Nicostratus, he would have inherited their property. 
This is only true if Nicostratus was the son of 
Thrasymachus, whereas Chariades alleges that Nicostratus 
was the son of Smicrus (15) and can support his 
allegation by means of witnesses who claim to be 
relatives of the deceased:
(Is. iv, 2 4)
Chariades1 allegation that Nicostratus was the son of 
Smicrus is firstly dismissed by an indignant oath,
0 * T  c
TO 6 O V ToO v'
TT16 T-f- S  & U v T €  S
ypy C 6 7-ocS-roL.L .
A I e T tp o * )• The only indication here that those
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giving testimony on behalf of Chariades were allegedly 
relatives of the deceased is the suggestion that they 
would be able to claim Nicostratus' estate on the grounds 
of their relationship to him. This implies that these 
witnesses might have been the testator's next-of-kin and 
his heirs " ab intestato". There is, however, no certain 
proof of this. The speaker does not seek to disprove the 
opposing testimony by referring to witnesses he has 
produced in favour of his own allegation, namely that it 
was Nicostratus son of Thrasymachus who died in Ake and 
whose property is disputed. He has only been able to 
prove that his clients were relatives of Nicostratus son 
of Thrasymachus, not that this man was the person who 
died in Ake. In the absence of any evidence of his own 
he attempts to undermine his opponent's case by the 
cynical suggestion that his witnesses must be mad 
( kvo'iocS ) to miss the opportunity of obtaining so much
money by giving evidence on Chariades' behalf. This
suggestion does not prove anything. Forster suggests 
that this topic had been dealt with more thoroughly in 
the earlier speech (16). However, the fact that the 
speaker fails to mention that witnesses have been
produced to say that the deceased was the son of
Thrasymachus suggests that this was not dealt with
adequately in the first speech.
In addition, arguments on moral grounds are used. 
It is alleged that Chariades neither cremated Nicostratus 
nor carried out his funeral (17), he states that
Chariades is a criminal (18) and ends with a eulogy of
Hagnon and Hagnotheus.
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In this particular case, it seems as if the jury's
decision would turn on two major points, namely whether
5w\\c.<u*
Nicostratus was the son of gUMraaymanjura and whether the 
will was a forgery.
It seems as if Chariades is able to prove the 
former by means of evidence given by relatives of the 
deceased, whereas Hagnon and Hagnotheus can only prove 
that they are cousins of Nicostratus son of Thrasymachus, 
not that he was identical with the man whose property 
they are claiming. This lack of evidence means that 
their claim on the grounds of kinship is not convincing. 
As far as the latter point is concerned, if no evidence 
nearer than eleven years previously can be produced, 
Hagnon and Hagnotheus are not able to argue against its 
validity by means of witnesses. In view of the 
inadequate evidence presented in opposition to the will 
and with reference to the identity of the testator, it 
seems as if Chariades had a reasonable chance of winning 
his case.
1
Astvohilus (no. 2/L)
The will of Astyphilus was allegedly made before he
left for Mytilene on military service. The testamentary
claimant is the son of the testator's paternal cousin, 
Cleon (19). However, the will's validity is questioned by 
the testator's homometric brother.
Towards the beginning of the speech the speaker
states that his aims are to prove that Astyphilus did not 
make a will and that he is the only person entitled to
inherit Astyphilus' property (20).
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The first argument which is made against the will on
legal grounds is that it was not witnessed by the proper
people (21). The speaker states that, in order to ensure
that a will would be upheld by a court of law, Astyphilus
> 'S
would have been sure ( (rM oi*) to have had it witnessed by 
relatives, demesmen, fellow ward members and as many 
others as possible (22). However, a rather damaging 
admission is made in a parenthetical clause that any
witnesses who testify in favour of the document have been
"persuaded" by his opponent:
e t  ^  ra> lip**, diro tovtcov ofto rr<*f>*Z^x-L.
(Is. ix, 9)
Here, the word rr&ireL6 -ron. is deceptively vague, since it 
carries implications of bribery, but does not commit the 
speaker to a definite charge (23). By means of this
statement the speaker seeks to damage his opponent's 
credibility. However, as Wyse rightly states, this
suggestion also implies that there are witnesses to the
will who fall into one of the cate/gories which the
speaker has mentioned earlier (24). Following this, 
witnesses who are demesmen, relatives and ward members
give testimony that they were not asked to be present at
the will making; it is alleged that evidence from such 
persons that they were not present is more convincing 
than contrary evidence from others who are not relatives 
of the deceased ( o l /uyjc>es r rp o t jto v -re s ) and just chance 
comers ( o t ) (25). However, in view of the
suggestion that certain men acquainted with the testator 
were "persuaded" to testify that they were present at the 
will making, this argument is not plausible.
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It is also stated that Cleon himself should have summoned 
persons to witness the will. Wyse correctly responds to 
this suggestion with the indignant question:
"What right had Cleon to invite anyone to witness another 
man1s will?" (26) .
It is very unlikely that a court of law would have
accepted evidence in favour of a will given by men who 
were not friends of the testator but were only acquainted 
with either the beneficiary or, in this case, the 
beneficiary's father (27).
The will was allegedly deposited with Hierocles, the 
maternal uncle of the testator. Attempts are made to 
destroy his credibility by means of character
assassination. Therefore, when the account of the
alleged fraud is given, it is that much more plausible 
(28) :
KplL r r p lv  p Lyv  t o v  £  eA vS p es  ,
5 o (<3r c v'i ot. y L y v o cro t u
I r  s  /  _  v —
emr'yde-LiOv j r p 0 to  r r p o . r o v s
O v S e r  TTf O b y  fCO'ST*. <> TTbt& ulV  S p y  , K e y t J v  O T u
B eZ o s  g lvj  f t s T v f i lo- l irro<foLro 'Lv j S c tt-B y x-cls ©✓
✓  > /  J  ** /
X & .T qL  XeA.(?t T T b T *- J feu T iS  <*-U> T  iCO<-
(Is. ix, 24)
Here, the picture drawn is of someone going from person 
to person regardless of whether they were related to the 
deceased, in the attempt to find someone who would claim
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the estate and share the proceeds with him; his role 
would be to fabricate the will. Wyse rightly finds the
passive v'occ misleading (29), because it does not
indicate clearly whose application to the archon is being 
referred to, whether Cleon7 s or the speaker7 s, since it 
is suggested earlier in the speech that Cleon entered 
upon Astyphilus7 estate as soon as his death was
announced:
Ua X  o v t o j  g f i S p u .  o v T o g t .  v a * . l  r r p o T e p o v  tcocl
N N  ^ (■ ~ C'L V
V V V  o v d t v o k  0i W o V  T O S  K X .'V jp O 'f  y y < r(.T (*~ L  *  y
kItto/ , etrecSy ife-rv <(/
T e r t h J k V T 'y K i Z l j ... 6 6 5  t o  y o j p ' o v  e ^ / S o i  T & V  tC tx X
6  c T < - o k K ) - 0  eJce-6 1/ O S  iC .o c T G .^ > .r r £  I/, o t . r r e i . r r o i *  £ < P y
y t
T O V  v o v  T O "V f c e t V T  o  V  6  <- V'©*. L y 7 7 ^  i. iS T  c  'U ^J.O i.S
'\py<P(£(*.£ 9ol^ .
(Is. ix, 3)
Wyse is of the opinion that the sections quoted here (ix, 
24,3) are not compatible. He therefore suggests the 
following solution:
"If we believed in the honesty of Isaeus7 narrative, we
should be driven to suppose that no sooner did Cleon hear 
of his cousin7 s death than he laid hands on his property 
out of sheer rapacity and lawlessness, without troubling 
to make any declaration of his son7 s title, and that, 
some time afterwards, hearing of Hierocles7 eagerness to 
participate in the fruits of forgery, or being visited by 
him in the course of his rounds, he perceived the utility 
of supporting his son7s pretensions by will" (30).
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However, the word suggests that Hierocles in
looking for someone to aid him in his scheme, had his eye
on a property which was not already occupied. In
addition, it seems unlikely that after occupying the
whole property, Cleon would be prepared to give part of
it to someone else. No witnesses are produced to testify
to the fact that Cleon occupied Astyphilus' estate as
C
soon as his death was annour^ed. Therefore, it is 
possible that the words t^ 1 6 T ol are an
example of hyperbole, their purpose being to exaggerate
Cleon's rascality. Therefore, it is more probable that 
after Astyphilus' death was announced, Hierocles thought 
of the idea of fabricating a will, and Cleon decided to 
aid him in this. The fact that the speaker does not make
it clear whose application Cleon did not wait for
(KoLL TTpLlS.. ) suggests that after concocting the
will together with Hierocles, Cleon applied to the 
archon, and moved onto the property before Astyphilus' 
half brother applied for the estate as next-of-kin and 
before the case was brought to court
(nyuv ru '
Wyse is also puzzled as to who was responsible for
forging the will:
"The role assigned to Hierocles is simple, to depose 
falsely that a certain document was left in his keeping 
by Astyphilus. But who undertook the more difficult and 
dangerous part of the business? Who wrote the document 
and counterfeited the seal or seals?" (31).
However, the narrative in chapter 24 of the speech (32) 
assigns Hierocles a more central role than Wyse does, for
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it is stated that he actually asked people to aid him in 
his scheme, stating that he intended to forge a will 
(tv* . . . K/)uvt£e*.i.To ), it is very unlikely that he
would have committed himself to asking persons to join 
with him in his scheme unless he also intended to procure 
witnesses and so on. The word which is used to
describe Hierocles' activities has undertones of bribery, 
since this word was normally used in reference to people 
accepting bribes (33) and would thus refer to the alleged 
arrangement by which Hierocles would forge a will and 
receive payment for so doing.
Forster states that "no convincing proof is adduced
for setting aside the will and no objection is raised to
any of the circumstances connected with it" (34).
However, some of those whom Hierocles approached are 
produced to testify that he went around "selling" his 
scheme, a problem which Wyse fails to tackle when
discussing Isaeus' narrative (35). The fact that 
Hierocles' rascality is proven by testimony weighs very 
much in favour of the testament not being genuine.
The speaker uses a further argument against the 
probaby(.ility of the will being genuine when he states
that it was too great a coincidence to be credible that 
Astyphilus made his will just before the expedition on 
which he died (36). However, the will of Hagnias was made 
in similar circumstances, and it was found to be valid at 
first (37).
It is also stated that the fact that the members of 
Astyphilus' phratry did not accept Cleon' s son as the 
adopted son of the deceased indicates that they knew that
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the boy had not been adopted by him (38). If this scheme 
had been successful, this would have been beneficial to 
Cleon's case, since the acceptance of the boy would have 
implied that they believed the will to be genuine.
However, the fact that the phratry refused to accept
Cleon's son as the adopted son of Astyphilus proves
nothing (39) except that as law-abiding citizens they 
would not take any steps until the verdict had been 
reached in a court of law.
The speaker seeks to support his case against the 
claim of Cleon's son by alleging that he is Astyphilus' 
next of kin, and thus more eligible to inherit his
property. He is Astyphilus' uterine half-brother. 
However, the speaker mentions that Astyphilus had a
sister. If she was still alive at the time of her 
brother's death, she would have been heiress { i.r r /£ *’7^rjpos> 
) to her brother's property and the speaker would not be 
the heir "ab intestato" as he pretends. Wyse suggests 
that she may have died without issue or that she may have 
believed that the will was genuine and not come forward 
to claim the estate (40). In the stemma I have included 
Astyphilus' aunt, whose husband gives evidence in the
speaker's favour that Euthycrates was at emnity with 
Thudippus (41). He is described as being one of
Euthycrates' doceZOL t and this indicates that the aunt 
would have been Astyphilus' paternal aunt. If
Astyphilus' sister had died without offspring, this
paternal aunt would be next in line to inherit the
deceased's property, since Thudippus had been adopted 
into another family, and collateral relatives through the
male line took precedence over relatives through females
in the laws of intestate succession (42). Therefore, the
speaker was not eligible to inherit his half brother's
estate on the grounds of kinship. It is possible that he
realized this, which would explain why he states that
even if he was not Astyphilus' next-of-kin, he would be
more eligible to inherit his estate than anyone else
because the two were very close to each other (43).
However, this does not prove anything of legal importance.
Other non-legal arguments are also brought forward
in support of the speaker's claim. He states that his
opponent did not carry out the deceased's funeral (44).
f\M
In an attempt to prove that Astyphilus was at ejawrity with 
Cleon, the speaker alleges that Astyphilus' father was 
murdered by Cleon's father Thudippus (45).
In this particular case, the jury would have had two 
factors to consider when deciding on the verdict, whether 
the account of the alleged fraud was convincing and
whether the speaker was indeedXheir ab intestato". The 
account of the alleged forgery of the will is convincing 
because witnesses are produced in favour of it 
(46). However, the speaker is not heir "ab intestato",
since there female relatives who are closer in their
ci
relationship to the deceased then he is. This fact is
very skilfully concealed by the speaker who only mentions 
each of them once in passing (47). If Cleon alleged that 
his son Myronides had been adopted by Astyphilus, an
inscription which dates from the middle of the fourth 
century describing Myronides of the deme Araphen as the
-503-
Isaeus ix
Stemma
M M
Thudippus F=M Euthycrates=F=Theophrastus
(adopted ------ (
into 
another
family) Astyphilus F Speaker
Cleon Anaxippus
Mvronides (possible, ^Cilra.men.l:a.r^ 
cion.tv\ounb )
Hierocles
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son of Cleon suggests that Cleon might have lost his case 
(48). However, Cleon might have had more than one son. 
Evenso, because of the fact that the will is proved to be 
a forgery by means of witnesses and those who are more 
closely related to Astyphilus are only mentioned in 
passing, it is possible that the speaker won his case.
Philoctemon (no. 25)
Davies states that the allegation that Philoctemon 
adopted his nephew by will (49) "must be treated with 
great suspicion" (50). No reason is given for this 
statement, but it may have been made because there is no 
evidence that Chaerestratus claimed Philoctemon's estate 
as soon as he heard of his death, but waited until the 
death of the testator's father Euctemon, when he claimed 
both estates. In this speech he treats the two 
properties as identical (51). Chaerestratus is opposed by 
Androcles who alleges that Euctemon left two legitimate 
sons by a second marriage. The speaker devotes the 
majority of his speech to attacking the boy's legitimacy 
rather than supporting his claim by testament.
Chaerestratus has the will read out before the
court, and produces as witnesses those who were present 
when it was made (52). It seems as if Androcles protested 
that Philoctemon made no will and died childless:
i~e> v ti> &
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Kot.1 O S^OL $ € jj .  & IS0S K .€ ic e T \fO $ y  J *CUL lAbLjOT'VjO 0 "V6  c v  
o t  P ~ * -p t iy  t v o / ^ c e v o  l . r t  e i~ i .  j  T e x e  vr y  6 u l  u r r o t L $ * * .
( ^ • > - O i < . T y f L O v *  . r r t j s  o v \ /  K rro L t . s  y j v  o e r t s  t o v  
€ocut~o v  <&$&>*.<$ i Sov ✓ v o v  rrO(.-*j 6 oCfj.&v'o s ><ot7“e *  t tt& v
t s t s \ * j « j-,
(*j o js io l o jS o  ro d e o s  T y *  K X ’ypovo/u(-<x~\s OkTrod u d o d e u
i < * l  t o T j  o iv T o v  y e v o  j
(Is. vi, 62-63)
In this quotation, the words y p *.rrr<*c . . . ^ / \ o k  T j^ c jt /
indicate that part of Androcles' argument consisted of 
allegations that the will was a forgery. This is 
successfully refuted by the reference to the fact that 
the witnesses to the will have given testimony in favour 
of it. Androcles' other allegation, namely that 
Philoctemon died childless, is answered by means of a 
rhetorical question. This answer is misleading, since 
the words -b o * rro cy  6 *Ljx e v  o s Kc/LT&xt rre t/
state that Philoctemon left an 
adopted son, thus suggesting that an adoption "inter 
vivos" had taken place, whereas he left a testament in 
which Chaerestratus was named as his adopted son. 
However, Philoctemon died in 367, and this speech was
made fifty two years after the Sicilian expedition (53), 
which would date it at 364. No explanation is given as 
to why Philoctemon's estate was not claimed by 
Chaerestratus as soon as his death was announced. 
Indeed, Androcles and Antidorus attempted to inscribe the 
two boys as the adopted sons of Ergamenes and 
Philoctemon, and even though this attempt failed, there 
is no indication that it was countered by a protestation
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that Philoctemon already had an adopted son, but that 
certain relatives clarified the situation (54). If 
Chaerestratus had already claimed the estate of 
Philoctemon as his adopted son, it is very improbable 
that Androcles and Antidorus would have taken such steps.
In this particular case, it seems as if the jury's 
decision as to whether or not the will was genuine would 
rest on whether Philoctemon made a will at all, and if 
so, why Chaerestratus waited so long to claim the 
estate. Although the testamentary claimant provides 
witnesses who allege that they were present when the will 
was made, he offers no explanation why he did not act on 
the will earlier, and why he left Philoctemon's 
house for about three years, an indication of a
lack of respect for his adoptive father. This omission 
might well have led the jury to believe that the document 
was forged. In addition, in order to be awarded 
Euctemon's estate, it was necessary for Chaerestratus to 
prove that the two boys were not Euctemon's legitimate 
sons (55). There is an inscription dating from the 
mid-fourth century or later which mentions Chaerestratus 
son of Phanostratus of Cephisia (56), and if this dates
from after the case, then Chaerestratus lost his claim.
Dicaeoaenes (II) (no. 10)
The speech Isaeus, v was made by the representative 
of the heirs "ab intestato" to the estate of Dicaeogenes 
(II), and is an attempt to sue Leochares for surety. In 
an earlier chapter, I have suggested that only one will 
was made by Dicaeogenes (II) (57) but here I shall be
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paying attention to the speaker's argument that two 
separate wills were presented to the court.
When referring to the fact that the first will had 
been found not genuine, the speaker states:
(Is. v, 15)
Here, no specific explanation is given for the reason why 
the courts decided that the earlier will was not 
genuine. Wyse states that it is unlikely that Proxenus 
was accused of forgery by his own son (58). Such an 
accusation does not seem probable, since it would be an 
example of filial disloyalty which the speaker would be 
expected to make much of. Wyse suggests that:
"Dicaeogenes may have asserted that the will put forward 
in 399BC was made after the will confirmed by the court 
in 411BC and rendered the earlier document null and void"
There is, however, no evidence for such an interpretation 
of the events mentioned in this speech which points to
such a possibility even though it has been argued that
the events narrated in the speech suggest that this was 
the case (60). It might be that Dicaeogenes argued that
the out of court agreement which was probably made
between his father and his aunts was not in accordance 
with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will 
(61). This agreement could be referred to as a 
because it was a solemn compact and those partaking
T0tj7'OC>V
(59).
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allegedly took oaths not to transgress its terms (62).
This explanation seems more probable than that put
forward by Wyse, because no specific reason is given for
fee
the earlier will being found invalid, and it would^in the 
speaker7 s interest to conceal such an agreement.
The second will was attacked by the heirs "ab 
intestato" by the means of prosecuting those who alleged 
that they had witnessed the document. This prosecution 
was carried out by one of them, Menexenus (III), and the 
conviction of one of the witnesses, Lyco, was obtained 
(63). However, Dicaeogenes (III) offered Menexenus (III) 
a share ofjthe property, so the prosecution of the 
witnesses stopped:
s  ^ / J \  r  ~ /  L /
T(~ b c o jA .i6 o u i^ e \/o y  ( * \> T O v  j jc e p o s  t o ~u  K .T i.'y p o 'V  o
? / ( — v. f V T' py r-
rt. € j \ - y \ / e T O  f  x /rr tp  c*> y e r r p c ^ T - r e  f f fo d o v  ? To us
§&  £»j eot-'KUJ>C O T  ot-S T&JY jutXX.pT'U If  C<^€-t l / o t c  .
(Is. v, 13)
Here, the language used is annoyingly vague. As Wyse 
rightly states, it is difficult to believe that people 
convicted of false witness could be released by the 
prosecutor,’ his suggestion that Menexenus (III) just
promised to take no further steps if he recovered the
share of the estate vThich was due to him (64) is a lot
more probable. Wyse wonders why Menexenus (III) and
Cephisodotus did not continue the prosecution themselves
(65), but it is possible that the heirs "ab intestato"
wished to present a united front. Witnesses are produced
&
to testify to the treachery of Menexenus (I-K ), so this 
part of the narrative is probably truthful. Later in the
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speech, the speaker states that the second will allegedly 
made by Dicaeogenes (II) is invalid because
_ c \ \ ^ \ ( /
CH. fX v .p T  ocu7~ 'vj v  ~ r o v  f f e Z o v  t o ^  ^ j u e T t r p o  1/
^ L Q L $ e 6  & e i-L  k t i X t J C O L V  y  £  v  J jtU p  7~ 'V {O  C CO If.
(Is. vi, 15)
Here, the plural o t  p . u . p ' r v  p ^ 6 * \ / T £ S  suggests that some, if 
not all of the witnesses of the will were found guilty of 
perjury. However, there is only evidence that one of the 
witnesses to the will, a man named Lyco, was so 
convicted. It therefore seems as if the speaker is not 
telling the truth here and is disguising the facts so 
that he can put his case in a better light, since the 
conviction of one of the witnesses would only discredit
the will, whereas the conviction of all of them would 
lead to the document being regarded as a forgery.
On the grounds that this second will had been found 
invalid, the heirs "ab intestato" put in a claim for the
estate of Dicaeogenes (II). This was met by a
protestation by Leochares who argued that the estate was
not adjudicable. The reason behind this protestation is 
not given, but it is possible that Leochares argued that 
the will had not been found invalid. Leochares was 
prosecuted by the heirs "ab intestato" for perjury and
was found guilty (66). If Leochares had stated that the 
will was genuine, then his conviction would indicate that 
the jury regarded the will as a forgery.
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Therefore, as far as the wills allegedly made by 
Dicaeogenes (II) are concerned/ the case made against the 
validity of the first will is not clarified/ and the
ne
genuin^ss of the second document was undermined by the 
sucessful prosecution of one of the witnesses for 
forgery. Conviction of Leochares for false witness is 
probably an indication that this second will was later 
regarded as not genuine.
Haanias (no. 15)
After the death of the girl adopted by means of 
Hagnias' will, the claim of the contingent heir, Glaucon, 
was contested by Phylomache, the testator's second 
cousin, and she was awarded the estate (57). Isaeus gives 
no reason as to why the will was declared invalid. On 
the other hand, Pseudo-Demosthenes puts forward the 
following allegation:
S e  ’j / ' G V C - J j l C . O ' *  Jc.0i.Tot. 6 * * " V  T fc
O k*£ O loj <oa o i§£X<pO.S . . oct1
<is TOT& TT*-p€6'ftO\/‘Te> y t  Ae J^ By 6 *.V y e v c & S  Ozj6ocl '
( [Dem. ] xliii, 4 )
Here, the word x.ocr*6 icev*-6 oiS-r£c) implies that Glaucus and
Glaucon forged the document. However, no evidence is 
produced to prove this specifically, and the fact that no 
one questioned the will immediately after Hagnias' death 
suggests that it was firstly thought to be genuine. 
There is, however, another explanation as to why Glaucon 
lost his claim; since he had been named in the will as 
contingent heir on the death of the daughter adopted in 
the document and the will had been declared legal after
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Hagnias died, Glaucon simply took possession of the 
property without putting in a claim for it. However, the 
fact that Phylomache was awarded the property indicates 
that a later jury found the document invalid. I have 
suggested in Chapter 6 that the reason for this might 
have been that the contingent bequest was only to come 
into effect if the girl were to die before coming of age 
or ^ two years afterwards (68). Glaucon claimed the estate 
about thirty years after Hagnias' death, and if the terms 
of the will were as I have suggested, it is likely that 
Glaucon lost his claim not because the will was found to 
be a forgery but because its terms rendered it invalid 
after a certain period of time.
Pvrrhus (no. 13)
By means of his will, Pyrrhus adopted Endius and 
probably stated that he was to be married to his daughter 
Phile (69).
The validity of this will was unquestioned for 
twenty years while Endius held the estate. However, 
Endius did not marry Phile, but she was married to a 
certain Xenocles. Following Endius' death, the sister of
Pyrrhus claimed the property and was opposed by Xenocles 
who claimed the estate on behalf of his wife. It seems 
as if he is also questioning the genuineness of the will: 
<Ss ykf> o v^  [ * £ $ ]  'arret * j  <t t ^ to rots
jJUbp.+-pTVp'] vCOttV €*r<' Tyj Sta-Gy toy TOV TTvpjZOV
(Is. iii, 56)
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Here, the method to be used is that of prosecuting the
made it. If successful, this would indicate that the 
document was a forgery. Since it seems as if this case 
is still pending there is no way of knowing whether the 
will was eventually proved invalid or not.
Wills made bv men with legitimate children.
The will in Hvnerides ii (no. 30)
In this particular case, the testator died leaving a 
pregnant wife and the legitimacy of the child is being
questioned by certain relatives who are accusing
Lycophron of adultery. Curtis states that the ultimate 
purpose of these relatives was to prove the will invalid
(70). However, the prosecutors here are those who opposed 
the closest relatives when they tried to eject Euphemus
(71). Therefore, they are not the heirs "ab intestato" 
but those who were bequeathed the testator's property in 
the event of his unborn child dying within two years of
coming of age. This indicates that the speech against 
Lycophron is not an attempt to invalidate the will but to
bring into effect the secondary bequest.
There is evidence in the speech that other relatives 
had attempted to remove Euphemus, who was probably
nominated as guardian of the testator's wife and unborn 
child, from the testator's estate (72).
witnesses who alleged that they were present when
It is not stated what form this attempted ejection took, 
but since it was made by the heirs "ab intestato" 
(£roi>5 gyyvJrtLTcj y£vov [$ ), it probably took the form of 
an attack on the validity of the will, since this would 
be of greatest benefit to them, as they would then stand 
to inherit in event of the child's death. There is no 
evidence in the speech which indicates how the heirs "ab 
intestato" sought to find the document invalid, whether 
they prosecuted the witnesses for perjury in order to 
have the will declared a forgery, or whether they 
questioned the testator's sanity. The fact that a case 
was later brought against Lycophron by those who were 
nominated as contingent heirs indicates that the heirs 
"ab intestato" lost their case.
Therefore, since the attempt at invalidating the 
will failed, it can be assumed that there was sufficient 
evidence in favour of the document for it to be upheld by 
a court of law.
Pasio (n o . 21)
Apollodorus, Pasio^s^ eldest son, brought a case 
against Phormio for twenty talents which he alleged 
Phormio had taken from his father's estate, about twenty 
years after his father's death (73). Demosthenes, xxxvi 
is Phormio's response to this claim.
Part of Apollodorus' argument seems to have been 
expected to be directed against the will of Pasio, since 
the speaker states that Ap^ollodorus told the arbitrator 
that a will was not made (py yev'&eSoo- icy/) and
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Nothing more is mentioned about the arguments which 
Apollodorus used against the will. His allegations are 
refuted by the speaker:
(Dem. xxxvi, 34)
The argument that Apollodorus accepted one clause of the
will which was in his favour is convincing because it
suggests that he regarded the will as genuine. The
n
speaker emphasises the weakness i f  Apollodorus' case by 
the use of irony (ov . . oC*v^ o<. ),he was prepared to
believe those clauses of the will which were beneficial 
to himself, but not others.
From the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech xlv it is 
apparent that Phormio's plea was so effective that 
Apollodorus was not even permitted to speak (75). This 
would indicate that, amongst other points which had been 
made, the jury believed the will to be genuine.
Apollodorus later brought an action against 
Stephanus who had given testimony (76) that Apollodorus 
had refused Phormio's challenge to open a document which 
was allegedly a copy of the will of Pasio.
V TO oi/V V ' 'T'tjV
During the course of his two speeches against Stephanus, 
Apollodorus makes various attacks on the genuineness of 
his father's will.
It is suggested that the testament was not presented 
to the court in the proper manner:
OvJCOV k &i,TTGp oL^y @ «£ V j  cCVTO ~TO
yptL/AjUdTeZoy ecS Tov epty&a. tcccl. rhr
'TTotp & )(0Vrvi, fA<*.pTTJp6s(. ....
([D e m . ] xlv, 17)
Here, the words e lrrep suggest that the reason
why the will was not placed into the evidence box was
because it was not genuine, since i ^ jB ^ S  can have this
meaning. Although Apollodorus does not specifically
state that the will was not put into the box into which
all evidence presented at a public arbitration had to be
placed (77) if the case was to be taken to court, the
word implies that this was not done. However, the
opposing party has deposed that the document was
presented before the arbitrator, which would suggest that
afterwards it had been sealed in the box with all the
other written evidence. In addition, no evidence which
\
(
had not been placed in this box was admissible before the 
court (78), and the fact that the document was read to
the court (79)and accepted as genuine by the members of 
the jury (80) indicates that it had been put into the box 
as required. Therefore, this argument is not convincing.
Apollodorus also states that the will was a forgery 
because he did not possess the document himself whereas
he should have inherited it together with his father's 
estate (81). However, it was not generally customary to
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deposit a will with the heir to the property or with one 
who would benefit under its terms although this was done 
in some cases (82), and Apollodorus was both his father's 
heir and benefitted under the terms of the will in that 
he received an additional bequest besides his share in 
the property (83). Thus, this argument is not plausible.
An attempt is also made to find the will spurious by 
referring to the lease of Pasio's bank (84):
that nobody would be prepared to pay the rent for the
bank; however, the fact that there is no evidence to
state that Phormio did not pay the rent, implies that
there was someone who was prepared to do this. The
was not a trustworthy person to be placed in charge of 
the bank because he led it into debt. However, the debt 
which Pasio is represented as owing the bank is probably 
a reference to loans made on the security of land 
(85),whereas Apollodorus implies here that this money was 
a deficit. Furthermore, the fact that Phormio was the 
bank's manager while Pasio was still alive (86) indicates 
that he was the most obvious choice for the position
o c r e t ' c j ^ v  TO G 0C ./V T ' * \ /
y  T p * T r £ $ x .  j  t d v t u j  t o^ Ctt J & n ~ e T ^ o e \ / j
([Dem . ] xlv, 3 3)
Here, the speaker combines rhetorical question
s'
with eoicos argument to attempt to prove the lease a 
forgery. The first question .. pi suggests
second question . . . £ n C r p e V j  suggests that Phormio
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which Pasio gave him.
Towards the end of the speech, Apollodorus suggests 
that Phormio wrote those parts of the will concerning 
Archippe's dowry and the bequest to her (87). However, 
this allegation is not supported by any proof.
On the other hand, in the second speech against 
Stephanus, Apollodorus argues that Pasio did not have the 
capacity to make a will (8 8 ). The fact that these
arguments are used suggests that Pasio did make a will,
and that it was genuine. Therefore, the arguments that 
the will was a forgery are rendered ineffective by those 
put forward on grounds of capacity.
Wills made by men without legitimate children and not
involving adoption.
Cleonymus (no. 24)
In the case concerning the will of Cleonymus, it is 
suggested that the will is a forgery. The speaker argues 
that heirs by kinship have a greater right to inherit
because their relationship cannot be disguised, whereas 
wills can be forged:
f i p  T£>$ y i i /o v s  c>t*& c o r -t jr * *  TT*yt~&s>
JCtXrl O v f t  o t o *  T & T O v T J e Q 'T 'L  TTpoS
y t v 6 3 > < ■ * • . s S'  t t o x 'ko *. y t -v
'x.rr&Pjy'ocv’,  o t  *.rrv -r o-u
/&. £ vCiOV S '  0V>c- f l  erfio U e
( Is . i , 4 1 )
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Here, the device of antithesis is used to compare the
trustworthiness of relationship with the unreliability of
a testament. Even though it is mentioned that forged 
wills have been presented to the courts, there is no 
argument or evidence that this particular will is forged. 
It is probable that the speaker merely wished to suggest 
that the will was not genuine in order to leave a doubt
3 i «■*>
in the minds of the jury. The words tfvit op&cos
by someone who was ill-advised was on the same footing
emphasises the duty which the claimants would have had 
towards Cleonymus1 relatives:
(is. i, 39)
Here, two responsibilities are mentioned; firstly the 
fact that they would have had to care for Polyarchus if 
he had been predeceased by Cleonymus and secondly that if 
Cleonymus had left daughters it would have been their
from chapter 11 where ±•4-' seem^ to be synonymous 
with e v f p o w ' /  and the context implies that a will made
legally with a forged document. The speaker also
y Tfo^-voi., 0 $ O rr*~T'yp o K\&U?\STjptOV/ TToclTCTOS
k &lI  *  e TrurV
T O  v  r r b t r r r r a v  y  
yvi/v2  tt^o
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duty to marry them or provide them with a dowry. The 
first argument is weak because if Cleonymus had 
predeceased Polyarchus, his nephews, as Polyarchus' next 
of kin would have had the power of administering the 
property if he had grown too old to care for it himself. 
Wyse states that "Cleonymus1 nephews ignore the fact that 
their uncle would not have inherited the family estate if 
he had died before his father, and that, if Cleonymus 
were dead and Polyarchus alive, their mother would be 
heiress with indefeasible rights of succession" (89). It 
is, however, possible that Cleonymus could have been in 
possession of the estate even if his father was alive, if 
Polyarchus had given him the rights of administration 
over his property (90). Furthermore, the mother of the 
heirs "ab intestato" is mentioned nowhere in the speech, 
and it is probable that she had died. Therefore, Wyse's 
argument that if Cleonymus had predeceased Polyarchus, 
his sister would become an c ^ ^ i^ X ^ p o s i-s probably 
irrelevant. On the other hand, Wyse is correct when he 
states that the other argument "loses much of its force" 
when it is remembered that the nephews would have had the 
right to marry Cleonymus' daughters and enjoy the use of 
the estate for many years. Because the situation 
envisaged would have been to the nephews' advantage, this 
argument is weak.
It is also argued that if the heirs "ab intestato" 
had predeceased Cleonymus, he would have had the right to 
inherit their estate, therefore they should inherit his 
property (91). This argument is somewhat amusing if one 
remembers that right at the beginning of the speech it is
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stated that the nephews' estate was debt-ridden (92).
However, this fact would only be apparent to the most 
alert listener, since the argument concerning reciprocal
bequests is placed at the end of the speech.
Therefore, the arguments against the will of
Cleonymus on grounds of fact are mainly concerned with 
the greater rights of the next of kin to inherit, and 
there is only a brief mention of the possibility of the
will being a forgery. Neither of these are convincing.
Archepolis (no. 25)
The will of Archepolis was challenged by the 
testator's brother (93).
Dionysius of Halicarnassus states that one of the 
points to be decided upon was whether or not the 
testament was made:
(Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Isaeo, 15)
This quotation is somewhat misleading, since the fact 
that a will is presented to the court indicates that one 
was made. Perhaps the author is referring to the 
speaker's argument that the will was a forgery, a fact 
which he mentions later:
d v rc js  e.Tft Tyis  $ i * jj j6 tv  j *&<-* y ^  ** rro&€rt*cnsTJ6
e T v y u r r o  -n>-0 r y  tc o ro ^  Tbis Sux.Byxocs,,
(D.H. De Isaeo, 15)
Here, the words ix ro  ro v  T& TeA t^)Ty K*r°$ clarify what the 
author has said earlier. In one of the fragments of the
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speech which remain, it is alleged that the speaker's 
opponents forged not one but four wills:
(Th. fr. 2)
It seems as if the speaker's case is supported by
witnesses, contracts and challenges in addition to
arguments from probability (94). However in view of the 
fact that only two fragments of the speech are extant in 
addition to a very brief commentary by Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, the arguments against the will's validity,
besides the allegation that it was a forgery, cannot be 
ascertained.
There is also a small amount of additional evidence 
which it is necessary to discuss with reference to the 
reasons for finding a testament invalid.
At the beginning of Isaeus, vii, an adoption "inter 
vivos" is compared to a testamentary adoption. The 
speaker states that whereas in the former method, the 
adoptive father makes his wishes clear, a testamentary 
adoption can be questioned:
may have been a certain distrust of wills in Athenian
4/otByJUJS $ £  T&TT’tLpcov  (J r r
rrox.'Ko't -rrerr Aoc 6
(Is. vii, 2 )
Here, the words &S*j 7lcus JeiroCy6e. seem to rely upon what
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courts, since a man did make his wishes very clear by 
means of testament.
The grounds on which a will was contested are given as 
forgery ( rre trh aL 6 ), which suggests that this might 
have been regarded by both himself and his listeners as 
the most common argument directed against the validity of 
a will.
There is also a mention of reasons for finding a 
will invalid in Aristotle's Problems:
A lo i T~ L G V L O t s  K.oc.6 ’T 'tj p  f & < £  7~0 l ■£ y  <£ r  g. g  L jU a frtO i/.
tolTs tt-ctis 'jt-y c j  yj* Vt l  y e v o v s  o-vic
e 6TL TO o v  O ilT o fe e .tre *-* ' §i*.9ylCaL(.
$& TT<5A»Xoc.6 ij)6 .v£ tZ $ 7^7 7 X  OTJ Sot. L -
(Aristotle, Problems, xxix, 3)
Here, the opening question A id . - yty<fZ£ovToci indicates 
that there was a bias in the Athenian courts in favour of 
heirs "ab intestato" as opposed to testamentary 
claimants, since it is asked why a verdict is more often 
returned in favour of the former.
•The reason given, namely that the claim of heirs "ab
intestato" cannot be disguised whereas wills have often 
•H>
been found 9 :^ be forgeries echoes the argument produced
in Isaeus, i, 42, and suggests that allegations of
forgery were those most commonly presented against the
validity of a will in an Athenian court of law.
Therefore, with reference to the table at the end of
this thesis, it can be seen that of the twenty ^ nine 
c
non-fictij£ious wills which we know about, the validity of 
sixteen has been questioned, and of these, fourteen were
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quest ioned in antiquity.
In eight of these cases, the major argument presented
against the documents concerned was that they were
(t>u^
forged, whereas in only^/cases was the major argument from 
Solon's testamentary law. This indicates that 
allegations of forgery were used more often in an attempt 
to overthrow a will than arguments from the provisions in 
the law of Solon. Furthermore, sources other than cases 
concerning testaments suggest that the major argument 
used against a will was that it was a forgery. All the 
wills whose genuineness was questioned date from the 
classical period. There is no evidence concerning 
allegations made against wills in the post-classical 
period.
f
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-526-
20. Is. ix, 1.
21. See Chapter 7, Formalities pp. 411-412.
22. Is. ix, 8.
23. D. Harvey, "Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek 
Politics", Crux: Essays presented to G.E.M. de Ste.
Croix on his 75th Birthday, (Exeter, 1985), p. 79.
24. Wyse, Isaeus, p. 633.
25. Is. ix, 10-11.
26. Wyse, ibid.
27. cf. Is. iv, 23.
28. This is gradually built up throughout the speech. It
is suggested that he is a liar (Is. ix, 6), a 
per jurer , (Is. ix, 19), that he is both ungrateful for 
the kindness which the speaker and his family have 
shown him, and he is slandering the dead.
29. Wyse, Isaeus, p. 640.
30. Wyse, ibid.
31. Wyse, ibid.
32. This is quoted above on p. 49?.
33. Harvey, op. cit. p. 85.
34. Forster, op. cit. p. 325.
35. Wyse, Isaeus, p. 626,640.
36. Is. ix, 14-15.
37. See below, pp. 510-511.
38. Is. ix, 33.
39. Wyse, Isaeus, p. 645.
40. Wyse, Isaeus, p. 643.
41. Is. ix, 19.
-527-
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
See Harrison, Law, 1, pp. 143-147.
Is. ix, 27-31.
See Chapter 6, Function, p. 172 and Hardcastle, ibid. 
Is. ix, 16-20. 
cf. Forster, ibid.
Is. ix, 19,29.
I.G . II 2 1747.
See Chapter 6, Function, pp. 173-175.
Davies, A.P.F. pp. 562-563.
Wyse, Isaeus p. 484, followed by Forster, op. cit. 
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Conclusion.
The subject of my concluding chapter shall be a brief 
discussion of the chronology of the Athenian will, since 
to my knowledge, this subject has not been touched upon 
by any previous student of Greek law. This analysis shall 
begin from the Homeric period because even though this 
evidence is not Athenian, it is of some use in attempting 
to ascertain what might have been the case before Solon's 
law of testament.
It could be objected that the number of wills which 
have been discussed is far too small for the statistics 
to be of any great significance. However, these 
thirty-eight wills constitute the majority of the extant 
evidence available at present to those studying Athenian 
testamentary law (1). Therefore, even though many other 
wills which we do not know about were probably made under 
Athenian jurisdiction, it seems unwise to disregard 
conclusions which this evidence leads one to just because 
it is not very extensive.
In view of the differing nature of the sources for 
this evidence, it might be thought that the conclusions 
drawn are somewhat distorted. However, this is not 
necessarily so. The wills dating from the earlier period 
are fictional, and are thus indicative of what might have 
been the case in ordinary daily life at this time. 
Conversely, when we move to the late fifth century and 
the whole of the fourth century, the nature of the 
evidence mostly consists of forensic speeches in which a 
will is disputed.
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However, in addition to disputed wills, in the course of 
their arguments, these speeches sometimes mention 
testaments which do not appear to have been disputed (2), 
and this indicates that the evidence from forensic
speeches is not as biassed as might be thought. On moving 
into the post-classical period, there is a definite 
difficulty, in that the majority the evidence
available concerning wills made under Athenian law at
this time is from Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the
Philosophers. Since the majority of these were single 
men, these documents cannot be regarded as evidence of
the testamentary provisions which may have been made by 
married men. However, the respective wills of Aristotle 
and Cnemon are of some use in redressing this imbalance. 
Furthermore, the fact that none of the known wills made 
by single men during this period contained an adoption is 
very strong evidence that this had ceased to be a 
significant function of the testament. Therefore, 
although the evidence presented has to be regarded with a 
certain amount of caution because of its differing 
nature, this difficulty is unavoidable. However, its 
significance can not be overlooked completely, because 
the evidence found in the different sources does provide 
strong indications concerning what the people of Attica 
specified in their wills.
With reference to the function of the Athenian 
testament, the evidence concerning fictional testaments 
and those made in the fifth century suggests that the 
original function of the will was not adoption, as has 
often been thought (3), but was the care of the family,
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since the majority of these wills are concerned with 
this. Although testamentary adoption was introduced by 
Solon in the sixth century as aa additional function of 
the will, it did not become common until the fourth 
century, when there seem^ to have been more testamentary 
adoptions than wills concerning family matters.However, 
even during this period, wills with functions other than 
adoption probably outnumbered those with this purpose. As 
far as bequests of property by will are concerned, these 
do not seem to have been unknown in earlier times, but 
were comparatively rare. The available evidence suggests 
that by the fourth century, this form of will was equally 
as common as wills concerning family matters. Following 
the close of the classical period, it seems as if the 
testamentary bequest was a very common function of the 
Athenian will. In addition, throughout the whole period, 
a will could contain an inventory of property and a 
record of debts due to the estate.
As far as the marital status of the testator was 
concerned, the evidence suggests that there were far more 
wills made by married men than by single men in the two 
earlier periods; in the fourth century, the numbers of 
single and married testators were equal, and by the 
post-classical period, far more wills were made by single 
men. The marital status thus has a direct link with the 
function of the will.
The results suggest that it was far more common for 
the authenticity of a will to be questioned in the fourth 
century than in either the earlier or the later period, 
even though this is partially due 'to the nature of the
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sources for these years. This does not seem to have any 
relationship with the increase of testamentary adoption. 
Conversely, all the wills concerning adoption in the 
evidence for the two earlier periods were questioned in a 
court of law. This suggests that at first, the Athenians 
tended to doubt the authenticity of wills with this 
function. Furthermore, all of the wills dating from the 
classical period whose major function was a bequest of 
property were questioned. This implies that later, 
testaments concerning this were regarded with a greater 
suspicion than those containing an adoption or regulating 
family matters. That the suspicion of wills probably 
lessened as time went on is shown by the fact that there 
is no evidence concerning the questioning of wills in the 
third century, although this could be partially due to 
the nature of the source material for this period.
Insofar as witnesses are concerned, the majority of 
testators in the two earlier periods did have their wills 
witnessed. Since the majority of the fictional wills were 
oral, this would have been necessary. On the other hand, 
in the fourth century, just under half of the wills were 
witnessed, and by the third century, there is evidence 
concerning the witnessing of only one quarter of the 
wills which we know about.
There was a lesser tendency in the two earlier 
periods to copy out and/or deposit one's will, whereas in 
the two later periods, there is evidence that either or 
both of these things were done by just under half of 
those testators about whom we have evidence.
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Therefore, the period 700-200 saw the gradual 
evolution of the will from a very rudimentary oral 
arrangement of one's goods and family responsibilities, 
to a detailed written document which might contain many 
different minor clauses in addition to its major 
function. That the Athenian testament was inextricably 
linked with the care of the ow*os is indicated by most of 
its functions: adoption of an heir; the care of one's
family; an inventory of property so that one's heirs will 
know the extent of their inheritance; and even in those 
wills whose major function is bequest without adoption, 
arrangements are often made for the care of the 
testator's dependants. Thus, the basic underlying motive 
for making a will, namely the care of the otK06, probably 
did not alter to any great extent during the period under 
consideration.
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TESTATOR
1 Odysseus
2 Telemachus
3 Ajax
5 Heracles
6 Heracles
9 Mneson
SOURCE
Homer,Odyssey
Homer,Odyssey
C. 594
Soph. Ajax
Chronological Table of The Wills Discussed in this Thesis (4). 
DATE STATUS FUNCTION FORM WITNESSES
c.700(A) m. ch.(m) care of family
marriage of wife
oral told to wife
c.700(A) s bequest of goods oral several friends
SOLON'S TESTAMENTARY LAW . ADOPTION BY TESTAMENT LEGALIZED.
oralc.440(A) m. ch.(m) bequest and
care of child
2, Teucer and 
testator's 
concubine
4 Heracles Soph. Trach. c.440(A) m. ch.(m) division of property written none at writing,
Soph. Trach. 
Eur. Alcestis
Aristophanes, 
Wasps
Eur.Palamedes
Is.vii
regulation of wife's 
dowry
c.430(A) m. ch.(m) marriage of
concubine to son
438(A) m. ch. (m) bequest of slave
girl
422 m. ch.(f) adoption of a
son to marry 
testator's 
daughter
c.416(A) 
415-3 s.
inventory
complete bequest 
of property
oral
oral
written
but contents 
told to wife
told to son 
told to Admetus
written
COPYING &
DEPOSITING
left in the 
house but 
shown to wife
10 Dicaeogenes(II) Is.v 411 s. adoption probably minimum of 3 
written
deposited 
with Proxenus 
-a relative
11 Euthycrates Is. ix c.410 m. ch.(m) guardianship of
chi Id, marriage of 
of wife.
12 Diodotus Lysias, xxxii 410/409 m.ch. (m+f (guardianship of written wife and brother 1 copy and
children, dowry for told will leir. m
wife and daughter. the house
QUESTIONED
yes
yes, no 
evidence for 
grounds, but 
indicated in 
Is. vii, 7.
prosecution 
of witnesses 
could lead 
to a
declaration 
of forgery
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TESTATOR SOURCE DATE STATUS FUNCTION FORM WITNESSES
404/3 DELETION OF CERTAIN CLAUSES IN SOLON'S LAW BY THE THIRTY TYRANTS.
13 Dionysodorus Lysias, xiii 404/403 m.ch.ex. care of family
request for vengeance
at least 4, 
wife and friends
403/2 PROBABLE RESTORATION OF THE CLAUSES DELETED BY THE THIRTY TYRANTS.
COPYING &
DEPOSITING
QUESTIONED
14 Pyrrhus Is. iii 401
15 Hagnias Is. xi 
[Don. ]xliii
396
m. ch.(f) adoption of son to 
marry the
testator's daughter
adoption (f) and 
bequest in the 
event of her death
probably
written
probably at least 1 
written
deposited 
with half- 
brother
prosecution 
of witnesses 
could lead 
to a
declaration 
of forgery 
suggestion 
of forgery 
but
probably 
found 
invalid 
because of 
terms
16 Apollodorus Is. vii
17 Conon Lysias xix
18 Aristarchus Is. x
19 Demosthenes (I) Dem.xxvii
xxviii
xxix
20 Nicostratus Is. iv
394-390 s.
374
adoption of a 
female relative
392-389 m.ch.(m) bequests, probably terms
the care of his son suggest
it was 
written
378-371 s. complete bequest 
of property
377-375 m.ch. (nH-f)guardianship of
children, dowry 
for wife & 
daughter, and 
naming of their 
husbands' 
inventory
s. adoption of friend
probably
written
written 3, maybe 4
including wife
at least 2
deposited 
with Aphobus
questioned 
on grounds 
of owner­
ship of 
property 
bequeathed
alleged 
forgery, but 
also mention 
of Solon's
Law
5 33-
TESTATOR SOURCE DATE STATUS FUNCTION
21 Pasio Dem. xxxvi 
[Dem.] xlv 
xlvi
370-371 m.ch.(m) guardianship of
minor son, division 
of property between 
sons, dowry and 
marriage of wife
22 Astyphilus Is. ix 371-366 s, adoption of a male 
relative
23 Theophon Is. xi 369/368 adoption of female 
female relative
24 Cleonymus Is. i 370-365 s. complete bequest 
of property
25 Archepolis Is. frags 1&2 
D.H.
de Isaeo 15
26 Philoctemon Is. vi.
not probably written
known s.
367 m. adoption of a 
male relative
27 Euctemon Is vi 367/6 m.ch.(m+f)regulation of
property limiting 
the inheritance of 
a son by a later 
marriage.
28 Polyeuctus Dem. xli 364-353 m.ch.(f) recording of debts
29 Plato D.L. iii 347 s. bequest of
and inventory
30 Hyperides ii 336 m. ch.ex. guardianship of
child,, bequest
to relatives in 
event of his death.
FORM WITNESSES COPYING &
DEPOSITING
QUESTIONED
written
written
written
written
first
oral
then
written
oral
written
probably
written
probably copied and forgery,
Phormio deposited mention of
with a Solon's Law
non-relative
allegedly 
certain) 
relatives 
(Is. ix, 9)
deposited
with
Hierocles
forgery,
brief
mention of 
Solon's Law
probably 
witnessed 
because 
contents 
not secret.
deposited 
with a 
friend
argument 
from Solon's 
Law, testator 
wished to 
revoke it, 
forgery.
alleged
forgery.
at least 2 deposited
with
brother-in-law
at least 4 deposited 
with 
a friend
recalled in 
365/4 
but not 
questioned
at least 5 questioned
on grounds 
of force
questioned 
but this 
failed.
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TESTATOR
31 Aristotle
32 Cnemon
33 Crantor
35 Epicurus
36 Strato
SOURCE
D.L.v
Menander,
Dyskolos
D.L.iv
34 Theophrastus D.L. v
D.L. x
D.L. v
DATE
322
316
290
286
271
268
STATUS FUNCTION
m. (w), care of family,
ch. (irri-f) bequests,
manumission 
of slaves
m. ch.(f) adoption of a
male non-relative, 
dowry for daughter
s. bequest and
oral regulation of 
burial
s. bequest of ,
care of school, 
bequests, 
burial
s. bequest of ,
care of school, 
care of orphan 
children of 
colleague
s. bequest of
property, 
care of school
FORM WITNESSES
written
oral at least 4 
(2 wonen)
written depositing 
6>lht6$$£c/
written
written
COPYING &
DEPOSITING
3 copies 
deposited 
with non­
beneficiaries
lodged in 
Metroon
37 Arcesilaus D.L. iv c. 242 bequest of 
property, 
minor bequest.
written copied and 
deposited 
with a 
relative 
and friends,
38 Lyco D.L. v 228-224 bequest of 
property, 
care of school, 
arrangements 
for burial.
written three
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS:
(A) = anachronistic
m. = married
(w) = widowed
s. = single
ch. = child/children 
(m)(f) = sex of child, male or female 
ch.ex. = child expected
QUESTIONED
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Results
Total number of wills 38
Function adoption 10
family 11
bequests 14
inventory 3
Status of testator married 18
single 16
Copied and deposited 12
Questioned 1 3
Witnessed 19
Fictional testaments, 700-416 (nos. 1-8)
Number of wills 8
Function adoption 1
family 4
bequests 2
inventory 1
Status of testator married 5
single 1
unknown 1
Copied and deposited 1
Questioned 1
Witnessed 5
Fifth Century, 416-401 (nos. 9-14)
Number of wills 6
Function adoption 2
family 3
bequests 1
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inventory 0
Status of testator married 4
single 2
Copied and deposited 2
Questioned 3
Witnessed 4
Fourth Century until 323 (nos. 15-30)
Number of wills 16
Function adoption 6
family 4
bequests 4
inventory 2
Status of testator married 7
single 7
Copied and deposited 7
Questioned 9
Witnessed 7
Later Period (nos. 31-38)
Number of wills 8
Function adoption 1
family 1
bequests 5
inventory 0
Status of testator married 2
single 6
Copied and deposited 3
Questioned 0
Witnessed ^
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Notes
1. Other evidence consists of infor-*uhpnconcerning Solon's 
law and its alteration by the Thirty, which is 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 4. In addition, Plato's 
Laws also contains a brief discussion of the subject, 
see Chapter 6, Function, pp. 359-361.
2. Is. ix (no.11), vii (no.16), xi (no.23), vi (no.26), 
Lysias, xxxii (no.12), xix (no.17), Dem. xxvii, 
xxvii,xxix (no.19).
3. See particularly the concluding paragraphs of Chapter 
6, Function.
4. This table is only a brief summary of the evidence. 
For further discussion, please see the relevant 
chapters.
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Appendix I
The Positions of Nicanor and Nicomachus in the Household
of Aristotle.
Even though this subject has been discussed in other 
places(l), I have decided to include it in my thesis 
because, in the light of various clauses in the will of
Aristotle, the relative positions of Nicanor and 
Nicomachus are in need of further discussion. I shall
begin with Nicanor.
The ancient evidence concerning Nicanor's position in 
Aristotle's household is as follows:
1. Vita Marciana
o p < f*v o $  i m p *  ^  ,^ reik/3v'6
OV p L V 'jfJ .jS  f< *c t T p o c f y S  j u y T o Y  U V T O V  Vtov'
Mnc*vop* e rp eye  K-ecl e rru iS zv te  v c o y  ia*L
T G X iv T iJ Y  e t c e A . e v & e *  € y  s  T j v  €oCXITOV OuyoLTtfO <*.
7TL> 04 £ c<> yevo(*.e.vyv *vT(*> JTu9i*Sos, So-£>y* l o l v t £> npos
7**10 Kii,) {op<f*/),s refers to Aristotle).
The Vita Vulgata contains the same information , is very 
simil^ar to the above quotation and is thought to be an
abridgement of it (2), as is Ptolemy's Vita (3).
2. Vi ta Lat ina
"...post mortem autem Nicomachi et Festidos parentum
ducitur a quodam$ nomine Proxeno Atarneo, cuius famam et 
nutrimentum habens in memoriam ipsius filium Nicanora 
educavit et docuit et sibi filium fecit et in morte sua 
precepit in testamento suam filiam in Pithaida genitam
eidem a Pithaida tradi illi Nicanori in uxorem." u;iA
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3. An inscription was found in Ephesus conferring the 
privileges of a t rpajfero* on A f y i s r o - r e x o v s  
$ (4).
Therefore, with the exceptions of Diogenes Laertius 
and Hesychius, neither of whom mention Nicanor's standing 
in Aristotle's household, the Greek and Latin traditions 
state that Nicanor was Aristotle's adopted son. The 
Syriac and Arabic Vitae do not mention the adoption of 
Nicanor, with the exception of the Arabic translation of 
Ptolemy-el-Garib's Life of Aristotle (5), which is 
thought to have been an abridgement of the Vita Marciana.
Of the more recent views, Zeller, Jaeger and Lipsius 
are of the opinion that Nicanor was the adopted son of 
Aristotle (6 ), thinking that the arrangements in the will 
are indicative of this. They do not, however, state 
specifically which arrangements in the will indicate 
this, neither do they discuss this in detail. On the 
other hand, Bruns (7) states that there is no indication
of an adoption in the will, and this opinion is
considered correct by Mulvany, During and Chroust (8 ). 
Gottschalk (9) also finds the adoption very dubious.
If the evidence for Nicanor's adoption rested solely 
on the provision in the will that Nicanor should care for 
Pythias and Nicomachus as if \ h e f  were father and brother 
(u>s Katu w V  i<#.\ <%$e>-<po£, ) / it would seem as
if the Greek and Latin traditions are at fault, since
this phrase does not indicate that an adoption took 
place. However, the fact that Pythias was not given a 
dowry when her marriage to Nicanor was arranged is an 
indication of the fact that an adoption took place,
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since, according to Attic laws, if a man with a daughter 
adopted a man as his son, he married the girl to him. 
There would thus have been no need to give a dowry (10). 
Furthermore, the inscription found at Ephesus, which 
confers the right of proxenus on Nicanor, son of 
Aristotle of Stagira, refers to the Nicanor mentioned in 
the will. Chroust rejects the evidence presented by this 
inscription on the grounds that it does not concur with
the fact that Aristotle does not specifically state in 
his will that Nicanor was his adoptive son (11). However, 
the clause in the will giving Pythias to Nicanor does
suggest that he was adopted by the testator. In addition, 
there seems to be no good reason as to why the Ephesians 
would have wished to misrepresent the legal paternity of 
Nicanor, since if he had not been adopted by Aristotle, 
he probably would have been referred to as the son of 
Proxenus, as it is thought that he was the son of
Proxenus and Aristotle's sister Arimneste (12). During 
conjectures that this inscription might have been made 
for the dangerous journey which Nicanor undertook at the 
time Aristotle was making 'his will (13), thus suggesting 
that he believes it to be authentic. He does not, 
however, discuss this inscription with reference to the 
possible adoption of Nicanor by Aristotle.
There are, therefore, two pieces of evidence in
favour of the possibility that Aristotle adopted Nicanor 
as his son*! one is a clause in the will and the other is 
an inscription. On the strength of these, it is my 
opinion that Nicanor was indeed adopted as Aristotle's 
s o n .
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The position of Nicomachus is also open to dispute.
The ancient and medieval evidence regarding his parentage 
is as follows (14):
1. Diogenes Laertius
Si  m I  j LSv  Afitco^ioi^ov S jj l £ y p t r v  x*\i.So s r j i  iroc*.xocicy$
V S  ( f y 6 c  T o ^ U L O i
2. Vita Hesychii
Si l> vieS* /JucopeLyOv ^pirvX.'Xl^os S .
3. Aristocles
(^ y 6 c  j j . G i ’ iu T 'fj / JT u Q i- * ‘ $g s  T y  s ^ E p p i'L o v  
T e x e ^ r y v  7 i p ' 6 T o T e ? ^ 6  e y y p c e v  j£p7r \ jx.7\.c£o< £ .  r o c  y e t .p t  r e * ,  £ J
y s  vcos * - v t £  b t i t , 0 } A < x y o i  £ v e r o  r o - Q  r o s  S i  < f ^ 6 * . v  
' o p f t x v o v  r p t c f e v r o c  G f e o ^ p o c e n o  k m X  S y  / u ^ Q i . f O c t . i c ' C e r c o v  o v t -c* .
& r r o f l * i s e T \ / gv* T T o t e p .& . (apud Eusebius, Praep. ev. xv)
4. Hermippus
6 T o T  £ S *  o *£r*.y e * .p  i  r y s  o v *  c£ y o l7 7 j * - \C S o $  r y 's
% T v , t p u s  e T T o ^ S o r r o t y  6 e  A t i k - o y c o c ^ o v  < * c l  e v v y w  r x  C - r y  p ^ P ' -  B * - s £ . r o v y
(apud Atheneaus, xiii, 589c.)
5. Suda
NtK.6p^os J £.ToLye>-pCry $ , tfrxoeofos, vto& pi* JAp/g rore\ov$
Tov $ t \OGofovs p o t d y r y s  S i  Q e o ^ p i c g ( M S  Se T'-'StS t c .o C l
XTouS^i.. eypocyev t f 9 i * . 5v  f i'f ix lo c 3  tcod rrept. T y $  <^ v6 t.x.yS
j f N. V
oCK.pO*6 €(MS TOM TotTpOb 'x.VTov. (15) (v. 39 8 )
6 . Vita Latina
"dimisit autem filium Nicomachum et filiam Pithaida.
(47)
7. Vita Aristotelis (Leonardo Bruno Arentinus)
"Uxores habuit duas, Phitaida scilicet et Herpilidem, 
quarum Phitaida alii filiam, alii neptem Hermiiae 
Atarnei de quo supra diximus. Herpilidem vero
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plerique ancillam eius fuisse tradidere, mortuaque uxore 
primo consuetudine ab eo receptam mox procreatis filiis 
pro uxore habitam. Ex hac Herpilide Nicomachus filius 
illi natus e s t .......... "
8 . Vita Syriaca 1
"He left two children, both of tender age, a son 
called Nicomachus and a daughter." (11)
9. Al-Mubashir
"At his death he left one boy, Nicomachus, tender of 
age, and a young daughter."(33)
10. (Jsaibia.
"As to my estate and my son, there is no need for me 
to be concerned about testamentary provisions." 
(Will,D.2k)
Of the authors quoted here, Diogenes Laertius 
and, it seems, Hesycnius, follow Timaeus in stating that 
Nicomachus was the illegitimate son of Aristotle and 
Herpyllis. Hermippus also suggests this in his rhetorical 
question. Aristocles and Arentinus both imply that 
Nicomachus was not a bastard, since both state that 
Herpyllis was Aristotle's wife,
(%pi6Tor eyy pev lEp-n oxxCSec. , Herpilidem ... pro
uxore habitam). The plural, "procreatis filiis," in 
Arentinus' account suggests that Herpyllis bore more than 
one child, but the tradition provides evidence concerning 
only one, namely Nicomachus.
The Suda does not mention who the boy's mother was (16). 
In addition, the Vita Syriaca and al-Mubashir's 
translation of Ptolemy-e1-Garib's Life of Aristotle do 
not question Nicomachus' legitimacy.
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There is also the clause in the Arabic version of
Aristotle's will which states that there is no need to
provide by testament for the boy. Gottschalk finds this
clause spurious because it is in the wrong place and is 
"..either redundant or wrong in law" (17). During thinks 
that it is genuine because if it were not, it would have 
been inserted earlier in the will (18). However, in Attic 
law it was not necessary for a man to include such a
clause in his will; a legitimate son just took what
portion of his father's estate remained after bequests
and debts (if any) had been paid. I therefore agree with 
Gottschalk and think that this clause in the Arabic
version of the will is spurious.
Furthermore, there is no intimation in the Greek
version of the will that Nicomachus was a bastard. If he 
had been illegitimate, it is very likely that Aristotle 
would have made some form of financial provision for him, 
since children born outside marriage could not inherit 
automatically (19).
Modern opinions concerning Nicomachus' parentage also 
differ. Mulvany and During (20) state that the will does 
not indicate that Nicomachus was illegitimate, and that 
the only source for this, is Timaeus, who probably 
included the statement in his work as part of his 
calumny. In addition, During believes the sentence "as to 
my estate ... provision" to be genuine, and thus 
concludes that Nicomachus was the legitimate son of 
Aristotle and Pythias (21).Gottschalk, although he does 
not specifically support this view, by stating that 
Herpyllis was not Aristotle's wife or mistress but
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probably a ward or relative, implies that he also thinks 
that Nicomachus was the child of Aristotle and Pythias 
(2 2 ) .
Bruns is of the opinion that Nicomachus was the 
legitimate son of Aristotle and Herpyllis, and that 
Herpyllis was legally married to the testator (23). This
is because there is no formal bequest to him in the will
which there would have been had he been illegitimate. 
Zeller also states that Nicomachus was the legitimate son 
of Herpyllis (24). Jaeger is of the opinion that 
Nicomachus was Herpyllis1 son, but he does not state 
whether he thinks the boy was legitimate or not (25). 
Chroust states that Nicomachus was the illegitimate son 
of Aristotle and Herpyllis who had later been legitimized
or adopted (25). He does not, however, suggest how this
could have been done, and therefore I do not find 
Chroust's suggestion convincing.
I agree with most of the arguments put forward by 
Mulvany and During, although, as stated above, I do not
think that the sentence "As to ........  provisions" in the
Arabic translation of the will is genuine. The tradition 
connecting Nicomachus with Herpyllis is grounded on 
Timaeus who is not a reliable source, and there is no 
evidence in Aristotle's testament which can be taken to 
suggest that he was either a bastard or the product of a 
second marriage with Herpyllis. I am therefore of the 
opinion that he was the son of Pythias (the philosopher's 
wife) and Aristotle.
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Chroust's statement here that the provisions of 
Aristotle's will provide an analogy with a will 
written by his father Nicostratus in which Arimneste 
was married to Proxenus who was given the care of 
Aristotle, Arimnestus and the estate, is based on no 
evidence. Chroust's statement that this putative will 
of Aristotle's father, Nicomachus, indicates that 
Proxenus was a relative because "under Greek law only 
an agnatic relative was charged with such duties" is 
contradicted both by the will of the elder 
Demosthenes in which Therippides, a friend of the 
testator, is appointed as guardian of the children,
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and by the will of Pasio in which the co-guardian of 
the testator's son, Phormio, is a freedman and not a 
relat ive.
13. During, A.B.T. n.271
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15. "Suda's notice on the younger Nicomachus is 
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by some ignoramus." During, A.B.T. p.291.
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26. Chroust. Arist. p.80, p.199, pp. 209-210.
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Appendix II
The Dates of Two Wills, Nicostratus and Aristarchus (II).
As far as the majority of wills are concerned, the
date of their making is either not disputed or can be
ascertained after a brief discussion of the available
facts. However, the respective wills of Nicostratus and
Aristarchus (II) fall into neither of these categories,
so it seems best to review separately the evidence
concerning them.
The date of the speech concerning the estate of
Nicostratus is disputed. A suggested date is 374. This
date is based upon Valckenaer's emendation of a difficult
manuscript reading in Isaeus iv, 7.The word m
the question - r ts  y^p ouk
itT e t c i lp o c r o ,  S£o u j  y x d e r - y v ,
was amended to ^ * 7 ^  .Ake was the town on the coast
of Phoenicia where Greek mercenaries commanded by
Iphicrates gathered in 374 (1). Wevers, however, dates
the speech at approximately 350 , arguing that it is a
later speech of Isaeus because of the greater proportion
of good prose rhythms (2). He thus proposes an
t s
alternative reading: v r but MacDowell
rightly states that this reading is unconvincing because
) *
" he gives no parallel for the passive^ , nor for
the active with an object meaning 'prize'; the object of 
this verb is normally 'struggle', 'danger' or the 
like"(3). However, MacDowell does agree that the passage 
provides "no adequate evidence for dating" (4).
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Wevers argues against Valkenaer's emendation by 
saying that the solution, even though paleographically 
very sound, is too simple (5), and that the situation 
envisaged is improbable:
"The conjectured reading will have to mean that 
Nicostratos, whose estate is in question , died at Ake 
c a . 374 and that his money was returned to Athens for
trial some time after his death. The first consideration 
is the oddity of a mercenary carrying 2 talents' worth of
money with him. A battlefield is hardly a safe place to
have such a large sum of money. But what is even more
incongruous is to think that, after Nicostratos' death
his money was dutifully sent to Athens from far off
Phoenicia, only to be mercilessly fought over once it
arrived safely at Athens. The picture of fourth century 
social conditions as portrayed by Isaeus as well as New 
Comedy make such unselfish loyalty highly
incredible . My estimation of Greek mercenaries
makes it hard to believe that such a sum of money left by 
a dead soldier in Phoenicia would ever find its way back 
to Athens"(6) .
On the other hand, there is a passage in Menander's
play, Aspis in which Daos, the slave of Cleostratus, 
returns to Athens from Lycia with the property of his
master who is presumed dead. In this instance, his 
property does not only consist of six hundred gold
staters (2 talents) but also some cups, clothing and 
slaves (7). The reason Daos is in possession of these
things is because he had been ordered to take them to 
Rhodes, deposit them there with a friend of his master
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and return to Cleostratus in Lycia. However, before he 
could do this, the Greek mercenaries were attacked by the 
natives , and thinking that his master had been killed, 
Daos went to Rhodes with the survivors, and then sailed 
to Athens, keeping his master's goods with him (8). It is 
therefore possible that a slave belonging to Nicostratus 
had returned from Phoenicia with his master's booty. (A 
possible route is illustrated in the map).This booty 
might not necessarily have consisted just of money as 
Wevers assumes, but also of other objects such as cups , 
clothes and slaves. Nicostratus would have had the 
opportunity of collecting a large sum of money and other 
property, since he had been absent from Athens for eleven 
years (9). The incident in Menander's Aspis indicates 
that it was not unusual for a soldier of fortune to have 
a large amount of property with him. This is also 
contrary to Wevers' argument. This incident in Aspi s 
therefore indicates that Wevers' arguments against 
Valkenaer's emendation of the text on the grounds that 
the situation was improbable, are not sound (10). 
Therefore, the earliest date for Is. iv would be 374, 
which is the date accepted by Wyse, Forster and Thalheim 
(11). Since Nicostratus died in 374, his will would not 
have been made later than this.
The will of Aristarchus is also rather difficult to 
date. Wevers gives an approximate date of 355 ( 12), but
it is generally thought that the speech was made during 
the Theban war (12),(378-371). MacDowell states that 
Wevers "is right in saying that the war mentioned in x 
need not be the Theban war, it may be the Social war, or
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indeed any war with which the speech may be found to be 
contemporary" (14).
In view of the different opinions expressed, a 
further brief examination of the evidence is necessary. 
The speaker of Isaeus x served throughout the Corinthian 
war (394-390), which indicates a minimum age of eighteen 
in 394. Thus, his date of birth would have been 412 at 
the latest, although it could have been earlier, and the 
marriage of his mother would have taken place at least 
nine months before this, in about 413 or earlier. The 
estate was given to Cyronides before the marriage of the 
speaker's mother (15), thus the latest date for this 
would be 413. If the case for the inheritance took place 
in 355, this would mean that at least fifty eight years 
had passed before the case was brought, which was the 
first time the inheritance had been contested in court. 
Wevers seeks to explain this long delay by saying that 
excuses are made for it. However, the speaker only gives 
one excuse for the period after the Corinthian war (16), 
and does not account for any further delay. This implies 
that the dispute probably took place in the next war 
after the Corinthian war, since Aristarchus died in 
battle in a war which was still being fought when the 
case was brought to court (17). The next war which Athens 
fought after the Corinthian war was the Theban war, and 
since no further excuses are made for a delay other than 
the fact that the speaker was disfranchised after the 
Corinthian war, it seems most likely that the war in 
which Aristarchus died was the Theban war. His will was 
therefore made at the latest in 378-371.
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Key to Abbreviations.
As far as the abbreviations of the names of classical 
authors are concerned, I have followed L.S.J . when 
necessary. For the most part, I have referred to my 
secondary sources in full during the course of this 
thesis. However, in some cases where a a book or article 
has been used many times, I have cited it by means of the 
author's surname and an abbreviation of the title. These 
abbreviations are as follows:
Beauchet, L. , Histoire de Droit Prive de la Republigue 
Ath^nienne, 3, (Paris, 1897)
= Beauchet, Droit 3 
Bruck, E.F., Die Scnenkung auf den Todesfa11, 
(Breslau,1909)
=Bruck, Schenkung 
Bruns, G.,"Die Testamente der Griechischen Philosophen", 
Zei tschrif t der Savi gny St iftung, R o m . Abtl., 1, ( 1880) 
=Bruns, D.T.G.P.
Chroust, A.H., Aristotle, 1, (London, 1973)
=Chroust,. Arist.
Davies, J.K., Athenian Proper tied Families, 600-300 B.C.
(Oxford, 1971)
=Davies, A . P .F .
During, I., Aristotle in the Biographical Tradition, 
(Goteborg, 1957)
=During, A.B.T.
Gernet, L . , Droit et Societe dans la Grece Ancienne 
(Paris, 1955)
=Gernet, D .G .S .A .
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Gottschalk, H.B., "Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic 
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=Gottschalk, Notes 
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